Addis Abeba – Somaliland, a self-declared republic in the Horn of Africa, has functioned autonomously since proclaiming independence in 1991, despite lacking international recognition. Over the years, it has built a functional democracy, held regular elections, maintained judicial independence, and achieved relative stability in a region often characterized by disorder. Its strategic location near the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait also lends it considerable maritime and geopolitical significance.
This article argues that Somaliland offers a range of opportunities—particularly for India. By advancing a compelling case for formal engagement, it will demonstrate how India could deepen its Indo-Pacific strategy and counterbalance China’s growing influence in the region through a bold and rarely exercised move in modern diplomacy: the formal recognition of Somaliland.
Geopolitical counterbalance
Establishing official ties with Somaliland would bring India closer to the Bab al-Mandab Strait—a critical maritime chokepoint through which approximately 10% of global trade flows. Access to ports such as Berbera offers India a strategic maritime advantage, particularly in light of China’s expanding military presence in nearby Djibouti.
Somaliland’s coastline offers India a strategic gateway to the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. Given that approximately 90% of India’s trade is seaborne, secure access to maritime routes is essential. Berbera represents the closest viable location for a future Indian maritime base west of the Malacca Strait, potentially reducing India’s dependence on existing facilities in locations such as Réunion or Madagascar.
India’s strategic posture aligns with the principles of defensive realism—emphasizing power projection without direct confrontation. The Somaliland coast lies directly across from China’s naval base in Djibouti. Gaining surveillance access in Berbera would enable India to monitor critical sea lanes and counterbalance the growing influence of other powers in the region.
Such a strategic position would significantly enhance India’s broader Indo-Pacific strategy, complementing its existing maritime presence in Chabahar, Duqm, and along the East African coast. Integrating Somaliland into India’s maritime domain awareness would contribute to a network of strategic encirclement around China’s Maritime Silk Road.
As a leading advocate of South-South cooperation, India stands to enhance its influence by supporting Somaliland’s institutional capacity building. Initiatives such as the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program and the Pan-African e-Network already align with Somaliland’s development needs. This approach stands in sharp contrast to the extractive and infrastructure-intensive Chinese diplomacy. Indian assistance would foster people-to-people connections and reinforce democratic legitimacy in the region.
Soft power projection
Somaliland fulfills all the criteria for statehood as outlined in the Montevideo Convention of 1933: a permanent population, a defined territory, an effective government, and the capacity to engage in foreign relations. From a constructivist perspective, Somaliland’s democratic credentials merit normative recognition by India. Despite its lack of formal recognition, Somaliland upholds press freedom, conducts competitive elections, and maintains traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution.
Somaliland’s bold diplomatic engagement with Taiwan since 2020 can be interpreted as a challenge to Chinese orthodoxy. In this context, India—currently engaged in ongoing border tensions with Beijing—could adopt a strategy of strategic hedging. A decentralized axis involving India, Somaliland, and Taiwan would represent a form of unofficial diplomacy grounded in shared democratic values.
India’s potential diplomatic recognition of Somaliland would be consistent with its historical support for the independence struggles of Namibia and Bangladesh.”
India and Taiwan are already cooperating in sectors such as technology, healthcare, and education. This understated Taiwan policy complements Somaliland’s commitment to pluralism and its pursuit of international recognition. As a member of the Quad, India benefits from an informal alignment with fellow democracies, reinforcing its image and credibility as a liberal power.
India’s potential diplomatic recognition of Somaliland would be consistent with its historical support for the independence struggles of Namibia and Bangladesh. Unlike China and Russia, India places greater emphasis on democratic legitimacy rather than the preservation of regimes. India has historical precedent for such a move, notably its support for Bangladesh’s independence in 1971. Recognizing Somaliland would reaffirm India’s post-colonial ideals and open avenues for trade, intelligence sharing, and regional cooperation.
India’s SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision emphasizes maritime cooperation and regional stability. In this context, Somaliland—particularly the Emirati-managed Port of Berbera—offers a potential strategic foothold for India in the western Indian Ocean.
Somaliland should be integrated into India’s SAGAR framework to foster a collaborative maritime order in the Indian Ocean. Such cooperation would strengthen regional security, support economic resilience, and promote the sustainable development of the blue economy.
Expansion of maritime security
Somaliland’s geographic proximity provides India with opportunities to conduct anti-piracy missions, humanitarian assistance, and logistical operations. Given the rise in maritime crimes—including arms trafficking, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and drug smuggling—joint enforcement efforts are increasingly vital. Somaliland could be integrated into India’s existing network of naval bases in Seychelles, Mauritius, and Oman, thereby contributing to the formation of a western Indo-Pacific arc of stability.
Establishing formal relations between Somaliland and India could pave the way for joint ventures in mineral development, fisheries, coastal tourism, and diaspora engagement. Additional areas of cooperation might include port logistics, utilization of air corridors, and defense technology exchanges.
Somaliland is actively engaged in piracy prevention, maritime law enforcement, and the development of its coast guard. India, in partnership with Kenya, could conduct joint naval exercises, share surveillance technologies, and coordinate counterterrorism efforts—particularly against threats posed by Al-Shabaab. With its fleet of nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers, India is well positioned to utilize Berbera for maintenance, refueling, and intelligence operations.
With the expansion of BRICS to include Egypt, Ethiopia, and the UAE, Somaliland is increasingly positioned as a strategic bridge. India is well placed to lead and shape this emerging dialogue.
Recognizing Somaliland would reinforce India’s image as a principled power committed to democracy and post-colonial justice. It would also grant India strategic access to the Port of Berbera, enhance the maritime framework of the SAGAR initiative, and solidify India’s standing as a credible leader within the BRICS+ grouping. AS
Editor’s Note: Gulaid Yusuf Idaan is a senior lecturer and researcher specializing in diplomacy, politics, and international relations in the Horn of Africa. He can be contacted at Idaan54@gmail.com