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RECOGNITION OF SOMALILAND: A STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE FOR REGIONAL AND GLOBAL STABILITY

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For more than three decades, Somaliland has occupied a unique and often misunderstood position in the international system: a state that functions in practice but remains unrecognized in law. This situation persists despite Somaliland’s consistent commitment to peace, democratic governance, and regional stability in one of the world’s most fragile regions—the Horn of Africa. Today, the question is no longer whether Somaliland qualifies for recognition, but whether continued non-recognition aligns with the principles of the United Nations and the strategic interests of the international community.

Somaliland and the Foundations of International Law

The United Nations Charter provides a clear normative framework for statehood, self-determination, and peaceful international relations.

Article 1(2) of the UN Charter affirms the purpose of the United Nations as developing friendly relations among nations “based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.” Somaliland’s case squarely fits within this principle.

Somaliland was a sovereign entity that gained independence in June 1960 and later entered a voluntary union with Somalia. Following the collapse of the Somali state and the mass atrocities committed against Somaliland’s civilian population in the late 1980s, that union effectively ceased to exist. Somaliland’s decision to restore its sovereignty in 1991 was not an act of secession, but a reassertion of a previously recognized statehood, consistent with historical and legal realities.

Furthermore, Article 55 of the UN Charter emphasizes the promotion of stability, peaceful relations, and economic and social development. Somaliland’s sustained peace, democratic processes, and locally driven reconciliation directly advance these objectives.

A Record Built on Peace, Democracy, and Responsibility

Since 1991, Somaliland has built its political order through indigenous peacebuilding mechanisms, inclusive dialogue, and constitutional governance—without large-scale international military intervention. It has conducted multiple competitive elections, ensured peaceful transfers of power, and maintained internal security in a volatile region.

These achievements reflect the core principles of Article 2(3) of the UN Charter, which obliges parties to settle disputes by peaceful means. Somaliland has consistently pursued dialogue, restraint, and cooperation, avoiding violent confrontation despite prolonged political isolation.

Why Recognition Is a Strategic Necessity

International recognition is not symbolic—it is functional. Under Article 2(1) of the UN Charter, the United Nations is founded on the principle of sovereign equality of states. Denying recognition to a functioning, peaceful, and democratic polity undermines this principle and weakens international consistency.

Recognition would allow Somaliland to:

Formally cooperate with the UN system and international financial institutions

Strengthen maritime security in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden

Contribute more effectively to counterterrorism and anti-piracy efforts

Access development and climate finance through transparent, accountable mechanisms

In an era of global insecurity, excluding a reliable and cooperative partner diminishes regional and international resilience.

Somaliland as a Stabilizing Force in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa is strategically vital to global trade and security. Instability in this region has direct international consequences. Somaliland’s stability, strategic location, and responsible governance make it a net contributor to peace rather than a source of risk.

Recognition would reinforce a positive international norm: that peacebuilding, democratic governance, and respect for international principles are rewarded—not sidelined.

Addressing Concerns About Precedent

Concerns that recognizing Somaliland may encourage fragmentation elsewhere overlook the uniqueness of its case. Somaliland’s history, legal status, and experience of state collapse and mass violence distinguish it clearly from contemporary secessionist movements.

International law does not prohibit recognition; rather, it leaves recognition to the political discretion of states, guided by facts on the ground. In this context, continued non-recognition contradicts both legal logic and strategic realism.

 

A Call for Principled and Pragmatic Diplomacy

The United Nations was founded to prevent conflict, reward peaceful behavior, and uphold the dignity of peoples. Somaliland embodies these values in practice. Continued ambiguity sends a damaging message: that stability, democracy, and restraint are insufficient grounds for international legitimacy.

Recognizing Somaliland would align the UN’s principles with its actions, strengthen regional peace, and uphold the credibility of international law.

Conclusion

In a world facing fragmentation, insecurity, and erosion of trust in global institutions, the international community cannot afford to ignore successful examples of locally driven peace and governance.

Somaliland has demonstrated, over more than three decades, that it is a responsible, peaceful, and democratic actor. Recognition is not a concession—it is a strategic, legal, and moral imperative.

The time has come to replace hesitation with clarity.

Recognition of Somaliland is recognition of stability, responsibility, and the very principles upon which the United Nations was founded.

 

Mohamed Abdi Idiris

International Relations And Diplomacy Expert

 

At What Cost Recognition? Somaliland’s Dangerous Gamble After Israel

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By Yousef Timacade.

For more than three decades, Somaliland has stood apart in the Horn of Africa as an unlikely success story. While the region burned with war, coups, and state collapse, Somaliland built a functioning political system, held multiple elections, transferred power peacefully, and maintained relative security without international recognition. It became, quietly and stubbornly, an icon of peace and democratic aspiration in one of the world’s most volatile neighborhoods. That hard-won stability is now under serious threat.

Following Israel’s full recognition of Somaliland, the territory finds itself thrust into a dangerous geopolitical storm, one that risks undoing decades of patient state-building. What was meant to be a diplomatic breakthrough may instead expose Somaliland to unprecedented hostility, internal fragmentation, and regional destabilization.

Israel’s recognition has dramatically altered Somaliland’s strategic environment. Almost overnight, Somaliland has attracted hostility not only from Somalia which has always opposed its independence but also from a widening constellation of actors: DjiboutiTurkeyIranthe Houthis, China, and many Arab and Muslim-majority countries. For Somalia, the move reinforces its narrative that Somaliland is undermining regional unity and aligning with foreign powers against Somali interests. For Turkey extremely invested in Somalia politically, militarily, and economically it represents a challenge to Ankara’s influence in the Horn. Iran and the Houthis, locked in broader confrontation with Israel and its allies, may see Somaliland as a legitimate target in a widening proxy conflict. China, which fiercely guards the principle of territorial integrity and has close ties with Mogadishu, is unlikely to tolerate a precedent that emboldens separatist movements elsewhere.

What makes this moment particularly perilous is not just diplomatic isolation, but the convergence of ideological, religious, and strategic opposition. Somaliland has never before faced such a broad alignment of adversaries at the same time. External pressure alone would be challenging enough. But the greater danger may lie within.

Somaliland’s peace has always rested on a delicate social contract one built on clan reconciliation, consensus politics, and a shared commitment to avoiding the chaos seen elsewhere in Somalia. That contract is vulnerable. Religious groups and militant networks could exploit popular anger over Israel’s recognition to radicalize segments of society, framing the issue not as foreign policy but as a religious betrayal. Even if the government maintains tight security, the risk of lone-wolf attacks, protests turning violent, or underground militancy cannot be dismissed.

More worrying still is the potential manipulation of clan divisions. Somaliland’s unity has endured because political competition has largely stayed within agreed boundaries. But foreign actors particularly wealthy states such as Qatar, which has a record of using financial influence in regional politics could inject large sums of money to fracture that unity. Funding rival elites, media campaigns, or local grievances could push clans into confrontation, turning political disagreement into social conflict.

History across the Horn of Africa offers a grim lesson: once clan polarization turns violent, it is extremely difficult to contain. This crisis unfolds in a Horn of Africa already under immense strain. Sudan is collapsing into civil war. Ethiopia remains fragile after internal conflict. Somalia continues to battle insurgency. Red Sea shipping lanes are militarized. The Houthis are expanding their reach.

In such an environment, even a small spark can ignite a wider blaze. Somaliland’s greatest strategic asset has always been its image: a peaceful, reliable, internally legitimate polity. If that image cracks if violence erupts or political cohesion weakens—Somaliland risks losing not only security but also the moral argument that underpins its quest for international recognition.

The central question now facing Hargeisa is stark: can Somaliland retain relations with Israel while preserving peace, unity, and security at home? This requires sober realism. Recognition, by itself, does not guarantee protection. Israel has its own regional priorities, and Somaliland is unlikely to rank high when weighed against Israel’s core security concerns. The United States, often assumed to follow Israel’s lead, has historically been cautious if not indifferent—toward Somaliland’s recognition, prioritizing stability in Somalia over rewarding Somaliland’s success.

Are Israel and the U.S. reliable long-term allies capable and willing to shield Somaliland from diplomatic isolation, economic pressure, and covert destabilization? There is, at present, little evidence to justify such confidence. That does not mean Somaliland must reverse course but it does mean it must recalibrate. Quiet diplomacy with Muslim-majority countries, reassurance to neighbors, and clear messaging that Somaliland is not becoming a forward base in regional conflicts are essential. Internally, the government must double down on inclusion, transparency, and dialogue, leaving no space for religious or clan-based manipulation.

Somaliland has always prided itself on wisdom born of hardship. This is one of those moments when restraint, not defiance, will determine survival. Recognition is not an end in itself. Peace is. Democracy is. Unity is. If those are sacrificed in pursuit of symbolic victories, Somaliland risks becoming another cautionary tale in a region already full of them.

The choice before Somaliland is not between Israel and its enemies but between strategic patience and reckless exposure. History will judge which path it takes.

 

Yousef Timacade.

Yousef Timacade is a lawyer, legal analyst, and commentator with over a decade of experience in program management, research, and human rights advocacy. He holds master’s degrees in both law and executive management, which have equipped him with a unique blend of legal expertise and leadership acumen. Throughout his career, he has worked with numerous national and international non-governmental organizations, driving impactful initiatives in the areas of human rights, policy development, and social justice. Currently, Yousef serves as the Country Coordinator for Somalia, Somaliland and Djibouti at SIHA Network, where he leads efforts to advance women’s rights and advocate for marginalized communities.

Staged “ISIS-Style” Violence Targeting Jews, Somalilanders Reported in Mogadishu

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Alarming Public Display Raises Fears of Escalating Radicalization and State Complicity

By Jama Ayaanle Feyte

MOGADISHU — Disturbing reports and emerging footage indicate that staged scenes of extremist violence, explicitly mimicking ISIS-style executions targeting Jewish and Somalilander figures, were recently enacted on the streets of the Somali capital. The public displays, described by monitors as highly choreographed, are raising urgent questions about the level of radicalization within segments of the population and the apparent acquiescence—and at times alleged encouragement—of local authorities.

The Incident

According to multiple social media accounts and regional analysts, actors performed simulated beheadings and “slaughter” scenes, employing iconography and propaganda methods characteristic of the Islamic State. The performances explicitly identified their victims as representing Jewish people and individuals from Somaliland, a breakaway region in northern Somalia that declares independence but lacks international recognition.

 

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ess accounts suggest that security forces were present but did not intervene to stop the spectacles, with some allegations that officials actively incited the crowds. The Somali federal government has not yet issued an official statement regarding the incident.

Broader Context: A Fragile State and Imported Hatred

Somalia remains entrenched in a decades-long struggle for stability. The internationally recognized Federal Government in Mogadishu is engaged in a major military offensive against the potent Al-Shabaab insurgency, which itself is affiliated with Al-Qaeda. A smaller ISIS-affiliate also operates in parts of the country.

The nation has no significant indigenous Jewish population, its historic community having emigrated decades ago. Analysts note that antisemitic tropes are not rooted in local Somali culture but have been imported via global jihadist propaganda. Their use here appears primarily symbolic, intended to paint any opposition—in this case, Somalilanders—as part of a malign, global conspiracy.

“Including ‘Jews’ as a target is a classic radical Islamist propaganda tool to universalize and legitimize local conflicts,” explains Dr. Abdiweli Ali, a regional security scholar. “Linking the Somaliland issue to this global hate narrative is dangerously inflammatory and suggests a strategic escalation in rhetoric.”

Potential Repercussions: Security, Diplomacy, and Society

The immediate and long-term consequences of such an event, if verified, could be severe:

· Security: Security experts warn this could serve as a potent recruitment tool for militant groups, seeking to outbid each other in extremism. It also risks inciting real-world violence against political opponents branded as “collaborators.”
· Diplomacy: Somalia’s vital partnerships with Western nations providing military, humanitarian, and budgetary aid could face severe strain. Donor countries, particularly the United States and European Union members, would likely demand a forceful government response and accountability.
· Social Cohesion: The act deliberately deepens societal fractures, undermining long-term reconciliation and state-building efforts. It creates a climate of fear for minorities and political dissidents.
· International Law: Legal experts state that public incitement to group-based violence could constitute a crime under international law, potentially attracting scrutiny from United Nations human rights bodies.

Calls for Verification and Response

Major human rights organizations and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) are likely to be pressed for comment and investigation. Verification of the precise nature of the events, the identities of the organizers, and the degree of any official involvement is critical.

“The Somali government has a responsibility to immediately and unequivocally condemn this hateful incitement, investigate any official complicity, and reaffirm its commitment to protecting all communities within its territory,” said a Nairobi-based diplomat speaking on condition of anonymity.

As of now, the streets of Mogadishu are reportedly calm. However, the reverberations from this staged theater of hatred are only just beginning, posing a significant new test for a government already battling on multiple fronts for its survival and legitimacy.

President Irro Hails National Unity, Foresees Wave of New Recognitions, and Urges Citizens to Protect Somaliland’s Gains

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In a rousing year-end address to his cabinet, President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi Irro delivered an optimistic message to the people of Somaliland, framing Israel’s historic recognition as the precursor to broader international acceptance.

“I bring good news to our people that many other nations are joining us on this path and will, God willing, recognize us,” President Irro declared. His statement fueled hope following Israel’s groundbreaking decision on December 26 to become the first United Nations member state to formally acknowledge Somaliland’s sovereignty.

The president expressed deep gratitude to cabinet members, parliamentarians from both houses, political parties, the media, and civil society for their steadfast support in advancing Somaliland’s quest for global recognition. He emphasized the nation’s exceptional solidarity, describing it as “100% united” behind this objective.

In a pointed critique of opposition from Mogadishu, President Irro lauded Somaliland’s religious scholars as “heroes” for standing firmly with their people. He contrasted this with what he described as Somalia’s primary tactic of deploying clerics to undermine recognition efforts.

“Somalia’s main weapon in its campaign to block our recognition was the use of religious scholars. I thank our own scholars for proving themselves to be heroes of the people,” he stated.

Addressing international adversaries, the president urged citizens to remain clear-eyed and vigilant. “Somaliland has clearly identified the individuals and nations that have shown hostility toward our state and our people. We harbor no hostility toward others, but we must know our enemies, distinguish them from our friends, and label them accordingly. Our friends will remain our friends.”

To those dismayed by Somaliland’s progress, he issued a firm rebuttal: “Attend to your own affairs; no one can halt Somaliland’s recognition.”

Shifting focus to domestic security, President Irro issued a passionate call for collective vigilance, proposing that every citizen play an active role in safeguarding the nation.

“I propose that we all become guardians of our own security—that every citizen serves as a police officer, an intelligence agent, a peacekeeper, and a sentinel. We must unite,” he urged. “We need to strengthen that unity further and collectively protect this victory.”

As the year closes, President Irro’s address stands as a rallying cry for continued resilience and shared effort, positioning Somaliland on the brink of enhanced international legitimacy after more than three decades of de facto independence.

Israel recognition of Somaliland strategic realignment, not misstep: expert

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Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as an independent state reflects strategic realignment, rewarding governance and state-building, say Horn of Africa experts, despite regional opposition.

NAIROBI, Kenya, Nov 31 — Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as an independent state represents a strategic and principled realignment rather than a diplomatic miscalculation, according to Horn of Africa security expert Jama Ayaanle Feyte.

In an extensive analysis, Feyte pushed back against claims that the move risks destabilising the region, arguing instead that it acknowledges long-standing political realities and rewards effective governance.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is not a puzzling misstep but a paradigm-shifting decision,” he said.

‎“Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is not a puzzling misstep but a paradigm-shifting decision,” he said.


‎“It courageously affirms a successful model of indigenous state-building and establishes a vital strategic bridgehead in a critical maritime corridor.”

‎Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991 and has operated with its own government, security institutions, and electoral processes for more than three decades, though it has remained without formal international recognition.

‎Feyte argues that Israel’s decision reflects facts on the ground rather than ideological adventurism.

‎“This recognition is not a reckless ‘rush’ but a principled stand for the right to self-determination,” he said, noting that Somaliland “has maintained peace, held democratic elections, and built functional institutions for over three decades.”

‎Recalibrating alliances
‎The expert situates the recognition within wider Horn of Africa and Red Sea security dynamics, highlighting Somaliland’s coastline along the Bab el-Mandeb Strait as a critical global maritime chokepoint. He frames the move as part of a broader recalibration of alliances.

‎Addressing concerns over clan divisions and territorial disputes, Feyte dismissed arguments that internal diversity undermines Somaliland’s legitimacy.

‎“All nations, especially in their formative stages, navigate complex internal dynamics,” he said, arguing that Somaliland has “successfully channelled these identities into a hybrid system of governance that has maintained peace.”

‎He cited recent peace initiatives in the Sanaag region, where communities adopted resolutions reaffirming coexistence, support for Somaliland’s sovereignty, and cooperation with government-led reconciliation efforts.

‎Israel’s recognition, however, runs counter to the long-standing position of regional organisations.

‎The African Union (AU), the East African Community (EAC), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have consistently reaffirmed their recognition of Somalia as a single, sovereign state, emphasising territorial integrity and unity as core principles underpinning regional stability.

‎These blocs have previously warned that unilateral recognition of breakaway regions risks undermining ongoing peacebuilding and state-building efforts in Somalia, a position aligned with broader AU policy on inherited colonial borders.

‎Feyte rejected claims that the recognition strengthens extremist narratives.

‎“Al-Shabaab’s ideology is inherently oppositional; it will manufacture grievances regardless of Israeli actions,” he said, adding that recognition instead strengthens institutions capable of countering radicalisation.

‎While acknowledging potential diplomatic backlash, Feyte argued it is temporary.

‎“The diplomatic isolation is temporary and tactical,” he said, maintaining that the long-term gains outweigh resistance rooted in what he describes as a “failed regional status quo.”

‎In this article:African Union, African Union Somalia policy, al-Shabaab counter, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Diplomacy, diplomatic realignment, EAC, East African Community, governance, Horn of Africa, Horn of Africa security, IGAD, IGAD stance Somaliland, Independence, israel, Israel Somaliland recognition, Jama Ayaanle Feyte, regional politics, regional stability Horn of Africa, Security, Somaliland, Somaliland governance, Somaliland independence, Somaliland peace initiatives, Somaliland state-building, State-Building

Source: Capital FM.KE

Diplomatic Tensions Escalate as Somaliland and Djibouti Recall Ambassadors

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The Republic of Somaliland has recalled its ambassador to Djibouti for consultations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation announced in an official statement on Wednesday.

“The Government of the Republic of Somaliland has recalled its Representative to the Republic of Djibouti to Hargeisa for consultations, as part of ongoing diplomatic engagements and in line with established diplomatic practice,” the ministry stated.

Officials confirmed that Somaliland’s ambassador is now in Hargeisa.

In a related development, Djibouti’s ambassador to Somaliland departed Hargeisa for Djibouti on Wednesday morning, according to officials familiar with the matter, confirming a reciprocal diplomatic withdrawal.

Analysts and diplomatic sources link the moves to Israel’s recent recognition of Somaliland—a decision Djibouti has publicly opposed—which has heightened diplomatic friction in the Horn of Africa. Djibouti has firmly rejected Somaliland’s increasing international engagements, a stance that has significantly strained bilateral relations.

Diplomatic sources indicate that the mutual recall of ambassadors represents a formal step to express displeasure while maintaining diplomatic ties, falling short of a complete severance of relations.

Neither government has elaborated on the nature or expected duration of the consultations. Djibouti’s foreign ministry did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

“Djibouti needs to adjust to the reality that Somaliland is now a recognized state and is on a path toward broader international acceptance. Djibouti cannot stop that momentum,” said Rashid Abdi, a research director specializing in the Horn of Africa.

He added, “Fomenting unrest or destabilizing Somaliland would be unwise. A calmer, more pragmatic approach based on cooperation rather than confrontation would better serve regional stability

Fostering Inclusion Through Fellowship: Somaliland Roundtable Advances Minority Youth in Garnering Job Skills

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By Goth Mohamed Goth

Hargeisa – A one-day roundtable on Inclusion Fellowships for Minority Youth in Somaliland, organized by the Daami Youth Development Organization (DYDO), was successfully held on 30 December 2025 at the Imperial Hotel in Hargeisa.

The event convened 15 representatives from institutions hosting project fellows—including SONSAF, SONYO, and the National Human Rights Commission—to strengthen collaboration, share progress, and discuss strategies for enhancing the participation of minority youth in governance and decision-making.

During the discussions, officers from the host institutions shared their experiences, reflections, and perspectives on the fellowship placements, emphasizing the value of collaboration, mentorship, and institutional engagement. Fellows also spoke about the benefits of the program, citing increased professional exposure, greater confidence, opportunities to engage in decision-making environments, and stronger links between their communities and public institutions.

This roundtable is part of the broader project “Inclusion Fellowships for Minority Youth in Somaliland,” implemented by DYDO in partnership with the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF) and Minority Rights Group International (MRG) as the international implementing partner. The initiative places young professionals from minority communities into local government and public institutions, helping to bridge trust gaps, promote diversity, and advance inclusive governance.

Participants reaffirmed their commitment to supporting minority fellows, strengthening mentorship, and co-developing strategies to ensure sustainability, institutional engagement, and long-term inclusion outcomes.

Among the beneficiaries of the program was Mr. Abdigani Said Jama from Borame in the Awdal region.
“In a world often fixated on university degrees, vocational training offers a powerful and pragmatic path for youth, building stronger economies and more fulfilled individuals,” he said. “This hands-on education is far more than just an ‘alternative’—it’s a direct launchpad into a meaningful career.” Mr. Abdigani added that after two years in the fellowship, he is now equipped with the necessary skills for employment.

Another graduate, Ms. Hinda Ahmed Jama, who also completed two years in the program, stated, “With my newly acquired skills, I can now fully utilize and harness my potential.”

 

 

Mr. Ahmed Mohamoud, Executive Director of the Somaliland Youth Umbrella (SONYO), the organization tasked with training the youth, noted, “Our organization strives to prepare youth for direct employability.” He explained that graduates gain job-ready skills from day one, significantly shortening the transition from education to employment and addressing critical skills gaps in talent-hungry industries. “Modern vocational training is at the forefront of technology,” he added, “preparing youth for the jobs of the future in fields like robotics, cybersecurity, coding, and multimedia.”

A representative from the Somaliland Human Rights Commission, speaking at the event, emphasized, “Empowering our youth goes beyond the workshop. The impact transcends technical proficiency. These programs foster critical soft skills—punctuality, teamwork, problem-solving, and communication—within a collaborative environment. For learners who thrive outside a conventional lecture hall, vocational training can reignite engagement and self-belief, providing a clear vision for their future.

African Union’s contradictory stand on Somaliland is outdated

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Israel’s recognition of Somaliland exposes contradictions in the African Union’s Somaliland policy, reviving debate over borders, precedent and regional stability. A former AU official argues the African Union’s stance is outdated, contradictory, and compromised by conflicts of interest — and that the AU is ignoring its own findings on Somaliland’s legal and democratic record

WASHINGTON — Israel’s decision on Dec. 26, 2025, to recognize the Republic of Somaliland as a sovereign state has done more than reshape diplomatic calculations in the Horn of Africa. It has exposed what critics describe as a deep and unresolved contradiction at the heart of the African Union’s policy toward one of the continent’s most stable yet unrecognized polities.

For Somalilanders, the announcement marked long-sought validation of a political reality they have sustained for more than three decades. For the African Union, it prompted a swift and familiar response: condemnation grounded in the principle of colonial-era borders and warnings about the risks of precedent.

That reaction, argues Prof. Wafula Okumu — a former African Union staffer and a leading scholar of the institution — reflects an approach that is not only outdated, but fundamentally at odds with the AU’s own history, findings and professed values.

“Israel’s recognition sent a clear message to the international community,” Okumu writes. “It is time to acknowledge the political and legal realities of the Horn of Africa.” Instead, he says, the AU defaulted to “a rigid interpretation of colonial-era borders that is not only outdated but also riddled with contradictions.”

African Union’s Somaliland Policy Faces Scrutiny After Israel Recognition
Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, a former Djibouti’s Foreign Minister and the current AU Commission Chairperson

A reflexive response

The AU’s position rests on its long-standing commitment to the 1964 Cairo Resolution, which enshrines the inviolability of borders inherited at independence. In response to Israel’s move, AU Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf warned that recognizing Somaliland would set a “dangerous precedent” and threaten the “unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Somalia.”

To Okumu, that argument represents a selective reading of history — and a failure of institutional memory.

“This argument conveniently ignores the AU’s own 2005 fact-finding mission to Somaliland, which came to a starkly different conclusion,” he writes.

That mission, dispatched by the AU itself, examined the legal, political and historical basis of Somaliland’s claim. Its findings now stand in sharp contrast to the organization’s current posture.

African Union’s Somaliland Policy Faces Scrutiny After Israel RecognitionA report the AU cannot escape

The 2005 report concluded that the 1960 union between Somaliland and Somalia was “never ratified” and had “malfunctioned,” resulting in “enormous injustice and suffering to the people of the region.” Far from framing Somaliland’s quest for recognition as destabilizing, the mission described it as “historically unique and self-justified in African political history.”

Crucially, the report rejected the very argument the AU now deploys. Somaliland’s case, it said, “should not be linked to the notion of ‘opening a Pandora’s box.’” Instead, the mission urged the AU to develop a “special method of dealing with this outstanding case.”

For Okumu, the implications are unavoidable. “The 2005 AU report is a damning indictment of the AU’s current stance,” he writes.

The mission also documented Somaliland’s political evolution since declaring independence in 1991. It praised the territory for “steadfastly laying the foundations of a democratic State, clothed with the relevant attributes of a ‘modern State.’” The report highlighted a constitution with separation of powers, the coexistence of traditional governance structures with elected institutions, active opposition parties and an emerging independent press.

Over more than three decades, Somaliland has maintained internal peace and built democratic institutions — a record that, as Okumu notes, stands in stark contrast to the chronic instability that has plagued Somalia.

Somaliland Is Not De Facto — It Is De Jure, The Legal Case for SovereigntyPrecedent, selectively applied

Despite this record, the AU has clung to what Okumu describes as a “dogmatic and outdated principle,” repudiating its own carefully considered findings in favor of reflexive opposition.

The oft-cited fear of precedent, he argues, rings hollow. The AU has already recognized the independence of Eritrea from Ethiopia and South Sudan from Sudan — both cases involving violent conflict and the creation of new international borders.

“In both cases, the AU accepted the reality of new states born from conflict and political division,” Okumu writes. “Somaliland’s case is arguably stronger, as it is not creating a new border but restoring an old one.”

The 1960 union between Somaliland and Somalia, he emphasizes, was voluntary and never formally ratified by either side. That legal reality, Okumu argues, places Somaliland outside the typical framework of secessionist movements.

By refusing to engage with Somaliland, the AU is not preventing fragmentation, he says. “It is punishing a successful and democratic state for the failures of its neighbor, while simultaneously betraying its own institutional memory and established precedents.”

Regional Reactions to Israel’s Recognition of Somaliland, Diplomatic Orthodoxy Meets Legal RealityQuestions of credibility at the top

Okumu’s critique goes beyond doctrine to the question of credibility. He argues that the AU’s stance is further compromised by a clear conflict of interest at the highest level of the AU Commission.

Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf is from Djibouti, a country whose economy is heavily dependent on port revenues. Djibouti is widely reported to derive up to 80 percent of its national income from port fees, with Ethiopia paying an estimated $1.5 billion to $2 billion annually for access to its ports.

The Ethiopia–Somaliland memorandum of understanding — which offers Ethiopia sea access in exchange for recognition — represents, in Okumu’s words, “a direct and existential threat to Djibouti’s economy.”

“For the AU Chairperson to be the primary voice of opposition to Somaliland’s recognition, when his own country has a direct and substantial financial interest in maintaining the status quo, is a serious conflict of interest,” Okumu writes. Such circumstances, he argues, undermine the AU’s credibility and raise doubts about the objectivity of its decision-making.

African Union’s Somaliland Policy Faces Scrutiny After Israel Recognition
Prof. Wafula Okumu, a former African Union staffer and the author of several publications on the AU, including “The African Union at 20: African Perspectives on Progress, Challenges and Prospects.”

A choice before the AU

As international dynamics shift, Okumu argues that the African Union faces a defining choice: cling to an abstract and inconsistent interpretation of borders, or align its policies with reality, precedent and its own stated principles.

“It is time for the African Union to abandon its dogmatic, contradictory, and compromised stance on Somaliland,” he writes. Rather than issuing “reflexive condemnations,” the AU should revisit the conclusions of its 2005 mission and engage Somaliland “in a constructive and forward-looking manner.”

Recognition, Okumu insists, would not undermine African stability. On the contrary, it would “reward a successful democracy, promote regional peace, and uphold the very principles of self-determination and justice that the AU claims to champion.”

“The world is moving on,” he concludes, “and the AU risks being left behind, clinging to an outdated map that no longer reflects the reality on the ground.”

Israel Recognizes Somaliland; Will the US Be Next?

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By Michael Rubin

On December 26, 2025, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar announced on X that Israel has recognized Somaliland, becoming the first country in the world to officially do so. “Over the past year, based on an extensive and ongoing dialogue, relations between Israel and Somaliland have taken shape,” he wrote. “Today we signed an agreement on mutual recognition and the establishment of full diplomatic relations, which will include the appointment of ambassadors and the opening of embassies.”

Fireworks erupted in Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital. Five years ago, the Somaliland president and foreign minister expressed their private interest in Israel ties, though it took some time to convince the Netanyahu government to engage. But Somalilanders were patient and persistent. They are one of only two African countries today who side with Taiwan over China. They embrace the United Kingdom and European Union and partner with the United Arab Emirates over more reactionary Arab states.

 

Background on Somaliland 

 

Somali nationalists claim that recognition of Somaliland’s independence is an assault on Somali unity. But the unity they imagine never existed. The five-pointed white star on Somalia’s pale blue flag, the “star of unity,” stands for five regions where ethnic Somalis reside: the former Italian colony (today’s Somalia), the former British colony (today’s Somaliland), the former French coaling station that today is Djibouti, Ethiopia’s Ogaden region, and Kenya’s North Eastern province.

In 1960, Somaliland won its independence from Britain. Five days later, however, Somaliland’s government chose to unify with the former Italian colony to form what would become Somalia.

It was not a happy marriage, and the former British protectorate split from Somalia in 1991.

Somali culture is clan-based, and the country’s Cold War dictator, Mohamed Siad Barre, first repressed and then attempted outright genocide of the Isaaq clan predominant in the former British Somaliland, which formed the core of resistance against his brutal rule. By the time Somalis ousted Siad Barre, his forces, augmented by South African and Angolan mercenaries, had killed up to 200,000 Isaaq clan members and leveled 80 percent of the city of Hargeisa.

Siad Barre’s exile in 1991 led to a vacuum of power throughout the country. The world remembers the period for its anarchy, starvation, warlordism, and “Black Hawk Down” chaos. But few know of the political consensus reached that year in Somaliland.

Rather than fight each other, Somalilander business leaders quarantined their political elites until they were able to hash out a new compact. Academics debate why it was successful. Some suggest the bifurcation between business and political elites helped. Businessmen looked at Mogadishu and feared a repeat; they accepted no political dysfunction that could interrupt their livestock trade.

Others say it was a unique moment. The Somali and Somaliland diasporas can afford to take uncompromising, radical positions that they don’t have to live with every day. But the Somaliland compact of 1991 came before cellphones, so local elites could create a fait accompli before diaspora communities could interfere.

Somalilanders lacked modern banking and mortgage financing. This meant they self-financed homes and businesses based on family loans. Noone was willing to subordinate themselves to politicians in Mogadishu consistently ranked by Transparency International as among the world’s most corrupt. Few Somalilanders living today have any direct memory of Mogadishu’s rule. They know history, though. To demand Isaaqs live under Mogadishu would be akin to demanding Rwandan Tutsis subordinate themselves to Hutu genocidaires; it simply was never realistic.

Unlike many other would-be secessionist states like the Kurds in Iraq, Biafrans in Nigeria, or Ambazonians in Cameroon, Somaliland’s borders were set by treaty under the British protectorate. Somalia might harbor irredentist claims to the regions of Sool and Sanaag, but this was always more the attempts of Mogadishu to distract from its own failures and China’s desire to wage a proxy war against Taiwan, with whom Somaliland partners.

 

Source: Shutterstock.

 

Self Reliance Worked

 

Somaliland’s three decades of isolation, in hindsight, may have been a blessing. The international community dumped billions of dollars of aid into Mogadishu, but Somaliland received next to none and had to raise its own budget from customs revenue and taxation. As a result, Somaliland built capacity and a tax base. It is home to major investments—multibillion-dollar communications and mobile money companies, one of the continent’s largest Coca Cola bottling plants, hotels, resorts, and transportation companies. Its deep-water Berbera port now competes with Djibouti and Mombasa. Most businesses that the international community labels as Somali are actually owned by Somalilanders.

Nowhere has Somaliland demonstrated its capacity and accountability more than with elections. Somaliland, unlike Somalia, has held more than eight elections since 1991. One was decided by less than 100 votes of more than one million cast. Each change of power has been peaceful. Somaliland elections are among the world’s most secure, with voter registration certified with biometric iris scans.

 

Who is Next? 

 

Ethiopians often joke they will not be the first country to recognize Somaliland, but they will not be the third either. Somalilanders initially sought to win recognition in West Africa from countries like Gambia—another country that resumed independence after a failed confederation. Gambia only reversed course after receiving significant bribes from Somaliland opponents.

The United States itself is actively debating recognition. The Pentagon and many in Congress favor it, though the State Department is dragging its feet.

Recognition of Somaliland has strategic benefits. The port of Berbera has one of the longest airstrips in Africa; it used to be an emergency landing strip for the U.S. space shuttle program. Several years ago, the United Arab Emirates renovated and upgraded it. Today, it could become a hub for anti-Houthi operations. The United States could also use Berbera as an alternative to an increasingly crowded Djibouti and interference from the Chinese base there.

What Israel has realized is that unity in the case of Somalia and Somaliland is neither realistic nor moral. They have gone separate ways since 1991, with Somaliland moving in positive directions that should be rewarded with recognition and engagement.

Michael Rubin
Michael Rubin is director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He is a frequent visitor to Somaliland.

The AU Chairperson’s Subjective Stance on Somaliland: A Gross Violation of Principle, Precedent, and Politics

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The swift and unequivocal statement issued on 26 December 2025 by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Dr. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, rejecting any recognition of Somaliland following reports of Israeli diplomatic engagement, has reignited a complex continental debate. While framed as a steadfast defense of AU principles, a deeper examination reveals a contentious intersection of legal precedent, historical context, and perceived national interest that challenges the narrative of pure institutional objectivity.

The Stated Principle: Uti Possidetis and Sovereignty

The Chairperson’s statement anchors itself firmly on the bedrock principle of uti possidetis juris—that borders inherited at independence are sacrosanct. This is explicitly rooted in:

  1. The OAU’s 1964 Cairo Declaration: As referenced, this seminal resolution states: “All Member States pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence.” This principle was adopted to prevent endless border wars and preserve continental stability.

  2. The Constitutive Act of the African Union: Which emphasizes “the respect of borders existing on achievement of independence” and “the sovereign equality and interdependence among Member States.”

On this basis, the Chairperson’s defense of Somalia’s territorial integrity is institutionally inconsistent as Somaliland happens to have gained international recognition at time of independence on 26 June 1960, and it has never claimed an inch beyond the borders the British rulers left it at the time. There is neither a plausible excuse nor a legal basis to the argument that a unilateral recognition of Somaliland is a precedent-setting fissure that could invite chaos, encouraging secessionist movements across a continent with numerous internal borders drawn by colonial fiat.

Precedents and International Instruments

The Chairperson rashly ignores that Somaliland’s claim for recognition finds substantial, albeit not uniformly applied, support in both continental precedents and evolving norms of international law. Within Africa, the most compelling analogue is Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia in 1993. While facilitated by the collapse of the Derg regime, Eritrea’s independence was legitimized by a UN-supervised referendum and, critically, African acceptance based on its distinct colonial history as Italian Eritrea and the violent dissolution of its federation with Ethiopia. This demonstrates that the uti possidetis principle can accommodate the reversion to a colonial boundary following the failure of a post-independence union. Similarly, the peaceful dissolution of the Senegambia Confederation in 1989 shows that African states can legally untie failed political mergers. Beyond Africa, the recognition of Bangladesh (1971), which seceded from Pakistan despite initial international reluctance, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, where internal republican borders became international boundaries, underscore that territorial integrity is not an absolute shield against political realities when a state collapses or a union fails irrevocably.

Internationally, Somaliland’s case engages the contested but emerging doctrine of “remedial secession.” This argument posits that a distinct political entity may legitimately claim the right to independent statehood if it has suffered severe, persistent injustices and human rights abuses within a larger state, and if the original unifying compact has been nullified. The International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) Advisory Opinion on Kosovo (2010) is pivotal here. The Court concluded that “international law contains no prohibition on declarations of independence.” While not a green light for secession, this detached the act of declaring independence from illegality, placing the onus on the political realm of recognition. Somaliland argues it meets the high bar for remedial secession: it suffered a documented genocide (the 1988 bombing of Hargeisa), endured the complete collapse of the union state (Somalia from 1991), and has since maintained a separate, peaceful, and democratic existence for over three decades. Furthermore, its consistent governance satisfies the Montevideo Convention criteria for statehood: a defined territory (its colonial borders), a permanent population, a government (with peaceful transitions of power), and a clear capacity to enter into relations with other states (evidenced by de facto agreements with Ethiopia, the UAE, and others). Thus, the Chairperson’s rigid stance not only ignores the AU’s own 2005 findings but also overlooks a body of state practice and legal argument that treats Somaliland not as a reckless secessionist project, but as a sui generis case of a restored sovereign entity emerging from the ashes of a defunct union.

Moreover, drawing upon the archived and internationally documented evidence, including military communiqués, the withdrawal of Somaliland from its union with Somalia was not merely a political secession but a morally and legally justified act of collective self-preservation. The documents reveal a systematic, state-sanctioned campaign of annihilation directed against the people of Somaliland in the late 1980s, orchestrated by the regime of Siad Barre and executed by commanders like his son-in-law, General Mohamed Saeed Hirsi “Morgan.” This was not conventional warfare but a genocide, characterized by the deliberate aerial bombardment of cities (Hargeisa, Burao), mass executions, and a policy aimed at the “total wipeout” of the population and the erasure of their homesteads. The union, originally entered into voluntarily in 1960, had become a vehicle for their extermination. Therefore, the people of Somaliland were not simply dissolving a dysfunctional political contract; they were exercising a fundamental right—indeed, a necessity—to flee a murderous state that had abrogated every duty of protection and had instead become the primary agent of their destruction. Their subsequent declaration of independence in 1991 was an act of reclaiming the sovereignty that had been violated by genocide, a restoration of the safe political vessel necessary for their survival, and a direct application of the principle that no people are obliged to remain in a union that seeks their extinction

The Omitted Precedent: The 2005 AU Fact-Finding Mission

Critics, however, argue that the Chairperson’s statement presents an incomplete picture by failing to acknowledge the unique and historically grounded case of Somaliland, as documented by the AU’s own bodies. The most critical omission is the 2005 AU Fact-Finding Mission Report led by Deputy President Moody Awori of Kenya.

The mission’s findings, which have informed years of behind-the-scenes debate, concluded that Somaliland’s case was “unique and self-justified in African political history” and that “the union between Somaliland and Somalia was never ratified and also malfunctioned when it went into action from 1960 to 1990.” The report noted Somaliland’s restoration of its “independent colonial borders,” its functioning democratic institutions, and its relative stability. Crucially, it recommended that the “AU should find a special method of dealing with this outstanding case” as it does not conflict with the principle of uti possidetis but rather represents a dissolution of a failed union.

By issuing a blanket condemnation without referencing this nuanced internal history, the Chairperson is accused of applying the principle of territorial integrity rigidly while ignoring the AU’s own documented exploration of its exceptions and complexities. This selective citation of institutional history undermines the AU’s capacity for nuanced conflict resolution.

The Subjective Lens: The Djibouti Factor

The alacrity of the condemnation—on the very day of the reported Israeli move—invites scrutiny of the Chairperson’s subjective position. As a senior statesman from Djibouti, his stance is inevitably viewed through the prism of his nation’s longstanding and vocal opposition to Somaliland’s recognition. This opposition is multi-faceted:

  • Djibouti views the port of Berbera in Somaliland, developed in partnership with UAE-based DP World, as a direct strategic and commercial threat to its own port dominance and status as a regional logistics hub.

  • Djibouti and Somaliland are competitors for influence in the Horn of Africa and for partnerships with global powers.

  • The “Greater Somalia” Paradox: The historical irony noted by critics is profound. One point on the Somali flag’s star historically represented the Somali-inhabited territories of the French Coast (now Djibouti), part of the pan-Somali “Greater Somalia” dream. Djibouti’s own 1977 independence, achieved through a referendum that rejected union with Somalia, affirmed its separation based on its distinct colonial boundary (French Somaliland). This mirrors Somaliland’s argument: it seeks recognition within its former British Somaliland colonial borders, not a new partition of Somalia.

Thus, the Chairperson is accused of leveraging his institutional role to advance a national policy that itself rests on the very colonial borders principle he invokes, but applied in a manner favorable to Djibouti’s interests.

Consequences for Institutional Dignity and Political Future

This incident carries significant implications for both the AU Commission’s dignity and Dr. Youssouf’s political standing.

  1. Erosion of Perceived Impartiality

The Commission’s Chairperson is expected to be the chief diplomat and neutral arbiter of the Union. When statements are perceived as rapid endorsements of one member state’s position (Somalia), influenced by the Chair’s national interests (Djibouti), against the documented unique case of a region (Somaliland), it risks painting the Commission as an instrument of political blocs rather than a guardian of principled, case-by-case deliberation. This damages its credibility in mediating other intra-state disputes.

The move solidifies his image in Somaliland and among its allies (Ethiopia, certain Gulf states) as an adversarial figure. This could limit his effectiveness in mediating future regional crises, such as the Ethiopia-Somalia tensions over the MoU with Somaliland.

Other member states with active secessionist movements may applaud the rigid, ill-motivated stance. However, states that value nuanced sovereignty or are themselves products of post-colonial political unions (e.g., Tanzania, Cameroon) may view the omission of the 2005 report as intellectually dishonest, weakening his moral authority.

His tenure will be remembered for a subjectively wobbly, traditionalist stance on sovereignty. Whether this helps or hinders a potential legacy as a unifying figure depends on the evolution of the Somaliland issue. If the situation festers or escalates, critics will point to this moment as a missed opportunity for more engaged, creative diplomacy. His ability to secure future continental roles may depend on the political balance between those who see his action as principled defense and those who see it as a politicized obstruction to resolving an enduring anomaly.

The Chairperson’s statement is nowhere near an honest reassertion of a fundamental, stability-preserving AU principle. By ignoring the Union’s own exploratory work on the singular case of Somaliland and by acting with a speed that aligns perfectly with his home country’s long-held geopolitical and economic opposition, he has opened himself to charges of wielding principle selectively. The dignity of the AU Commission suffers when its pronouncements appear to overlook its own archives. For Dr. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, the immediate reward is the applause of sovereignty’s staunchest defenders. The long-term cost may be a diminished perception of his impartiality and a legacy intertwined with the perpetuation of a frozen conflict, rather than its resolution. In the high-stakes politics of the Horn of Africa, where principle and interest are perpetually entangled, such actions are rarely forgotten.