1. Executive Summary

2. Abstract

3. Introduction

4. ISIR’s Framing and Misrepresentations

5. Historical and Legal Foundations

6. Security Realities in SSC

7. Recognition and International Law

8. Economic Investment and Budget Myths

9. External Actors and Proxy Conflict

10. Consequences of ISIR’s Narrative

11. Conclusion & Recommendations

12. References

Executive Summary

The Institute for Strategic Insights and Research (ISIR) released a policy brief in July 2025 that misrepresents the historical, legal, and political realities of Somaliland’s sovereignty over its eastern regions of Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC). By framing Somaliland’s jurisdiction as a “claim,” its 1991 restoration of independence as a “unilateral declaration,” and clan militias as “Khatumo forces,” ISIR perpetuates a narrative that undermines a lawful state and risks destabilizing the Horn of Africa. This rebuttal systematically corrects ISIR’s distortions, providing evidence-based analysis across historical, legal, security, economic, and geopolitical dimensions.

Key findings include:

• Somaliland’s sovereignty is grounded in its 1960 independence, the unratified union with Somalia, and the principle of uti possidetis juris, making SSC an integral part of its territory.
• The 1991 Declaration of Independence and 1993 Borama Conference reflect broad inter-clan consensus, not a unilateral act.
• The SSC insurgency is driven by external actors, including Somalia, Puntland, and China, rather than internal economic marginalization.
• Somaliland’s historical investment in SSC exceeds the region’s revenue contribution, refuting claims of systemic neglect.
• ISIR’s narrative legitimizes militias, emboldens external interference, and undermines conflict resolution.

This paper calls for fact-based analysis that respects Somaliland’s sovereignty, acknowledges external drivers of conflict, and supports regional stability through responsible policy discourse.

Abstract

The Institute for Strategic Insights and Research(ISIR) recently released a policy brief on the Somaliland–Khatumo situation that advances a narrative fundamentally at odds with historical facts, international law, and Somaliland’s constitutional reality. By framing Somaliland’s jurisdiction over its eastern regions as a “claim,” mischaracterizing the 1991 restoration of sovereignty as a “unilateral declaration,” and portraying clan militias as legitimate “Khatumo forces,” ISIR perpetuates a narrative that undermines Somaliland’s lawful sovereignty and destabilizes regional security. This rebuttal provides a comprehensive, evidence-based correction of the ISIR brief, addressing the historical and legal basis of Somaliland’s sovereignty, the realities of the security situation in Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC), the misrepresentation of development and budgetary allocations, and the external geopolitical factors fueling the conflict. A clear understanding of these issues is vital to any informed policy discussion on Somaliland’s future and the stability of the Horn of Africa.

1. Introduction

The July 2025 ISIR Somaliland–Khatumo Policy Brief has drawn significant attention for its analysis of the ongoing conflict in Somaliland’s eastern regions. However, closer scrutiny reveals a report that mischaracterizes Somaliland’s sovereignty, legitimizes militia activity, and selectively interprets economic and political realities to advance a narrative that undermines a functioning and historically legitimate state. Somaliland, an independent state that regained its sovereignty in 1991 after the disintegration of the Somali Republic, exercises effective governance over a defined territory with a permanent population. Its legal claim to the borders of the former British Somaliland Protectorate is rooted in international law, specifically the doctrine of uti possidetis juris. ISIR’s portrayal of Somaliland as “claiming” its own territory and “unilaterally declaring independence” ignores both historical continuity and legal facts.

Furthermore, by referring to armed clan militias as “Khatumo forces” and attributing the current unrest to “economic marginalization,” ISIR misrepresents the causes of instability. The reality is more complex: the insurgency in Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn is driven primarily by a combination of external interference from Mogadishu, tribal dynamics, and geopolitical maneuvering by actors such as China, which seeks to pressure Somaliland over its partnership with Taiwan.

This paper aims to correct the record. It factually addresses ISIR’s mischaracterizations, presenting the historical and legal foundations of Somaliland’s sovereignty, the factual nature of the security situation in the east, the true patterns of development investment, and the external forces driving the conflict. By doing so, it calls for a more fact-based and responsible approach to analyzing Somaliland’s future and the dynamics of the Horn of Africa.

2. Methodology: How ISIR Misframes the Narrative

The ISIR Somaliland–Khatumo Policy Brief employs a pattern of linguistic and analytical framing that systematically undermines Somaliland’s lawful sovereignty and legitimizes narratives advanced by actors opposed to its independence. Understanding this misframing is essential to evaluating the credibility of the brief and its policy recommendations.

2.1 Linguistic Framing: “Somaliland’s Claim over the East”

Throughout the brief, ISIR repeatedly describes Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC) as territories under “Somaliland’s claim.” This framing implies that Somaliland is asserting jurisdiction over foreign or disputed land, when in fact these regions are integral to its territorial integrity under the boundaries inherited at independence on 26 June 1960. The use of “claim” delegitimizes Somaliland’s sovereignty and fuels the false perception that those regions lie outside its lawful borders.

2.2 Mischaracterizing Sovereignty Restoration as “Unilateral Declaration”

ISIR describes Somaliland’s 1991 restoration of sovereignty as a “unilateral declaration of independence,” disregarding the legal principle of state continuity and the historical fact that Somaliland voluntarily united with Somalia in 1960 under an unratified agreement. The Somali Republic ceased to function after 1991, and Somaliland’s reinstatement of its sovereignty, endorsed by all major clans and reaffirmed in the Borama Conference of 1993 was a reclamation, not a secession. Framing it otherwise perpetuates the idea of illegitimacy.

2.3 Retroactive Legitimization of Clan Militias as “Khatumo Forces”

The brief refers to “battles between Somaliland forces and Khatumo forces,” implying the existence of an organized, legitimate administration. In reality, no such cohesive force existed at the start of hostilities; the conflict involved clan militias, with Puntland forces also engaged. By elevating these militias to “forces” under an administrative banner, ISIR legitimizes actors that reject Somaliland’s constitutional order and operate with external backing.

2.4 Selective Economic Narrative

ISIR’s treatment of Somaliland’s 2025 national budget uses a single fiscal year to argue that “SSC” regions suffer “economic marginalization.” This approach ignores the security context, militia control prevents project implementation and overlooks historical data showing that those regions have historically received development investment disproportionate to its revenue contribution. By omitting this broader picture, ISIR constructs a narrative of deliberate exclusion that fuels grievances.

2.5 Ignoring External Drivers of Conflict

The brief portrays unrest in those regions as a purely internal grievance, omitting evidence of Mogadishu’s financing of militias and China’s alleged provision of arms to destabilize Somaliland and pressure it to sever ties with Taiwan. By leaving out these critical external dynamics, ISIR presents an incomplete and misleading causal analysis.

Together, these patterns create a narrative in which Somaliland is cast as an illegitimate actor exercising control over “claimed” territory, while militia activity is normalized and external interference is erased. This framing not only misinforms readers but risks emboldening militia violence and undermining efforts toward stability.

3. Historical and Legal Context of Somaliland’s Sovereignty

A central weakness of ISIR’s July 2025 brief is its failure to engage with the historical and legal foundations of Somaliland’s sovereignty. Instead, the brief adopts language that portrays Somaliland as “claiming” territory or having “unilaterally declared independence,” undermining the well-established historical, constitutional, and international legal basis of the Somaliland state.

3.1 Colonial Borders and Uti Possidetis Juris

Somaliland’s modern boundaries were established during the British colonial period (1884–1960) and recognized upon the country’s independence on 26 June, 1960 as the State of Somaliland. Under the principle of uti possidetis juris, post-colonial African states are defined by their colonial boundaries at the time of independence. Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC) were part of the State of Somaliland when it gained independence, and they remain legally integral to the Republic of Somaliland today. To refer to these regions as territories under “Somaliland’s claim,” as ISIR repeatedly does, is not only inaccurate but dangerous. It feeds a false narrative that Somaliland seeks to annex land beyond its lawful borders, delegitimizing the state’s constitutional authority and emboldening militia groups that challenge its sovereignty.

3.2 The Union with Somalia and Legal State Continuity

On 1 July 1960, the State of Somaliland tried to enter a union with the Trust Territory of Somalia, forming the Somali Republic. Crucially, this union was never legally ratified by a unifying treaty that met international standards. The absence of a ratified treaty meant that, under international law, Somaliland retained its legal sovereignty. With the collapse of the Somali Republic in 1991, the union dissolved in practice. Somaliland’s reinstatement of sovereignty on 18 May 1991 was therefore not a “secession” but a reclamation of independence based on state continuity. International legal scholarship recognizes that an unratified union cannot erase a state’s original sovereignty.

3.3 The 1991 Declaration of Independence and Borama 1993 Conference

The 1991 Declaration of Independence was not a unilateral action by one clan or faction. It was endorsed by all major Somaliland communities: Isaaq, Dhulbahante, Gadabursi, Warsangeli, and Issa, through their traditional sultans and elders. This inter-clan legitimacy was further consolidated in 1993 at the Borama Conference, which brought together 150 elders representing all these communities and elected a national leadership for the restored Republic of Somaliland. The conference took place in Borama, a Gadabursi-dominated town, underscoring the cross-clan consensus behind Somaliland’s statehood.

3.4 Why “Unilateral Declaration” and “Claim” Are Misleading

By repeatedly using the phrases “unilaterally declared independence” and “Somaliland’s claim over the east,” ISIR distorts both historical facts and legal norms. Somaliland is not “claiming” SSC regions; it is exercising sovereignty over territories that were part of the internationally recognized State of Somaliland in 1960. Similarly, Somaliland’s restoration of independence was a lawful act of state continuity, not a breakaway bid or separatist project. The danger of such mischaracterizations lies not only in their inaccuracy but in their political consequences. They lend rhetorical legitimacy to actors both domestic militias and external sponsors that reject Somaliland’s sovereignty and fuel ongoing conflict.

4. Misrepresentation of Security Realities in SSC Regions

ISIR’s July 2025 brief significantly misrepresents the security dynamics in Somaliland’s eastern regions, particularly Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC). By describing the conflict as “battles between Somaliland forces and Khatumo forces,” the report inaccurately grants political and military legitimacy to what were, in fact, clan-based militias operating outside any formal administrative structure.

4.1 The Myth of “Khatumo Forces”

When hostilities escalated in 2023, there were no unified “Khatumo forces” commanding cohesive military units or exercising structured governance. The fighting involved fragmented clan militias, often aligned with external actors such as Puntland, and motivated by local power struggles rather than a coherent political agenda. ISIR’s repeated use of the term “Khatumo forces” retroactively legitimizes these militias, elevating them to the status of an organized force and obscuring their role in destabilizing Somaliland.

4.2 Somaliland’s Duty to Defend Sovereignty and Civilians

Under both domestic and international law, Somaliland has a constitutional obligation to protect its citizens and defend its territorial integrity. The operations in SSC were undertaken not to “occupy” contested lands, as ISIR’s language implies, but to restore order and protect communities subjected to militia violence. For example, Habarjeclo community defense forces mobilized only after sustained attacks by SSC militias, including the burning of Buqdharkayn village and the killing of its mosque’s imam. Framing such legitimate defensive measures as a “contest” between equal parties ignores Somaliland’s responsibilities as a sovereign state and downplays the humanitarian imperative to shield civilians from militia aggression.

4.3 External Support for Militias

ISIR’s analysis omits the critical fact that the SSC militias have received consistent material support from external actors. Puntland has provided both manpower and resources, while Mogadishu has sought to weaken Somaliland through proxy forces. More recently, China has reportedly supplied arms to these militias as part of a broader strategy to pressure Somaliland to sever ties with Taiwan. Omitting these dynamics from any security assessment results in a distorted and incomplete picture of the conflict.

4.4 Consequences of Mischaracterization

By mislabeling clan militias as “Khatumo forces” and framing the conflict as one between equivalent political entities, ISIR’s brief inadvertently legitimizes armed opposition to Somaliland’s sovereignty. This framing emboldens militia groups, undermines conflict resolution efforts, and creates confusion among international stakeholders about the nature of the violence in SSC.

5. Recognition and International Law

A recurring theme in ISIR’s July 2025 brief is its emphasis on Somaliland’s lack of international recognition, which the report uses to cast doubt on the legitimacy of Somaliland’s sovereignty and its right to defend its territory. This framing not only misinterprets international law but also overlooks Somaliland’s fulfillment of the core attributes of statehood.

5.1 Statehood Under the Montevideo Convention

The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933) establishes four criteria for statehood: a permanent population, a defined territory, an effective government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Somaliland meets all four requirements. It has a population of over five million people, exercises governance over the borders of the former British Somaliland Protectorate, operates functioning state institutions, and maintains formal diplomatic and trade relations with a number of states, including UAE, Ethiopia and Taiwan.

5.2 Recognition Is Declaratory, Not Constitutive

Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention makes clear that: “The political existence of a state is independent of recognition by other states. Even before recognition, a state has the right to defend its integrity and independence.” This principle directly contradicts ISIR’s insinuation that Somaliland’s lack of formal recognition undermines its sovereignty. Recognition by other states is declaratory: it acknowledges a state’s existence; it does not create it. Consequently, Somaliland’s right to defend its territorial integrity including the Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn regions is fully protected under international law and Somaliland constitution, regardless of its recognition status.

5.3 Sovereignty and the Right to Self-Defense

Somaliland’s security operations in the east are consistent with the inherent right of all states to defend their territory and population. Framing such measures as illegitimate because Somaliland is not yet internationally recognized misrepresents well-established norms of international law. Indeed, withholding the ability of an unrecognized but fully functional state to safeguard its integrity would create a dangerous precedent, effectively granting armed non-state actors a veto over constitutional order.

5.4 ISIR’s Selective Treatment of International Norms

ISIR’s omission of the Montevideo Convention and related principles is not a mere oversight. It underpins the report’s broader narrative that Somaliland operates outside the bounds of lawful sovereignty, casting defensive actions as contested “claims” rather than the exercise of state authority. This misrepresentation distorts the legal framework governing statehood and undermines efforts to resolve the conflict in line with international law.

6. Development, Budgets, and the Myth of Marginalization

One of the central claims in ISIR’s July 2025 brief is that Somaliland’s eastern regions particularly Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC)—are victims of systematic economic marginalization. The report bases this conclusion on Somaliland’s 2025 national budget, arguing that infrastructure and social development investments in the so-called “Khatumo region” are “virtually absent.” However, this assertion is both factually incomplete and misleading, as it ignores the historical context of development investment, the realities of security on the ground, and the fiscal dynamics of Somaliland’s governance.

6.1 Misuse of a Single-Year Budget Snapshot

ISIR’s reliance on the 2025 budget is problematic for two reasons. First, Somaliland currently does not control large parts of the eastern territories, which remain under the control of hostile militias. It is both illogical and irresponsible to criticize the absence of development projects in areas where the central government cannot safely operate or deploy resources. Second, the use of a single fiscal year disregards the broader historical pattern of investment. Looking only at 2025, a year marked by active conflict and militia control, gives the false impression of deliberate economic neglect.

6.2 Historical Investment Patterns

Prior to the 2023 escalation of hostilities, Somaliland allocated significant resources to eastern regions, often in amounts disproportionate to their revenue contribution. For example:

• The first phase of the Somaliland Development Fund (SDF) allocated USD 11 million of its USD 59 million budget, nearly 19%, to projects in Sool and Sanaag.
• Somaliland’s 2022 national budget showed that Dhulbahante-inhabited districts in eastern Sool received proportionally more development projects than Isaaq-inhabited districts in western Sool, such as Ainabo.
• Sool as a whole generates only 1.29% of Somaliland’s domestic revenue (approximately USD 744,000), yet the region receives substantially more than this amount in development funding.

Infrastructure projects implemented in the years preceding the conflict included:

– Las Anod–Kalabaydh Road

– Tab’a Road

– Widhwidh Road

– Dararweyne MCH Center

– Sarmany District Administration Office & Police Station

– Damala-Hagarre MCH

– Irshida Police Station

– Las Anod University Campus

– El Afwein TB Hospital

– Gambadha Customs Offices

In total, these projects accounted for over 18% of the national allocation, a figure far exceeding the region’s share of revenue.

6.3 Understanding Fiscal Realities

Somaliland is an unrecognized, resource-constrained state, yet it has consistently sought to equitably distribute its limited revenues. Far from evidence of marginalization, historical allocations to those regions demonstrate a pattern of reinvestment: the region receives more in development funds than it generates. ISIR’s failure to account for these realities paints an inaccurate picture of systemic neglect.

6.4 Root Causes of the Insurgency

ISIR attributes calls for autonomy and armed resistance in SSC to economic marginalization. This conclusion ignores the real drivers of instability:

• External interference from Mogadishu, which funds militias as part of a proxy war against Somaliland.
• Clan-based grievances, which are exploited by political actors seeking to weaken the central government.
• Geopolitical dynamics, including China’s support for militia groups to pressure Somaliland over its partnership with Taiwan.

By focusing narrowly on a single-year budget and disregarding these deeper drivers, ISIR constructs a misleading economic narrative that misinforms policymakers and risks perpetuating conflict.

7. External Interference and Proxy Warfare

A critical flaw in ISIR’s July 2025 brief is its failure to acknowledge the extensive role of external actors in sustaining the insurgency in Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC). By portraying the conflict as a purely internal grievance driven by “economic marginalization,” the report ignores the deliberate destabilization of Somaliland by external powers that view a stable, democratic Somaliland as contrary to their strategic interests.

7.1 Somalia’s Proxy Campaign

The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has long viewed a stable and independent Somaliland as a threat to its territorial claims. As a result, Mogadishu has pursued a sustained proxy campaign to weaken Somaliland by financing, arming, and politically supporting SSC militias. This strategy aims to prevent Somaliland from consolidating control over its eastern regions and to manufacture instability that undermines its case for international recognition.

While ISIR’s policy brief acknowledges this factor in passing, it significantly minimizes its centrality to the conflict. The report treats Somalia’s involvement as a peripheral issue rather than the driving force behind the sustained unrest in Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn. In reality, the conflict cannot be understood or resolved without acknowledging that the insurgency is largely fueled by Mogadishu’s deliberate policy of destabilization. The political, financial, and military backing provided by the FGS is not incidental; it is strategic, systematic, and rooted in a broader effort to deny Somaliland both domestic authority and international legitimacy. Downplaying this reality, as ISIR does, distorts the root causes of the conflict and risks enabling continued external interference under the guise of internal grievance.

7.2 China’s Strategic Interests

Another external actor implicated in the SSC conflict is China, which has grown increasingly alarmed by Somaliland’s expanding diplomatic and economic partnership with Taiwan. Intelligence reports and credible analyses suggest that Beijing has supplied arms and other forms of material support to SSC militias as part of a broader strategy to pressure Somaliland into severing ties with Taipei. This transforms the SSC conflict from a purely domestic or regional issue into part of a larger geopolitical contest, in which China seeks to expand its influence in the Horn of Africa and undercut Taiwan’s diplomatic presence.

Yet ISIR’s brief makes no mention of this critical dimension. By ignoring China’s role, ISIR omits a key driver of the conflict, one that helps explain both the intensity of the insurgency and the stakes involved. The failure to acknowledge this international context reduces the conflict to a simplistic narrative of internal grievance, obscuring the extent to which great power competition is shaping events on the ground. This omission is not just a gap in analysis; it weakens the credibility of the report and risks misleading policymakers about the broader strategic forces at play.

7.3 Puntland’s Involvement

Puntland, which maintains its own territorial ambitions over parts of SSC regions, has provided logistical support, manpower, and safe havens for militias engaged in fighting Somaliland’s forces. This involvement further complicates the security environment, effectively turning the SSC regions into a battleground for competing external interests. The evidence of Puntland’s direct military and political support to anti-Somaliland militias has been well documented, yet ISIR’s policy brief downplays this factor.

Instead, ISIR frames the militias as a grassroots insurgency driven by local demands for autonomy, an interpretation that ignores the extent of external coordination and resourcing behind their operations. By casting the conflict in SSC as a local uprising, ISIR erases the regional proxy dynamics that have turned what might have been a manageable internal dispute into a prolonged and destabilizing confrontation. This narrative serves to obscure the political agendas of Puntland and Mogadishu, and misleads observers into viewing the militias as independent actors responding solely to domestic grievances, rather than as instruments of broader geopolitical strategies.

7.4 Consequences of Ignoring External Interference

ISIR’s omission of these dynamics is not a neutral analytical choice; it fundamentally distorts the reality of the conflict. By framing SSC unrest as an organic local uprising against “marginalization,” ISIR erases the decisive role of external sponsors and the geopolitical dimensions of the violence. This narrative not only misleads international stakeholders but also emboldens militia groups by granting them undue legitimacy and obscuring their reliance on external backers. Recognizing the proxy nature of the SSC insurgency is essential for any serious analysis of the conflict. Failing to do so misdiagnoses the problem, misdirects policy responses, and ultimately perpetuates the cycle of instability.

8. The Dangers of ISIR’s Narrative

ISIR’s July 2025 brief is not just an inaccurate analysis; its framing carries serious real-world consequences for Somaliland and the broader Horn of Africa. By repeatedly describing Somaliland’s lawful jurisdiction over Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC) as a mere “claim,” and mischaracterizing the 1991 restoration of sovereignty as a “unilateral declaration of independence,” ISIR delegitimizes a state whose foundations are rooted in both historical continuity and international legal principles. These rhetorical choices are not neutral, they reinforce a narrative that casts Somaliland as an aggressor or separatist entity, rather than a sovereign government reclaiming authority after the collapse of an unratified union.

This framing is especially dangerous in a fragile regional context. It emboldens armed non-state actors by lending credibility to their cause, implicitly validating their rejection of Somaliland’s constitutional order. It also signals to external actors such as Mogadishu, Puntland, and even Beijing that undermining Somaliland’s sovereignty through proxy forces and political pressure may be tolerated or overlooked. Moreover, it discourages meaningful diplomatic engagement by international stakeholders who might otherwise support Somaliland’s efforts to restore stability and governance in its eastern regions.

In doing so, ISIR’s brief weakens prospects for conflict resolution, sows confusion among policymakers, and contributes to an already volatile security environment. Rather than advancing peace or understanding, the brief risks fueling further fragmentation and instability in one of the most strategically important—and conflict-prone regions of Africa.

8.1 Delegitimizing Sovereignty

Casting Somaliland’s lawful authority over SSC as a “claim” misrepresents the region’s status under international law. SSC territories were part of the State of Somaliland that gained independence from Britain on 26 June 1960 and joined Somalia in an unratified union that collapsed in 1991. By depicting Somaliland as “claiming” these territories, ISIR suggests they lie outside its lawful borders, implicitly justifying militia opposition and external interference.

8.2 Normalizing Armed Rebellion

ISIR’s characterization of the conflict as a battle between “Somaliland forces and Khatumo forces” grants political and military legitimacy to clan militias that lack coherent governance structures. This framing obscures the fact that these groups are sustained by external actors, including Somalia, Puntland, and China, and engage in attacks on civilian populations, such as the burning of Buqdharkayn village and the killing of its mosque’s imam. Normalizing such actors undermines the rule of law and invites further violence.

8.3 Ignoring State Continuity

Describing Somaliland’s 1991 restoration of sovereignty as a “unilateral declaration of independence” erases the fundamental principle of state continuity. This is not a matter of semantics, it is a misrepresentation of legal and historical fact. Somaliland did not secede from Somalia; it reclaimed the sovereignty it voluntarily surrendered in 1960 when it entered into a union with the former Italian Somaliland. That union was never legally ratified through a binding international treaty or formal constitutional process, making Somaliland’s decision to dissolve the failed union both lawful and consistent with international norms governing statehood.

This distinction is critical. Framing Somaliland as a breakaway or claiming ‘Somaliland unilateral declaratory” implies rebellion against an existing legal authority, which is not the case. Such mischaracterizations bolster delegitimizing narratives promoted by actors hostile to Somaliland’s stability and recognition. They obscure the unique legal precedent and historical legitimacy underpinning Somaliland’s claims, and they undermine efforts to gain fair consideration within regional and international legal frameworks. In essence, ISIR’s language does not merely distort the past, it actively contributes to the marginalization of Somaliland’s political reality today.

8.4 Fueling Grievances with Selective Economics

ISIR’s selective use of a single-year budget to claim “economic marginalization” lacks both analytical rigor and historical context. By highlighting one fiscal snapshot without examining broader trends over time, it ignores the well-documented reality that those regions have received disproportionately high levels of public investment relative to their contribution to national revenue. Decades of development spending on roads, hospitals, education, and administrative infrastructure in these areas reflect Somaliland’s commitment to inclusive governance, despite logistical challenges and periodic insecurity.

This omission is not a minor oversight, it distorts the fiscal relationship between those regions and the central government, and misleads readers into believing that economic neglect is a structural grievance. Such framing lacks merit in both economic and governance terms, as it fails to account for how national budgets are planned, prioritized, and constrained in fragile post-conflict states like Somaliland. Worse still, it reinforces grievance-based narratives that militia leaders actively exploit to mobilize support, justify violence, and advocate for separatism under the guise of marginalization. By presenting a one-sided economic picture, ISIR not only undermines Somaliland’s development efforts but also contributes intentionally or not—to the cycle of misinformation fueling the conflict.

8.5 Regional Security Implications

A narrative that undermines Somaliland’s sovereignty while legitimizing armed groups risks wider destabilization. It emboldens external actors seeking to weaken Somaliland, including Mogadishu and Beijing, and undermines the democratic and relatively stable governance model that Somaliland represents in the Horn of Africa. ISIR’s brief, by mischaracterizing both history and present realities, does more than misinform: it fuels conflict, emboldens militia violence, and jeopardizes regional stability.

9. Correcting the Narrative

Somaliland’s sovereignty is not a matter of dispute under international law.

• SSC regions are integral to the State of Somaliland under the colonial borders it inherited at independence on 26 June 1960, in line with the principle of uti possidetis juris.
• The union with Somalia in 1960 was never ratified, and Somaliland’s 1991 sovereignty restoration was a lawful act of state continuity, not a “unilateral declaration.”
• The 1991 Declaration of Independence and 1993 Borama Conference involved broad inter-clan consensus, refuting the claim that Somaliland’s statehood is narrow or exclusionary.

9.1 Recognizing Security Realities

ISIR’s portrayal of SSC as a legitimate force ignores key realities:

• The so-called “Khatumo forces” were not a unified or legitimate military entity but fragmented clan militias, often supported by Puntland and Mogadishu.
• China’s involvement, including arms transfers to militias, reflects broader geopolitical efforts to pressure Somaliland over its partnership with Taiwan.
• Somaliland’s defensive operations, including the mobilization of local defense units such as the Habarjeclo SSB forces, were necessitated by militia attacks on civilians, such as the burning of Buqdharkayn village and the killing of its mosque’s imam.

9.2 Economic Realities and the Myth of Marginalization

ISIR’s selective use of the 2025 budget to claim marginalization ignores:

• Somaliland’s inability to implement projects in militia-controlled areas.
• Historical patterns showing disproportionate investment in those regions relative to its revenue contribution (e.g., 19% of Somaliland Development Fund Phase I allocated to Sool and Sanaag).
• The fact that those regions historically received more development funding than it generates in revenue, even under severe fiscal constraints.

9.3 Policy Recommendations

For policymakers, analysts, and partners engaging with Somaliland:

1. Acknowledge Somaliland’s lawful sovereignty based on colonial borders and state continuity.

2. Reject narratives that describe SSC as a “claimed” territory or Somaliland’s sovereignty as a “unilateral declaration.”

3. Address the role of external actors, particularly Somalia, Puntland, and China, in sustaining the insurgency.

4. Support economic reintegration of SSC through security stabilization, enabling Somaliland to deliver development and services.

5. Encourage fact-based reporting that reflects the historical and legal realities of Somaliland, avoiding language that legitimizes militias or fuels grievances.

9.5 Conclusion

An accurate and responsible analysis of Somaliland’s situation must engage with historical context, international legal principles, and the practical realities of governance on the ground. Simplistic or selective narratives that delegitimize Somaliland’s sovereignty while implicitly legitimizing armed militias—do not just distort the truth; they actively risk prolonging conflict, undermining peace-building efforts, and destabilizing the wider Horn of Africa.

Reports like ISIR’s July 2025 brief, which downplay external interference, misrepresent Somaliland’s legal status, and amplify grievance-based narratives without evidence, contribute to policy confusion and embolden actors opposed to peace. Analysts and policymakers must move beyond superficial framings and adopt a fact-based, historically grounded approach, one that upholds lawful governance, supports regional stability, and affirms Somaliland’s right to defend its territory and citizens against externally backed insurgencies. Anything less risks sacrificing long-term peace for short-term misperceptions.

References

1. Bradbury, M. (2008). Becoming Somaliland. Oxford: James Currey. (For historical context on Somaliland’s independence and the Borama Conference.)

2. Carroll, A. J., & Rajagopal, B. (1993). The Case for the Independent Statehood of Somaliland. *American University International Law Review*, 8(2), 653–681. (For legal analysis of Somaliland’s state continuity and the unratified union.)

3. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933). League of Nations Treaty Series, 165, 19. (For criteria of statehood and recognition principles.)

4. Somaliland Development Fund (SDF). (2020). Phase I Project Allocation Report. Hargeisa: Somaliland Ministry of Planning. (For data on development investments in SSC.)

5. Somaliland Ministry of Finance. (2022).National Budget Report. Hargeisa: Government of Somaliland. (For revenue and expenditure data.)

6. International Crisis Group (2023). Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Anchor of Stability. Africa Report No. 312. (For analysis of external interference in SSC.)

10. Various news sources (2023–2025). Reports on Chinese arms transfers and Taiwan-Somaliland relations.(NYT, Reuters, BBC News, Horn Diplomat, Somaliland Chronicle, American Enterprise Institute