‎Ethiopia’s pursuit of strategic maritime access entered a potentially pivotal phase last week, following the introduction of the ‘Somaliland Independence Act’ by US Congressman Scott Perry.

‎The move signals a potential shift in Washington’s stance on Somaliland’s statehood—an outcome that could bolster Ethiopia’s ambitions for a naval base and a strategic port partner outside Djibouti.

‎The Horn of Africa has long been shaped by a delicate balance of regional fragility and global rivalries. Yet for many Ethiopians—and increasingly for the government since the political shifts of 2018—the question of sea access is once again moving beyond the realm of traditional diplomacy. It cuts to the heart of national sovereignty, economic self-reliance, and long-term development.

Last week’s reintroduction of a US congressional bill on Somaliland’s recognition—reviving an effort that failed in 2022—has given rise to a renewed sense of possibility.

‎At its core lies the prospect that a narrow corridor along Somaliland’s northern coast could offer Ethiopia the maritime access it has been longing for. The development has sparked a wave of mixed reactions from analysts, regional experts, and Horn of Africa observers.

‎As discussions around Somaliland’s recognition intensify, experts and analysts speaking with The Reporter offer varying interpretations of what such a move could mean for Ethiopia’s regional ambitions—particularly its pursuit of maritime access and geostrategic leverage on the Red Sea.

‎Some foreign policy scholars argue that if a major power—be it the United States or another actor—recognizes Somaliland first, Ethiopia would find it diplomatically easier to follow suit. They suggest this would not represent a fundamental shift, but rather a continuation of Ethiopia’s historically cautious and reactive foreign policy posture.

‎“Ethiopia has often waited for others to move first in cases of contested statehood, particularly where recognition carries international consequences,” Daniel Worku, lecturer and an academic fellow at ETH Zurich’s Center for International Conflict Mediation and Negotiation, noted.

Speaking anonymously, a researcher based in Nairobi, says Ethiopia is not the exception in following the ‘let the others do it first’ approach.

“The talk of recognition of Somaliland by the US is not a new thing and has been an issue since Ethiopia expressed its interest for the Gulf of Aden strip through the MoU signed in January last year. This is driven mainly by the new administration in Washington and the strong lobbying by Somaliland pursuing recognition from the US. There is also strong support for the recognition in the UK. But they don’t seem to want to be the first ones to recognize it. Hence, some groups in the UK, for instance, were urging their government to follow Ethiopia’s example,” he told The Reporter.

‎On the other hand, some caution that recognition alone may not significantly alter Ethiopia’s commercial access to the sea. From this perspective, experts argue that while sovereign access through Somaliland could offer long-term benefits, particularly for transport and trade, its practical implications would remain limited unless backed by robust infrastructure and international legitimacy.

‎‎An expert from Addis Ababa University who wished to remain unnamed emphasizes that Ethiopia’s core interest may not be access for trade per se, but rather the establishment of a naval base—a return to maritime power that Addis Ababa has not wielded since the early 1990s.

‎“The naval question is paramount. If another country recognizes Somaliland first, it reduces the diplomatic burden Ethiopia would otherwise face in establishing military infrastructure on foreign soil,” said the expert.

‎The researcher from Nairobi observes that while Ethiopia wants to formalize its deal with Hargeisa, Somaliland’s November elections and the subsequent change of government has stalled developments.

‎Still, he argued that, looking beyond the MoU, Addis Ababa does not seem content with a lease on the shores of Berbera.

‎”Ethiopia wanted to achieve one important goal through the MoU—make the maritime access question a global agenda. But the ultimate target seems to be to acquire a permanent sea outlet to host its navy, and that seems to be focused on Assab. But that would mean triggering complex geopolitical dynamics in the region, including getting into an elongated war with Eritrea and its allies. Even if Addis Ababa succeeds in toppling Isaias, Eritrea will be a lifelong assignment for Ethiopia,” he told The Reporter.

‎The AAU expert agrees. He contends that the continental backlash can not be expected to be as light as the global.

‎”By international pressure, I mean pressure from outside Africa—whether from Europe or other global powers. Within the immediate region, particularly in the Horn of Africa and the general continental context, I don’t think that pressure will ease to the same extent,” he told The Reporter.

‎The expert argued that the US, as a distant actor pursuing its own strategic interests, may proceed to grant recognition. Perhaps Israel might follow. Other countries may also join. But, according to him, the real question is: Will African countries align themselves with the US position?

‎”For most African nations—including Ethiopia—it’s difficult to accept the idea that a region can simply declare itself an independent state, like Somaliland has done. This is especially true considering that, in the next ten years or so, no African country appears to be in a position to allow such fragmentation within its own borders,” he asserted.

‎The expert explained that until the member countries of the continent overcome this broader continental challenge, the African Union itself is bound by foundational principles.

‎”One of the AU’s earliest legal commitments is the recognition and preservation of colonial-era borders. There may be arguments that Somaliland’s case is unique and deserves exceptional consideration,” he said. “But, unless that argument is sufficiently developed and advanced, Ethiopia following the US in recognizing Somaliland—without careful regional and international calibration—could expose it to significant pressure and even backlash from both African and Arab states.”

An analyst based in Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State argues similarly. Speaking anonymously, he foresees that while recognition by distant actors such as the US or Israel could embolden Ethiopia, he warns that pressure from the African Union, neighboring Horn states, and influential Arab countries would likely persist.

‎“The real challenge is not Washington or Tel Aviv—it’s how Addis Ababa navigates African and Arab responses, which are often far less flexible when it comes to redrawing borders,” said the political analyst.

He posits that this ties into a broader structural issue: the African Union’s enduring commitment to preserving colonial-era borders, and argues that this principle remains a barrier to Somaliland’s recognition, regardless of Western actions.

‎“Unless the AU revisits its founding legal framework, no member state—including Ethiopia—is likely to break ranks easily,” said the analyst.

‎Still, others, like Daniel, concede that Somaliland presents a unique case, with a functional government, democratic institutions, and a history of stability. But, they also warn that without a sustained and credible diplomatic campaign framing it as an exceptional case, Ethiopia’s alignment with early recognizers like the US could provoke backlash.

‎“Recognition without consensus could deepen Ethiopia’s diplomatic isolation in parts of Africa and the Arab world. This is why I am saying Ethiopia should not rush but be cautious in navigating how to guarantee its national interest pursuit,” Daniel concluded.

‎According to the expert from AAU, US recognition of Somaliland would not necessarily mark a rupture with long-standing African norms.

‎“When it comes to the principle of territorial integrity, the US has generally aligned itself with prevailing international norms. It hasn’t actively undermined them,” he said. “So the idea that Washington formally recognizing Somaliland would constitute a radical shift doesn’t quite hold up.”

‎He adds that while comparisons are often drawn with cases like Greenland or maritime disputes in the Gulf of Mexico, the Somaliland case presents unique geopolitical realities that make US recognition more of a calculated decision than a precedent-breaking move.

‎Another expert disagrees.

‎He observes that the US recognition will have significant global geopolitical implications mainly because of Taiwan and the One China Policy the US accepts.

“It will set a precedent for China and could trigger it to launch an attack on Taiwan to avoid potential complications if there is any move to recognize Taiwan. This could intensify the rivalry of these powers in the Horn,” he told The Reporter.

‎Yet, all agree that the more pressing question is not whether recognition upholds or erodes norms, but how it intersects with Ethiopia’s national interests.

‎“The key issue for Ethiopia is how such a move would serve its own national interest. The real question, as I see it, is: How should Ethiopia secure access to the sea? The preferred approach would be one that is legal, peaceful, and internationally acceptable—recognized by the African Union and friendly states. If Ethiopia can achieve this diplomatically rather than through conflict, then it could lead to a better outcome,” said one expert.

‎While US recognition of Somaliland might appear tactically beneficial in the short term—especially if it facilitates Ethiopia’s port diversification or naval ambitions—observers caution that deeper geopolitical complexities are likely to emerge over time.

‎Ethiopia, with a population exceeding 120 million, holds the distinction of being the world’s most populous landlocked nation. Since the early 1990s, its lack of sovereign access to the sea has been a source of persistent grievance.

‎The country has remained almost entirely dependent on Djibouti’s ports to facilitate its import and export activities. Today, over 90 percent of Ethiopia’s international trade is funneled through this single maritime corridor—an arrangement that costs the nation an estimated USD 1.5 to 2 billion annually in port charges and logistics expenses.

‎Against this backdrop of strategic vulnerability, recent discussions around potential US recognition of Somaliland are being closely watched in Addis Ababa—not only for their implications on secession and territorial norms, but more crucially for the new geopolitical alignments they could trigger across the Horn of Africa. While Somaliland already operates as a de facto state, international recognition—especially from a major power like the United States—could mark a turning point, particularly in how external actors position themselves in the region.

‎Experts argue that recognition from Washington could open doors for Somaliland to tap into new economic and security opportunities almost immediately. Western states have already begun retreating from large-scale economic assistance in the Horn, leaving a vacuum increasingly filled by China and Gulf states. Within this shifting landscape, Somaliland could quickly become a contender for alternative financing mechanisms, particularly debt arrangements backed by strategic infrastructure or resource concessions. Coupled with that, the promise—or perception—of security guarantees from a Western bloc could further enhance its appeal.

‎Such a shift, however, would not occur in isolation. Analysts suggest that US recognition could trigger parallel moves from close American allies, particularly Israel, either publicly or behind the scenes. Given Israel’s growing but often discreet engagement in East Africa, and its alignment with US regional interests, Somaliland could emerge as a new point of convergence. This, in turn, could provoke reactions from regional actors already locked in proxy dynamics along the Red Sea corridor, according to experts.

‎”For instance, groups like the Houthis—who have long framed Israel as a primary adversary—might begin to view Somaliland as a new target, especially if it is perceived as hosting Israeli or American military infrastructure,” said one expert.

‎Moreover, there are concerns that such developments could heighten Somalia’s internal volatility.

‎”Militant groups and opposition factions within Somalia may interpret foreign recognition of Somaliland as a provocation, using it to mobilize forces or escalate political tensions in Mogadishu. Any perception of external meddling—particularly by powers like the US and Israel—could inflame nationalist sentiment and further complicate efforts at regional stabilization,” said the expert from Addis Ababa University.

‎He contends that in the midst of these potential shifts, Gulf nations will also be recalibrating their positions.

‎”While many have delayed formal recognition of Israel, the spirit of the Abraham Accords continues to influence Gulf diplomacy. Port investments, maritime security, and the race for strategic footholds along the Red Sea are likely to shape their approach to Somaliland more than ideological considerations,” he asserted.

‎According to him, their posture toward Ethiopia will depend on how Addis Ababa navigates this unfolding alignment—particularly regarding port access and naval ambitions.

‎But perhaps the most immediate questions revolve around Egypt and Eritrea. Both countries have shown increasing willingness to engage with Somalia diplomatically and militarily—tensions were heightened especially after Ethiopia signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Somaliland in January, 2024 .

‎”The possibility of a US-Israel-Somaliland nexus may prompt Cairo and Asmara to tighten coordination with Mogadishu, not only to counterbalance the perceived expansion of American influence but also to assert their own maritime and security interests in the region,” said one expert.

In such a scenario, Ethiopia may find itself tangled in a new web of rivalries—at once pursuing its own corridor to the sea while navigating the ripple effects of great-power competition that threaten to redraw the strategic map of the Horn, according to him.

‎”However, Somalia demonstrated last year just how far it is willing to go, having exhausted nearly all its diplomatic channels to oppose Ethiopia. But I don’t believe we will witness a more intense reaction from Somalia, Eritrea, or Egypt than what we saw then—even if Somaliland gains recognition and Ethiopia begins activating its port and naval base agreements,” he stated.

‎Still, he cautions that rather than external backlash, Ethiopia should focus more on possible internal disturbances, particularly in the Ogaden region.

“It must remain vigilant to ensure that the ripple effects of Somaliland’s recognition do not reverberate inward. Any move taken in the name of national interest must be carefully managed,” said the expert.

‎While the potential US recognition of Somaliland could offer a diplomatic opening for Ethiopia’s long-held maritime ambitions, it also comes with no shortage of geopolitical risk.

‎Ethiopia’s strategic calculus must now account for not only the reactions of neighbors like Somalia, Eritrea, and Egypt but also the broader implications of aligning too closely with external powers such as the United States and Israel.

The analysts and experts who spoke with The Reporter are in agreement that even as Hargeisa positions itself as a stable and functional partner, Addis Ababa must tread cautiously. Its quest for sea access—whether framed as economic necessity or national resurgence—must remain rooted in regional consensus, infrastructural viability, and diplomatic foresight.

‎‎Ultimately, they argue that Ethiopia’s best path forward may lie in crafting a careful balance: leveraging the momentum created by Somaliland’s rising international profile without isolating itself from African or Arab allies. With domestic fragilities still present and regional tensions likely to intensify, the focus for Ethiopian leadership should be on ensuring that any move—however strategic—is sustainable, regionally acceptable, and aligned with long-term national interests.