In a significant boost to Somaliland’s economy, the Ministry of Investment and Industry and the Ministry of Livestock and Rural Development have signed a landmark investment agreement with Huseyin Bilen Ali Oglu, a Turkey-based company. The deal, formalized in a recent ceremony, focuses on direct investment in Somaliland’s livestock sector, specifically targeting live animals, meat production, and animal feed.
Abdifatah Ismail Ducale, Director General of the Ministry of Investment and Industry, opened the event by outlining the agreement’s objectives, emphasizing its potential to enhance Somaliland’s livestock industry, a cornerstone of the nation’s economy. “This partnership will drive growth and create new opportunities for our pastoralist communities,” Ducale stated.
Further details were provided by Ali Ahmed Abdi, Deputy Minister of Livestock, who highlighted the agreement’s role in modernizing meat processing and improving animal feed supply chains to meet both domestic and export demands.
Hüseyin Bilen Ali Oğlu, Chairman of the Turkish company, expressed enthusiasm for the venture, saying, “We are thrilled to invest in Somaliland’s vibrant livestock sector, contributing to its development and global market reach.”
The ceremony concluded with remarks from the Ministers of Investment and Industry, Said Mohamed Burale, and Livestock, Omar Shucayb. Both underscored the deal’s importance in fostering economic growth and job creation. “This investment aligns with our vision to make Somaliland a hub for livestock production and trade,” Minister Burale noted.
The Ministry of Investment and Industry has been instrumental in securing this agreement, reflecting its ongoing efforts to attract impactful foreign investments. With livestock accounting for a significant portion of Somaliland’s exports, particularly to Gulf countries, this partnership is poised to strengthen the nation’s economic resilience and global competitiveness.
Further details on the agreement’s implementation and economic impact are expected in the coming months as the project progresses.
In a significant step toward enhancing aviation security in Somaliland, the UK Government, through its Somaliland office, has facilitated a comprehensive training program aimed at strengthening airport security measures. The initiative, which focuses on passenger profiling and document screening, underscores the growing partnership between the UK and Somaliland in addressing critical security challenges at Hargeisa Airport.
Rachid Jama, Director General of Somaliland’s Civil Aviation expressed gratitude to the UK Government for their support. “This initiative plays a vital role in strengthening airport security and enhancing the capacity of our staff in passenger profiling and document screening. Your continued support is deeply appreciated,” Jama stated.
The training, held in Hargeisa, brought together a diverse group of participants, including aviation security personnel and local authorities. Louise Hancock, Head of the British Office in Somaliland, also acknowledged the importance of the program, stating on X on May 27, 2025, “Thanks to our UK Home Office International Operations colleagues for providing this crucial training.” Her statement highlights the collaborative efforts between the UK and Somaliland in bolstering security infrastructure.
Somaliland’s aviation sector has been working diligently to meet international standards, as outlined by the Somaliland Ministry of Civil Aviation and Airports Development. “Together, we are committed to building a resilient aviation infrastructure, enhancing the quality of our airports, and upholding international standards to serve both our citizens and global partners,” the Ministry stated on its website. This training aligns with those goals, equipping airport staff with the skills needed to handle complex security challenges.
Hargeisa Airport, a key hub for domestic and international travel, has been under scrutiny for its security protocols, particularly given the Horn Region’s unique challenges.
The UK’s involvement in this training program reflects a broader commitment to supporting Somaliland’s development, particularly in areas like security and infrastructure. The initiative also comes at a time when Hargeisa Airport is working to improve its facilities, offering amenities like currency exchange counters, ATMs, and a Lost & Found service, as noted by Cleartrip.com. Passengers are advised to arrive 3-4 hours early for international flights to navigate security and immigration processes, which are expected to become more rigorous with the implementation of new training protocols.
As Somaliland continues to navigate its complex socio-political landscape, partnerships like this one with the UK Government are seen as vital for building capacity and fostering stability. With aviation security at the forefront, Hargeisa Airport is poised to become a safer and more reliable gateway for travelers, contributing to Somaliland’s broader aspirations for growth and international recognition.
The statement in support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, announced hours after Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Irro) set out on an official trip to Nairobi, is indicative of a calculated balancing act that the Kenyan government has taken in its Horn of Africa policy. And though the timing may be one of diplomatic double-dealing, Kenya is, strategically, pursuing a route to serve its regional interests without overtly destabilising relations with Mogadishu. This is a nuanced yet subtle means of edging closer towards recognising Somaliland’s de facto autonomy – one that reflects wider geopolitical and economic realities.
Contextualizing the Timing
It’s no coincidence or contradiction that Kenya has issued that public statement supporting Somalia’s federal government and has hosted Somaliland’s leader. Kenya’s twin priorities are instead exposed:
Respecting Diplomatic Norms By repeating a commitment to Somalia’s territorial integrity, Kenya is respecting the African Union (AU) norm of sacred colonial borders, which is key for regional solidarity and to not be seen as undermining Mogadishu.
Advancing Strategic Interests: By playing host to Somaliland’s president, Kenya is demonstrating its recognition of Hargeisa as the system-stable in a volatile region. Somaliland’s relatively well-functioning government, control of its territory and economic prospects make it an essential partner for trade and security cooperation.
This has caused Kenyans the dilemma of being able to pursue engagement with Somaliland without having to officially recognize its independence as a general approach between principle and pragmatism.
Why Engage Somaliland? A Pragmatic Calculus
Security Imperatives:
And the relative peace of Somaliland stands in sharp contrast to the protracted insecurity of Somalia. As a frontline and critical state in the fight against Al Shabaab, Kenya has been accruing the benefits of intelligence and border coordination with Hargeisa, which has managed to keep terrorism largely at bay. Nurturing relations with Somaliland serves as a regional counterterrorism counterpoint while easing pressure on Kenyan forces in Somalia.
Economic Opportunities:
Somaliland’s upgraded Berbera Port, run by DP World, is a gateway to landlocked Ethiopia, and a potential competitor with Djibouti. That sums up perfectly with what Kenya’s vision 2030(focus on infrastructure and trade) and use of Berbera as an alternative maritime corridor.) Some mutual benefits also lie in Somaliland’s unexplored resources and the trade in livestock to (a major sector for Kenya).
working relationship with Somaliland, Kenya sets itself up to broker any future Somalia-Somaliland talks, a role it plays in the Horn of Africa. This is consistent with President Ruto’s aspirations to establish Kenya as a continental peacemaker, evidenced by its role in the Sudan and Ethiopia peace talks.
Politicians in Mogadishu have repeatedly described such ties as violations of Somalia’s sovereignty. There are also two immediate qualifiers to Somalia’s grievances, however:
A Government’s Long Reach: The federal government of Somalia has little power — not even in Jubaland or Puntland, let alone Somaliland, which has been operating as a breakaway nation since 1991.
Federalism Hypocrisy: The federal system of government affords Galmudug and Hirshabelle the power of autonomy but not Somaliland. This inconsistency undermines Mogadishu’s moral high-ground to oppose Hargeisa’s self-government.
Kenya’s mention of “consultation with Mogadishu” in its statement is a diplomatic fig leaf, a belief that by saying one engages with Mogadishu while recognizing Somaliland, the pain of appearing to violate Somalia’s sovereignty is eased.
Kenya’s post-plebiscite condition has regional and Kenya’s diplomatic precedent
Kenya isn’t the only one taking this practical approach:
Ethiopia: Signed a shifting MoU with Somaliland in 2023, above Mogadishu’s rejection for economic gains.
UAE: Works through DP World in Berbera and has been investing heavily in the infrastructure of Somaliland in a piece of transactional diplomacy known to be common of Gulf states.
Western Nations: Without according to it full recognition, the U.S. and the EU deepen their contacts with Somaliland in the areas of development and democracy.
Kenya’s decision to recognize Kosovo in 2025 also shows that its willingness to flout diplomatic orthodoxy runs to where it sees its interests. Somaliland’s argument – which is predicated upon historical sovereign territory, governance and stability – is stronger than that of Kosovo, which does not have UN membership.
Is Kenya “Playing Both Sides”? A Misleading Perception
Detractors might characterize the Kenyan behavior as duplicitous, but that misses how modern statecraft works. Kenya’s policy is less about “siding” with Mogadishu or Hargeisa and more about:
Risk Management, by sidestepping head-to-head clash with Somalia (and the AU’s disparate norms) but progressively ‘normalizing’ relations with Somaliland.
Futureproofing: Anticipating Somaliland’s prospective positive progress, and ensuring Kenya is not isolated in forming regional linkages.
Projection of Soft Power: Nairobi as a neutral arena for talks, such as Qatar for resolving global conflicts.
The Way Forward: Gradual Acknowledgement via Involvement
Kenya’s calibrated approach could provide a model for the world. No sudden recognition of Somaliland (such a move could spark conflict); but a step-by-step plan to develop economic, security and diplomatic relations would:
Encourage Somaliland to improve governance and human rights.
Pressure Mogadishu to redress grievances that drive separatism, like marginalisation and resource differences.
Urge organizations like the AU to rethink strict norms in cases of de facto statehood.
Conclusion: Pragmatism over Dogma
Kenya’s dual engagement with Somalia and Somaliland is proof that its foreign policy is one aimed at safeguarding our national interest and regional order, without being constrained by political dogmatism. Although Mogadishu’s sovereignty is politically sacrosanct, facts on the ground of Somaliland’s imaginary independence, peace, and economic promise cannot be dismissed. By doing realpolitik with Hargeisa (with open lines of communication with Mogadishu), Kenya advances a view of a Horn of Africa that values functional governance over traditional notions of diplomatic recognition.
The rest of the world, more frequently paralyzed by bureaucratic caution, could take a lesson from Nairobi’s double-sided approach. Whether or not Somaliland secures recognition, it is a keystone of regional stability: even Kenya’s pragmatic diplomacy recognizes this.
Borama – Dr. Hussein Bashir Hirsi, Minister of Health Development of the Republic of Somaliland, today led a high-level delegation, including representatives from UNFPA, on a pivotal working visit to the Awdal region. The visit aimed to bolster healthcare services and foster partnerships with higher education institutions critical to advancing Somaliland’s health sector.
Key Engagements:
1. Meeting with Regional Health Officials: Minister Hirsi and his team held strategic discussions with the Awdal Regional Health Administration, focusing on progress in healthcare delivery, resource allocation, and challenges facing the region.
2. Tour of Amoud University: The delegation conducted an in-depth review of the university’s health-related programs, including its medical and public health departments. Minister Hirsi underscored the need for academia to align curricula with national healthcare priorities.
3. Institute of Health Sciences Visit: At the institute, the Minister engaged directly with students and faculty, emphasizing the importance of practical training and innovation in health education. Discussions centered on modernizing training facilities and addressing gaps in specialized healthcare skills.
Minister’s Remarks:
Dr. Hirsi praised the Awdal regional leadership and Amoud University for their collaborative spirit, stating, “Our partnership with educational institutions is vital to building a skilled healthcare workforce. We are committed to empowering youth through quality education and ensuring equitable access to healthcare services across Somaliland.” He further highlighted UNFPA’s role in supporting these initiatives, calling for sustained international collaboration.
Focus on Youth and National Development:
The Minister reiterated the government’s dedication to youth empowerment, particularly in the health sector. “Investing in our young professionals today will secure Somaliland’s health tomorrow,” he noted, urging institutions to prioritize research and community-focused training programs.
Next Steps
The Ministry announced plans to allocate additional resources to Awdal’s health infrastructure and expand scholarships for students pursuing medical and public health degrees. A follow-up workshop with UNFPA and regional stakeholders is slated for next month to finalize actionable strategies.
Hargeisa– The Natural Resources, Environment, Production, and Energy Committee of Somaliland’s House of Representatives convened a pivotal consultative meeting today with the Ministry of Energy and Minerals to align efforts on national resource management and energy sector development.
Chaired by Committee Chairman Hon. Suleiman Mohamed Farah (Goox), the session was attended by Vice-Chairman Hon. Abdikarin Meecad Isaaq and committee members, including Hon. Abdihakim Hugur Abdi, Hon. Mahmoud Salax Abdi, Hon. Ahmed Hassan Ali (Casoowe), Hon. Yahye Abdullahi Amin Ararse, Hon. Bashir Hussein Hirsi, alongside Committee Coordinator Mustafe Mohamed Hassan and Clerk Farah Seed Carab.
Energy and Minerals Minister Hon. Eng. Ahmed Jama Barre led the ministry’s delegation, joined by Director General Dr. Shucayb Ismaan Mahmoud, Energy Department Head Abdirazaq Mohamed Abdi, Petroleum Department Head Yusuf Muse Ibrahim, and Minerals Department Head Omar Abdullahi Farah.
Focus on National Priorities
The meeting aimed to provide lawmakers with direct updates on the ministry’s strategic initiatives, particularly in optimizing Somaliland’s natural resources and advancing sustainable energy solutions. Discussions emphasized transparency, intergovernmental coordination, and accelerating progress on critical national projects.
Outcome
Both parties reaffirmed their commitment to enhanced collaboration, pledging to streamline communication and prioritize policies that bolster Somaliland’s resource governance and energy security.
“This dialogue marks a critical step in aligning legislative oversight with executive action for the benefit of all citizens,” stated Committee Chairman Farah.
Addis Ababa-The Minister of Commerce and Tourism of the Republic of Somaliland, Mr. Abdirahman Hassan Nur, led a delegation to Addis Ababa this week, engaging in pivotal talks with Ethiopian officials to bolster cross-border trade and regional cooperation. Accompanied by Mr. Ridwan Abdurashid Sh. Mohamed, Director of the Minister’s Office, and Somaliland’s Trade Attaché in Ethiopia, Minister Nur met with Dr. Kassahun Gofe, Ethiopia’s Minister of Trade and Regional Integration, to advance shared economic priorities.
During the meeting, Minister Gofe emphasized Ethiopia’s commitment to deepening ties with Somaliland, stating, “Our historic relationship and geographic proximity create immense opportunities for mutual growth.” Key outcomes of the discussions include:
Enhanced Bilateral Trade. Both parties pledged to expand cooperation under a proposed Simplified Trade Regime (STR), designed to reduce bureaucratic hurdles, lower tariffs, and stimulate commerce for businesses and communities along shared borders.
Accelerated Agreements: The ministries agreed to prioritize finalizing pending trade and cross-border goods exchange pacts, with a focus on swift ratification to unlock new economic opportunities.
Joint Technical Committee: A bilateral task force will be formed to operationalize the STR and draft actionable strategies for resolving trade bottlenecks, improving customs efficiency, and fostering people-to-people ties.
Minister Nur highlighted the significance of the talks, remarking, “This collaboration marks a critical step toward economic integration, benefiting millions in both regions.”He further thanked Ethiopia for its hospitality and presented Minister Gofe with a symbolic gift reaffirming Somaliland’s commitment to partnership.
The U.S. military is backing off its usual talk of good governance and countering insurgencies’ underlying causes, instead leaning into a message that its fragile allies in Africa must be ready to stand more on their own.
At African Lion, its largest joint training exercise on the continent, that shift was clear: “We need to be able to get our partners to the level of independent operations,” Gen. Michael Langley said in an interview with The Associated Press.
“There needs to be some burden sharing,” Langley, the U.S. military’s top official in Africa, said on Friday, the final day of the exercise.
For four weeks, troops from more than 40 countries rehearsed how to confront threats by air, land, and sea. They flew drones, simulated close-quarters combat and launched satellite-guided rockets in the desert.
Maneuvers mirrored previous editions of African Lion, now in its 21st year. But mostly gone now is language that emphasizes ideas the U.S. once argued set it apart from Russia and China.
Messaging about the interwoven work of defense, diplomacy and development once formed the core of Washington’s security pitch. In their place now are calls for helping allies build capacity to manage their own security, which Langley said was a priority for President Donald Trump’s Defense Department.
“We have our set priorities now — protecting the homeland. And we’re also looking for other countries to contribute to some of these global instability areas,” he said, referencing U.S. support for Sudan.
The shift comes as the U.S. military makes moves to “build a leaner, more lethal force,” including potentially cutting military leadership positions in places like Africa, where America’s rivals continue to deepen their influence.
China has launched its own expansive training program for African militaries. Russian mercenaries are recalibrating and cementing their role as security partner of choice throughout North, West and Central Africa.
In an interview a year ago, Langley emphasized what U.S. military officials have long called a “whole of government approach” to countering insurgency. Even amid setbacks, he defended the U.S. approach and said force alone couldn’t stabilize weak states and protect U.S. interests against the risk of violence spilling out.
“I’ve always professed that AFRICOM is not just a military organization,” Langley said last year. He called good governance an “enduring solution to a number of layered threats — whether it be desertification, whether it be crop failure from changing environments, or whether it be from violent extremist organizations.”
The “whole of government approach” no longer occupies the same place at the center of U.S. messaging, though Langley said holistic efforts have worked in places like Ivory Coast, where development coupled with defense had reduced attacks by jihadi groups near its volatile northern border.
But such successes aren’t a pattern.
“I’ve seen progression and I’ve seen regression,” said Langley, who is scheduled to exit his post later this year.
The U.S. military’s new posture comes even though many African armies remain ill-equipped and insurgent groups expand.
“We see Africa as the epicenter for both al-Qaida and Islamic State,” a senior U.S. defense official said earlier this month, noting both groups had growing regional affiliates and the Islamic State group had shifted command and control to Africa. The official spoke on condition of anonymity because he wasn’t authorized to discuss the issue publicly.
Africa has rarely ranked high on the Pentagon’s list of priorities, but the U.S. has still spent hundreds of millions of dollars on security assistance and has roughly 6,500 Africa Command personnel on the continent. In some regions, the U.S. faces direct competition from Russia and China. In others, regional affiliates of al-Qaida and the IS still require direct military action, Langley said.
The messaging shift from “whole of government” to more burden-sharing comes as fears grow that rising violence could spread beyond hotspots where insurgents have expanded influence and found vacuums in which they can consolidate power.
Parts of of both East and West Africa have emerged as epicenters of violence. In 2024, more than half of the world’s terrorism victims were killed across West Africa’s Sahel, a vast desert territory ruled by military juntas, according to the Institute for Economics and Peace. The group, which compiles yearly terrorism statistics, also found Somalia accounted for 6% of all terrorism-related deaths, making it the deadliest for terrorism in Africa outside the Sahel.
Since Trump took office, the U.S. military has escalated airstrikes in Somalia, targeting IS and al-Shabab operatives. But despite air support, Somalia’s army remains far from being able to maintain security on the ground, Langley acknowledged.
“The Somali National Army is trying to find their way,” Langley said, adding that they had regained some footing after years of setbacks. “There are some things they still need on the battlefield to be very effective.”
Similarly in West Africa, the notion that states could soon have the capacity to counter such threats is a distant prospect, said Beverly Ochieng, an analyst at Control Risks, a security consulting firm. Even before Western influence began to wane in the Sahel, needed military support was limited, threats remained active, and local militaries were left without the tools to confront them.
Western powers with a presence in the Sahel have gradually scaled back their engagement, either by choice or after being pushed out by increasingly hostile governments.
“Many of them do not have very strong air forces and are not able to monitor the movement of militants, especially in areas where roads are very difficult to traverse, the infrastructure is extremely poor,” Ochieng, who specializes in the Sahel and Great Power competition in Africa, said.
The Kenyan government has pulled the brakes on a planned inauguration of the Somaliland Liaison Office into a diplomatic office citing the country’s “unwavering recognition” of the federal government of Somalia.
In a statement released on Monday evening, the State Department for Foreign Affairs directed that the event scheduled for Tuesday, May 27, be abandoned as it had not received necessary approval.
“The Ministry further notes with concern that to the extent the event of 27th May 2025 has not been granted approval from this Ministry, its investiture of the status of a Diplomatic Office does not enjoy the imprimatur of the Republic of Kenya and cannot be allowed to proceed,” read the statement.
Just hours before the ban, Kenya reaffirmed her recognition of the federal government of Somalia amid speculation of a planned Nairobi visit of Somaliland President, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi.
In the initial statement, Kenya said that it acknowledged President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s federal administration out of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, national unity and political independence of Somalia.
“Kenya unequivocally recognises the authority of the Federal Government in Mogadishu as the sole and legitimate body responsible for administering the affairs of Somalia, including those pertaining to its regions,” read the statement in part.
“The government of Kenya considers Somalia as a strategic ally in advancing these shared objectives, and reaffirms its commitment to fostering bilateral relations based on mutual trust, respect for sovereignty and recognition of territorial integrity.”
According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya will seek concurrence of the federal government of Somalia as it continues diplomatic engagements with both Jubaland and Somaliland.
The statement coincides with speculations of a visit of Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi to, among other things, inaugurate a diplomatic mission in Nairobi.
Somalia is one of Kenya’s export destinations notably for the Miraa produce, and partners with Kenya on security including the fight against terrorism.
“As Somalia continues to advance its state building and institutional development agenda, the Government of Kenya stands ready to support these efforts through sustained dialogue, enhanced regional cooperation, and mutually beneficial partnerships,” stated Kenya.
Somalia is navigating domestic political crises including Somaliland’s disputed self-declaration of independence.
Additionally, the federal government has disputed the reelection of Jubaland President Ahmed Madobe.
By any legal standard, Republic of Somaliland is a fully sovereign state from June 26, 1960. It entered the international stage with formal treaties and an independent legal personality.
Yet within five days, this independent state was plunged into a chaotic and unratified “union” with Somalia Italiana. the center of it was Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, a leader whose political gamesmanship and lack of resolve cost Republic of Somaliland its rightful continuity as a sovereign state. Far from being a strategic mastermind, Egal’s actions documented in British historical documents which exposes him as a leader who lacked clarity, firmness, and foresight.
The Bluff That Backfired: Mohamed’s Rushed Motion
One of the most damning insights comes from internal British correspondence dated early April 1960, just before Somaliland’s Legislative Council session. The British representative described Egal and his colleagues as playing a dangerous game:
“They rejected my repeated advice that the motion should be so framed as to allow some room for manoeuvre.”
Here, Egal is shown to have ignored British warnings. Rather than proposing a flexible resolution that allowed for proper negotiation and legal coordination with Somalia, he insisted on pushing a firm motion calling for union on July 1st, 1960 – just days after Somaliland’s independence.
But why the rush?
Egal came under intense pressure from his own political party and colleagues, including members of the Executive Council (equivalent to a cabinet) to change the motion he put forward and demand immediate union with Somalia on July 1, 1960.
“Had he been strong at the start he could probably have got away with it…”
This shows the UK believed Egal caved under political pressure rather than sticking with a more cautious plan.
What was Egal’s original plan?
A moderate motion likely meant:
Entering negotiations with Somalia after its independence.
What motion was actually adopted?
A request for immediate union with Somalia on July 1, just 5 days after Somaliland’s own independence.
But here’s the kicker:
The UK Governor calls this idea “an impossibility” and warns of serious consequences:
Somalia wouldn’t even be independent until July 1, so it couldn’t legally form a union before then.
• British Parliamentary approval and legal preparations would be required in London, which could not be done in five days.
• There were also diplomatic complications (especially with Ethiopia, because of the 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement).
Why is this so important legally?
This is direct evidence that:
1. No legal mechanism existed for Somaliland and Somalia to form a union by July 1, 1960.
2. The union was politically driven, not lawfully constructed.
3. Even British officials described the “immediate union” as impractical, rushed, and dangerous.
“Mohamed has shown increasing signs of weakness and lack of leadership…”
Mohamed refers to Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, then Chief Minister of the Somaliland Protectorate. The British are openly stating that he was not acting as a strong, sovereign leader should especially on matters as critical as union. He was not safeguarding national interests and yielded to pressure rather than asserting a constitutional process.
“…since pressure was put on him last Saturday by some members of the Party, including at least one member of Executive Council…”
The push for immediate union was coming not from a legal framework, but from internal political party pressure. Even the Executive Council, which was supposed to uphold governance, joined the populist tide.
The pressure wasn’t from international treaties, legal agreements, it was from his own internal political faction.
“…that the moderate and sensible motion he was going to propose about union with Somalia should be modified to ask for immediate union on 1st July.”
This was sabotaged by internal pressure demanding a rushed and reckless approach: “immediate union on 1st July.”
“Had he been strong at the start he could probably have got away with it…”
If Egal had stood firm, he could have implemented a gradual and constitutional union, or perhaps protected Somaliland’s sovereignty altogether. But his failure to assert leadership let the extremists of his party hijack the agenda.
“…and Mohamed only found three supporters against it.”
Egal was virtually unskilled and couldn’t resist this illegal and rushed motion. Only three others supported his original approach.
“I have, of course, pointed out to the four Ministers that such a request is an impossibility…”
The British government flatly stated that union on July 1 was legally and constitutionally impossible. Somalia wouldn’t be independent until July 1 and you can’t unite with a state that doesn’t yet exist. The UK Parliament still had to debate relevant legislation. This is concrete proof that the so-called union was illegal – the timing made it unrealizable.
“…because the independent Government of Somalia will not exist until that date and legislation must be enacted in England…”
Britain was saying: “You cannot pass a motion to unite with a country that hasn’t even been born.” Moreover, even British legislation and legal frameworks for Somaliland’s independence had not been completed.
The “union” was based on a fantasy. No treaties were signed, no laws were passed, no ratification occurred.
“I have also emphasized ad nauseam the appalling disadvantages which would flow from so quick a change…”
Ad nauseum means repeatedly to the point of exhaustion. The British official had warned over and over again that rushing into union was deeply dangerous and irresponsible. “So quick a change” refers to the demand for immediate union with Somalia on July 1, 1960, just days after Somaliland’s independence on June 26, 1960.
This was not a strategic, planned transition it was a rash, political stunt. A legitimate union requires time, treaties, ratification, legal frameworks, and protections for both sides. None of that existed. The British saw this as a self-inflicted collapse of the newly born Somaliland state.
“…mentioning particularly the 1954 agreement with Ethiopia and the position with the Civil Service and the sudden rundown which takes place.”
This refers to the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1954, in which the UK (on behalf of Somaliland) negotiated grazing rights and administration of the Haud and Reserved Areas.
These were international legal agreements between Britain and Ethiopia on behalf of Somaliland and administered by the British.
• If Somaliland merged instantly with Somalia, the new “Somali Republic” would inherit none of these obligations unless a formal succession plan was in place. There was no treaty ensuring Somalia would honor Somaliland’s prior agreements.
So the 1954 agreement could be voided, harming Somaliland, and violating international law regarding treaty succession.
The British were also deeply concerned about the fate of civil servants both British and local working in the Protectorate’s administration. Many were under contractual obligations that required stable governance and legal protections. If union occurred instantly, their legal status, pay, and pensions would collapse overnight.
This issue later became the basis for the UK Somaliland Public Officers Agreement (POA) signed after independence &recognized Somaliland’s independent legal personality.
It also shows that no mechanisms were in place to merge administrative systems or protect civil servants during the so-called union.
“…and the sudden rundown which takes place.”
“Rundown” refers to a sudden collapse or withdrawal of existing governance structures and administrative systems. The UK expected a transition period where it would gradually transfer power. But with this reckless plan for immediate union, there would be no such transition. Somaliland would effectively be abandoned administratively with no plan in place. This would lead to chaos in courts, finance, education, and security. It confirms that Somaliland’s after independence was sabotaged, not preserved or united responsibly.
Legal and Political Conclusion:
This line proves that no legal safeguards, no treaty frameworks, and no transition mechanisms were in place for a legitimate union. Instead, the government of Somaliland committed constitutional suicide under political pressure, and the British clearly saw it coming.
> “…he and his colleagues in Executive Council have now got themselves into the position with their parties that makes it impossible for them to do otherwise than to introduce a motion requesting union on 1st July.”
Egal’s leadership had locked himself into a political position, he was no longer in control of the state. The language “makes it impossible” shows that he was forced by party dynamics, not legal reasoning. There was no free and sovereign decision to unite. It was coerced internally and politically thus not valid under international law.
“I am afraid that we must now accept that a motion proposing 1st July will be introduced. I think the Ministers themselves realize that they cannot obtain what they ask… and they are now attempting to put the responsibility for delay either on to the Somalia Government or to Her Majesty’s Government.”
This quote is revealing: Egal and his minsters knew full well that a July 1st union was legally and logistically impossible. Somalia wasn’t even independent yet, and there was no time to ratify a formal Act of Union on the day they become independent. The motion was a political gimmick, calculated bluff meant to force Somalia to reject the union, thereby relieving Somaliland of responsibility in the public eye.
But as the British warned, this plan was deeply flawed:
“They believe it is quite possible that the Somalia representatives will say that their request is impossible. If Abdullahi Issa should take this line, embarrassing pressures could be built up in Somalia…”
Abdullahi Issa (1922–24 March 1988) was the first Prime Minister of Somalia from 29 February 1956 to 1 July 1960
Egal gambled that Somalia’s Prime Minister, Abdullahi Issa, would reject the rushed date. That way.. he could blame Somalia for the failure and walk away without consequences. But if Somalia accepted, Egal would have to commit Somaliland to an unnegotiated union, without a constitution, without guarantees, and without legal ratification.
This, in fact, is exactly what happened.
British Officials Saw It Coming: Mohamed’s Lack of Strength
“This involves obvious dangers, not only for them but also for Somalia and for Her Majesty’s Government.”
The British saw the risks of what was happening. If Somalia said no, it could cause instability inside Somalia against Abdullahi Issa. But if the British said no, it could cause trouble in Somaliland, where people might blame the British for interfering. The British didn’t openly agree with the july 1st date yet, and their government stayed quiet. In fact, the British were so careful they warned against making any public promises about the July 1st union in their official messages.
“I do not feel that Her Majesty’s Government should show its hand about the date at this stage.”
This tells us clearly: Even the colonial power saw the union as premature, and Egal’s motion as unwise.
No Legal Framework, No Ratified Union, No National Interest
Egal’s fatal weakness was this: he tried to satisfy political sentiment about Somali unity, while ducking the responsibility of legally securing Somaliland’s future. Instead of standing firm and demanding a legal process and a negotiation between two sovereign states, he rushed to appease pan-Somalist excitement without protecting Somaliland’s sovereignty.
“They have told me that immediately after Legislative Council they will have informal talks with members of the Somalia Government…”
Informal talks after passing a motion for union? That is the very opposite of statecraft. Egal bypassed the formal treaty process, violating the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and allowed a so-called Act of Union (drafted unilaterally in Mogadishu) to define the terms of the union after the fact a move never ratified by Somaliland’s legislative body.
The UK openly admits that 1 July 1960 is impossible for union:
“…I cannot, however, implement Mr. Lennox-Boyd’s undertaking unless the independent Somalia Government is in being; it is therefore clearly impossible for union to take place on the 1st July.”
Then softened to:
“clearly impossible as a practical matter.”
This is crucial legal evidence that:
• The UK knew union was impossible on 1 July.
• They also knew Somalia was not yet a functioning state (and thus not a legal party to any union).
• The phrase “as a practical matter” is a legal meaning: union could not lawfully occur.
The Outcome:
The July 1 “union” was not a union at all it was an annexation disguised as merger. Somalia continued to use its own colonial flag, its own constitution (drafted in Mogadishu without Somaliland’s input), and its own administrative systems. There was no new flag, no negotiated merger of laws, and no legal continuity for Somaliland.
“Should the Somalia representatives raise no difficulties, we would have to face up to a strong demand for a date…”
This quote shows how Egal’s plan completely relied on Somalia rejecting the union date. Once Somalia didn’t object, Egal had no fallback, no bargaining chip, no legal cover.
“Persuade Mohamed and his colleagues of the unwisdom of introducing a motion which is unrealistic…”
This line proves that even Her Majesty’s Government viewed Mohamed’s motion for union as premature and unrealistic. They recognized legal, procedural, and political gaps – but chose not to stop him outright.
Why Egal pushed ahead anyway?
Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal was politically trapped. He feared being blamed by Somaliland nationalists if he didn’t deliver a quick union (which was falsely sold as pan-Somali unity), and by Somalia if he delayed. He pushed for the motion not because it was legally sound, but because it was politically expedient a way to absolve himself of responsibility by “delivering union” fast and leaving the legal mess to someone else.
British awareness:
The British clearly understood the consequences: if Egal pushed this motion forward, it would backfire on everyone, him, Somalia, and Britain itself. They were warning him not out of concern for Somaliland’s sovereignty, but to avoid political fallout.
“…and may prove embarrassing to them [Mohamed], the Government of Somalia, and Her Majesty’s Government.not yet too late… persuade him that a statesmanlike intention [is better]”
The British were trying to talk Egal down, encouraging him to act “statesmanlike” meaning, take a long-term, careful view rather than rushing into a motion that would lack legitimacy. The fact that they were still trying to stop him at this late date shows how politically desperate Egal had become.
This line underscores that the union was not being driven by legality or statecraft, but by fear, image, and colonial fatigue.
“…there are many practical problems including those which would arise from the termination of the 1954 Agreement…”
If Britain had transferred obligations to Somalia without a ratified union, they’d be breaching international law. Britain’s concern here was that Egal’s motion, if passed and treated as binding, would create a legal vacuum and potentially make Britain liable for damages or international claims.
Britain resolved this potential legal trap by choosing the only course that would protect its own international obligations and prevent legal exposure, On June 26, 1960. Britain granted full sovereignty to Somaliland, as a legally independent state.
The “union” was not ready there was no ratified treaty, no agreed constitution, no binding legal mechanism.
2. Britain had treaty obligations to Somaliland (e.g., the 1954 Public Officers Agreement) that couldn’t just be “inherited” by a third party unless a legitimate successor state existed.
3. Transferring sovereignty to Somalia (instead of to Somaliland itself) without a ratified agreement would have been a direct violation of international law.
So what did Britain do?
Instead of transferring Somaliland directly into a union (which would make them liable), Britain granted Somaliland full independence first, making it a:
• Separate, de jure sovereign entity
• Equal to Somalia
• Free to negotiate a union – or not – on its own terms
This legal independence absolved Britain of any further responsibility or liability. From that point on, any union would have to be conducted as a bilateral agreement between two sovereign states.
British Warnings: The Impossible July 1 Union
British officials were clear and consistent in their documents leading up to July 1, 1960. The Governor of Somaliland protectorate at the time repeatedly communicated the practical and legal impossibility of executing a union by the designated date. Among the most telling excerpts:
• “It was quite impossible to arrange a union by 1st July, 1960, negotiations would necessarily be prolonged…”
• “The independent Government of Somalia will only be established on that day [July 1], so formal agreement could not be reached beforehand.”
• “There would be great difficulties to overcome if union were to be effected on 1st July, given that the contemplated constitutional changes would require legislation in both countries.”
The Retroactive “Fix”: The Italian-Somalian Act of Union
Faced with the legal vacuum and political pressure, the solution came in the form of a retroactive Act of Union drafted and signed only by Somalian representatives months after July 1. This document was an attempt to legitimize the union after it had already been proclaimed and to cover up the lack of Somaliland’s participation.
• No Somaliland signatories appear on the Act of Union.
• The document was effectively imposed on Somaliland without its consent.
• It served as a political tool to justify Somalia’s claim to Somaliland’s territory and sovereignty.
This retroactive “fix” was facilitated by the Italian administration in failed Somalia and Somalian political actors eager to solidify the union narrative. However, it stands as a legal and historical anomaly, a unilateral act that Somaliland has continuously rejected.
Conclusion: A Weak Leader at a Pivotal Moment
Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal may have had noble intentions, but his actions during the 1960 union crisis paint the picture of a leader who lacked the strength to defend the legal identity of his people. He gambled with Somaliland’s sovereignty, tried to shift responsibility through political trickery, and ultimately facilitated the annexation of a sovereign state into a fragile, artificial union.
His behavior was not bold statecraft, it was a failure to lead.
As history has shown, that rushed and unratified “union” collapsed in 1991, when Somaliland finally reasserted and restored its sovereignty back. But the damage Mohamed’s weakness inflicted in 1960 remains. His legacy is not of unity, but of surrender a moment when legal sovereignty was traded for a political illusion, and Somaliland paid the price.
This analysis adds critical legal and historical weight to the core thesis:
There was no legal union between Somaliland and Somalia on 1 July 1960.
• The UK publicly and privately acknowledged this.
• Even internal motions pushing for union were semantic, symbolic, and unofficial.
• No treaty, no joint ratification, and no simultaneous independence and union.
• British officials were fully aware that this was impractical, premature, and lacked legal foundation
In a significant boost to regional development, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Somaliland have made substantial progress on key infrastructure projects, including the expansion of Berbera Port, the development of the Berbera Corridor, and enhancements to the local airport. These initiatives are part of a broader strategic partnership aimed at transforming Somaliland into a major trade hub in East Africa.
Ambassador Bashe Omar, Somaliland’s former envoy to the UAE, highlighted the transformative impact of these projects, stating, “The UAE-Somaliland partnership is delivering real progress. Berbera Port, the Corridor, and the Airport are just the beginning of a new era of development and connectivity for Somaliland and the broader region.” His remarks underscore the collaborative efforts and the vision behind these infrastructure developments.
The Berbera Port, a critical component of this partnership, has seen increased capacity and improved logistics facilities, thanks to investments from UAE-based DP World and support from British International Investment. The port’s expansion is expected to facilitate trade equivalent to nearly 27% of Somaliland’s GDP by 2035, supporting over 53,000 jobs and enhancing access to vital goods for millions in the region.
UK MP Gavin Williamson, during a recent visit, praised the developments, stating, “We see the future, we see its potential, and we recognize that it will lead the whole of East Africa.” His comments reflect growing international recognition of Somaliland’s strategic importance and the UAE’s role in catalyzing this growth.
The Berbera Corridor, a complementary project, aims to improve connectivity between the port and inland areas, further boosting trade and economic activity. Simultaneously, upgrades to the airport are enhancing Somaliland’s capacity to handle international flights, facilitating both commercial and humanitarian operations.
Ambassador Omar also emphasized the broader implications of these projects, noting, “Actions speak louder than accusations. Despite challenges, the tangible progress in infrastructure is a testament to our commitment and the potential for regional stability and economic growth.” His words highlight the resilience of the partnership amidst geopolitical tensions, particularly with neighbors.
As these projects continue to unfold, they promise to deliver long-term benefits, including job creation, improved access to essential goods, and enhanced regional stability. The partnership’s success is a testament to the power of strategic collaboration in driving sustainable development in challenging environments.
Legal and Political Conclusion:
