MOGADISHU – The Somali Future Council issued a press statement on 15 May 2026, congratulating Somali youth on the 81st anniversary of the founding of the Somali youth struggle, marked as Somali Youth Day.
However, the Council expressed regret in informing the Somali public and the international community that political talks held in Mogadishu from 13 to 15 May 2026 between the Federal Government of Somalia and the Somali Future Council – facilitated by international partners – have collapsed. According to the Council, the failure occurred because the former President and his administration rejected a political agreement based on an inclusive transition process, national consensus, and shared responsibility to resolve the constitutional vacuum created by the expiry of the President’s term on 15 May 2026.
The Council stated that it entered the negotiations in good faith, with responsibility and sincerity, but that the former President instead chose the path of political conflict, instability, and security disruption.
Reaffirming its constitutional position, the Somali Future Council declared that the President’s term legally ended on 15 May 2026, in line with Article 91 of the Provisional Constitution. Consequently, the Council recognises Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as a former president.
To ensure continuity of state institutions and avoid an administrative vacuum, the Council believes that during the transition period, the Federal Government must operate under executive power restraint – confined to technical and administrative functions – and refrain from unilateral decisions on political matters, the constitution, elections, and national security.
The Council warned that unilateral actions by the former president would further escalate political tensions, violate constitutional law, and undermine national unity and stability at a time when Somalia still faces serious security threats from Al-Shabaab and ISIS. The Council added that it would peacefully and legally prevent Hassan Sheikh from continuing to lead the country without legal or political legitimacy.
Call to Security Forces
The Somali Future Council called on all security forces to uphold their constitutional duty to protect the Somali people and the nation, and to recognise that Mr. Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is a former president from whom they should not take executive orders. The Council also commended the various armed forces fighting terrorist groups on the front lines.
Political Roadmap
The Council announced that it is establishing a political framework to address how to preserve Somali statehood and national unity during the transition period.
Acknowledgements
Finally, the Council thanked international partners who supported the dialogue process and reiterated its commitment to managing and resolving the political transition period.
Mogadishu, 15 May 2026 – The Federal Government of Somalia has announced that it will proceed with a nationwide one-person, one-vote election, declaring that the country has entered a transition toward a fully democratic system based on universal suffrage.
In an official press release, the government said it is fulfilling its constitutional obligation to grant Somali citizens their right to elect and be elected. The statement noted that continuous consultations have been held with electoral stakeholders and civil society to gather input.
Over the past three days, the government engaged some opposition members in dialogue. However, the press release said those opposition figures brought forward views that contradict the fundamental right of every citizen to vote and stand for election.
“The Federal Government of Somalia informs the Somali people that a free, fair, and transparent one-person, one-vote election will take place in the country, in full compliance with the Constitution, national laws, and the political programme set out by the government,” the statement read.
Despite the deadlock with regional presidents and opposition leaders, the government reiterated that the door to dialogue and consultation remains open.
BACKGROUND – Stalemate Over Electoral Consensus
Efforts by Somalia’s Federal Government to reach a broad political consensus on the upcoming one-person, one-vote election have hit an impasse. Regional state leaders and key opposition figures have repeatedly clashed with the federal authorities over the timing, security arrangements, and power-sharing formulas. While the government insists on a direct universal suffrage model as mandated by the constitution, several federal member states have called for a hybrid system to ensure clan representation. Multiple rounds of talks mediated by international partners have failed to produce a unified roadmap, deepening the political divide ahead of the planned vote.
When concerns are raised about Turkish influence over energy operations in Somaliland, the standard reassurance is familiar: there is no Turkish state ownership involved. Companies such as Genel Energy are publicly listed on the London Stock Exchange, incorporated in Jersey, and governed by international corporate standards. On paper, this should settle the matter.
In reality, it does not.
The concern was never about formal ownership. It is about informal political pressure and how such pressure operates in geopolitically contested environments.
The Limits of the Ownership Argument
Genel Energy is, by every formal metric, a British registered independent. Yet its shareholder structure tells a more complicated story. As of 2023, its largest shareholder was Bilgin Grup Doğal Gaz A.Ş., a Turkish conglomerate holding roughly 22 per cent of the company, while private companies collectively held a majority stake. Genel also maintains an operational office in Istanbul alongside its London headquarters.
None of this constitutes state control. But that is beside the point. Formal ownership is visible, regulated, and legally constrained. Informal influence is none of these things.
In countries where the executive wields strong authority and foreign policy is closely linked to national strategy, large private firms and financial institutions are rarely fully insulated from political expectations, especially on sensitive regional issues. Influence need not take the form of directives to be effective. It can operate through signalling, regulatory discretion, access to capital, and an implicit understanding of national priorities.
Turkey’s Strategic Stakes in Somaliland
Turkey’s opposition to Somaliland’s international recognition is neither abstract nor passive. It is an active component of Ankara’s regional strategy in the Horn of Africa.
Over the past decade, Turkey has become Somalia’s most influential external partner, combining humanitarian engagement with infrastructure investment and direct military support. In February 2024, Ankara and Mogadishu signed a wide ranging defence and economic cooperation agreement that effectively positioned Turkey as Somalia’s security guarantor.
That relationship shapes Turkey’s posture toward Somaliland directly. When Ethiopia and Somaliland signed a memorandum of understanding in January 2024, under which Ethiopia would gain access to the port of Berbera in exchange for a commitment to recognise Somaliland, Turkey moved quickly to undermine it. Leveraging ties with both Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, Ankara promoted alternative arrangements routing Ethiopian trade through ports in southern Somalia managed by Turkish interests rather than through the Emirati managed port of Berbera. The Ethiopia Somaliland agreement was subsequently frozen under Turkish Somali pressure.
The pattern repeated in December 2025, when Israel became the first country to formally recognise Somaliland. Turkey’s response was swift and unambiguous, condemning the move as illegitimate and coordinating opposition with Somalia, Egypt, and Djibouti. This is not the posture of a country indifferent to Somaliland’s status. Turkey is among the most active opponents of its recognition, defending concrete strategic and economic interests along the Red Sea corridor.
How Informal Pressure Shapes Outcomes
Against this backdrop, the presence of large Turkish private shareholders in a company operating in Somaliland’s most strategically sensitive sector inevitably introduces risk, even without overt interference.
That risk is structural. Shareholders may press for delays, additional risk assessments, or more conservative capital allocation. Strategic hesitation can be justified on entirely legitimate grounds: security concerns, ESG considerations, insurance costs, or compliance risk. None of these arguments need reference politics. Yet the outcomes may still align neatly with a state’s foreign policy objectives.
Consider the record. Genel has held its Somaliland licence since 2012 and has maintained a consistent presence in Hargeisa. Yet the Toosan 1 exploration well remains undrilled more than a decade later, with progress repeatedly described as contingent on further optimisation, stakeholder engagement, and enabling conditions. These delays may be commercially explicable. But they also fit the pattern one would expect where informal political pressure encourages caution without requiring explicit intervention.
No allegation of bad faith is implied. The point is simpler: in geopolitically contested environments, commercially defensible hesitation and politically convenient hesitation are indistinguishable from the outside.
Risk Aversion as a Political Instrument
This dynamic is not unique to Turkey. Similar patterns appear wherever private capital and national strategy intersect, whether in state adjacent Chinese firms, Gulf sovereign investment, or politically exposed Russian capital during periods of tension.
The lesson is that risk aversion itself can become a political instrument. It requires no conspiracy and no coercion. It requires only a shared understanding of political realities and behaviour adjusted accordingly under the cover of reasonable commercial caution.
For Somaliland, the stakes are unusually high. Energy development is not merely an economic project. It is tied directly to fiscal capacity, state credibility, and international engagement. Sustained uncertainty in flagship projects weakens Somaliland’s economic narrative and reinforces the argument, advanced by its opponents, that its political status remains too unresolved to support serious investment.
What This Means for Somaliland
The answer is not to shun foreign investment, but to approach it with clear eyed realism. That means diversifying partners, limiting concentration of influence from states with defined interests in Somaliland’s status, and structuring contracts robustly enough to distinguish genuine commercial delay from structural hesitation.
Formal ownership structures tell only part of the story. In environments where sovereignty itself is contested, it is the informal pressures, unseen, deniable, and structural, that often matter most. Precisely because they are hardest to prove, they are also the hardest to ignore.
Hargeisa – The National Peace Committee of the Republic of Somaliland held a significant meeting with officials from the British Government, namely Paul-Andre Wilton from the UK Embassy in Kenya and Louise Hancock, Head of the UK Office for Somaliland.
The discussions focused on strengthening relations and cooperation between Somaliland and the UK, particularly in the areas of peace, stability, and regional partnership.
The officials also exchanged views on the security situation in the region, Somaliland’s role in maintaining peace, and ways to further deepen bilateral cooperation.
The Somaliland National Peace Committee expressed gratitude to the UK government for its support and solidarity with Somaliland. In turn, the UK officials commended Somaliland’s efforts in promoting peace, stability, and regional security.
Last week, the Somaliland Field Office successfully conducted a document safety training for 20 Somaliland Immigration and Border Control Officers, including four female officers.
Officers from different stations across Somaliland actively engaged in the training, strengthening their knowledge and practical skills in passport inspection, identifying printing techniques, and recognizing security features in official documents.
The training also included presentations on the differences between regular passengers and diplomatic travellers, airport security, and safety procedures, as well as open-source intelligence and intelligence-gathering techniques.
This training plays a vital role in enhancing the capacity, professionalism, and operational effectiveness of Immigration Officers, while also contributing to the improvement of the quality of services provided to the community.
By Jama Ayaanle Feyte
Accra, Ghana – Hon Hersi Haji Ali Hassan , the Chairman of Somaliland’s ruling party, Waddani, has described the 8th Africa Political Summit (APS 2026) as a vital opportunity to build strong relationships with ruling parties across the Horn of Africa, the continent, and the wider world.
The Chairman , who travelled to Accra for the landmark conference, confirmed that Waddani Party is deepening its diplomatic and political engagement with other African political organisations.
“It is a pleasure that the ruling party, WADDANI, has established good relations with the ruling parties in the Horn of Africa, as well as across Africa and the world,” the Hon. Hersi said.
The summit, organised by the Association of Political Consultants – Africa (APC-Africa), was held on May 14, 2026, at the University of Professional Studies (UPSA) in Accra, Ghana. The host country for this year’s edition was Ghana.
Reinventing Political Campaigns
Under the theme “Reinventing Political Campaigns: Strategy, Technology, Resourcing, and Grassroots Mobilization”, the event brought together political strategists, party leaders, and election experts from across the continent.
The programme featured keynote addresses, panel discussions, and the presentation of the Africa Democracy Award. Among the solidarity speakers listed was Hersi Ali H. Hassan, National Chairman of the Waddani Party, Somaliland.
The morning plenary sessions focused on campaign management, voter engagement, data-driven political strategy, and the future of political campaigning in Africa.
National Day Message
At the conclusion of his remarks, the Chairman of Waddani reminded Somalilanders of an important upcoming occasion:
“This is for our National Day on 18 May!”
The reference is to Somaliland’s independence day, celebrated annually on 18 May, marking the country’s restoration of sovereignty following the collapse of the Somali central government in 1991.
Growing Continental Influence
The summit highlighted the increasing role of African political parties in sharing best practices on election strategy, digital campaigning, and party financing. The Waddani Party’s active participation signals Somaliland’s continued efforts to forge political partnerships despite its lack of international recognition.
APC-Africa has indicated that the 9th Africa Political Summit will be hosted in another member country in 2027.
Jama Ayaanle Feyte is .Journalist, Horn of Africa Security Expert and Political Analyst
Mogadishu i-Today’s meeting between the Federal Government of Somalia and opposition politicians ended without an agreement on the most critical points related to the country’s electoral process.
The meeting, which lasted several hours, took place inside a heavily secured area at Aden Adde International Airport — specifically at a facility belonging to NISA (the National Intelligence and Security Agency).
The government side was represented by the President of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and the Deputy Prime Minister, Salah Ahmed Jama. The opposition was led by the President of Puntland, Said Abdullahi Deni, and former Somali President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed.
According to sources, representatives from the U.S. and British embassies were present at the start of the meeting and played a role in opening the talks, but later withdrew to allow the Somali leaders to continue their discussions directly.
During the meeting, the opposition insisted on a comprehensive discussion of electoral issues — including those related to federal member states — expressing concern about the current process.
President Hassan Sheikh and Deputy Prime Minister Salah Ahmed Jama, for their part, defended the government’s plan for direct elections, which are already taking place in the districts of the Southwest administration. The government leaders stated that this electoral process is a mechanism to expand popular political participation and that technical preparations must be made for its implementation.
President Said Abdullahi Deni and former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed argued that the electoral dispute cannot be resolved without reaching a comprehensive political agreement that includes the federal member states.
The representatives from the U.S. and British embassies returned to the meeting after the discussions became more intense.
Ultimately, the two sides agreed to continue negotiations and to hold another meeting tomorrow, Thursday.
By Said Ahmed
In the early morning hours of May 12, 2026, I encountered news from Hargeisa that was both unexpected and deeply consequential. The Hargeisa Local Council had voted to remove Mayor Abdikarim Ahmed Mooge from office during a council session that rapidly altered the city’s leadership. The decision unfolded quickly and, most notably, without violence or public disorder. Like many Somalilanders in the diaspora, I experienced immediate surprise and disbelief. Initial reports from regional media, including Hiiraan Online, Saxafi Media, and other outlets, confirmed both the outcome and the procedural nature of the transition.
As further details emerged, what stood out was not only the abruptness of the leadership change but also the calm and orderly way in which it was carried out. That moment became the catalyst for this reflection. It prompted a deeper consideration of what this event reveals about governance, institutional resilience, and the evolving trajectory of Somaliland’s political development.
This episode reflects a broader structural tension that I describe as the Local Governance Paradox. At a time when Somaliland is gaining increased international visibility through diplomatic engagement and strategic partnerships, the realities of governance within Hargeisa remain uneven. Nationally, there is a narrative of stability, progress, and a continued pursuit of international recognition. Regionally focused platforms such as Horn Diplomat and other media increasingly portray Somaliland as an emerging political actor in the Horn of Africa. Yet within the capital, persistent challenges in infrastructure, service delivery, and administrative capacity continue to shape everyday life.
This divergence between external projection and internal performance raises important questions about sustainability. It calls into question whether international momentum can be maintained without corresponding improvements in local governance systems. The issue is not simply one of image, but of alignment between aspiration and institutional capability.
The tenure of Mayor Abdikarim Ahmed Mooge represented a significant shift in Hargeisa’s political culture. Elected in 2021 with one of the strongest mandates in Somaliland’s recent history, his leadership emphasized a civic identity that sought to move beyond clan based political organization. His focus on linking municipal taxation to visible public goods such as roads, sanitation, and urban cleanliness resonated strongly with a younger generation seeking tangible change. Commentaries and local analyses, including those on platforms like Gallaydh, highlighted both the symbolic and practical significance of this approach.
At the same time, his administration exposed the structural limits of reform oriented leadership within a constrained municipal environment. Rapid urban expansion, limited fiscal capacity, and entrenched political dynamics restricted the pace and scope of transformation. His leadership demonstrated what was possible, but it also revealed how difficult it is to institutionalize reform within existing systems.
The events of May 12 must therefore be understood within this wider institutional setting. The extension of local council mandates reshaped political timelines and incentives, altering the expected rhythm of municipal accountability. Instead of a transition driven by municipal elections, the change in leadership occurred through internal council mechanisms, as reported by Saxafi Media and others. The presence of senior government figures during the council session underscored the broader political significance of the decision and indicated that the process was embedded within the larger architecture of governance.
While the council acted within its formal authority, the process inevitably raises questions about accountability and representation. When leadership changes occur through internal deliberation rather than direct electoral renewal, the connection between citizens and decision makers becomes less immediate. This creates a potential gap in public trust, particularly for those who view electoral mandate as the primary source of legitimacy.
At the same time, the peaceful execution of the transition remains significant. In a region where political shifts can trigger instability, the ability to manage such a consequential change without conflict reflects a level of institutional discipline and a shared commitment to order. This produces a dual reality in which procedural stability coexists with concerns about democratic depth and inclusive participation.
The implications extend beyond municipal governance. Somaliland’s pursuit of international recognition and its expanding diplomatic engagement contribute to a narrative of forward movement. However, recognition that is not grounded in consistent and effective governance risks remaining symbolic. Analyses of emerging political entities, including coverage on platforms such as AllAfrica, frequently emphasize that institutional performance at the local level is central to long term credibility.
For international partners, the legitimacy of a political system is assessed through the reliability of its institutions, particularly those that directly affect citizens. If municipal governance struggles to deliver services, maintain continuity, or ensure transparent decision making, broader claims about state capacity may face increased scrutiny. Hargeisa, as the political and economic center, plays a decisive role in shaping these perceptions.
The leadership transition therefore serves as a critical test of alignment between national ambition and local reality. It highlights the need to move beyond governance models centered on individual leadership and toward systems that are durable, predictable, and institutionalized. It also underscores the importance of strengthening mechanisms for public accountability and communication during periods when electoral timelines are extended or disrupted.
Without such mechanisms, there is a risk that citizens, including those in the diaspora, will perceive political decisions as distant and elite driven. This perception can gradually erode trust, which is essential for both domestic legitimacy and international confidence. For a polity seeking formal recognition, that erosion would carry significant cost.
From a scholar practitioner perspective, this moment reinforces the importance of grounding state building analysis in local governance practices. The reaction across the Somaliland diaspora reflects both emotional connection and analytical concern. It illustrates how closely the country’s global image is tied to developments within its capital.
The orderly nature of the transition offers cautious optimism, suggesting that institutional norms continue to function and that political actors retain a preference for nonviolent change. However, long term legitimacy depends on more than procedural calm. It requires consistent delivery of equitable, transparent, and effective governance that citizens can see and experience.
Ultimately, the Local Governance Paradox captures a central challenge facing Somaliland today. The events of May 12, 2026, demonstrate that while the state may project confidence and progress internationally, its durability will be determined by the strength of its local institutions. Unless Somaliland brings its municipal governance performance into closer alignment with its diplomatic ambitions, it risks advancing the narrative of recognition faster than it consolidates the institutional foundations necessary to sustain it.
Hargeisa – Mr. Abdulrasaq M. Farah “Wiiwaa” was elected this morning as the new Mayor of the capital, Hargeisa. In the same session, Aden Jama Xaddi (Xil Mideeye) was elected Deputy Mayor.
An extraordinary meeting of the Hargeisa City Council convened early this morning, with the Governor of Maroodi Jeh region, Prof. Ahmed Mohameed Cadaad, present as an observer. The new mayor and his deputy were elected by a majority vote.
Ten of the 18 council members were present during the session. The new Mayor, Eng. Abdirisaq Mohamed Farah Wiiwaa, and his Deputy Mayor, Eng. Adan Jama Xaddi (Mideeye), were elected by a show of hands.
The session, held earlier in the morning under tight security at the local government headquarters, was boycotted by the dismissed Deputy Mayor Khadar Nur, councillor Said Abdisamad Cudhay, and five other members who opposed the convening of the meeting.
Notably, the outgoing Mayor, Abdikarim Ahmed Mooge was present during the session. He stated that he was fulfilling the campaign pledge he made during the election—that he would not extend his five-year term beyond the elected period.
