By Nassir Hussein Kahin, Hargeisa, Somaliland.
The United States is showing increased interest in Somaliland, considering the establishment of an official diplomatic office in Hargeisa as part of its strategy to counter China’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa. This interest coincides with a shift in power in both the U.S. and Somaliland, with a new administration taking over in Hargeisa following Somaliland’s presidential election in November 2024 and with a new Trump administration in Washington.
Recent Posts on X and reports suggest that high-level U.S. officials, including from AFRICOM, have visited Somaliland, signaling a ramp-up in engagement. The potential for a U.S. diplomatic office in Hargeisa, Somaliland has been a topic of discussion, especially with the new Trump administration reportedly considering formal recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign state. This approach is seen as part of a broader strategy to push back against Chinese influence in Africa, highlighted in policy documents like Project 2025.
As a result, Somalia’s Federal Parliament and foreign affairs committees have vehemently intensified their efforts on social media and other platforms, pushing a narrative against U.S. engagement with Somaliland.
These campaigns, laden with inaccuracies and misrepresentations, aim to discredit Somaliland’s legitimate quest for international recognition. However, a closer analysis reveals stark contrasts between Somaliland and Somalia in governance, stability, and their respective relationships with the international community. These differences highlight Somaliland’s credibility as a partner and expose the flaws in the propaganda campaigns designed to undermine its legitimacy.
For example, the claim that Somaliland is a regime rife with human rights abuses, fraudulent elections, and ethnic marginalization is a distortion of reality. For decades, Somaliland has stood out as a beacon of peace and stability in the Horn of Africa, a region notorious for its political volatility. Somaliland has held multiple credible elections, developed an inclusive governance system, and maintained the rule of law. Unlike Mogadishu, which is plagued by corruption, clan-based rivalries, and the diversion of foreign aid, Somaliland has demonstrated resilience and a commitment to democratic principles as the world witnessed in its latest peaceful November 2024 presidential and parliamentary elections and its current inclusive representative government.
Furthermore, the false accusations regarding alleged human rights violations in Somaliland’s eastern regions of Sool, Sanaag, and Cayn (SSC) regions is propaganda.These allegations often originate from groups aiming to delegitimize Somaliland’s authority rather than from neutral observers. The evidence presented thus far remains anecdotal and politicized. Meanwhile, Mogadishu’s governance is under constant scrutiny from international watchdogs that have documented systemic corruption, foreign aid mismanagement, and a pattern of suppressing dissent. The contrast between Somaliland’s relative transparency and Mogadishu’s entrenched problems speaks volumes about their respective governance structures.
Somalia’s criticism of Somaliland’s lobbying efforts in Washington, D.C., is another cornerstone of its propaganda. The claim that Somaliland manipulates U.S. policy is not only ironic but also hypocritical, given Mogadishu’s own notorious reliance on foreign aid to fund extensive lobbying campaigns. Reports indicate that Somalia’s federal government, including President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, has diverted significant resources intended for humanitarian aid to pay high-profile lobbying firms in the U.S. These funds, desperately needed to address Somalia’s dire economic and humanitarian crises, have instead been used to undermine Somaliland’s bid for recognition.
In contrast, Somaliland’s lobbying efforts reflect its democratic aspirations and strategic priorities. Its outreach to the U.S. and other international actors is rooted in its track record of peace, stability, and governance. Far from being an exercise in manipulation, Somaliland’s approach demonstrates its determination to secure recognition on the merits of its accomplishments. It is Mogadishu’s own use of lobbying, funded by diverted aid, that raises serious ethical questions.
The strategic argument against U.S. engagement with Somaliland is deeply flawed. The Berbera Port, developed in partnership with the UAE’s DP World, exemplifies Somaliland’s forward-thinking economic strategy. This modern, high-capacity port connects landlocked Ethiopia to global trade and has become a critical hub for regional commerce. Mogadishu, on the other hand, has struggled to develop comparable infrastructure.
Claims that Zeila could serve as an alternative trade hub are unfounded, as the port lacks the modern facilities and investments that Berbera enjoys. The suggestion that the U.S. should focus instead on establishing a military base in Zeila—a port that Mogadishu claims as part of Somalia’s “Awdal State”—is both impractical and disingenuous. Zeila is geographically and politically part of Somaliland, and Mogadishu’s claim to it lacks historical or legal basis. The reality is that Awdal is an integral part of Somaliland, and its people overwhelmingly support Somaliland’s sovereignty. Such proposals highlight Mogadishu’s desperation on how far its inability to acknowledge the wishes of Somalilanders and its disregard for historical and political realities
Somaliland has consistently demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with Western partners and maintain transparency in its dealings, making it a reliable ally. This stands in stark contrast to Mogadishu’s vulnerability to external influences. Somalia’s close ties with countries like China, Egypt and Turkey, whose regional agendas often conflict with U.S. interests, further complicate its role as a potential partner. Somaliland’s independent and cooperative stance positions it as a more credible option for the U.S. to engage with strategically.
The “One-Somalia” policy, long upheld by the international community, is an outdated framework that fails to reflect the realities on the ground. Somalia remains fractured, with its federal government struggling to exert meaningful authority beyond Mogadishu. The federal system is marred by clan rivalries and governance breakdowns, leaving Somalia unable to unify its various regions. Meanwhile, Somaliland’s decades-long autonomy and its functioning governance structure render the “One-Somalia” unattainable.
Somaliland has consistently resisted destabilizing influences and prioritized regional stability. Unlike Somalia, which has been vulnerable to foreign interference from countries like Egypt, Turkey and China, Somaliland has maintained peaceful relations with its neighbors, including Ethiopia, while focusing on economic development. This independent approach underscores Somaliland’s potential as a reliable partner for the U.S. and other international actors.
Opposition to U.S. engagement with Somaliland often hinges on fears of alienating Somalia or provoking China. Yet this perspective underestimates Somaliland’s importance in countering Chinese expansionism in Africa. By strengthening ties with Hargeisa, the U.S. can support a partner aligned with democratic values and free from Beijing’s influence. Somaliland’s strong diplomatic ties with Taiwan further underscore its willingness to stand against China’s global ambitions.
Recognizing Somaliland’s sovereignty is not merely a geopolitical necessity but also a moral imperative. Somaliland’s consistent governance, economic vision, and political stability offer the U.S. a unique opportunity to strengthen its position in the Horn of Africa. Supporting Somaliland aligns with American values of democracy, self-determination, and responsible governance. As the United States considers its strategy in the Horn of Africa to counter China’s growing influence, establishing a diplomatic presence in Hargeisa, Somaliland emerges as a decisive and pragmatic choice.