By Michael Rubin

On June 30, 2025, Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi Irro arrived in Qatar to meet Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim al-Thani, who serves jointly as the Gulf emirate’s prime minister and foreign minister. While previous Somaliland presidents have visited Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the visit to Qatar appeared a diplomatic breakthrough as it marked an expansion of Somaliland’s diplomatic reach.

The Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affair’s subsequent statement was an insult, one that should disqualify Qatar from any future role mediating conflict in the Horn of Africa. The Qatari press release stated that it was “the State of Qatar’s belief that Somalia’s future is built through openness and constructive communication among all its components, to ensure respect for the sovereignty and national unity of the Federal Republic of Somalia.”

Put aside the fact that neither under President Mohamed Farmaajo nor Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has the Federal Republic of Somalia respected constitutional federalism. Under both unelected leaders, the federal government in Mogadishu has encroached on the constitutional rights of Puntland, Jubaland, and the South West State. Both Farmaajo and Hassan Sheikh divert international aid both to their own supporters in Mogadishu and into their own personal bank accounts in countries and territories like Switzerland and Gibraltar or property holdings in Türkiye. The two presidents have hijacked security assistance meant to counter Al-Shabaab in order to target their own political opponents. Meanwhile, both leaders have repeatedly sold Somalia’s sovereignty to the highest bidder, be it Chinese fishing concessions or land grants and construction contracts to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. How does Qatar expect anyone to respect Somalia’s sovereignty when its own leaders make a mockery of it?

Greater Somalia is as much a dream as Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arabism. Djibouti, Ethiopia’s Ogaden region, and Kenya’s former North Eastern Province will never return to Mogadishu’s control. To state that is not to be anti-Somali; after all, more Somalis live outside Mogadishu’s control than inside it and have no desire to be under Mogadishu’s control. Why would they wish to join the least successful, most corrupt, and most dysfunctional government of all Somali-populated regions? If Qatar is not going to share its gas wealth with Egypt’s impoverished Arab population or subject itself to Baghdad’s corrupt leadership, why does Qatar believe Somaliland should give Somalia title over its scant resources?

The real hypocrisy, however, is in any comparison of historical grounds by which Qatar justifies its independence with its own hostility toward Somaliland’s case. After Arabs ended Persian rule over Bahrain in the 18th century AD, the Khalifa family took control not only ruling Bahrain’s main island, but also the Qatar peninsula. Over subsequent decades, the ancestors of Qatar’s current rulers staged a number of rebellions, most unsuccessful. In 1861, Bahrain and British Indian authorities signed a treaty recognizing Qatar as a dependent of Bahrain. In the 1867 Bahrain-Qatar War, Bahraini forces completely destroyed Doha and Wakrah, much as Somali dictator Siad Barre would do just over a century later to Hargeisa. The following year, the British government imposed a settlement that recognized Qatar as a separate entity. In effect, British forces confirmed Qatar’s distinctness less than two decades before they did the same thing in Somaliland.

While Qatar appears to buy the logic of Somali irredentists who say that clan identity should not be enough to justify Somaliland’s independence, the only difference between Qatar, Bahrain’s ruling family, and the United Arab Emirates is tribal identity. Qataris may argue that the Khalifa’s family’s persecution of the Thani shaped Qatari identity, but even the worst Bahraini persecution of Qatari tribes was orders of magnitude less than what Siad Barre and his Darod clan did to Somaliland’s Isaaq.

Qatar’s hypocrisy gets worse, however. While the British may have recognized the Qataris as a distinct entity in 1868, independence did not come for more than a century. Prior to the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, Qatar, Bahrain, and the seven Trucial State were part of a joint Federation of Arab Emirates that the British envisioned maintaining control. Qatar and Bahrain ultimately refused to cede political and economic autonomy to the new entity; both unilaterally declared their independence leaving the Trucial States to form the United Arab Emirates.

Qatar today enjoys full independence. Its history shows its willingness to take up arms to prevent outside powers from forcing it into an unwanted union with either Bahrain or the United Arab Emirates. How ironic, then, that its approach to Somaliland forgets its own origins and negates the principles upon which its independence rests.

Michael Rubin is director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum and a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

Introduction

In June 2025, Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi Irro made a landmark visit to Doha at the invitation of the Qatari government. The visit marked the first official diplomatic engagement between the Republic of Somaliland and the State of Qatar, a move that has stirred both intrigue and alarm. While some hailed it as a diplomatic breakthrough, others saw it as a calculated maneuver by Qatar to reassert its influence in the Horn of Africa and subtly undermine Somaliland’s sovereignty.

The stakes are high. In a region shaped by Gulf rivalries, proxy politics, and contested sovereignties, the question is not just what Qatar wants from Somaliland but what Somaliland stands to lose.

Qatar’s Statement: A Diplomatic Sleight of Hand

Following the meeting, Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a carefully worded statement. While it acknowledged the meeting with President Irro, it referred to him as the leader of a “member state of the Federal Republic of Somalia” and reaffirmed Qatar’s “full commitment to Somalia’s sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity”.

This language was not accidental. It signaled that Qatar does not recognize Somaliland as an independent state and continues to align itself with Mogadishu’s position. More importantly, it framed the engagement not as a bilateral diplomatic breakthrough, but as part of Qatar’s broader efforts to promote Somali unity.

For Somaliland, this was a diplomatic trap: a high-profile meeting that appeared to elevate its status, but in fact reinforced the very narrative it has spent decades trying to dismantle.

Strategic Threats: What’s at Stake for Somaliland?

While diplomatic engagement with Qatar may offer short-term visibility and economic promises, it also carries significant risks:

1. Reintegration Pressure via Mediation

Qatar has a long history of brokering deals in the Horn of Africa, often under the guise of reconciliation. There is growing concern that Doha’s ultimate aim is to revive Somaliland–Somalia talks not as equals, but under the framework of Somali unity. This could undermine Somaliland’s decades-long quest for sovereign recognition and reframe its status as a “breakaway region” rather than a self-governing republic.

2. Undermining Existing Alliances

Somaliland’s most significant foreign investment comes from the UAE, particularly through DP World’s development of Berbera Port. Qatar’s rivalry with the UAE is well-documented, and its entry into Somaliland’s diplomatic orbit could strain Hargeisa’s relationship with Abu Dhabi. If Qatar’s influence grows, it may attempt to counterbalance or even displace Emirati interests jeopardizing critical infrastructure and trade projects.

3. Intelligence and Political Influence Operations

Qatar has been accused in other contexts of using soft power and financial networks to shape political outcomes. In Somaliland, where institutions are still consolidating, there is a risk that Qatari engagement could fuel elite co-optation, fund proxy actors, or deepen internal divisions—particularly if Doha seeks to empower factions more amenable to its regional agenda.

4. Diplomatic Ambiguity and the Recognition Trap

By engaging Somaliland without recognizing it, Qatar may be attempting to neutralize Somaliland’s diplomatic momentum. The optics of high-level meetings can be used to placate Hargeisa while avoiding any formal shift in policy. This creates a “recognition trap,” where Somaliland is seen as engaging globally but gains no legal or political ground.

The Regional Chessboard: Gulf Rivalries and Great Power Games

Qatar’s move must also be understood within the broader context of Red Sea geopolitics. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is now a contested corridor, with the U.S., China, Turkey, and Gulf states all vying for influence. Somaliland’s location makes it a strategic prize.

• The UAE has invested heavily in Berbera and sees Somaliland as a logistics and security partner.
• Turkey, aligned with Qatar, has deepened its military and economic presence in Mogadishu.
• The U.S., increasingly interested in countering China, has begun engaging Somaliland more directly—viewing it as a stable, pro-Western foothold.

Qatar’s engagement may be an attempt to preempt U.S. recognition of Somaliland, or at least ensure that if it happens, Doha has a seat at the table.

Somaliland’s Dilemma: Engage or Resist?

President Irro’s visit to Doha was diplomatically bold but it must now be followed by strategic clarity. Somaliland cannot afford to be drawn into Gulf rivalries without a clear understanding of the costs. Engagement with Qatar should be conditional, transparent, and aligned with Somaliland’s long-term recognition strategy.

Key safeguards should include:

• Reaffirming that Somaliland’s sovereignty is non-negotiable.
• Ensuring that Qatari investments do not undermine existing partnerships.
• Demanding reciprocity in diplomatic engagement, not just symbolic gestures.
• Establishing parliamentary oversight over any agreements signed with Doha.

Conclusion: Between Opportunity and Orchestration

Qatar’s outreach to Somaliland is not a diplomatic accident, it is a calculated move in a high-stakes regional game. For Somaliland, the challenge is to engage without being absorbed, to negotiate without being neutralized, and to assert its sovereignty without becoming a pawn.

The road to recognition is long and fraught with detours. But if Somaliland is to reach its destination, it must navigate with eyes wide open and never mistake attention for acceptance.

Harir Yasin – Freelance Journalist and Writer

Hariryasin2@gmail.com