In the Horn of Africa, a diplomatic gamble is taking shape that could redraw strategic lines in one of the world’s most contested maritime zones. Somaliland, a self-declared republic unrecognised by any UN member state, is offering the United States something it can ill afford to ignore: access to a coveted stretch of Red Sea coastline and rights to valuable mineral deposits, including lithium, in exchange for what it has been seeking for over three decades — formal recognition.

For the 5.7 million people who live here, independence is not a theoretical aspiration but a political reality since 1991. Yet on most maps, Somaliland still appears as part of Somalia. Now, under President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, the territory is proposing an audacious deal to Washington, one that could recast its role in global geopolitics.

A coastline of consequence

The offer is deceptively straightforward: the US gains a prime military foothold near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, while Somaliland secures recognition. This narrow maritime chokepoint links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, through which roughly a third of global seaborne trade passes.

Recent Houthi rebel attacks on shipping have disrupted trade and inflated insurance costs. For Washington, the prospect of securing a monitoring base in Somaliland, out of reach of adversarial influence and within striking distance of a major shipping artery, is a tempting strategic proposition.

Lithium and leverage

Beyond military positioning, Somaliland is dangling another prize: untapped mineral wealth. Geological surveys suggest deposits of lithium, a key component in batteries for electric vehicles and renewable energy storage, alongside tin, gold, gemstones and industrial minerals.

The potential economic outcomes are starkly different. An extract-and-export model would bring royalties and jobs but risk locking Somaliland into a familiar trap: resource dependency without long-term industrial growth. By contrast, developing local refining and manufacturing could transform the economy, expand employment, and embed the country into global supply chains.

This is where geopolitics sharpens the offer. By securing lithium access with guarantees on responsible mining and supply stability, Somaliland could become a key link in Western efforts to reduce dependence on strategic minerals from China.

From protectorate to pariah

Somaliland’s current path was shaped by a turbulent history. Once the British Protectorate of Somaliland, it gained independence on 26 June 1960 before voluntarily uniting with Italian Somaliland to form Somalia. Discontent grew under centralised rule from Mogadishu, culminating in brutal campaigns against the Isaaq clan during Siad Barre’s dictatorship — violence that many consider genocide.

When Barre fell in 1991, Somaliland broke away, choosing stability over Somalia’s subsequent decades of turmoil. It built governance structures from the ground up, approved a new constitution in 2001, and has since held multiple peaceful elections, including a 2024 vote that saw Abdullahi’s Waddani party take power, one of the few non-violent opposition victories in Africa that year.

Yet democracy has not brought prosperity. The economy, worth around $7 billion in 2022, depends heavily on remittances. International loans and aid from bodies like the World Bank remain inaccessible due to its unrecognised status.

Foreign investment and failed deals

Despite these hurdles, Somaliland has attracted strategic investment. In 2016, DP World took over management of the Port of Berbera, later partnering with Ethiopia. A more recent 2024 deal to grant Ethiopia a 50-year lease on part of Somaliland’s coastline in exchange for recognition collapsed after Mogadishu and Addis Ababa mended ties under Turkish mediation.

That diplomatic setback has likely influenced Hargeisa’s decision to turn to Washington. The US already maintains a heavy military presence in Djibouti, but the crowded, costly port city is also home to China’s first overseas base which is a constant reminder of great power rivalry. Somaliland’s location offers an alternative, free from Beijing’s direct reach.

The recognition roadblock

Reports indicate that US-Somaliland talks over partial recognition and base access have been ongoing since March 2025. But formal recognition faces major obstacles. Washington, like the African Union, officially supports a “One Somalia” policy, wary of encouraging separatist movements across the continent.

Somalia’s federal government strongly opposes Somaliland’s independence, and from a counter-terrorism standpoint, the US is reluctant to weaken Mogadishu’s authority in the fight against Al-Shabaab. In recent African history, only Eritrea and South Sudan have achieved widely accepted statehood after secession.

Given these constraints, President Abdullahi has floated a phased approach: deepen military and economic ties first, and push for formal diplomatic recognition later.

Caught between powers

The timing of Somaliland’s overture is no accident. The Horn of Africa has become a focal point for global competition. The UAE is entrenched at Berbera, China is in Djibouti, and US-China tensions are playing out in the shipping lanes of the Red Sea. For Washington, aligning with a relatively democratic, pro-Western Somaliland could strengthen supply chains, bolster maritime security, and counter Chinese influence, all without the political baggage of Djibouti.

The stakes for Somaliland

For Hargeisa, the stakes could not be higher. A US security partnership and resource deal could transform its economic and diplomatic fortunes. But failure could mean continued limbo: stable, functional, but invisible on the world stage.

After thirty-four years of surviving without recognition, Somaliland is making its boldest move yet. In an era defined by strategic competition, it is betting that the right deal, at the right moment, might finally turn survival into sovereignty.

President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi “Irro” is preparing for a high-stakes diplomatic visit to the United States, a move that could reshape Somaliland’s international standing and accelerate its decades-long pursuit of formal recognition. With scheduled engagements in Washington, D.C., the visit is expected to focus on security cooperation, economic partnerships, and democratic governance positioning Somaliland as a stable and strategic ally in the Horn of Africa.

But as Somaliland steps forward, the trip is also stirring regional anxieties. Somalia, China, and Turkey each with vested interests in the region are watching closely, and in some cases, maneuvering to counter Somaliland’s rising profile.

Strategic Objectives of the Visit

President Irro’s agenda includes:

• Diplomatic Recognition: Advocating for Somaliland’s sovereign status, democratic record, and peaceful governance since 1991.
• Security Cooperation: Offering strategic access to Berbera Port and Airport for U.S. military and logistical use.
• Economic Engagement: Seeking American investment in infrastructure, energy, and digital transformation.
• Democratic Governance: Showcasing Somaliland’s electoral integrity and institutional resilience.

Regional and Global Implications

Somalia’s Reaction: Sabotage and Symbolism

Somalia’s federal government has historically opposed any bilateral engagement with Somaliland that hints at recognition. Earlier this year, Mogadishu attempted to sabotage the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Somaliland and Ethiopia, an act widely seen as an effort to block Somaliland’s access to international platforms.

Despite this, President Irro has signaled that Somaliland remains committed to regional peace and cooperation, and will continue to support Somalia’s development where possible. The message is clear: Somaliland seeks recognition, not confrontation.

However, the anticipated U.S. visit is likely to provoke:

• Diplomatic protests from Mogadishu to the African Union and United Nations.
• Renewed lobbying to preserve the “One Somalia” narrative.
• Escalation of rhetoric portraying Somaliland’s outreach as illegitimate.

Turkey’s Uneasy Balancing Act

Turkey, a close ally of Somalia and a major investor in Mogadishu’s infrastructure, finds itself in a delicate position. Ankara has:

• Built military and civilian infrastructure in Somalia.
• Publicly supported Somalia’s territorial integrity.
• Maintained informal commercial ties with Somaliland.

Yet recent developments have raised eyebrows. A Somaliland Chronicle investigation revealed that Favori Airports, a Turkish company notorious for its controversial management of Mogadishu’s Aden Adde Airport, has been courting Somaliland officials for potential contracts.

The report describes Favori as a firm with a “toxic reputation,” citing:

• UN-documented financial manipulation
• Labor exploitation and sexual harassment scandals
• Political interference and lack of aviation credentials

Critics argue that welcoming Favori into Somaliland’s aviation sector would be a dagger to the heart of sovereignty especially given the company’s deep ties to Turkey’s ruling AKP party and its role in Somalia’s airport operations.

Turkey’s dual posture defending Somalia diplomatically while its companies seek influence in Somaliland underscores the geopolitical complexity surrounding Irro’s visit.

China’s Strategic Calculus

China, which adheres to a strict “One Somalia” policy, views Somaliland’s engagement with the U.S. as a geopolitical threat. Potential responses include:

• Strengthening ties with Mogadishu to counterbalance U.S. influence.
• Offering infrastructure deals to Somaliland to discourage Western alignment.
• Lobbying African Union members to block recognition efforts.

With Berbera emerging as a strategic port, China’s interest in the Red Sea corridor is intensifying—and Somaliland’s diplomatic choices are being closely monitored.

Meetings and Engagements

President Irro’s itinerary is expected to include:

• Consultations with U.S. State Department and Pentagon officials
• Briefings with Congressional committees on foreign affairs and African policy
• Roundtables with think tanks and diaspora leaders
• Strategic discussions on critical minerals, maritime security, and trade

Potential Benefits for Somaliland

If successful, the visit could yield:

• Elevated international profile
• Expanded development aid and investment
• Enhanced security cooperation
• Momentum toward formal recognition

Conclusion: Diplomacy with Eyes Wide Open

President Irro’s visit to Washington is not just a diplomatic milestone, it’s a calculated move in a region where symbolism and sovereignty are tightly contested. As Somalia attempts to block Somaliland’s progress, and Turkey’s corporate interests blur diplomatic lines, Somaliland must tread carefully.

The message from Hargeisa is one of confidence and clarity: Somaliland seeks recognition, but not at the expense of regional peace. It will continue to engage constructively, even with those who oppose its independence because true sovereignty is not just declared, it is demonstrated.

As the world watches, Somaliland steps forward—not in defiance, but in determination.

Mr. Harir Yasin – Freelance Journalist and Political Analyst.

hariryasin2@gmail.com

The Kulmiye Party crushing  defeat in the 2024 presidential election was a clear verdict from the voters—particularly in the Northeast regions, including Burao–where Chairman Mohamed Kahin’s stronghold was. After 14 years in power marked by corruption, lawlessness, bad governance, and economic stagnation, the voters have spoken. Yet instead of reform, Kulmiye’s leadership is locked in a petty power struggle. In Hargeisa, two rival factions are engaged in brinkmanship over who will take control and attempt to rebuild the party.

Kahin, 72, is a veteran politician and former Interior Minister who has served Somaliland for many years. Under the party’s rules, his position as chairman automatically makes him the presidential nominee—without competition. This process is undemocratic, resembling a Soviet-style system, and gives Kahin and his loyalists near-complete control over party operations.

However, the election data tells a different story. The Kulmiye party received fewer votes than expected from Northeast regions—Kahin’s own political home turf—garnering fewer than 9,700 votes there. By contrast, most of the party’s votes came from the Northwest regions, over 180,000,  including the most populous region, Maroodi-Jeex. Despite his prominent role as Interior Minister, the majority of his constituents rejected Kulmiye in 2024, instead voted for Presidential candidate Cirro and the Ictisaam infected Kaah party. In fact, his political base has eroded, the coalition that once backed Kulmiye has collapsed, and the party risks irrelevance unless it changes course.

Critics  of Kahin argue that the party must hold a convention to elect new leaders and an executive committee. They insist that delegate selection should reflect the results of the 2024 election rather than rely on the outdated sub-clan identity quotas reminiscent of Somalia’s discredited 4.5 system. Without reform, Kahin’s Northeastern faction risks losing influence—unless his strategy is simply to play the role of spoiler.

If Kulmiye hopes to challenge the Pro-Somalia  incumbent party successfully, it must follow the will of the people. Those tied to the 2024 election defeat and the military debacle in the insurrection of East Sool—including former President Bihi, Kahin, Samaale, and other entrenched figures—should step aside. The party urgently needs new leadership with a bold agenda because  Somaliland faces coordinated efforts by Pro-Somalia forces  seeking to undermine its independence  through Cirro’s presidency ; defending the nation requires fresh leadership with a bold, unifying agenda.

For over a decade, Kulmiye presided over growing lawlessness and entrenched corruption. Powerful business interests—such as Dahabshiil Group (aka Dhigshill ) and Telesom, a subsidiary of Hormuud Telecommunications, and others act as “States within The State,” much like Russian oligarchs. The political system has become rigged, dominated by oligarchs who manipulate corrupt politicians and media, radical Ictisaam clerics, and clan  identity politics to advance their narrow interests. They are steadily eroding Somaliland’s freedom, economy, and democratic process.The people deserve a party that fights for them, not one that serves merchants of corruption..

The only way to break this stranglehold is for principled legislators—committed to ordinary Somalilanders—to take control of the legislature. An opposition rooted in principle is what Somaliland desperately needs. Prolonging internal disputes, obstructing party functions, or dragging conflicts into court will only damage Kulmiye’s standing and benefit Pro-Somalia Waddani and  the Ictisaam Kaah party, both of whom would like to see Kulmiye disappear like the Udub party. But that will not happen, as Kulmiye still has patriots with grassroots support  willing to protect it as a viable, pro-Somaliland alternative.

Chairman Kahin must remember that Kulmiye is a national institution—not the proprietary  of any sub-clan, faction, or business elite. He must not become a tool for Kaah or their radical Ictisaam allies from East Burao. Instead, he should ensure the party convention is held on time and participate in genuine reform.

I would even further suggest changing the name of the party to Somaliland Party, and its Symbol too.

Kahin issued a letter last week postponing the party convention till June 2027. However, Osman Badmah, a member of the interim executive committee said, “The party convention will take place on schedule; it is illegal for Kahin to unilaterally postpone it. “

Rather than hiding behind  few loyalists and party apparatchiks, Kahin should tour the country—especially the Northwest regions, including Sheikh, Berbera, Hargeisa, Arabsiyo, Gabiley, Geed Ballaadh, Tog Wajaale, and Borama—to meet local party officials, prospective candidates, community leaders, and grassroots activists. Listening to their perspectives will help guide the party’s direction. Denying citizens meaningful participation in the political process is not only odious—it is illegal.

Chairman Kahin should put the country before personal ambition.Gubanmedia calls on Kahin and his supporters to heed voters’ demands: hold the Kulmiye party convention in October,  2025, as the party agreed, including Kahin. However, before the convention, there must be an open and transparent forum where both factions can debate and agree on how delegates will be chosen.

We acknowledge Kahin’s past contributions to Somaliland’s independence and governance. He served and fought well for our country. We want to thank him for his service and dedication.

However, the nation now stands at a crossroads. Somaliland needs leaders with vision—leaders who can fight the entrenched corruption, Clan identity politics, radical Ictisaam clerics, and bad governance that have fueled poverty and lawlessness.

It is time for Kahin to step aside for a new generation committed to saving Somaliland from decline—before the al-Shabaab/Ictisaam syndicates tighten their grip. If we fail to act now, we risk losing our hard-fought freedom!

May Allah Bless Somaliland

Ali-Guban Mohamed

Founder and Editor

Gubanmedia.com, Covering the Horn of Region