Addis Abeba – The Horn of Africa, long shaped by strategic interests and colonial legacies, is once again emerging as a center of intense diplomatic engagement. With this development, Ethiopia has increasingly positioned itself as a proactive regional actor, adopting a multipolar diplomatic strategy to overcome the limitations of its landlocked geography. In contrast, Egypt has pursued a more defensive foreign policy, particularly in relation to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance (GERD) and what it perceives as threats to its Red Sea security doctrine. Somalia occupies a strategically ambiguous space, balancing the influence of these two regional powers while contending with ongoing internal instability. Meanwhile, Somaliland has attracted unexpected diplomatic attention, skillfully leveraging its coastal geography to establish new international partnerships.
This commentary examines three key pillars of Ethiopia’s increasingly assertive foreign policy: the management of the GERD, the strategic push for maritime access through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland, and the country’s calibrated response to shifting global power dynamics, exemplified by its accession to BRICS. By analyzing the reactions of regional actors, the article explores how the Horn of Africa is being reshaped—not solely by conflict, but by competing visions of sovereignty, regional alignment, and political agency.
Pillar One: GERD as a geopolitical declaration
Ethiopia has firmly established its position on the GERD, grounded in a strong doctrine of sovereignty and legal autonomy. Rejecting any arrangement that would impose legally binding conditions on the filling or operation of the dam—particularly regarding the filling—Addis Abeba has adopted a stance of legal minimalism. Rather than entering into new treaties that could constrain its sovereign rights, Ethiopia refers to the 2015 Declaration of Principles (DoP) as a sufficient framework for cooperation, emphasizing that the agreement does not require further legal ratification.
While critics often portray this position as obstinate or obstructionist, it is more accurately described as a calculated assertion of post-colonial water rights. Notably, Ethiopia’s approach is not based on military escalation, nor does it expend excessive diplomatic capital. Instead, it reaffirms the normative principle that upstream riparian states possess equal and inherent rights to utilize transboundary water resources for national development.
In this context, the GERD has evolved into more than a hydroelectric project; it has become a geopolitical statement. It symbolically rejects the legacy of colonial-era water-sharing arrangements—particularly the 1929 and 1959 Nile Waters Agreements, which heavily favored Egypt. As such, the GERD stands as a symbol of African self-determination, transforming Ethiopia’s pursuit of equitable access to natural resources into a broader pan-African narrative of liberation and resistance to externally imposed legal constraints.
The successful articulation of this narrative significantly enhances Ethiopia’s strategic autonomy, both globally and regionally. Consequently, the GERD stands as the foundational pillar of Ethiopia’s burgeoning geopolitical doctrine: a reordering of Nile Basin geopolitics premised on national independence, a reinterpretation of existing legal frameworks, and a rebalancing of regional power dynamics.
Pillar Two: MoU with Somaliland
Ethiopia’s most geopolitically ambitious undertaking in recent memory occurred in January 2024, with the signing of a MoU with Somaliland, a de facto but not a de jure republic. As stated in the official readout, the MoU is intended to “pave the way to realize the aspiration of Ethiopia to secure access to the sea and diversify its access to seaports.” This marks a significant departure from Ethiopia’s traditionally cautious foreign policy ethos and reflects a broader shift towards a more assertive, interest-driven approach to international relations.
At the core of the MoU lies Ethiopia’s most pressing strategic concern: sovereign access to the sea. Since Eritrea’s secession in 1993, rendering Ethiopia landlocked, the nation has predominantly relied on foreign ports—primarily Djibouti—for virtually all its maritime trade. While previous Ethiopian administrations pursued this objective through discreet diplomacy and commercial agreements, the current government has adopted a more assertive strategy, aiming to fundamentally reshape regional geopolitics. The MoU with Somaliland, therefore, represents a decisive move towards achieving both maritime and military freedom.
The GERD has evolved into more than a hydroelectric project; it has become a geopolitical statement.”
The international response was swift and varied. The Arab League issued a critique, subtly targeting Ethiopia’s ambitions by citing the potential for militarization of the Red Sea by non-littoral states as a significant threat. Egypt, already embroiled in a contentious dispute with Ethiopia over the GERD, also criticized the MoU, asserting that the agreement constitutes an egregious interference in the Red Sea’s precarious balance. These reactions underscore the destabilizing implications of Ethiopia’s new foreign policy trajectory. Addis Abeba’s actions clearly indicate that the status quo is no longer acceptable; indeed, Ethiopia is actively participating in defining a new one.
It’s noteworthy that the MoU also signals a broader shift in African diplomatic trends, moving from normative principles towards realpolitik. By signing an MoU with Somaliland, despite Somalia’s continued assertion of sovereignty over the territory and the African Union’s adherence to colonial-era boundaries, Ethiopia has prioritized its strategic interests over multilateral consensus. This step signifies a measured diplomatic maturity, dictated by pragmatic reasoning rather than ideological agreement. It also foreshadows a renewed willingness to act unilaterally, particularly concerning crucial national interests such as maritime access.
This development carries significant strategic implications. A potential Ethiopian presence in Berbera would position the nation in close proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a critical maritime choke point connecting the Indian Ocean to the Suez Canal. Such a presence would not only enhance Ethiopia’s strategic reach but also further entrench it within the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean-Red Sea corridor—an increasingly contested space involving global powers like China, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Russia, and the United States. In this context, gaining port access isn’t merely an end in itself; it’s an effort by Ethiopia to become an indispensable component in the strategic calculations of key global and regional actors.
The implications of the MoU extend beyond logistical and military considerations. It signals a fundamental shift in Ethiopia’s foreign policy—from a survivalist, dependency-driven posture to one rooted in strategic independence and assertive regionalism. The willingness to engage with a de facto state, even at the expense of established diplomatic norms, reflects a broader departure from ideology-centered diplomacy toward a realpolitik, interest-based approach. In doing so, Ethiopia has made it clear that it is no longer confined by the constraints of passive diplomacy. Instead, it is prepared to take calculated risks in pursuit of its long-term national interests.
Furthermore, the MoU has come to symbolize a serious recalibration of Ethiopia’s strategic outlook. It challenges conventional understandings of sovereignty, redefines the security architecture of the Horn of Africa, and positions Ethiopia as a rising geopolitical actor in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean regions. This emerging foreign policy direction is likely to be characterized by a renewed and necessary focus on national interest, regional influence, and maritime ambition. Crucially, this development suggests that Ethiopia is not only solidifying its position as a continental land power but is also laying the groundwork to become a maritime power—one capable of projecting its interests across the region in the 21st century.
Pillar Three: BRICS accession
Ethiopia has also repositioned itself as a skillful actor within the evolving multipolar world order, navigating a path between traditional Western alliances and the rising influence of the Global South. Amid growing international competition, Addis Abeba has adopted a delicate diplomatic balancing act—maintaining critical development assistance from Western partners while actively engaging with emerging power blocs such as BRICS.
This dual-track strategy was exemplified by Ethiopia’s accession to the BRICS—a significant geopolitical shift. However, Ethiopian officials were careful to frame this move not as a rejection of the West, but as an economic diversification effort. They emphasized that the decision aimed to expand opportunities for economic growth and development, rather than alienate long-standing partners, particularly the United States. This nuanced approach has enabled Ethiopia to sustain cooperation in vital areas such as food security, public health, and humanitarian aid—sectors where U.S. support remains highly significant. This diplomatic balancing act represents one of Ethiopia’s most understated yet remarkable achievements. Despite its increasing alignment with Global South powers, Ethiopia has continued to receive substantial U.S. aid.
Ethiopia’s ability to maintain strong ties with the West while deepening its cooperation with BRICS members—especially China, Russia, and India—demonstrates a sophisticated practice of diplomatic compartmentalization. Rather than provoking tensions with Western donors, Ethiopian diplomats have prioritized shared humanitarian and development goals, even as Addis Abeba actively courts non-Western partners under the BRICS framework.
This strategic maneuvering has yielded tangible benefits. By tapping into BRICS-backed development financing and other alternative diplomatic channels, Ethiopia has broadened its access to capital, reduced dependence on Western political conditions, and enhanced its international agency. Most importantly, this approach has enabled Ethiopia to avoid the vulnerabilities associated with over-reliance on a single geopolitical bloc, thereby strengthening its capacity to pursue an independent and diversified foreign policy.
The MoU [with Somaliland] signals a broader shift in African diplomatic trends, moving from normative principles towards realpolitik.”
Furthermore, a significant diplomatic realignment is underway in the greater Horn of Africa. The decline of Cold War militaristic affiliations has ushered in a new transactional era within the international system. In this emergent order, ideological adherence holds less sway than the tangible utility derived from engagement with diverse patrons. Both Somaliland and Ethiopia have, to a notable extent, capitalized on this fluid environment to enhance their geostrategic positions.
Despite its lack of formal recognition, Somaliland has developed meaningful partnerships—most notably with the United Arab Emirates—and, significantly, has entered into a historic port-access agreement with Ethiopia. These developments underscore a growing shift away from recognition as the sole measure of international legitimacy. In contexts where trade, security, and infrastructure are at stake, transactional interests are increasingly taking precedence.
In stark contrast, despite its strong relations with Western powers and Gulf allies, Egypt’s capacity to exert regional influence has been constrained by geographical limitations and the increasing assertiveness of other regional actors. Similarly, Somalia remains reliant on Western and Turkish support for its security, yet it lacks the strategic agility to diversify its international relationships to the extent that Ethiopia has achieved.
Finally, it is important to highlight that Ethiopia’s foreign policy illustrates how engagement with BRICS and continued cooperation with Western donors are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, they serve as complementary instruments within a coherent foreign policy framework. This reflects a more nuanced form of strategic autonomy—one grounded in the practical imperatives of national development. As the global power structure continues to shift, Ethiopia’s approach may well serve as a model for other Global South nations seeking to navigate a multipolar world without compromising essential partnerships.
Regional Reactions: Defensive postures, strategic ambiguity
Ethiopia’s assertive diplomacy has triggered significant, though varied, reactions from key regional actors, primarily Egypt and Somalia. Egypt’s foreign policy in the Horn is predicated on two fundamental interests: preserving its historical water entitlements from the Nile and maintaining a preeminent strategic position in the Red Sea. Ethiopia’s actions have directly challenged both these interests. Cairo, in response, has pursued a policy of defensive activism, employing signaling, alliance building, and legalism in an effort to counter Ethiopia’s growing influence.
In response to the Ethiopia–Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding, Egypt issued a strong statement declaring that “no landlocked country would be allowed to build a naval base in the Red Sea.” However, Cairo currently lacks the logistical capacity to unilaterally enforce such a position. Its relationship with Somalia has largely been symbolic, serving more to reaffirm Egypt’s presence as a regional actor than to produce any concrete diplomatic or military front against Ethiopia.
Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa is now characterized by pragmatic alliances, astute strategic maneuvering, and calculated ambiguity.”
On the other hand, Somalia’s diplomatic response to the Ethiopia–Somaliland MoU has been characterized by minimalistic eloquence, reflecting what might be described as a posture of controlled ambiguity. The Somali government faces a dual challenge: on one hand, defending its sovereignty and jurisdiction over Somaliland as an internationally recognized entity; on the other, navigating the complex geopolitics shaped by its limited enforcement capacity and regional isolation.
Under President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, the government in Mogadishu has vocally condemned the MoU as a violation of Somalia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. However, it has been careful not to frame the agreement as a casus belli, a conscious decision that speaks to considerations beyond mere expediency. Geographic proximity, the fact that Ethiopia and Somalia share major trade routes, and Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia through the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) have all constrained Mogadishu’s capacity to escalate the dispute. Domestically, Somalia continues to grapple with fragmented governance, chronic insecurity, and weak institutions—factors that further inhibit the formulation of an assertive foreign policy.
This cautious ambiguity, while tactically risk-averse, has effectively placed Ethiopia in a strong diplomatic position. Addis Abeba has reframed its relationship with Somaliland, emphasizing that it does not constitute a breach of Somalia’s sovereignty but rather represents a negotiation process grounded in mutual benefit—particularly access to the sea and trade. Ethiopia’s appeals to regional integration, port security, and economic growth have quietly resonated with certain African and Gulf states, thereby undermining Somalia’s efforts to rally a consensus against the agreement.
Although Egypt and the Arab League have traditionally expressed symbolic solidarity with Mogadishu, their support has largely remained declarative rather than substantive. Meanwhile, Ethiopia has advanced a proactive foreign policy rooted in non-alignment and South-South cooperation, aligning closely with BRICS member states and cultivating new partnerships. This approach has weakened Egypt’s ability to mobilize a unified Arab-African coalition in defense of Somalia, leaving Mogadishu increasingly isolated.
Somalia has refrained from internationalizing the dispute or escalating it to a level of substantial deterrence, leaving it vulnerable to Ethiopia’s more nuanced and multifaceted diplomacy. While Somalia maintains a morally and legally superior position, Ethiopia has skillfully inverted the narrative, redefining the dispute not as aggression but as a matter of infrastructure development, energy, and regional maritime connectivity. In this context, Somalia’s silence cannot be interpreted as strategic; rather, it reflects institutional paralysis. Such an ineffective response risks conferring de facto legitimacy on Ethiopia’s actions and jeopardizing Somalia’s prospects in future negotiations.
Consequently, Somalia’s inability to mount a coherent counter-diplomacy risks rendering its sovereignty claims purely rhetorical, as Addis Ababa continues to expand its influence and normalize relations with non-traditional partners like Somaliland.
Redrawing geopolitical equation
The evolving diplomatic landscape in the Horn of Africa has given rise to a new regional equation, marked by several defining dynamics. Foremost among these is the shift from multilateralism to bilateralism. Regional bodies such as the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have largely proven ineffective in addressing emerging disputes. This institutional weakness has created space for bilateral engagements, enabling states to advance their strategic interests outside traditional frameworks.
A second notable trend is the ascendancy of strategic action over legal discourse. A clear divergence has emerged between the approaches of countries like Egypt and Somalia—that rely heavily on legal frameworks to assert sovereignty—and those of Ethiopia and Somaliland, countries that prioritize direct, outcome-driven strategies. This development reflects a broader regional pattern in which practical, strategic gains are increasingly valued over rigid legal interpretations.
Thirdly, ambiguity has become a powerful diplomatic instrument. Strategic silence now serves as an effective tool, allowing actors across the region to de-escalate tensions while retaining the flexibility to adapt their positions. This deliberate ambiguity has enabled stakeholders to navigate complex geopolitical realities without foreclosing future diplomatic options.
Conclusion
Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa is now characterized by pragmatic alliances, astute strategic maneuvering, and calculated ambiguity. Through its assertive strategic endeavors, Ethiopia has maintained autonomy over its pivotal national project, the GERD; advanced its efforts to secure maritime access via the MoU with Somaliland; and obtained membership in the influential BRICS bloc. Through these efforts, Ethiopia is actively reshaping the regional landscape.
In contrast, Egypt and Somalia appear to be struggling to adapt, with their reactive and defensive approaches proving insufficient to stem Ethiopia’s growing strategic momentum. The future of the region will likely be shaped less by traditional legal agreements and more by the strategic positioning and diplomatic agility of its key actors, with Ethiopia currently at the forefront. AS
Editor’s Note: Gulaid Yusuf Idaan is a senior lecturer and researcher specializing in diplomacy, politics, and international relations in the Horn of Africa. He can be contacted at Idaan54@gmail.com
Ethiopia’s Strategic Triple Play: How assertive diplomacy on GERD, Somaliland MoU, BRICS membership reshapes Horn of Africa power dynamics
MoFAIC Concludes Two Days National Diaspora Policy Validation Workshop.
By Goth Mohamed Goth
Hargeisa – The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Somaliland concluded a two-day policy dialogue and validation workshop (July 16-17) at Hargeisa’s Ali Jirde Hotel, dedicated to finalizing Somaliland’s National Diaspora Policy Development.
Organized by the Ministry’s Diaspora Department, the event convened academics primarily from Somaliland communities abroad. Participants included diaspora returnees (business people, community leaders, activists youth, women, and professionals), officials from Somaliland ministries and agencies, representatives of Somaliland missions, civil society members, academics, researchers, and other stakeholders.
The Foreign Minister Mr. Abdirahman Daahir Aden Bakaal opened the meeting and highlighted significance of the event. Remarks were also delivered by the Director-General of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mohamed Abdirahman Hassan, Minister of Resettlement & Rehabilitation, Mr. Hassan Mohamed Ducaale, Deputy Ambassador of Somaliland to the UK, Mr. Mohamed Hassan Waes.
During the working sessions, the Diaspora Department presented draft document for the policy, and discussions focused on: Strengthening Engagement: Optimizing diaspora participation in national development and state-building, addressing Challenges: investment barriers, taxation system, land ownership, access to information, reintegration support, facilitating the homecoming of the diaspora-born children, essential services provision upon return, formalising incentives to the diaspora and formulation of required regulatory frameworks, among other topics.
Key insights highlighted:
Somaliland possesses a significant diaspora with substantial financial and intellectual resources currently underutilized.
Structured engagement could unlock vital economic investment, innovation, and modern expertise.
The diaspora encouraged to collaborate on major projects and investments, including Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), supported by enabling legislation and enhanced trust-building.
Participants recommended increasing consultative meetings and knowledge-sharing forums between the diaspora, the Government institutiond and all stakeholders.
Director of the diaspora Department, Ms. Ugbaad Nasir Omar closed the workshop, thanking attendees and announcing registration for the upcoming ,”Somaliland Diaspora Week Conference” (August 2-5, 2025, Serene Servor Hotel, Hargeisa).
Policy Significance:
The National Diaspora Policy i finalization is a priority for the Foreign Ministry, aligned with the Unity & Action Government Agenda and the 3rd National Development Plan. Once ratified, this long-awaited policy will produce strategic frameworks, actionable programs, and impactful projects to elevate diaspora participation and service delivery, marking a significant step in leveraging this vital national asset.
Taiwan and Somaliland Unveil “Taiwan Avenue” in Hargeisa, enhancing their bilateral relationship.
By Goth Mohamed Goth
In a significant step for Taiwan-Somaliland relations, “Taiwan Avenue,” a newly upgraded roadway in Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital, was officially inaugurated.
The ceremony featured Taiwan’s Ambassador Hon. Allen C. Leu, Somaliland’s Foreign Minister Hon. Abdirahman Dahir, Hargeisa Mayor Mr. Abdikarim A. Mooge, Somaliland Taiwan Envoy Hon. Mohamoud Jama Aden Galaal, and numerous officials and guests, reflecting the growing partnership between the two nations amid Taiwan’s limited international presence.
This infrastructure project, financed by the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the local government, aims to improve connectivity and stimulate economic activity in Hargeisa’s bustling areas. The road’s rehabilitation is anticipated to reduce traffic congestion and foster national development, illustrating Taiwan’s commitment to development aid partnerships.
This initiative aligns with Taiwan’s broader diplomatic efforts in Africa, where it seeks to extend its influence while countering China’s “One China” policy.
The Republic of Somaliland, having declared independence from Somalia in 1991 yet remaining unrecognized globally, has cultivated a unique relationship with Taiwan, including establishing representative offices in each other’s capitals.
The inauguration of “Taiwan Avenue” not only marks infrastructural advancement but also signifies a strengthening of bilateral ties, highlighting Taiwan’s support for Somaliland’s recognition and development goals.
As both nations navigate complex geopolitical landscapes, this collaboration exemplifies their shared commitment to mutual benefit and international engagement.
Somaliland Investment Ministry Receives Arab-Africa Economic Council Delegation
By Goth Mohamed Goth
Hargeisa – Ms. Hibaaq Ali Abdi, Director of the Investment Department at Somaliland’s Ministry of Investment and Industry, welcomed a high-level delegation from the Arab-Africa High-Level Economic Council upon their arrival at Hargeisa International Airport.
The delegation, headquartered in Saudi Arabia and led by Ms. Hani Abu Zeid, was received by a welcoming party including senior ministry officials, business leaders, community representatives, and religious scholars.
Director Hibaaq stated the delegation’s visit is an *exploratory mission. Its primary objectives include meeting with various institutions and assessing specific investment opportunities within Somaliland. Key sectors highlighted for potential investment were livestock, fisheries, mining, and broader trade and industry, with the possibility of establishing operational hubs in the country.
Director Hibaaq further emphasized that the growing international investor interest in Somaliland is directly resulting from the recent overseas diplomatic visits undertaken by H.E. President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdilaahi Irro.
The Nile Equation: Trump, Egypt, and Ethiopia in the Crosscurrents of Power and Water
He who controls water controls life. But he who politicizes the flow may one day drown in the current of his own ambition.” – Ancient Nile Proverb (Reimagined)
By Mohamud A. Ahmed – Cagaweyne
In the unforgiving geometry of global politics, few variables carry as much symbolic, strategic, and existential weight as water. And no river embodies that burden more than the Nile, a 6,650-kilometer lifeline stretching across eleven African nations, yet historically treated as the sovereign reserve of one:
As East Africa redefines its voice, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, widely known as GERD, has emerged not just as an engineering feat but as a monument to Ethiopia’s unyielding aspiration. GERD is not simply a dam; it is Ethiopia’s declaration of energy sovereignty and regional pride. Its foundation is cemented not only in concrete but also in a century’s worth of frustration over exclusion from colonial-era water-sharing agreements.
For Egypt, however, the image is starkly different. GERD represents uncertainty. To Cairo, the dam embodies a looming threat to an already fragile dependency on the Nile, upon which more than 97 percent of Egypt’s population relies for freshwater. In Egyptian eyes, GERD is a geopolitical earthquake on their northern doorstep.
With President Donald J. Trump now serving a second term in office, the global tone toward this dispute has shifted once again. His recent comment, “If I were Egypt, I’d want the Nile waters,” stripped of diplomatic tact and filled with implicit alignment, rekindled memories of his earlier tenure, which was markedly unsympathetic to Ethiopia’s position. Trump’s previous endorsement of Egypt’s right to consider military strikes against the dam signaled a provocative disregard for multilateral engagement.
Trump’s first term offered little support to Ethiopia in its quest for development through the Nile. Instead, Washington’s role was often viewed as unbalanced, favoring Egypt’s claims rooted in outdated treaties. His second term, despite the world’s evolved understanding of African agency, seems to echo that same unsettling rhythm. His recent remarks are not only diplomatically clumsy but strategically dangerous, emboldening extremist voices while undermining decades of regional negotiation.
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, located near Ethiopia’s border with Sudan, is Africa’s largest hydroelectric facility. With a reservoir capable of holding 74 billion cubic meters of water and an expected output of over 6,000 megawatts, GERD is a critical infrastructure project meant to power regional development. Yet its political charge far outweighs its engineering blueprint.
Ethiopia insists that the dam is a non-consumptive, run-of-the-river project, passing water downstream after generating power. There is no intention to deprive Egypt or Sudan of their rightful share. What Addis Ababa demands is equitable access, not dominance but fairness. Ethiopia contributes more than 85 percent of the Nile’s flow, yet until recently had little say in how it was managed.
This fundamental imbalance underlines a deeper truth. The Nile is not a colonial inheritance but a shared African asset. As one African hydrologist observed, “Africa cannot rise by denying one nation’s sunrise for the sake of another’s sunset.” GERD, in that light, should be seen not as a threat but as a triumph, a symbol of what Africa can achieve when unshackled from historical asymmetries.
Trump’s tendency to weaponize rhetoric rather than wield it diplomatically puts the entire basin at risk. Statements that imply support for military action against a peaceful development project are not only irresponsible, they are incendiary. When great rivers become bargaining chips, diplomacy becomes a game of levees and leverage.
Historically, Egypt’s control over the Nile was enshrined in the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and reaffirmed in 1959, which granted Egypt and Sudan exclusive rights to the river’s flow. Ethiopia, the source of the Blue Nile, was not party to these agreements. Such colonial arithmetic has long been contested by Addis Ababa and other upstream countries who see no legitimacy in deals made without their consent.
Former Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi captured this sentiment best: “No one can stop Ethiopia from using the Nile. It is ours as much as theirs.”
The GERD now represents a broader African renaissance, an attempt to recalibrate history through infrastructure, sovereignty, and science. But it also reflects the precarious politics of perception. Egypt views Ethiopia’s technical reassurances with suspicion. Trump’s vocal alignment with Cairo only amplifies that distrust.
Consider the Nile not merely as a river, but as a geopolitical equation:
N = f(R, P, T)
Here, N represents the stability of the Nile Basin. R stands for regional trust, P for the distribution of power, and T for the timing of dam operations. Under Trump’s lens, the variables shift dangerously. By rhetorically empowering Egypt, he distorts the equilibrium, reducing regional trust and threatening the delicate timing agreements Ethiopia has promised to uphold.
Despite these tensions, the African Union continues to advocate for dialogue. Ethiopia has filled parts of the reservoir while inviting negotiations over the long-term timetable. But if political actors like Trump continue to fuel division, the space for compromise will narrow.
The stakes extend far beyond water. As one geopolitical strategist warned, if water is the new oil, then the Nile is the Middle East of Africa. Mishandling this dispute could trigger a chain reaction that destabilizes not only the Horn but North Africa as well.
President Trump may believe that the Nile issue is a matter of simple negotiation. But the Nile is not a contract. It is a civilizational current, a river of history, blood, and belief. Reducing it to a transactional dispute is both shortsighted and dangerous.
Ethiopia’s vision is not conquest but cooperation. It is not the weaponization of water but the democratization of development. GERD should stand as a beacon of continental pride, not a flashpoint for continental discord.
Let it be remembered that true statesmanship builds consensus, not conflict. The Nile will continue to flow. But history will record who tried to redirect its course with force rather than fairness. And even the Pharaohs, if they were alive today, might agree.
Mohamud A. Ahmed – Cagaweyne is a Columnist, Political and Security Analyst, and Researcher, Greenlight Advisors Group, Somali Region of Ethiopia. He can be reached at +251900644648
OFFICIAL STATEMENT: PUNTLAND GOVERNMENT REAFFIRMS CONSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY AND CALLS FOR UNITY
Puntland Government of Somalia
Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Democratization
July 16, 2025
PRESS RELEASE
The Puntland Government welcomed the decision of the Dhulbahante clan elders issued in Las Anod city on February 6, 2023, and played a pivotal role in the struggle to reclaim Las Anod city and the broader Sool region on August 25, 2023. The Puntland Government also declared its readiness to host consultations with Dhulbahante clan elders and traditional leaders, followed by a general conference for all Puntland stakeholders to deliberate on the future of the regions inhabited by the Dhulbahante clan. However, the planned consultations to determine the legal future of the clan’s territories and their status within the Puntland governance framework have not yet commenced.
Declaration
The Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Democratization of the Puntland Government hereby declares:
- In full accordance with Article 7 (Sections 1 & 2) and Article 138 (Sections 1 & 2) of the Puntland Constitution, the Sool and Cayn regions (inhabited by the Dhulbahante) and all resident communities fully pledged allegiance to the Puntland State Administration in 1998.
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Any territory or clan seeking autonomous administration within the Puntland Government must first undergo a legal process and engage in comprehensive consultations with the clans that established the Puntland State in 1998.
Therefore, the Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Democratization of the Puntland Government, acknowledging the Dhulbahante clan’s desire for autonomous administration, resolves the following:
- Until a legal status is achieved through broad consultation among all Puntland stakeholders, the Sool and Cayn regions and their resident communities remain fully subject to the Puntland Constitution, laws, and governance framework.
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The Puntland Ministry of Interior condemns the overt hostility of the Federal Government of Somalia toward the security and stability of the Puntland Government, which seeks to undermine Puntland’s security and statehood and sabotage the joint efforts of the Puntland Government, international partners, and global allies against the international terrorism of Daesh and Al-Shabaab.
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The Puntland Government urges the people of Puntland to strengthen their unity and safeguard Puntland’s security and statehood.
…END…
Somaliland Cabinet Approves National Education Policy, Reviews Security & Economy
By Goth Mohamed Goth
The Council of Ministers of the Republic of Somaliland, chaired by H.E. President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Cirro) and attended by H.E. Vice President Mohamed Ali Aw Adbi, convened its 27th session today at the Presidential Palace.
Key outcomes and discussions included:
1. National Security Assessment
Minister of Interior and National Security, Mr. Abdirashid Mohamed Ahmed (Magaalo), briefed the Council on recent incidents in Dhahar District. He affirmed overall national stability, characterizing reported events as routine criminal activity and traffic accidents posing no systemic threat.
2. Economic Growth Strategy Unveiled
Minister of Finance and National Development, Mr. Abdullahi Hassan Aden, and Deputy Minister Mr. Ismail Mawlid Abdullahi presented a comprehensive strategy to accelerate Somaliland’s economy. The plan prioritizes boosting domestic production through investment promotion, industrial support, income enhancement, and policy reforms, targeting key sectors including livestock, fisheries, agriculture, textiles, dairy, and mining.
3. Public Health Risks Highlighted
Minister of Health Development, Dr. Hussein Bashir Hirsi, warned of significant public health risks from unregulated pharmacies and private healthcare facilities. He stressed the urgent need for continuous monitoring, strict enforcement of licensing requirements, and protecting citizens from untrained providers and unsafe medications.
4. Unanimous Approval of National Education Policy
Following extensive deliberation on the long-pending policy, Ministers emphasized the critical need to modernize the education system and elevate quality standards. Minister of Education, Science, and Technology, Professor Ismail Ducaale Yusuf, committed to implementing a contemporary curriculum aligned with global benchmarks and national goals.
President Irro formally tabled the policy for approval, securing its unanimous endorsement by the Council with no objections or abstentions.
Somaliland President Hosts Swiss Ambassador for Bilateral Talks
By Goth Mohamed Goth
Hargeisa – The President of the Republic of Somaliland, H.E. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Irro), today held a meeting with Ambassador Mirko Giulietti, the Swiss Ambassador accredited to both Somaliland and Somalia, at the Presidential Palace. Ambassador Giulietti and his delegation are currently on an official visit to the Republic of Somaliland.
The discussions centered on enhancing peace and stability within the region.
President Cirro expressed gratitude to the Ambassador and his delegation for their visit to Somaliland. He briefed them on the significant progress made by the new administration, particularly in strengthening peace and social cohesion among communities in Somaliland’s eastern regions. The President highlighted the government’s efforts in professionalizing the National Armed Forces and securing their vehicles, emphasizing that Somaliland achieved this independently without external assistance.
Furthermore, the President reaffirmed Somaliland’s firm commitment to bolstering security and stability in the Horn of Africa region. He underscored Somaliland’s dedication to good governance, adherence to democratic principles, and the conduct of free and fair elections.
Ambassador Giulietti commended the peace, stability, and democratic system prevailing in Somaliland, especially given its location in a conflict-prone region. He expressed Switzerland’s readiness to support ongoing peace-building efforts. The Ambassador indicated he would present recommendations to his government on how Switzerland could assist Somaliland in these endeavors. He also welcomed the prospect of dialogue to resolve existing differences.
Somaliland Minister of Foreign affairs opens the National Diaspora Policy Validation Workshop
The Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Somaliland, Hon. Abdirahman Daahir Aadan Bakaal, and the Director-General of the Ministry, Hon. Mohamed Abdirahman, today opened a working validation workshop to finalize the Somaliland National Diaspora Policy. This policy falls under the mandate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MFAIC).
The two days event organized and coordinated by the Diaspora Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the workshop was attended by all stakeholders in Somaliland’s diaspora affairs.
These stakeholders played a significant role in enabling Somaliland to develop a comprehensive and well-rounded policy addressing multifaceted aspects of diaspora engagement.
The speech delivered today by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Somaliland, Hon. Abdirahman Daahir Aadan Bakaal, at the opening of the workshop to finalize and validate the Somaliland National Diaspora Policy (a policy under the mandate of the MFAIC), emphasized the Ministry’s role as the national authority responsible for Diaspora Affairs.
Somaliland Launches National Initiative for Climate-Resilient Education
Ministry Integrates Climate Adaptation into Schools and Curriculum
By Goth Mohamed Goth
Hargeisa – The Somaliland Ministry of Education and Science, under Minister Prof. Ismail Ducale Yusuf, today launched the Smart Climate Change Education Initiative.
The groundbreaking program will develop climate-resilient school infrastructure and embed climate change education into the national curriculum. This aims to increase public awareness and prepare future generations for environmental challenges.
Minister Yusuf cited the Daallo Mountain disaster as a catalyst, stressing the initiative’s role in building national resilience. The launch event saw participation from key ministries, the National Disaster Agency, and Save the Children.
This proactive move aligns Somaliland’s education system with global sustainable development goals, positioning it as a regional leader in climate-responsive education.