The political terrain of Somaliland and the contested SSC-Khatumo regions is shifting beneath the feet of its most prominent actors. At the heart of this transformation lies a fractured alliance between three former comrades: President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi Irro, Waddani Party Chairman Hersi Ali Haji Hassan, and former Speaker of Parliament Abdirisak Khalif Ahmed. Once united under the reformist banner of Waddani, these men now represent diverging—and in some cases, conflicting visions for the future of Somaliland and the broader Somali region.

Abdirisak Khalif’s dramatic defection to SSC-Khatumo and his bid for its presidency have triggered a cascade of political, ideological, and geopolitical consequences. His move has not only shaken the foundations of Somaliland’s political establishment but also exposed the fragile alliances and hidden agendas that shape power in the Horn of Africa. This article traces the evolution of their alliance, the rupture that followed, and the high-stakes power struggle now unfolding across Hargeisa, Las Anod, Garowe, and Mogadishu.

I. A Brotherhood Forged in Opposition

For over a decade, Abdirisak Khalif Ahmed was a pillar of the Waddani Party. As a founding member and close confidant of both Irro and Hersi, he helped shape Waddani’s identity as a reformist, inclusive, and nationalist alternative to the ruling Kulmiye party. His election as Speaker of the House of Representatives in 2021, defeating Kulmiye’s candidate, was not only a political milestone for the opposition but also a personal triumph for Khalif, who had long been seen as a bridge between Somaliland’s center and its periphery.

The trio Irro, Hersi, and Khalif shared more than political goals. They were bound by mutual trust, strategic alignment, and a shared vision of a democratic and internationally recognized Somaliland. Their alliance was seen as a model of political maturity in a region often defined by fragmentation. But that unity would not survive the crisis that erupted in Las Anod.

II. The Las Anod Crisis and a Turning Point

In early 2023, Las Anod, the capital of the Sool region, became the epicentre of a violent confrontation between Somaliland security forces and local militias aligned with the SSC movement. The conflict, which left hundreds dead and thousands displaced, exposed deep-rooted grievances among the Dhulbahante clan, who have long rejected Somaliland’s authority over the region.

Abdirisak Khalif, a native of Las Anod and a respected Dhulbahante elder, was dispatched to mediate. But what began as a peace mission quickly turned into a political awakening. Disillusioned by the government’s militarized response and moved by the demands of his community, Khalif resigned from his position as Speaker in June 2023 and publicly defected to the SSC-Khatumo movement.

His departure was not just a personal decision; it was a political earthquake. For the first time, a senior Waddani figure and national leader had broken ranks and sided with a movement that openly rejected Somaliland’s sovereignty over the contested regions.

III. Irro and Hersi: Caught Between Loyalty and Legitimacy

President Irro, elected in 2024 with a landslide 63% of the vote, now finds himself in a precarious position. On one hand, he must uphold Somaliland’s territorial integrity and respond to public pressure to assert control over Las Anod. On the other hand, he must reckon with the defection of a former ally whose grievances resonate with a significant portion of the population.

Waddani Chairman Hersi Ali Haji Hassan, known for his strategic discipline and ideological clarity, has remained firm in defending Somaliland’s unity. But sources close to the party suggest that Khalif’s departure was deeply personal for both Irro and Hersi—more than a political betrayal, it was the unravelling of a brotherhood forged in opposition.

The emotional weight of Khalif’s defection has complicated Waddani’s internal cohesion. Some party members have called for a hardline stance, while others quietly sympathize with Khalif’s critique of the government’s handling of the Las Anod crisis.

IV. Khalif’s Presidential Bid in SSC-Khatumo

In June 2025, Abdirisak Khalif officially announced his candidacy for the presidency of SSC-Khatumo, a self-declared federal state seeking autonomy within Somalia. Speaking in Las Anod, he declared:

“I can no longer remain on the sidelines. I believe the time has come to take the initiative and lead this administration to its next phase.”

Khalif’s campaign is built on a platform of local empowerment, federal integration with Somalia, and a rejection of what he calls “unilateral rule from Hargeisa.” His rhetoric has struck a chord with many in the SSC regions, who feel marginalized by Somaliland’s central government.

But his candidacy is also a direct challenge to Somaliland’s claim over the region. By positioning SSC-Khatumo as a legitimate federal entity, Khalif is not just running for office—he is redrawing the political map.

V. Complications of Loyalty: When Political Breakups Are Not Personal

Despite his public break with Somaliland, rumours persist that Khalif maintains private communication with Irro and Hersi. These lingering ties raise uncomfortable questions:

• Could Khalif act as a backchannel for Somaliland’s interests?
• Might Waddani appear conflicted or compromised in its stance on SSC-Khatumo?
• Could this erode public trust in both SSC-Khatumo and Somaliland’s leadership?

Such ambiguity could destabilize both camps. For SSC-Khatumo, it raises fears of infiltration or co-optation. For Somaliland, it risks appearing indecisive or divided in the face of a secessionist challenge.

VI. The Hidden Agenda? Hersi, Ictisam, and the Shadow of Political Islam

Beyond the political fallout, there are growing concerns about the ideological undercurrents within Waddani’s leadership particularly the influence of Chairman Hersi Ali Haji Hassan and his alleged ties to the Ictisam movement, a Salafi-Islamist network with growing reach in the Horn of Africa.

While Hersi has publicly positioned himself as a nationalist and reformist, critics argue that his religious affiliations may be shaping Waddani’s internal culture and long-term strategy. The Ictisam movement, known for its conservative interpretation of Islam and its emphasis on religious governance, has been quietly expanding its influence in Somaliland’s communities.

Some political observers fear that:

• Waddani’s secular image may be a façade, masking a deeper ideological agenda rooted in political Islam.
• Hersi’s consolidation of power within the party could marginalize moderate voices and centralize decision-making around a religiously aligned inner circle.
• The party’s future policies, especially on education, women’s rights, and judicial reform, could be shaped by Ictisam-aligned doctrine rather than democratic consensus.

If these concerns prove valid, Somaliland could face a dangerous convergence of religious conservatism and political centralization, undermining its pluralistic foundations and alienating secular and minority communities.

VII. The Other Side of the Coin: Can SSC-Khatumo Trust Khalif?

Despite his defection, Abdirisak Khalif faces skepticism from within SSC-Khatumo itself. Many elders and youth in Las Anod question whether a man who spent decades in Somaliland’s political elite serving as Minister of Commerce and Public Works and later as Speaker of Parliament can truly represent a movement built on rejecting Somaliland’s authority.

Some of the concerns include:

• Perceived opportunism: Critics argue that Khalif only joined SSC-Khatumo after losing political ground in Hargeisa.
• Lingering loyalty: His long-standing friendship with Irro and Hersi raises fears that he may act as a bridge or even a backchannel for Somaliland’s interests.
• Trust deficit: For a movement rooted in clan-based grievances and historical marginalization, Khalif’s elite background makes him a complicated figure to rally behind.

This internal tension could fracture SSC-Khatumo’s unity or weaken Khalif’s legitimacy as a presidential contender.

VIII. Strategic Calculations: Who Benefits from Khalif’s Rise?

While Khalif presents himself as a break from the past, his rise may serve the interests of both Somaliland and Puntland.

 For Somaliland:

• He is more moderate and predictable than hardline SSC leaders.
• His ties to Irro and Hersi allow for potential backchannel diplomacy.
• His leadership could contain radicalism and soften SSC’s stance.

 For Puntland:

• A Khalif-led SSC-Khatumo creates a buffer zone with Somaliland.
• It reduces pressure to reintegrate SSC into Puntland.
• It offers a potential ally in federal negotiations.

Both regions may quietly prefer Khalif over more militant or unpredictable alternatives.

IX. Hassan Sheikh’s Countermove: Rallying Behind Firdhiye

In May 2025, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud hosted Firdhiye at Villa Somalia and invited him to participate in the National Consultative Council (NCC), a symbolic and strategic endorsement that signalled Mogadishu’s preferred partner in the Lasanod. This move was not merely ceremonial; it was a calculated effort to consolidate federal influence in the contested SSC regions and to counterbalance Khalif’s growing popularity.

Hassan Sheikh’s motivations are multifaceted:

• Federal alignment: Firdhiye has consistently advocated for SSC-Khatumo to become a recognized federal member state within Somalia, aligning with Mogadishu’s long-term vision of a decentralized federal system.
• Avoiding Somaliland entanglements: Unlike Khalif, Firdhiye has no political baggage tied to Hargeisa or Waddani, making him a cleaner and more ideologically consistent partner for the federal government.
• Maintaining leverage: A loyal SSC-Khatumo leader gives Mogadishu more influence in the Lasanod, especially in negotiations over resource sharing, security coordination, and constitutional reform.

Behind the scenes, federal MPs and ministers from the Dhulbahante community have been quietly mobilizing support for Firdhiye’s re-election. The goal is to ensure that SSC-Khatumo remains firmly within Somalia’s federal orbit and does not drift into a hybrid identity shaped by former Somaliland insiders like Khalif.

This emerging rivalry between Khalif, the insider-turned-outsider, and Firdhiye, the federalist loyalist, has become a defining contest for the future of SSC-Khatumo. It is not just a local leadership race; it is a proxy battle between competing visions of governance, identity, and regional alignment.

X. Implications for Somaliland and the Horn of Africa

The political drama unfolding between Irro, Hersi, and Khalif and the broader contest between Khalif and Firdhiye has far-reaching implications for Somaliland, Somalia, and the Horn of Africa at large.

For Somaliland:

• The defection of Khalif has exposed internal fractures within Waddani and raised questions about the government’s ability to maintain unity in the face of regional dissent.
• The ideological direction of Waddani under Hersi’s leadership may alienate secular and moderate constituencies, especially if suspicions about Ictisam’s influence continue to grow.
• The possibility of backchannel diplomacy with Khalif could offer a path to de-escalation in Las Anod, but it also risks undermining Somaliland’s official stance on sovereignty.

For Lasanod:

• The leadership contest between Khalif and Firdhiye could either strengthen the movement through democratic competition or fracture it along lines of trust, ideology, and external allegiance.
• The movement’s credibility hinges on its ability to remain independent of both Hargeisa and Mogadishu while articulating a clear and unified vision for federal integration.

For Puntland:

• A Khalif-led SSC-Khatumo could serve as a buffer against Somaliland expansionism, but it may also complicate Puntland’s own territorial claims and federal ambitions.
• Puntland’s cautious support for SSC-Khatumo reflects its desire to influence the region without becoming entangled in a direct confrontation with either Somaliland or Mogadishu.

For Mogadishu:

• Backing Firdhiye allows the federal government to assert its presence in the Lasanod and counter Somaliland’s narrative of sovereignty.
• However, overt interference could backfire if it is perceived as undermining SSC-Khatumo’s autonomy or manipulating its leadership process.

XI. The Sanaag Question: A New Front in the Territorial Contest

As SSC-Khatumo consolidates control over Sool and Cayn, attention is now turning to the contested region of Sanaag. Both SSC-Khatumo and the Federal Government of Somalia are quietly pushing to incorporate eastern Sanaag into SSC-Khatumo’s territory despite resistance from both Puntland and Somaliland.

Federal officials have reportedly encouraged political mobilization in towns like Ceelbuh, aiming to shift local allegiances. For SSC-Khatumo, the inclusion of Sanaag would strengthen its federal claim and expand its clan-based support base. But Puntland has pushed back forcefully, accusing Mogadishu of “deliberate destabilization” and warning of confrontation if boundaries are redrawn without consensus.

This new front threatens to ignite a three-way contest over Sanaag, one that could destabilize the entire Sanaag region.

Conclusion: A Region Rewritten, A Brotherhood Unravelled

What began as a shared political journey between Irro, Hersi, and Khalif has evolved into a fragmented contest over identity, ideology, and influence. Their personal bond, once a symbol of Somaliland’s political maturity, has been overtaken by competing ambitions and irreconcilable visions for the future of the Somali territories.

Khalif’s transformation from a national Speaker to a regional contender has not only redrawn the political map of SSC-Khatumo but also exposed the fragility of alliances built on convenience rather than conviction. His candidacy is both a challenge to Somaliland’s territorial claims and a test of SSC-Khatumo’s internal cohesion. Yet, even as he gains ground, doubts about his loyalties and legacy linger.

Meanwhile, Hersi’s consolidation of power within Waddani and his alleged ideological leanings raise deeper questions about the direction of Somaliland’s future. Is Waddani still a secular reformist movement, or is it becoming a vessel for religious conservatism cloaked in nationalist rhetoric?

The federal government’s backing of Firdhiye and its quiet campaign to incorporate Sanaag into SSC-Khatumo signals a broader strategy to reshape Somaliland’s political geography. But these maneuvers risk igniting new conflicts with Somaliland, who view Sanaag as non-negotiable.

Harir Yasin is a freelance journalist and analyst. He can be reached at ariryasin2@gmail.com