By any legal standard, Republic of Somaliland is a fully sovereign state from June 26, 1960. It entered the international stage with formal treaties and an independent legal personality.
Yet within five days, this independent state was plunged into a chaotic and unratified “union” with Somalia Italiana. the center of it was Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, a leader whose political gamesmanship and lack of resolve cost Republic of Somaliland its rightful continuity as a sovereign state. Far from being a strategic mastermind, Egal’s actions documented in British historical documents which exposes him as a leader who lacked clarity, firmness, and foresight.
The Bluff That Backfired: Mohamed’s Rushed Motion
One of the most damning insights comes from internal British correspondence dated early April 1960, just before Somaliland’s Legislative Council session. The British representative described Egal and his colleagues as playing a dangerous game:
“They rejected my repeated advice that the motion should be so framed as to allow some room for manoeuvre.”
Here, Egal is shown to have ignored British warnings. Rather than proposing a flexible resolution that allowed for proper negotiation and legal coordination with Somalia, he insisted on pushing a firm motion calling for union on July 1st, 1960 – just days after Somaliland’s independence.
But why the rush?
Egal came under intense pressure from his own political party and colleagues, including members of the Executive Council (equivalent to a cabinet) to change the motion he put forward and demand immediate union with Somalia on July 1, 1960.
“Had he been strong at the start he could probably have got away with it…”
This shows the UK believed Egal caved under political pressure rather than sticking with a more cautious plan.
What was Egal’s original plan?
A moderate motion likely meant:
Entering negotiations with Somalia after its independence.
What motion was actually adopted?
A request for immediate union with Somalia on July 1, just 5 days after Somaliland’s own independence.
But here’s the kicker:
The UK Governor calls this idea “an impossibility” and warns of serious consequences:
Somalia wouldn’t even be independent until July 1, so it couldn’t legally form a union before then.
• British Parliamentary approval and legal preparations would be required in London, which could not be done in five days.
• There were also diplomatic complications (especially with Ethiopia, because of the 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement).
Why is this so important legally?
This is direct evidence that:
1. No legal mechanism existed for Somaliland and Somalia to form a union by July 1, 1960.
2. The union was politically driven, not lawfully constructed.
3. Even British officials described the “immediate union” as impractical, rushed, and dangerous.
“Mohamed has shown increasing signs of weakness and lack of leadership…”
Mohamed refers to Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, then Chief Minister of the Somaliland Protectorate. The British are openly stating that he was not acting as a strong, sovereign leader should especially on matters as critical as union. He was not safeguarding national interests and yielded to pressure rather than asserting a constitutional process.
“…since pressure was put on him last Saturday by some members of the Party, including at least one member of Executive Council…”
The push for immediate union was coming not from a legal framework, but from internal political party pressure. Even the Executive Council, which was supposed to uphold governance, joined the populist tide.
The pressure wasn’t from international treaties, legal agreements, it was from his own internal political faction.
“…that the moderate and sensible motion he was going to propose about union with Somalia should be modified to ask for immediate union on 1st July.”
This was sabotaged by internal pressure demanding a rushed and reckless approach: “immediate union on 1st July.”
“Had he been strong at the start he could probably have got away with it…”
If Egal had stood firm, he could have implemented a gradual and constitutional union, or perhaps protected Somaliland’s sovereignty altogether. But his failure to assert leadership let the extremists of his party hijack the agenda.
“…and Mohamed only found three supporters against it.”
Egal was virtually unskilled and couldn’t resist this illegal and rushed motion. Only three others supported his original approach.
“I have, of course, pointed out to the four Ministers that such a request is an impossibility…”
The British government flatly stated that union on July 1 was legally and constitutionally impossible. Somalia wouldn’t be independent until July 1 and you can’t unite with a state that doesn’t yet exist. The UK Parliament still had to debate relevant legislation. This is concrete proof that the so-called union was illegal – the timing made it unrealizable.
“…because the independent Government of Somalia will not exist until that date and legislation must be enacted in England…”
Britain was saying: “You cannot pass a motion to unite with a country that hasn’t even been born.” Moreover, even British legislation and legal frameworks for Somaliland’s independence had not been completed.
The “union” was based on a fantasy. No treaties were signed, no laws were passed, no ratification occurred.
“I have also emphasized ad nauseam the appalling disadvantages which would flow from so quick a change…”
Ad nauseum means repeatedly to the point of exhaustion. The British official had warned over and over again that rushing into union was deeply dangerous and irresponsible. “So quick a change” refers to the demand for immediate union with Somalia on July 1, 1960, just days after Somaliland’s independence on June 26, 1960.
This was not a strategic, planned transition it was a rash, political stunt. A legitimate union requires time, treaties, ratification, legal frameworks, and protections for both sides. None of that existed. The British saw this as a self-inflicted collapse of the newly born Somaliland state.
“…mentioning particularly the 1954 agreement with Ethiopia and the position with the Civil Service and the sudden rundown which takes place.”
This refers to the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1954, in which the UK (on behalf of Somaliland) negotiated grazing rights and administration of the Haud and Reserved Areas.
These were international legal agreements between Britain and Ethiopia on behalf of Somaliland and administered by the British.
• If Somaliland merged instantly with Somalia, the new “Somali Republic” would inherit none of these obligations unless a formal succession plan was in place. There was no treaty ensuring Somalia would honor Somaliland’s prior agreements.
So the 1954 agreement could be voided, harming Somaliland, and violating international law regarding treaty succession.
The British were also deeply concerned about the fate of civil servants both British and local working in the Protectorate’s administration. Many were under contractual obligations that required stable governance and legal protections. If union occurred instantly, their legal status, pay, and pensions would collapse overnight.
This issue later became the basis for the UK Somaliland Public Officers Agreement (POA) signed after independence & recognized Somaliland’s independent legal personality.
It also shows that no mechanisms were in place to merge administrative systems or protect civil servants during the so-called union.
“…and the sudden rundown which takes place.”
“Rundown” refers to a sudden collapse or withdrawal of existing governance structures and administrative systems. The UK expected a transition period where it would gradually transfer power. But with this reckless plan for immediate union, there would be no such transition. Somaliland would effectively be abandoned administratively with no plan in place. This would lead to chaos in courts, finance, education, and security. It confirms that Somaliland’s after independence was sabotaged, not preserved or united responsibly.
Legal and Political Conclusion:
This line proves that no legal safeguards, no treaty frameworks, and no transition mechanisms were in place for a legitimate union. Instead, the government of Somaliland committed constitutional suicide under political pressure, and the British clearly saw it coming.
> “…he and his colleagues in Executive Council have now got themselves into the position with their parties that makes it impossible for them to do otherwise than to introduce a motion requesting union on 1st July.”
Egal’s leadership had locked himself into a political position, he was no longer in control of the state. The language “makes it impossible” shows that he was forced by party dynamics, not legal reasoning. There was no free and sovereign decision to unite. It was coerced internally and politically thus not valid under international law.
“I am afraid that we must now accept that a motion proposing 1st July will be introduced. I think the Ministers themselves realize that they cannot obtain what they ask… and they are now attempting to put the responsibility for delay either on to the Somalia Government or to Her Majesty’s Government.”
This quote is revealing: Egal and his minsters knew full well that a July 1st union was legally and logistically impossible. Somalia wasn’t even independent yet, and there was no time to ratify a formal Act of Union on the day they become independent. The motion was a political gimmick, calculated bluff meant to force Somalia to reject the union, thereby relieving Somaliland of responsibility in the public eye.
But as the British warned, this plan was deeply flawed:
“They believe it is quite possible that the Somalia representatives will say that their request is impossible. If Abdullahi Issa should take this line, embarrassing pressures could be built up in Somalia…”
Abdullahi Issa (1922–24 March 1988) was the first Prime Minister of Somalia from 29 February 1956 to 1 July 1960
Egal gambled that Somalia’s Prime Minister, Abdullahi Issa, would reject the rushed date. That way.. he could blame Somalia for the failure and walk away without consequences. But if Somalia accepted, Egal would have to commit Somaliland to an unnegotiated union, without a constitution, without guarantees, and without legal ratification.
This, in fact, is exactly what happened.
British Officials Saw It Coming: Mohamed’s Lack of Strength
“This involves obvious dangers, not only for them but also for Somalia and for Her Majesty’s Government.”
The British saw the risks of what was happening. If Somalia said no, it could cause instability inside Somalia against Abdullahi Issa. But if the British said no, it could cause trouble in Somaliland, where people might blame the British for interfering. The British didn’t openly agree with the july 1st date yet, and their government stayed quiet. In fact, the British were so careful they warned against making any public promises about the July 1st union in their official messages.
“I do not feel that Her Majesty’s Government should show its hand about the date at this stage.”
This tells us clearly: Even the colonial power saw the union as premature, and Egal’s motion as unwise.
No Legal Framework, No Ratified Union, No National Interest
Egal’s fatal weakness was this: he tried to satisfy political sentiment about Somali unity, while ducking the responsibility of legally securing Somaliland’s future. Instead of standing firm and demanding a legal process and a negotiation between two sovereign states, he rushed to appease pan-Somalist excitement without protecting Somaliland’s sovereignty.
“They have told me that immediately after Legislative Council they will have informal talks with members of the Somalia Government…”
Informal talks after passing a motion for union? That is the very opposite of statecraft. Egal bypassed the formal treaty process, violating the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and allowed a so-called Act of Union (drafted unilaterally in Mogadishu) to define the terms of the union after the fact a move never ratified by Somaliland’s legislative body.
The UK openly admits that 1 July 1960 is impossible for union:
“…I cannot, however, implement Mr. Lennox-Boyd’s undertaking unless the independent Somalia Government is in being; it is therefore clearly impossible for union to take place on the 1st July.”
Then softened to:
“clearly impossible as a practical matter.”
This is crucial legal evidence that:
• The UK knew union was impossible on 1 July.
• They also knew Somalia was not yet a functioning state (and thus not a legal party to any union).
• The phrase “as a practical matter” is a legal meaning: union could not lawfully occur.
The Outcome:
The July 1 “union” was not a union at all it was an annexation disguised as merger. Somalia continued to use its own colonial flag, its own constitution (drafted in Mogadishu without Somaliland’s input), and its own administrative systems. There was no new flag, no negotiated merger of laws, and no legal continuity for Somaliland.
“Should the Somalia representatives raise no difficulties, we would have to face up to a strong demand for a date…”
This quote shows how Egal’s plan completely relied on Somalia rejecting the union date. Once Somalia didn’t object, Egal had no fallback, no bargaining chip, no legal cover.
“Persuade Mohamed and his colleagues of the unwisdom of introducing a motion which is unrealistic…”
This line proves that even Her Majesty’s Government viewed Mohamed’s motion for union as premature and unrealistic. They recognized legal, procedural, and political gaps – but chose not to stop him outright.
Why Egal pushed ahead anyway?
Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal was politically trapped. He feared being blamed by Somaliland nationalists if he didn’t deliver a quick union (which was falsely sold as pan-Somali unity), and by Somalia if he delayed. He pushed for the motion not because it was legally sound, but because it was politically expedient a way to absolve himself of responsibility by “delivering union” fast and leaving the legal mess to someone else.
British awareness:
The British clearly understood the consequences: if Egal pushed this motion forward, it would backfire on everyone, him, Somalia, and Britain itself. They were warning him not out of concern for Somaliland’s sovereignty, but to avoid political fallout.
“…and may prove embarrassing to them [Mohamed], the Government of Somalia, and Her Majesty’s Government.not yet too late… persuade him that a statesmanlike intention [is better]”
The British were trying to talk Egal down, encouraging him to act “statesmanlike” meaning, take a long-term, careful view rather than rushing into a motion that would lack legitimacy. The fact that they were still trying to stop him at this late date shows how politically desperate Egal had become.
This line underscores that the union was not being driven by legality or statecraft, but by fear, image, and colonial fatigue.
“…there are many practical problems including those which would arise from the termination of the 1954 Agreement…”
If Britain had transferred obligations to Somalia without a ratified union, they’d be breaching international law. Britain’s concern here was that Egal’s motion, if passed and treated as binding, would create a legal vacuum and potentially make Britain liable for damages or international claims.
Britain resolved this potential legal trap by choosing the only course that would protect its own international obligations and prevent legal exposure, On June 26, 1960. Britain granted full sovereignty to Somaliland, as a legally independent state.
The “union” was not ready there was no ratified treaty, no agreed constitution, no binding legal mechanism.
2. Britain had treaty obligations to Somaliland (e.g., the 1954 Public Officers Agreement) that couldn’t just be “inherited” by a third party unless a legitimate successor state existed.
3. Transferring sovereignty to Somalia (instead of to Somaliland itself) without a ratified agreement would have been a direct violation of international law.
So what did Britain do?
Instead of transferring Somaliland directly into a union (which would make them liable), Britain granted Somaliland full independence first, making it a:
• Separate, de jure sovereign entity
• Equal to Somalia
• Free to negotiate a union – or not – on its own terms
This legal independence absolved Britain of any further responsibility or liability. From that point on, any union would have to be conducted as a bilateral agreement between two sovereign states.
British Warnings: The Impossible July 1 Union
British officials were clear and consistent in their documents leading up to July 1, 1960. The Governor of Somaliland protectorate at the time repeatedly communicated the practical and legal impossibility of executing a union by the designated date. Among the most telling excerpts:
• “It was quite impossible to arrange a union by 1st July, 1960, negotiations would necessarily be prolonged…”
• “The independent Government of Somalia will only be established on that day [July 1], so formal agreement could not be reached beforehand.”
• “There would be great difficulties to overcome if union were to be effected on 1st July, given that the contemplated constitutional changes would require legislation in both countries.”
The Retroactive “Fix”: The Italian-Somalian Act of Union
Faced with the legal vacuum and political pressure, the solution came in the form of a retroactive Act of Union drafted and signed only by Somalian representatives months after July 1. This document was an attempt to legitimize the union after it had already been proclaimed and to cover up the lack of Somaliland’s participation.
• No Somaliland signatories appear on the Act of Union.
• The document was effectively imposed on Somaliland without its consent.
• It served as a political tool to justify Somalia’s claim to Somaliland’s territory and sovereignty.
This retroactive “fix” was facilitated by the Italian administration in failed Somalia and Somalian political actors eager to solidify the union narrative. However, it stands as a legal and historical anomaly, a unilateral act that Somaliland has continuously rejected.
Conclusion: A Weak Leader at a Pivotal Moment
Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal may have had noble intentions, but his actions during the 1960 union crisis paint the picture of a leader who lacked the strength to defend the legal identity of his people. He gambled with Somaliland’s sovereignty, tried to shift responsibility through political trickery, and ultimately facilitated the annexation of a sovereign state into a fragile, artificial union.
His behavior was not bold statecraft, it was a failure to lead.
As history has shown, that rushed and unratified “union” collapsed in 1991, when Somaliland finally reasserted and restored its sovereignty back. But the damage Mohamed’s weakness inflicted in 1960 remains. His legacy is not of unity, but of surrender a moment when legal sovereignty was traded for a political illusion, and Somaliland paid the price.
This analysis adds critical legal and historical weight to the core thesis:
There was no legal union between Somaliland and Somalia on 1 July 1960.
• The UK publicly and privately acknowledged this.
• Even internal motions pushing for union were semantic, symbolic, and unofficial.
• No treaty, no joint ratification, and no simultaneous independence and union.
• British officials were fully aware that this was impractical, premature, and lacked legal foundation
