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‎SSC-Khaatumo State Formation Talks Collapse Amid Leadership Rift and Violence 

‎SSC-Khaatumo State Formation Talks Collapse Amid Leadership Rift and Violence 

By Goth Mohamed Goth

‎‎Las Anod – Traditional Elders Intervene After Failed Conference Sparks Armed Clashes in Las Anod

‎ A critical meeting sponsored by Somalia’s Federal Government (FGS) to establish the SSC-Khaatumo administration has collapsed, deepening political divisions in the region. The failure underscores a defining power struggle between key figures: Khalif (an insider-turned-outsider) and Firdhiye (a federalist loyalist).

‎On Wednesday, multiple presidential candidates accused interim leader Firdhiye of undermining the state finalization conference, scheduled to open Thursday in Las Anod. At a press briefing, they denounced the event as “exclusionary and illegitimate,” citing inadequate representation for the Warsangeli clan. They alleged delegates were selected without full clan endorsement.

‎The crisis escalated when an initial attempt to convene the conference at Jabuutiwi Hotel was disrupted by six armed technical vehicles linked to Mr. Ahmed Kharash and Mr. Abdirisaaq Khalif. Rival factions later moved toward the University under armed escort but faced gunfire, heightening tensions.

‎Traditional elders (Garaad’s) intervened, brokering a temporary ceasefire and demanding both sides lift their siege of Las Anod. Following an emergency meeting, the elders issued binding directives:

‎1. No amendments to the existing SSC-Khaatumo charter agreed upon by Dhulbahante clans under Firdhiye’s interim administration.
‎2. Immediate withdrawal of the visiting Warsangeli delegation and tribal militias to their home territories.
‎3. Demilitarization of Las Anod: All candidate-aligned militia forces must exit the city and cease destabilizing actions.
‎4. Direct talks between elders and the Mogadishu-based delegation.

‎The elders emphatically pledged that no faction would be permitted to unilaterally control future talks, reaffirming their authority over the process.

Somaliland’s 3 National Political Parties are Set to hold their First National Conventions in December 2027

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By Goth Mohamed Goth

Hargeisa – A critical timeline clarification has been issued regarding the holding of the first National Conventions (Shirwayne) of Somaliland’s three new political parties.

‎In a statement released by the Secretary General of House of Representatives
‎Abdirisaaq Said Ayaanl in regard to timeline clarification has been issued regarding the holding the first National Conventions (Shirwayne) of Somaliland’s three new political parties.

‎Background Context
‎The previous three political parties were established on December 12, 2012, and granted a 10-year mandate. This period concluded on December 22, 2022. Under Law No. 14,  new political associations must register six months prior to the expiration of existing parties’ mandates.

‎The Registration Committee announced that all associations and parties must submit documentation detailing their:
‎- Central Committees
‎- Executive Committees
‎- Party Leaderships

‎Seven political associations and three national parties participated. All submitted their organizational structures—Central Committees, Executive Committees, and Leaderships—following internal conferences.

‎Current Status 
‎On November 13, 2024, elections were held for associations and parties. By December 13, 2024, three parties emerged: Waddani, Kaah, and Kulmiye.

‎Key Questions
‎When will these new parties hold their inaugural National Conventions, per legal requirements?

‎Legal Analysis
‎Under Law No. 14, the three newly recognized parties effectively initiated their conference cycles , following the conclusion of the previous parties’ 10-year term. The previous parties held their final regular conferences in 2022.

Conclusion
‎The inaugural National Conventions for Waddani, Kaah, and Kulmiye are legally scheduled for December 2027, as their operational timeline commenced in 2022. Crucially, no legally recognized convention may occur before 2027.

‎Somaliland China Dilemma

By Mohamed Ahmed Awil

Somaliland has historically struggled to establish reliable relationships with international development partners in its quest for international recognition.

‎Previous administrations prioritized partners who endorsed Somaliland’s aspiration for sovereign statehood, often at the expense of tangible economic or developmental gains for its citizens.

‎This approach has limited Somaliland’s official ties to a handful of countries—Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the United States, and Taiwan.

‎Unfortunately, most of these relationships are heavily one-sided, skewed in favor of the external partner, and lacking in mutual benefit or alignment with international legal frameworks.

‎A prime example is Somaliland’s engagement with the UAE, which is primarily confined to managing the Port of Berbera. This arrangement denies Somaliland a significant share of revenue from one of its most strategic national assets.

‎With recent leadership transitions, Somaliland must recalibrate its foreign policy strategy.

‎Greater emphasis should be placed on attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and international aid, rather than fixating on diplomatic recognition, particularly since the global consensus still supports Somalia’s territorial unity and federal structure.

‎Nonetheless, recognition can still be pursued—strategically—by crafting a foreign policy that garners acceptance and cooperation from members of the international community.

‎Such a policy must address the concerns of sovereign states wary of legitimizing secessionist or “de facto” entities, which they often see as threats to international borders and regional security.

‎Why China?

‎Engaging China would bring significant economic and diplomatic benefits to Somaliland.

‎Records indicate that China had previously expressed interest in cooperating with Somaliland—offering to fund road infrastructure, develop an airport, and open a liaison office to enhance bilateral ties. These offers were never realized.

‎Instead, Somaliland chose to partner with Taiwan, with both parties recognizing each other publicly. This move, observers argue, went against the expectations of a region increasingly aligned with Afro-Chinese cooperation.

‎Somaliland’s decision was likely influenced by the hope of gaining international recognition, access to Western donors, and limited development aid—such as scholarships and infrastructure funding—from Taiwan.

‎However, the potential benefits from partnering with China, the world’s second-largest economy, far outweigh those offered by Taiwan.

‎China offers an alternative to the legacy of Western dependence. It is also a critical player in the global minerals market—an area in which Africa, and potentially Somaliland, has a comparative advantage.

‎Engaging Beijing could offer Somaliland both economic leverage and diplomatic visibility, without closing the door to relations with the West.

‎Africa is already central to China’s global strategic ambitions. With a growing population and underserved markets, the continent is fertile ground for trade, infrastructure, and industrial partnerships.

‎China is Africa’s top trading partner, and its firms are rising rapidly in sectors such as manufacturing and construction—often outpacing their Western counterparts, who typically focus on resource extraction and finance.

‎At the 2024 Beijing Summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged $51 billion in loans, investments, and aid to Africa over three years.

‎Somaliland could benefit from this pledge, if it reconsidered its diplomatic posture and embraced strategic pragmatism over symbolic partnerships.

‎Importantly, building ties with China does not preclude engagement with other international actors. Somaliland must leverage its strategic location and potential to draw value from both Chinese and alternative partnerships.

‎The future of Somaliland’s diplomacy will depend on its ability to demonstrate strategic, material, and political relevance to emerging and established global powers.

‎Mohamed Ahmed Awil is the former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Federal Republic of Somalia to the People’s Republic of China. X (@m_amb)

Somaliland Central Bank Governor Emphasizes Critical Role of Financial Laws in National Development

By Goth Mohamed Goth

Hargeisa, – Central Bank Governor Abdinasir Ahmed Hirsi has asserted that robust financial laws and policies are fundamental to securing global confidence and attracting international investment to Somaliland.

“Global trust in our financial institutions surges when we strengthen the legal frameworks and policies combating financial crimes,” Governor Hirsi stated during his opening address at a specialized training program organized by the Somaliland Bankers Association for the nation’s financial institutions.

Governor Hirsi underscored the urgent need to enhance the skills and awareness of personnel within Somaliland’s financial sector. “Developing accounting expertise and unified systems is essential. This enables us to effectively combat financial crimes and build standardized financial practices,” he emphasized.

He directly linked regulatory strength to economic growth: “Transparent financial practices and legally sound policies are the gateway to attracting international investment. When our laws and policies align with global standards, the world invests confidently in Somaliland.”

Collaborative Anti-Crime Effort
Khalif Sheikh Omar, Head of the Somaliland Bankers Association, and Mustafe Abdi, Director of the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Department, also addressed the gathering. They highlighted the training’s critical role in establishing foundational capabilities to combat money laundering and related financial crimes.

Government-Wide Commitment
The event underscored a coordinated national effort:
– The Somaliland Government
– The Central Bank
– The Specialized Banking Sector
Are collectively engaged in an intensive campaign to eliminate financial crimes, particularly money laundering. A core focus remains elevating the expertise and qualifications of the nation’s financial workforce

Gabiley Governor Reaffirms Transparency for Transformative Wajaale Project

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The Wajaale Development Project is a comprehensive development initiative jointly implemented by the Government of Somaliland and the Pharo Foundation, focusing on the development of the Wajaale area and improving the lives of its residents.

‎The Governor of Gabiley, Mr. Mohamed Abdilahi Bookh outlined ambitious plans for the Wajaale Project, highlighting its potential to reshape the region’s economy and community welfare through sustainable development.

‎’A Flagship Initiative for Somaliland’s Future, designed as a cornerstone of national development strategy, the Wajaale Project integrates:

‎Project Objectives:
 Water Reservoir (Dam): Construction of a large dam to harvest rainwater for use by the local community and livestock.
  Farmers. The second phase of the project will focus on developing farmers to increase agricultural production and create jobs.

‎Social Service Development:
  Health: Building or rehabilitating healthcare facilities.
  Education and Skills: Programs to enhance the knowledge and skills of youth.

‎Job Creation: Direct and indirect employment opportunities accessible to the community.

‎Regarding livestock, land will be cultivated with fodder crops like grass, which will be provided free of charge to the local community.

Collaboration:
‎The project will work closely with:
 The Wajaale Local Government
  National level Ministries
   Community leaders and local organizations.

Partnership:
 The Somaliland Government is fully committed to collaborating with the Pharo Foundation to achieve food security and sustainable development.
 The project will serve as a strategic model for regional development, economic growth, and improving the lives of the local population.

‎Land Management and Control:
 Land management and control will remain, as before, under the authority of the Somaliland Government Forces.

‎Project Output:
‎* All the benefits will accrue to Somaliland. This will eliminate the need for the country to import wheat and flour from abroad.

‎Addressing recent community discussions, Governor Bookh emphasized the government’s commitment to transparency and open dialogue: Our offices are open to anyone seeking information about this initiative. We are dedicated to addressing concerns and ensuring the project serves our people’s needs.

‎He also issued a firm warning against misinformation campaigns, vowing to safeguard the project’s progress from disruptive efforts.

Upcoming Somaliland Diaspora Week 2025 Announcement 

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Hargeisa, Somaliland – August 2–5, 2025; The vibrant capital city of Hargeisa is proud to host the Somaliland Diaspora Week 2025 at the newly inaugurated Serene Seravor Hall. This year’s event, themed “Redefining the Role of Diaspora,” highlights the strategic importance of the diaspora in shaping Somaliland’s future.

Organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation’s Diaspora Department, this edition of the Somaliland Diaspora Week represents a major evolution in its format, expanding in duration, scope, and scale. Over four days, nearly 500 delegates from across the globe will convene to celebrate, collaborate, and chart new pathways for diaspora involvement.

The event will bring together a rich tapestry of participants, including representatives from Somaliland’s global diaspora communities, academics, professionals, entrepreneurs, artists, youth groups, and women’s organizations. Government officials from various ministries and agencies, civil society leaders, domestic investors from key sectors such as banking, commerce, industry, agriculture, and higher education, and mayors from Somaliland’s major cities.

Central to the week’s agenda are expert panel discussions featuring both diaspora and local specialists. These sessions will delve into critical topics such as:

● Enhancing Somaliland’s international recognition and global participation

● Trends and impacts of diaspora investment

● Harnessing diaspora skills and expertise for national growth

● Engaging diaspora-born youth in preserving national identity, language, culture, and civic values

Historic Presidential Inauguration

In a landmark moment, President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Irro) will officially inaugurate the Somaliland Diaspora Week, becoming the first head of state in Somaliland’s history to do so. This underscores the government’s strong commitment to prioritizing diaspora relations.

Event Highlights

Day 1: Opening ceremony and high-level panel discussion. Diaspora exhibition spotlighting diaspora entrepreneurs, investors, exporters, and social impact projects.

Day 2:: Partnership Innovation Day Somaliland & Its Global Citizens: A New Partnership Model”

Day 3: Cultural celebration featuring traditional performances, arts, and family-friendly activities designed for diaspora communities

Day 4: Grand closing ceremony and gala dinner

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation reaffirms its dedication to strengthening ties with the Somaliland national diaspora communities.

Diaspora members currently in Somaliland or planning to attend can register through the event website, www.sldiasporaweek.org, +252-63-8880240, diaspora.mofa@sldgov.org

https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1CHfUSGUoa/

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Click the link below for Somali Version

Shirka Todobaadka Qurba-joogga Somaliland 2025-5

SOMALILAND’S SHIFTING POLITICAL TRAJECTORY – A BETRAYAL OF SOVEREIGNTY OR A PRAGMATIC PIVOT

For over three decades, Somaliland has stood as a rare beacon of stability and democratic governance in the Horn of Africa. Since reclaiming its independence in 1991, the self-declared republic has built functioning institutions, held competitive elections, and maintained internal peace—remarkable achievements in a volatile region. Under former President Muse Bihi Abdi, the pursuit of international recognition gained notable traction through strategic partnerships with Ethiopia, the UAE, and key Western allies.

Yet the election of President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi ‘Irro’ in December 2024 appears to mark a significant shift in Somaliland’s political trajectory—one that risks reversing years of diplomatic progress and undermining its hard-earned sovereignty.

The Recognition Drive Under President Bihi 

President Bihi’s administration worked tirelessly to advance Somaliland’s case for international recognition. A landmark Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed with Ethiopia in early 2024 signaled a potential breakthrough, with Addis Ababa considering recognition in exchange for naval access to the Red Sea. The UAE’s investment in Berbera Port further elevated Somaliland’s strategic value, transforming it into a vital logistics hub.

Western democracies, including the United States and the United Kingdom, increasingly viewed Somaliland as a reliable and democratic partner. Several U.S. lawmakers in both the House and Senate even introduced legislation urging formal recognition of Somaliland and greater bilateral cooperation. The momentum was real.

However, this progress faced intense pushback. China, alarmed by Somaliland’s diplomatic ties with Taiwan, actively lobbied against recognition. Qatar and Turkey, both strong allies of Somalia’s federal government—widely seen as aligned with Islamist factions—sought to derail Somaliland’s efforts. Egypt, motivated by regional rivalry with Ethiopia, also opposed any move that might enhance Addis Ababa’s influence, including through its partnership with Somaliland.

The Laascaanood Crisis and Foreign-Backed Encroachment

The eruption of violence in Laascaanood in 2023 was a turning point. Pro-union militants—representing only a small fraction of Somaliland’s population—allegedly seized the town with covert backing from Mogadishu, supported by China, Qatar, and Turkey. Since then, Somalia has expanded its footprint into eastern Somaliland, including Sanaag and Buuhoodle districts. The muted response from the Somaliland government has raised alarm bells, with many fearing that territorial concessions are being traded for reconciliation talks.

President Irro’s Risky Realignment 

President Irro’s administration has signaled a willingness to engage in dialogue with Mogadishu—a dramatic departure from Somaliland’s longstanding policy of non-negotiable sovereignty. While diplomacy should never be discounted, any negotiations that dilute Somaliland’s territorial integrity or political autonomy pose serious risks. If reports of a softened stance on disputed regions are accurate, it could embolden Somalia and its foreign backers to escalate pressure and destabilize Somaliland’s internal cohesion.

Pragmatism or Miscalculation?

Supporters of President Irro’s approach argue that it reflects pragmatism—seeking to avoid further bloodshed and inviting international mediation. But history offers little reason for optimism. Concessions to Mogadishu have rarely produced lasting peace. Somalia’s federal government remains fragmented, fragile, and heavily influenced by foreign interests that have shown no commitment to a peaceful, two-state solution.

If Somaliland compromises its firm stance on independence, it may find itself drawn into a forced unity arrangement—one that ignores the will of its people and erases decades of self-governance.

The Way Forward 

Somaliland’s strength lies in its resilience, democratic values, and the legitimacy of its cause. To safeguard its sovereignty and ensure its survival as a viable state, the current administration must take bold and deliberate steps:

Reaffirm Sovereignty – The government must publicly and unequivocally assert its commitment to territorial integrity and political independence, particularly in the face of rising external pressure.

Strengthen Strategic Alliances – Deepen engagement with trusted partners, including the African Union, Ethiopia, the UAE, and Western democracies, to counterbalance the growing influence of Somalia’s foreign backers.

Mobilize Diplomatic Efforts – Revitalize international lobbying campaigns, highlighting the African Union’s 2005 fact-finding mission, which concluded that Somaliland’s case is “unique and self-justified” in African political history and called for a “special method” to resolve it.

Moreover, Somaliland’s democratically elected government, led by President Irro, should proactively work through global platforms—leveraging the UN Charter, international legal conventions, and bilateral partnerships—to end its 34-year political isolation and economic marginalization. The United Nations should establish a Special Representative Office to address the future relationship between Somaliland and Somalia.

Secure Laascaanood and Border Regions – If credible reports of foreign-backed militarization are confirmed, Somaliland must act decisively to defend its borders and national unity.

Conclusion

Somaliland’s journey toward international recognition has been long, costly, and principled. Now is not the time to falter. The international community—especially the UN, AU, EU, United States, and the United Kingdom—must not remain silent as powerful actors attempt to redraw the map of the Horn of Africa for their own strategic gain.

For Somaliland, the path forward is clear: reaffirm its sovereignty, resist external manipulation, and assert its right to self-determination. The people of Somaliland have earned their independence through peace, sacrifice, and democratic will. It must not be bargained away.

Written by Suleiman Bolaleh 

Sbolaleh.email@gmail.com

Oakland, California

 

 

 

From Hargeisa to Las Anod: The Strategic Chessboard of Somaliland and Somalia

The political terrain of Somaliland and the contested SSC-Khatumo regions is shifting beneath the feet of its most prominent actors. At the heart of this transformation lies a fractured alliance between three former comrades: President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi Irro, Waddani Party Chairman Hersi Ali Haji Hassan, and former Speaker of Parliament Abdirisak Khalif Ahmed. Once united under the reformist banner of Waddani, these men now represent diverging—and in some cases, conflicting visions for the future of Somaliland and the broader Somali region.

Abdirisak Khalif’s dramatic defection to SSC-Khatumo and his bid for its presidency have triggered a cascade of political, ideological, and geopolitical consequences. His move has not only shaken the foundations of Somaliland’s political establishment but also exposed the fragile alliances and hidden agendas that shape power in the Horn of Africa. This article traces the evolution of their alliance, the rupture that followed, and the high-stakes power struggle now unfolding across Hargeisa, Las Anod, Garowe, and Mogadishu.

 

I. A Brotherhood Forged in Opposition

For over a decade, Abdirisak Khalif Ahmed was a pillar of the Waddani Party. As a founding member and close confidant of both Irro and Hersi, he helped shape Waddani’s identity as a reformist, inclusive, and nationalist alternative to the ruling Kulmiye party. His election as Speaker of the House of Representatives in 2021, defeating Kulmiye’s candidate, was not only a political milestone for the opposition but also a personal triumph for Khalif, who had long been seen as a bridge between Somaliland’s center and its periphery.

 

The trio Irro, Hersi, and Khalif shared more than political goals. They were bound by mutual trust, strategic alignment, and a shared vision of a democratic and internationally recognized Somaliland. Their alliance was seen as a model of political maturity in a region often defined by fragmentation. But that unity would not survive the crisis that erupted in Las Anod.

 

 

II. The Las Anod Crisis and a Turning Point

In early 2023, Las Anod, the capital of the Sool region, became the epicentre of a violent confrontation between Somaliland security forces and local militias aligned with the SSC movement. The conflict, which left hundreds dead and thousands displaced, exposed deep-rooted grievances among the Dhulbahante clan, who have long rejected Somaliland’s authority over the region.

Abdirisak Khalif, a native of Las Anod and a respected Dhulbahante elder, was dispatched to mediate. But what began as a peace mission quickly turned into a political awakening. Disillusioned by the government’s militarized response and moved by the demands of his community, Khalif resigned from his position as Speaker in June 2023 and publicly defected to the SSC-Khatumo movement.

His departure was not just a personal decision; it was a political earthquake. For the first time, a senior Waddani figure and national leader had broken ranks and sided with a movement that openly rejected Somaliland’s sovereignty over the contested regions.

 

III. Irro and Hersi: Caught Between Loyalty and Legitimacy

President Irro, elected in 2024 with a landslide 63% of the vote, now finds himself in a precarious position. On one hand, he must uphold Somaliland’s territorial integrity and respond to public pressure to assert control over Las Anod. On the other hand, he must reckon with the defection of a former ally whose grievances resonate with a significant portion of the population.

Waddani Chairman Hersi Ali Haji Hassan, known for his strategic discipline and ideological clarity, has remained firm in defending Somaliland’s unity. But sources close to the party suggest that Khalif’s departure was deeply personal for both Irro and Hersi—more than a political betrayal, it was the unravelling of a brotherhood forged in opposition.

The emotional weight of Khalif’s defection has complicated Waddani’s internal cohesion. Some party members have called for a hardline stance, while others quietly sympathize with Khalif’s critique of the government’s handling of the Las Anod crisis.

 

IV. Khalif’s Presidential Bid in SSC-Khatumo

In June 2025, Abdirisak Khalif officially announced his candidacy for the presidency of SSC-Khatumo, a self-declared federal state seeking autonomy within Somalia. Speaking in Las Anod, he declared:

“I can no longer remain on the sidelines. I believe the time has come to take the initiative and lead this administration to its next phase.”

Khalif’s campaign is built on a platform of local empowerment, federal integration with Somalia, and a rejection of what he calls “unilateral rule from Hargeisa.” His rhetoric has struck a chord with many in the SSC regions, who feel marginalized by Somaliland’s central government.

But his candidacy is also a direct challenge to Somaliland’s claim over the region. By positioning SSC-Khatumo as a legitimate federal entity, Khalif is not just running for office—he is redrawing the political map.

 

V. Complications of Loyalty: When Political Breakups Are Not Personal

Despite his public break with Somaliland, rumours persist that Khalif maintains private communication with Irro and Hersi. These lingering ties raise uncomfortable questions:

  • Could Khalif act as a backchannel for Somaliland’s interests?
  • Might Waddani appear conflicted or compromised in its stance on SSC-Khatumo?
  • Could this erode public trust in both SSC-Khatumo and Somaliland’s leadership?

Such ambiguity could destabilize both camps. For SSC-Khatumo, it raises fears of infiltration or co-optation. For Somaliland, it risks appearing indecisive or divided in the face of a secessionist challenge.

 

VI. The Hidden Agenda? Hersi, Ictisam, and the Shadow of Political Islam

Beyond the political fallout, there are growing concerns about the ideological undercurrents within Waddani’s leadership particularly the influence of Chairman Hersi Ali Haji Hassan and his alleged ties to the Ictisam movement, a Salafi-Islamist network with growing reach in the Horn of Africa.

While Hersi has publicly positioned himself as a nationalist and reformist, critics argue that his religious affiliations may be shaping Waddani’s internal culture and long-term strategy. The Ictisam movement, known for its conservative interpretation of Islam and its emphasis on religious governance, has been quietly expanding its influence in Somaliland’s communities.

Some political observers fear that:

  • Waddani’s secular image may be a façade, masking a deeper ideological agenda rooted in political Islam.
  • Hersi’s consolidation of power within the party could marginalize moderate voices and centralize decision-making around a religiously aligned inner circle.
  • The party’s future policies, especially on education, women’s rights, and judicial reform, could be shaped by Ictisam-aligned doctrine rather than democratic consensus.

If these concerns prove valid, Somaliland could face a dangerous convergence of religious conservatism and political centralization, undermining its pluralistic foundations and alienating secular and minority communities.

 

VII. The Other Side of the Coin: Can SSC-Khatumo Trust Khalif?

Despite his defection, Abdirisak Khalif faces skepticism from within SSC-Khatumo itself. Many elders and youth in Las Anod question whether a man who spent decades in Somaliland’s political elite serving as Minister of Commerce and Public Works and later as Speaker of Parliament can truly represent a movement built on rejecting Somaliland’s authority.

Some of the concerns include:

  • Perceived opportunism: Critics argue that Khalif only joined SSC-Khatumo after losing political ground in Hargeisa.
  • Lingering loyalty: His long-standing friendship with Irro and Hersi raises fears that he may act as a bridge or even a backchannel for Somaliland’s interests.
  • Trust deficit: For a movement rooted in clan-based grievances and historical marginalization, Khalif’s elite background makes him a complicated figure to rally behind.

This internal tension could fracture SSC-Khatumo’s unity or weaken Khalif’s legitimacy as a presidential contender.

 

VIII. Strategic Calculations: Who Benefits from Khalif’s Rise?

While Khalif presents himself as a break from the past, his rise may serve the interests of both Somaliland and Puntland.

 For Somaliland:

  • He is more moderate and predictable than hardline SSC leaders.
  • His ties to Irro and Hersi allow for potential backchannel diplomacy.
  • His leadership could contain radicalism and soften SSC’s stance.

 For Puntland:

  • A Khalif-led SSC-Khatumo creates a buffer zone with Somaliland.
  • It reduces pressure to reintegrate SSC into Puntland.
  • It offers a potential ally in federal negotiations.

Both regions may quietly prefer Khalif over more militant or unpredictable alternatives.

 

IX. Hassan Sheikh’s Countermove: Rallying Behind Firdhiye

In May 2025, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud hosted Firdhiye at Villa Somalia and invited him to participate in the National Consultative Council (NCC), a symbolic and strategic endorsement that signalled Mogadishu’s preferred partner in the Lasanod. This move was not merely ceremonial; it was a calculated effort to consolidate federal influence in the contested SSC regions and to counterbalance Khalif’s growing popularity.

Hassan Sheikh’s motivations are multifaceted:

  • Federal alignment: Firdhiye has consistently advocated for SSC-Khatumo to become a recognized federal member state within Somalia, aligning with Mogadishu’s long-term vision of a decentralized federal system.
  • Avoiding Somaliland entanglements: Unlike Khalif, Firdhiye has no political baggage tied to Hargeisa or Waddani, making him a cleaner and more ideologically consistent partner for the federal government.
  • Maintaining leverage: A loyal SSC-Khatumo leader gives Mogadishu more influence in the Lasanod, especially in negotiations over resource sharing, security coordination, and constitutional reform.

Behind the scenes, federal MPs and ministers from the Dhulbahante community have been quietly mobilizing support for Firdhiye’s re-election. The goal is to ensure that SSC-Khatumo remains firmly within Somalia’s federal orbit and does not drift into a hybrid identity shaped by former Somaliland insiders like Khalif.

This emerging rivalry between Khalif, the insider-turned-outsider, and Firdhiye, the federalist loyalist, has become a defining contest for the future of SSC-Khatumo. It is not just a local leadership race; it is a proxy battle between competing visions of governance, identity, and regional alignment.

 

X. Implications for Somaliland and the Horn of Africa

The political drama unfolding between Irro, Hersi, and Khalif and the broader contest between Khalif and Firdhiye has far-reaching implications for Somaliland, Somalia, and the Horn of Africa at large.

For Somaliland:

  • The defection of Khalif has exposed internal fractures within Waddani and raised questions about the government’s ability to maintain unity in the face of regional dissent.
  • The ideological direction of Waddani under Hersi’s leadership may alienate secular and moderate constituencies, especially if suspicions about Ictisam’s influence continue to grow.
  • The possibility of backchannel diplomacy with Khalif could offer a path to de-escalation in Las Anod, but it also risks undermining Somaliland’s official stance on sovereignty.

For Lasanod:

  • The leadership contest between Khalif and Firdhiye could either strengthen the movement through democratic competition or fracture it along lines of trust, ideology, and external allegiance.
  • The movement’s credibility hinges on its ability to remain independent of both Hargeisa and Mogadishu while articulating a clear and unified vision for federal integration.

For Puntland:

  • A Khalif-led SSC-Khatumo could serve as a buffer against Somaliland expansionism, but it may also complicate Puntland’s own territorial claims and federal ambitions.
  • Puntland’s cautious support for SSC-Khatumo reflects its desire to influence the region without becoming entangled in a direct confrontation with either Somaliland or Mogadishu.

For Mogadishu:

  • Backing Firdhiye allows the federal government to assert its presence in the Lasanod and counter Somaliland’s narrative of sovereignty.
  • However, overt interference could backfire if it is perceived as undermining SSC-Khatumo’s autonomy or manipulating its leadership process.

 

XI. The Sanaag Question: A New Front in the Territorial Contest

As SSC-Khatumo consolidates control over Sool and Cayn, attention is now turning to the contested region of Sanaag. Both SSC-Khatumo and the Federal Government of Somalia are quietly pushing to incorporate eastern Sanaag into SSC-Khatumo’s territory despite resistance from both Puntland and Somaliland.

Federal officials have reportedly encouraged political mobilization in towns like Ceelbuh, aiming to shift local allegiances. For SSC-Khatumo, the inclusion of Sanaag would strengthen its federal claim and expand its clan-based support base. But Puntland has pushed back forcefully, accusing Mogadishu of “deliberate destabilization” and warning of confrontation if boundaries are redrawn without consensus.

This new front threatens to ignite a three-way contest over Sanaag, one that could destabilize the entire Sanaag region.

Conclusion: A Region Rewritten, A Brotherhood Unravelled

What began as a shared political journey between Irro, Hersi, and Khalif has evolved into a fragmented contest over identity, ideology, and influence. Their personal bond, once a symbol of Somaliland’s political maturity, has been overtaken by competing ambitions and irreconcilable visions for the future of the Somali territories.

Khalif’s transformation from a national Speaker to a regional contender has not only redrawn the political map of SSC-Khatumo but also exposed the fragility of alliances built on convenience rather than conviction. His candidacy is both a challenge to Somaliland’s territorial claims and a test of SSC-Khatumo’s internal cohesion. Yet, even as he gains ground, doubts about his loyalties and legacy linger.

Meanwhile, Hersi’s consolidation of power within Waddani and his alleged ideological leanings raise deeper questions about the direction of Somaliland’s future. Is Waddani still a secular reformist movement, or is it becoming a vessel for religious conservatism cloaked in nationalist rhetoric?

The federal government’s backing of Firdhiye and its quiet campaign to incorporate Sanaag into SSC-Khatumo signals a broader strategy to reshape Somaliland’s political geography. But these maneuvers risk igniting new conflicts with Somaliland, who view Sanaag as non-negotiable.

Harir Yasin is a freelance journalist and analyst. He can be reached at ariryasin2@gmail.com

Somaliland Issues Stern Rebuke to Somalia Over Sanaag Region Interference

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By Goth Mohamed Goth

Hargeisa – The Republic of Somaliland has strongly condemned the Federal Government of Somalia in Mogadishu for what it terms “blatant interference” in the Sanaag region. Somaliland accuses Mogadishu of deploying federal troops to parts of Sanaag, warning the move threatens both Somaliland’s stability and regional peace in the Horn of Africa.

In a press briefing, Somaliland’s Minister of Information, Culture, and Awareness, Hon. Ahmed Yassin Sheikh Ali, denounced the troop deployment as “deplorable and shameful.” He criticized Mogadishu’s security record, stating: **“A leader incapable of securing Mogadishu from Al-Shabaab’s havoc has no right to send forces into Sanaag. This is a disgrace.”

Minister Ali warned that Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration would bear full responsibility for any repercussions from this “reckless provocation.” He emphasized Somaliland’s borders are “non-negotiable and inviolable” and demanded Mogadishu cease its actions immediately. “We urge President Mohamud to keep his hands off matters he was not elected to interfere in,” he declared.

Reports confirm federal troops—including Somalia’s Danab Special Forces—have been deployed to Sanaag, with over 200 personnel expected imminently.

The minister further accused Mogadishu of misusing international security aid to destabilize peaceful Somaliland regions like Sanaag. He called for global scrutiny of Somalia’s funding allocations, citing protests by unpaid federal troops over delayed salaries.

In response, Somaliland has mobilized resources to secure Sanaag, implementing a “peace framework” prioritizing community dialogue and reconciliation. Minister Ali reaffirmed Somaliland’s unwavering pursuit of recognition, cautioning Mogadishu: “No force or conflict will halt our path to international legitimacy.”

Warsengeli Traditional Leaders Council Denounce Proposed FSG Sponsored Khaatumo Meeting

By Jama Feyte, Journalist and Horn of Africa Analyst

In a statement released by the the Traditional Leadership Council of the Sanaag and Highland regions,  led by the Grand Sultan of the Warsengeli have in the strongest terms denounced the proposed FSG Sponsored Khaatumo meeting which will be held in Las Anod town.

The Press statement by the Warsengeli Traditional leaders read as follow:-


‎Date: 8th July, 2025

‎We, the Traditional Leadership Council of the Sanaag and Highland regions, whose names are listed below, hereby declare the following points:

‎1. The Sanaag and Highland regions are integral parts of the territories upon which the Puntland State was founded in 1998. Their status within Puntland remains unchanged. We call upon the Puntland Government to actively work towards the development and defense of these regions.

‎2. We categorically state that no political conference has been convened by the clans, nor have any binding decisions resulted from such a gathering.

‎3. We declare to the Khaatumo traditional leadership and its administration that they hold no mandate to represent the clans of the Sanaag and Highland regions at the purported conference in Las Anod. We are not participants in any outcomes of that conference, nor are we prepared to engage in activities taking place there.

‎4. We appeal to the traditional leadership of our brotherly clans of the Siciid Harti lineage to fully respect the self-governance of the clans in the Sanaag and Highland regions. This is essential for peaceful coexistence among the clans and prevents estrangement between kindred and allied communities.

‎5. To the International Community, we affirm that we have not agreed to establish any conference or new administration, nor have we entered into any pact or understanding to that effect.

‎6. Finally, we urge the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to confine itself to the areas under its elected mandate and refrain from interfering in the affairs of our brotherly and allied clans.

‎Issued by the following Traditional Leaders:

‎* Sultan Siciid Sultan Abdisalaan Garaad Maxamuud Cali-Shire
‎* Sultan Mohamed Sultan Abdullahi Cartan
‎* Islaan Hussein n Haji Abdisalaan
‎* Chief Mohamed Chief Ibrahim Maakhiri
‎* Garaad Mohamed Garaad Abdullahi Ali Ciid