Garowe – In a significant escalation of counter-terrorism efforts, U.S. Special Operations Forces launched a joint military operation with Puntland security units, targeting a fortified ISIS hideout in Somalia’s Balade Valley.
The operation, which took place on Wednesday, saw dozens of U.S. personnel inserted into the remote area via MH-60 helicopters. Air support was provided by MQ-9 Reaper drones, which executed precision strikes on a militant compound in the Habarbakuuje and Mareero sub-districts. Intelligence assessments suggested the base housed 10 to 15 ISIS operatives.
The assault precipitated a prolonged and intense firefight, lasting several hours, as joint forces engaged militants entrenched in a well-defended position. The hideout was believed to harbor foreign fighters from Syria, Turkey, and Ethiopia.
Initial battlefield assessments confirm the operation resulted in several key militant casualties, including a senior ISIS commander and his aides. Total estimated fatalities range between five and ten. Furthermore, the joint forces successfully destroyed a weapons cache and mining equipment, critically disrupting the group’s illicit gold mining operations—a primary source of financing for its activities in the region.
The Puntland government has reiterated its strategic objective to eradicate the ISIS footprint in its territory by the end of 2025.
This operation underscores the sustained partnership between the United States and Puntland, which has combined targeted airstrikes and intelligence support to degrade militant capabilities in the challenging mountainous terrain, forcing their retreat into increasingly isolated enclaves.
Dr. Edna Adan Ismail, the pioneering nurse, midwife, and humanitarian from Somaliland, has been awarded the prestigious 2025 Gusi Peace Prize—often referred to as the “Asian Nobel Peace Prize.
This recognition celebrates her lifelong dedication to advancing healthcare, women’s rights, peacebuilding, and community development in the Horn of Africa and globally.
The award, presented annually by the Gusi Peace Prize Foundation in Manila, Philippines, honors just 15 individuals from over 1,000 nominees for their profound impact on humanity.
A Pioneer in Action
Born in 1937 in Hargeisa, Somaliland, Dr. Ismail trained as one of the first Somali women to study nursing and midwifery in the UK. She later became Somaliland’s first female Foreign Minister (2003–2006).
Amid recovery and rebuilding, she founded the Edna Adan Maternity Hospital and Edna Adan University in 2002, funding them by selling her personal assets. These institutions have trained thousands of healthcare professionals, slashed maternal mortality rates, and spearheaded campaigns against female genital mutilation (FGM) and gender-based violence.
Now 88, Dr. Ismail continues her advocacy for Somaliland’s recognition and global health equity, embodying resilience in a region marked by instability.
The Significance of the Gusi Peace Prize
Established in 2002 to honor WWII hero Captain Geminiano Javier Gusi, the prize—endorsed by the Philippine Senate—spotlights leaders in human rights, health, and education. Dr. Ismail’s selection underscores her “outstanding contributions to humanity through service, leadership, and humanitarian dedication,” especially in maternal health and women’s empowerment.
From delivering babies in Somaliland clinics to forging diplomatic paths, Dr. Ismail has woven personal sacrifice into global change. The 2025 Gusi Peace Prize affirms her as a beacon of hope, showing how one life can foster peace through health and dignity. As she often says, her work is about “affirming the dignity of women.”
Congratulations, Dr. Edna—Somaliland and the world stand taller because of you.
Hargeisa, Somaliland – The President of the Republic of Somaliland, H.E. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi (Cirro), today met at the Presidential Palace with General Dagvin Anderson, the Commander of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), the US Deputy Chief of Mission, Ambassador Justin Davis, and a high-level delegation they were leading on an official visit to the Republic of Somaliland.
This meeting, which was of significant strategic importance, focused on strengthening the cooperation between Somaliland and the United States, particularly in the areas of security, regional stability, and safeguarding the mutual interests shared by both sides in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.
The President briefed the US delegation on the role the Republic of Somaliland plays in the security, stability, and strengthening of the democratic framework in the region. He noted that the Republic of Somaliland places particular emphasis on securing its borders, combating extremist groups, and ensuring the security of international maritime routes in the Gulf of Aden.
The US AFRICOM Commander, Mr. Dagvin Anderson, stated that Somaliland occupies a strategic location vital to the overall security of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa region, emphasizing the importance of closer collaboration between the two sides.
Similarly, the US Deputy Chief of Mission, Mr. Justin Davis, commended Somaliland for the crucial role it plays in protecting regional peace and stability, maritime security, and noted that Somaliland possesses a well-organized military force and a stable political system.
The Deputy Chief of Mission expressed that the United States government considers it important to enhance cooperation in security sectors, develop security institutions, and grow the bilateral relations.
The President underscored that the Republic of Somaliland is fully prepared to work with the United States government to consolidate regional security and counter growing threats, particularly those arising from the power rivalry in the maritime domain of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, as well as the increasing activities of destabilizing groups in the region.
Furthermore, the President indicated that there is a broad opportunity available for the two countries, concerning the enhancement of cooperation in Defense, Economy, Investment, and essential public services. The President clearly demonstrated to the high-level delegation that Somaliland is a reliable partner for the United States, located in the most strategic position in the Horn of Africa.
The President of the Republic of Somaliland noted that the US Security and Strategic Interests in the Horn of Africa region are intrinsically linked to the Recognition of Somaliland, given that Somaliland is a country with a functioning democratic system, national armed forces that have safeguarded its security for over 30 years, and a location critical to US strategy for regional stability.
The meeting concluded with a full understanding that the two sides will strengthen security cooperation, elevate strategic operations, and work together to protect the stability of the Red Sea and the overall security of the Horn of Africa region, to enable a framework built on shared interests and sustainable, fruitful collaboration.
It is noteworthy that the US delegation, led by US Africa Command Commander Gen. Dagvin Anderson and Deputy Chief of Mission Justin Davis, upon concluding their meeting with the President of the Republic of Somaliland in Hargeisa, were also taken to the Airport, the Berbera International Port, and the coastal city of Berbera for an inspection tour.
In recent years, we have increasingly observed incidents involving individuals who perpetrate serious violations against innocent young children. The most recent case involved a woman who subjected a small child to extreme physical abuse—an incident that spread widely on social media—ultimately resulting in the child’s death. Shortly afterward, another case emerged involving a Qur’an teacher in Burco who was convicted after being accused of sexually abusing a young innocent child.
From the perspective of scientific and clinical understanding—particularly within the field of mental health and psychological collectively known as personality disorders—there are two conditions that appear to be indirectly reflected in the actions of these perpetrators.
The first disorder involves an individual who derives emotional gratification from consistently inflicting harm, pain, or excessive punishment on a young child. This may include severe beatings, assigning harsh tasks, or intentionally causing suffering under the guise of discipline. The woman whose video circulated widely, showing her brutally torturing a young child, serves as a clear example of this phenomenon.
Perpetrator in the court.
The second disorder also falls under the broad category of personality disorders but is more specifically associated with sexual disorders, a subgroup within this field This disorder involves seeking sexual gratification through inappropriate or abnormal means. While there are many forms of such conditions, the incident concerning the Qur’an teacher in Burco corresponds to a disorder in which an adult is sexually attracted to very young children who have not yet reached puberty. Individuals with this disorder can come from any background; it is a recognized condition globally and occurs across many societies.
These types of disorders are particularly prevalent in Somali regions due to the prolonged hardships experienced over the past 34 years—war, poverty, and widespread psychological stress. Childhood trauma, in particular, increases vulnerability and predisposes individuals to developing personality disorders later in life. These cumulative factors contribute to the troubling behaviors that are now becoming more visible, though many cases remain hidden and unreported.
It is important to question why certain individuals claim to defend an “accused Qur’an teacher” while neglecting to acknowledge the rights and suffering of the young child who is the true victim—a child who also belongs to the Qur’anic tradition.
Quran teachers protesting against the verdicts
The legal system does not distinguish between teacher, president, or ordinary citizen. Its purpose is to protect all members of society, and anyone who commits harm must be held accountable according to the law.
As immoral behaviors have increased in recent times, there has also been a noticeable rise in individuals with mental health conditions—referred to in clinical terms as sexual disorders. These conditions are primarily understood by health professionals and practitioners working in the field of child safeguarding. Among these disorders is pedophilia, affecting many people worldwide. This disorder involves adult men who sexually target young children. It is not influenced by marital status; rather, it is a psychological condition reinforced by distorted impulses. This issue is especially common in settings where teachers are left alone with children without adequate administrative oversight or regular monitoring.
It is essential for society to remain vigilant. Parents must closely monitor the environments in which their children without adequate administrative oversight or regular monitoring.
It is essential for society to remain vigilant. Parents must closely monitor the environments in which their children learn—whether in schools, Qur’anic centers, or other educational settings. Equally important is establishing strong communication between parents and children. Parents should speak with their children daily, foster trust, and ensure that if a child reports something concerning, they are not met with blame or punishment. If a parent responds with anger or blame, the child may refrain from sharing information in the future, which can place them at further risk.
A final note: It is possible that some scholars are correct in suggesting that certain individuals may be attempting to undermine religious institutions by targeting religious figures. Such claims can be examined critically and responsibly. However, it must also be acknowledged that the young victim is himself a child of the Qur’an. Therefore, one should not portray the teacher alone as representing the Qur’anic tradition; the child is equally part of it.
Finally no child should experience violence in any form. No matter who they are or where they are from.
Written by: Abdisalaan Gullied
Public Health Specialist
Master of Public Health Candidate, Uganda
Child Safeguarding Advocate and Humanitarian Activist.
The Norway-based seismic data company TGS-NOPEC has entered into an agreement with the Federal Government of Somalia, specifically with the Somali Petroleum Authority (SPA).
This agreement grants TGS the rights to market, license, and put out to tender oil exploration and extraction rights within Somaliland’s land and maritime territories. The areas included are those previously surveyed by TGS, as detailed in the maps and blocks attached to the agreement.
TGS has held the primary exploration data for most of Somaliland’s oil blocks for many years. The initial data acquisition began during the administration of former Somaliland President Dahir Riyale Kahin, and subsequent governments have renewed the company’s agreements.
What are the implications of this deal?
This new agreement, signed on the 22nd of this month, effectively allows Somalia to directly receive all revenues generated from the oil exploration data pertaining to Somaliland. Analysts suggest it fundamentally undermines Somaliland’s claim to sovereignty over the oil and gas resources within its own borders.
Furthermore, by transferring this data to the Somali government, TGS appears to have invalidated its previous agreements with the Somaliland government.
What are Somaliland’s options?
To date, the Somaliland government has not issued an official statement regarding the agreement between Somalia and TGS. Its official response and subsequent actions remain to be seen.
Observers note that Somaliland must respond decisively and quickly to this development. A failure to do so could see this agreement follow the path of the airspace control deal, which was initially contested but has now become a significant political and economic burden.
Will this deter foreign investment in Somaliland?
The new agreement explicitly permits TGS to subcontract or share the oil data with other companies. It is widely anticipated that Turkish companies will be primary beneficiaries, following a separate oil and gas cooperation deal signed between Somalia and Turkey last year.
Any foreign company attempting to operate in Somaliland’s territory based solely on an agreement with Mogadishu would face severe practical and security challenges, especially on land. However, the maritime domain presents a more complex defensive scenario for Somaliland, requiring urgent strategic attention to safeguard its offshore resources.
Somalia’s Provisional Constitution enshrines a federal system that relies on clearly defined powers and respect for state-level autonomy. Articles 48 and 54 leave little room for interpretation any authority not explicitly delegated to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) resides with the Federal Member States (FMS). Identity registration, notably, is not listed among the federal government’s exclusive competencies. Instead, it falls under civil registration, citizenship verification, and local administration—areas traditionally regarded as shared or residual responsibilities.
Against this legal backdrop, the unilateral creation of the National Identity and Registration Authority (NIRA) has sparked a nationwide debate. Legal scholars, policymakers, and FMS authorities contend that the FGS may be exceeding its constitutional mandate, encroaching on the rights and prerogatives of the states. This is not merely an administrative question; it is a test of constitutional discipline, federal balance, and the long-term credibility of Somalia’s state-building process. Indeed, it is precisely this potential overreach that raises concerns about the process by which NIRA was introduced.
Limited Consultation with Federal Member States
If the constitutional ambiguity raised initial alarms, the approach to NIRA’s rollout has only intensified them. Article 50 of the Provisional Constitution emphasizes cooperation and consultation as fundamental pillars of federal governance. Yet, NIRA’s implementation has been widely perceived as a top-down initiative that largely bypassed these requirements. Federal Member States report they were not afforded meaningful input into the design, governance, or operational framework of a national identity system—an instrument that directly affects their security responsibilities, service delivery mechanisms, and civic documentation processes. This lack of consultation has deepened political mistrust and hardened positions. In a country where intergovernmental trust is fragile, sidelining the FMS risks transforming a potentially valuable reform into a source of friction. Without broad consensus, NIRA could evolve into yet another centralized structure in a system explicitly designed to prevent the concentration of power.
Concerns Regarding Legislative and Procedural Legitimacy
Article 50 of the Provisional Constitution is explicit in requiring collaboration, consultation, and power-sharing across levels of government. Federal institutions affecting state-level functions are expected to be designed through inclusive processes that ensure nationwide ownership. However, several Federal Member States contend that they were not adequately consulted during NIRA’s conception, design, or rollout.
This perceived lack of meaningful engagement has contributed to skepticism regarding NIRA’s legitimacy. In addition, questions have been raised about whether the legislative procedures used to establish NIRA complied with the constitutional requirement for bicameral approval—especially the role of the Upper House, which exists specifically to safeguard the interests of Federal Member States. Ambiguities in the legislative process further deepen concerns about the institution’s legal soundness.
The establishment of the National Identification and Registration Authority (NIRA) in Somalia raises substantial legal, constitutional, and administrative concerns, particularly in light of the existence of fully operational identification mechanisms at both the federal and state levels. Somalia presently maintains a valid, internationally recognized biometric passport, which functions as the principal instrument of national identification, incorporating biographic data, biometric identifiers, security elements, and nationality verification, and thus conforms to global standards of personal identification.
The presence of such a passport system calls into question the necessity and legality of instituting an additional federal identification framework, especially given that Articles 48 and 54 of the Provisional Constitution reserve to the Federal Member States powers not expressly conferred upon the Federal Government. Furthermore, each Federal Member State has independently invested in civil registration and identification systems, which citizens utilize for local services, intra-state mobility, security clearance, employment verification, and, in jurisdictions conducting local elections, electoral registration.
These state-level systems constitute the operational and functional backbone of population management and enjoy both accessibility and community trust. The unilateral creation of a federal ID by NIRA risks duplicating these existing systems, undermining the authority of state civil registries, generating administrative redundancies, imposing unnecessary financial burdens, and creating citizen confusion. The introduction of a third, separate federal identification system, alongside the existing passport and state-issued IDs, would produce three layers of identification, leading to
Such fragmentation not only compromises efficiency but also threatens the integrity of civil registration and population management. Identity systems inherently involve sensitive personal and biometric data that determine eligibility for services, humanitarian aid, taxation, security clearance, mobility, and electoral participation.
In Somalia’s fragile political environment, where trust between governmental institutions is limited, centralization of such authority at the federal level engenders concerns regarding data security, neutrality, and potential misuse. Federal Member States and civil society actors have expressed apprehension that, absent robust safeguards, the system could be politicized or wielded in a manner disproportionately affecting certain regions or communities.
NIRA’s current approach, widely perceived as an attempt to supplant rather than integrate state-level civil registration systems, contravenes recognized international federal best practices, which emphasize cooperative, decentralized, or hybrid models that align national identification frameworks with subnational institutions.
To address the concerns surrounding NIRA and to ensure constitutional conformity, Somalia could benefit from a coordinated, constitutionally grounded approach that prioritizes federal–state cooperation, legal compliance, and citizen trust, ensuring that identity management systems are harmonized, secure, and reflective of Somalia’s federal structure while preserving the integrity and authority of existing state-level civil registration mechanisms.
mandates
Integration of existing passports and state IDs into a harmonized system rather than their replacement
Enactment of clear data protection and privacy laws to foster citizen trust
A phased, consultative approach to identity modernization.
Implementation of these measures would ensure that identity management respects the federal structure, safeguards civil registration integrity, mitigates institutional overreach, and enhances national confidence in Somalia’s identification system.
Conclusion
While the objective of establishing a national identity authority is commendable, NIRA’s current framework faces constitutional ambiguity, procedural challenges, and fundamental questions about necessity. Somalia already possesses a valid national passport and functioning state-level identification systems. Introducing an entirely new federal ID system—without harmonization or constitutional clarity—risks duplication, political tension, and inefficiency. A successful identity system for Somalia must be grounded in federal cooperation, legal certainty, and respect for existing institutions. Through consultation and consensus-building, Somalia can modernize identification in a manner that strengthens—rather than disrupts—its evolving federal governance structure.
By Abdifatah Abdinur
State Minister of the Presidency
Puntland State of Somalia
Should Israel recognize the pro-Western state located in the Horn of Africa—an area whose security importance for Israel has become even more pronounced over the past two years?
By Asher Lubotzky
‎In the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region—areas whose security and strategic importance for Israel have grown significantly over the past two years—lies Somaliland, an independent and pro-Western state that has yet to be recognized by the international community. Its primary objective is to secure recognition and to build alliances with states that can support it vis-à -vis its rival, the Somali government in Mogadishu. In recent years, Somaliland has cultivated close ties with the United Arab Emirates and Taiwan. Its leadership has now placed considerable hope in the Trump administration, and in this context, it has intensified its efforts to achieve recognition, including from Israel. This article examines Israel–Somaliland relations from Israel’s perspective and outlines the considerations for both supporting and delaying Israeli recognition.
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‎Somaliland—More Than Thirty Years of Independence and Stability
‎Somaliland covers the northwestern part of what the international community still recognizes as Somalia. It was independent for a brief five-day period in 1960 before joining a union with Somalia, and it later reasserted its independence in 1991 as it emerged from the brutal Somali civil war that began in the late 1980s.
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‎Over the past century, Somaliland has developed a distinct identity. It was ruled by the British (unlike Somalia, which was under Italian control); its people have long-standing ties with South Yemen across the Gulf of Aden; and most of its population belongs to the Isaaq clan, in contrast to Somalia’s other major clan families. The Isaaq suffered discrimination, violence, and—according to its members—even genocide at the hands of the clans that ruled Somalia, especially during the 1980s.
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‎Since declaring its de facto independence, Somaliland has contrasted sharply with Somalia in almost every respect: its security environment is calm, its internal politics are stable, and it has no significant jihadist presence. Although there are border disputes in outlying areas where other clans reside, these conflicts remain localized and contained. Since the 2000s, Somaliland has maintained a stable, effectively functioning multi-party democratic system with regular elections. The most recent vote, held in 2024, featured orderly and peaceful transfers of power. All major political forces are pro-Western and wary of Islamist movements, as well as of China and Russia. Although they differ on how to achieve it, they all share the overarching goal of securing international recognition.
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‎Somalia’s instability is largely concentrated in the south, which has helped bolster Somaliland’s stability. It is far from the main conflict zones—whether fighting among rival clans or clashes between the government and the powerful al-Shabaab organization. Somaliland also borders relatively stable and friendly neighbors: Ethiopia, Puntland (a de facto autonomous state within Somalia’s federation), and Djibouti, and it maintains peaceful relations with all three. In 2024, Somaliland signed a strategic memorandum of understanding with Ethiopia that would grant landlocked Ethiopia access to the strategic port of Berbera, along with an implicit promise of future recognition of Somaliland’s independence (the agreement was later effectively frozen, although not formally canceled, due to Turkish–Somali pressure). Relations with Djibouti have also advanced, and in October 2025, Somaliland signed the “Nairobi Agreement” with Puntland to enhance security and commercial cooperation.
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‎In recent years, Somaliland has also expanded its ties with other pro-Western states. Its two most strategic partners are Taiwan and the United Arab Emirates. Taiwan—a global chip-manufacturing powerhouse—has invested in Somaliland’s rare metals and minerals sector, while the UAE has invested heavily in developing the port of Berbera. For the UAE, Somaliland offers a strategic foothold in the Horn of Africa, complementing its other regional strongholds, such as Socotra Island in Yemen, Puntland, and Darfur.
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‎Somaliland also has reasons to be cautiously optimistic about its relationship with the United States. American delegations—including representatives from the Pentagon—have visited the country, which positions itself as a potential strategic base for the United States in the region. President Trump has stated that US recognition of Somaliland is under consideration, and Congress is planning to urge the State Department to re-examine bilateral ties with the goal of enhancing them. As an interim step, lawmakers have proposed that the State Department start distinguishing between Somalia and Somaliland in its travel advisories. Senior Republicans, including Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, have repeatedly voiced support for recognizing Somaliland’s independence. Nevertheless, Washington is still weighing several strong arguments against recognition, and progress has been slowed by delays in key appointments and in formulating a broader US policy toward Africa and the Red Sea.
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‎Against this backdrop, Somaliland is waging a media and lobbying campaign to advance its bid for international recognition. In May 2025, Somaliland’s presidency appealed to UN member states to recognize it as an independent state, and in October 2025, local media reported that more than 20 states, including Israel, were moving toward recognition. Somaliland has also become increasingly willing to adopt additional symbols of sovereignty. In November 2025, it declared full control over its airspace—separating it from Somalia’s nominal sovereignty—and required all aircraft to obtain direct authorization from Somaliland’s authorities to fly through its airspace. It also announced that it would no longer recognize visas issued by the government in Mogadishu.
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‎International recognition has therefore been the paramount goal of Somaliland’s successive governments—a goal that has remained unchanged despite democratic transfers of power. Recognition would formalize Somaliland’s status and, it hopes, protect it from a future scenario in which a strengthened Somalia—alone or with its allies—might seek to re-impose its authority over the territory with international legitimacy. In addition to recognition, Somaliland aims to secure reliable and powerful allies.
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‎For now, the danger posed by the government in Mogadishu remains largely hypothetical. Somaliland faces more immediate security concerns, including the Houthis; the spread of global jihad (currently active in neighboring Puntland); separatist pressures along its periphery; and subversive activity linked to China and Turkey—threats for which there is tangible evidence on the ground.
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‎The Importance of Somaliland for the West and Israel
‎Somaliland’s significance lies in its geostrategic location and in its willingness—as a stable, moderate, and reliable state in a volatile region—to work closely with Western countries. Its location at the entrance to the Gulf of Aden—opposite southern Yemen—linking the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean gives it a unique geostrategic importance. This strategic value was why the British Empire took control of the territory at the end of the 19th century, and why the United States secured access to a military base there during the Reagan administration in the 1980s, at the height of the Cold War.
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‎Today, Somaliland’s coastline and territory lie roughly 300 to 500 kilometers from Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen, including the port of Hodeidah. Since the Gulf states, the United States, and Israel have all fought the Houthis in recent years without achieving a decisive outcome, Somaliland’s location—and the possibility of operating from its territory—could be a game changer.
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‎Somaliland could serve as a forward base for a range of missions: intelligence collection and monitoring of the Houthis and their military buildup; logistical support for Yemen’s internationally recognized government in its war against the Houthis; and direct operations, from offensive actions to intercepting Houthi attacks at sea or by UAVs. A useful parallel is Israel’s close alliance with Azerbaijan, which has significantly strengthened Israel’s strategic and operational ability to counter the Iranian threat. Similarly, Somaliland could become a key pillar of Israel’s efforts to address the Houthi threat.
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‎Alongside Somaliland’s strategic location, it is equally important that its government seeks wide-ranging cooperation with pro-Western states. This reflects both political willingness and practical capability. Although Eritrea lies even closer than Somaliland to areas from which operations against the Houthis could be launched, its regime is anti-Western and maintains friendly ties with Iran. Djibouti, despite its strategic location, maintains de facto neutrality in regional conflicts, while Ethiopia lacks access to the sea and has ambivalent relations with the United States.
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‎Somaliland, therefore, offers a unique combination of geostrategic location and a clear readiness to pursue extensive cooperation with Western-aligned states. Its growing ties with the United Arab Emirates—driven in part by Abu Dhabi’s interest in the war against the Houthis—underscore this. Somaliland has also signaled that it is prepared to develop broad security relations with the United States, including the possibility of hosting an American base, and it might be open to cooperation with Israel.
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‎In relation to Israel, Somaliland’s government has maintained a positive stance, even during the past two years of the war in Gaza, and it is plausible that unofficial contacts already exist among senior figures in both parties. In recent months, Somaliland has signaled its willingness to cooperate with pro-Israel initiatives, including the expansion of the Abraham Accords. Public discourse in Somaliland tends to be generally pro-Israeli, although critical voices also exist, particularly in light of the war and reports from Gaza, as well as the presence of non-violent Salafi movements in the country.
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‎Considerations for and Against Recognizing Somaliland
‎For Somaliland, the most coveted prize is US recognition, which it expects would prompt many other US partners to follow suit. It therefore devotes the bulk of its diplomatic efforts to the White House and Congress. Somaliland presents itself as firmly opposed to China and willing to take significant steps to advance American interests in the strategic Red Sea-Indian Ocean region. In its engagement with the United States, Somaliland also highlights its democratic system, political freedoms, and opposition to radical Islamist ideologies. In conversations with US officials and in its public messaging, Somaliland has made clear its eagerness to join the Abraham Accords. Moreover, Somaliland’s desire for US recognition is so strong that its government did not publicly reject reports circulating several months ago that Washington was considering a proposal to resettle Gazans in Somaliland, even though the idea was extremely unpopular among Somaliland’s own population.
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‎Nonetheless, despite Somaliland’s goodwill toward Washington and its strategic location, the United States remains hesitant to grant it formal recognition—for several significant reasons.
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‎First, on principle, US policy on Somalia has been consistent in recent decades in supporting the “One Somalia” policy, the position that Somalia should remain a single, unified state rather than be divided into separate sovereign entities. Washington has sought to strengthen the government in Mogadishu, particularly in light of its two-decade war against al-Shabaab. From the US perspective, Somalia is an ally—albeit a weak and failing one—and the United States periodically provides military assistance, including in strikes against global jihadist operatives.
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‎In contrast, recognizing Somaliland would be viewed in Mogadishu as an American betrayal and could trigger blowback inside fragile Somalia—for example, by encouraging the formal secession of Puntland and Jubaland, both of which are still symbolically committed to Mogadishu’s authority, or by strengthening al-Shabaab. This concern aligns with a broader international reluctance to recognize unilateral border changes or secessionist states, out of fear of opening a Pandora’s box and destabilizing borders elsewhere, especially in the Middle East and Africa.
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‎Although this is a significant consideration for Washington, which is generally inclined to maintain the status quo, it is possible that the Trump administration could break with the long-standing practice of upholding “One Somalia” and resisting recognition of secessionist states. However, another factor likely plays an even more important role for the United States at present: the stance of most Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt, as well as Turkey, all of which support preserving Somalia’s unity. With the exception of the UAE, Arab League states both officially and in practice support Somalia’s territorial integrity and vehemently oppose recognition of Somaliland. For Turkey, Somalia is a central ally in the Red Sea region, approaching the status of a client state. These powerful states—whose views carry weight in Washington—have made clear their strong opposition to recognizing Somaliland.
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‎While their influence in Washington is far more limited, African Union member states also tend to oppose the formal recognition of secessionist entities, fearing a domino effect across the continent.
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‎Compared with the United States, Israel faces additional considerations. While opposition from Qatar and Turkey to recognizing Somaliland is not particularly significant for Israel—and could arguably have the opposite effect—Egypt’s position, and possibly China’s, could prove more consequential. At the same time, Israel’s close relationship with the UAE strengthens the case for supporting Somaliland. However, Israel has traditionally been reluctant to recognize secessionist states, partly out of concern that doing so could set precedents that might backfire in the context of a Palestinian state. This concern is less relevant today, given the de facto and near-universal international recognition extended to the Palestinian “state” in recent years.
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‎A more serious factor for Israel—one that warrants caution and serious reflection before extending formal recognition to Somaliland—is a pragmatic one. Recognizing Somaliland without parallel US recognition could trigger negative repercussions for both Israel and Somaliland. While an Israel–Somaliland agreement might appear to strengthen Israel’s regional standing, it could also provoke a significant backlash in parts of the Muslim world. This could place Somaliland at the center of regional criticism and could push it to scale back or avoid expanding its public cooperation with Israel. Paradoxically, Israeli recognition could even complicate efforts to broaden the Abraham Accords to additional Muslim states.
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‎Below the Threshold of Recognition—At Least for Now
‎Israel requires allies in the Red Sea region for many strategic reasons, among them the possibility of a future campaign against the Houthis. Somaliland is an ideal candidate for such cooperation, as it could offer Israel potential access to an operational arena close to the conflict zone. Beyond security cooperation, ties with Somaliland also carry economic and reputational value for Israel’s national security, given the minerals located in Somaliland and Israel’s interest in cultivating relationships with Muslim populations in the region. Israel should, therefore, work to expand its cooperation with Somaliland, ideally in coordination with the UAE and the United States.
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‎Nevertheless, Israel has compelling reasons to refrain from becoming the first state to recognize Somaliland. Foremost among these is the concern that early recognition could actually hinder the cultivation of close relations, given the possible regional reactions and dynamics. As long as the United States (or at least the UAE) does not recognize Somaliland as an independent state, Israel should not act alone on this front.
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‎The recommendation, therefore, is to advance relations with Somaliland below the threshold of recognition. While Israel and its partners in Washington can assist Somaliland in efforts to persuade the Trump administration to recognize it, the United States should be the first to make any public move. In parallel, prior to formal recognition, Israel and Somaliland can deepen their security and economic partnerships, establish interest offices (as many other states already do with Somaliland), and even take symbolic steps such as recognizing Somaliland passports.
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‎Such steps would avoid the risks of formal recognition while still enabling both sides to advance their essential interests. An Israeli security and economic presence in Somaliland does not necessarily require formal recognition, and conversely, Somaliland may at present prefer close, quiet ties with Israel over high-profile, precedent-setting declarations. Somaliland stands to gain substantially from such cooperation, particularly given the security challenges it faces in the Red Sea region and the Horn of Africa. For Israel, Somaliland may prove to be a game changer in the struggle against the Houthis.
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‎** The author wishes to thank the team at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) for their fruitful discussions on the issue, including those held during a guest lecture the author delivered at INSS on September 30, 2025; Dr. Rashid Abdi, Director of Research at Sahan Global in Nairobi, Kenya, for his dialogue and knowledge sharing; and the Israel–Africa Relations Institute for its support and encouragement.
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‎The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’
Hargeisa, Somaliland – The President of the Republic of Somaliland, H.E. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (irro), today held a strategic meeting with the Ambassador of Denmark, H.E. Steen Sonne Andersen, at the Presidential Palace.
The President expressed his gratitude to the Ambassador and the Government of Denmark for their consistent support to Somaliland in the areas of development, economic infrastructure, public institutions, and technical support for the electoral process and democratization.
The President emphasized that the Republic of Somaliland is committed to strengthening and expanding the relations between the two countries, particularly in the fields of security cooperation, economy, social services, and development programs.
For his part, the Danish Ambassador congratulated the President and his Government on the successful peacebuilding and stabilization efforts in the eastern regions of Somaliland, particularly the city of Wrigavo.
The Ambassador underscored that his government will continue its support for Somaliland in the areas of peacebuilding, the development of economic infrastructure, and strengthening institutions crucial for good governance.
Furthermore, Ambassador Andersen highlighted Denmark’s development programs and the major projects it is undertaking in Somaliland. He also discussed with the President the progress of the electoral process and the democratization project in the Republic of Somaliland.
The meeting concluded with a mutual understanding to continue working together on issues of peace, stability, and development in the Horn of Africa region.
Field Office Somaliland recently supported the Somaliland Coast Guard (SLGC) Mobile Training Unit in delivering a specialized training on oil spill prevention and environmental protection.
Fourteen officers from Berbera, Zaylac, Maydh and Hargeisa participated in both theoretical and practical sessions to strengthen their ability to respond to environmental incidents. During the training, they practiced techniques for securing contaminated areas and safely collecting oil spills using professional equipment previously donated by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB).
This initiative further enhances the SLCG’s capacity to protect Somaliland’s coastline and marine environment.
Galkayo – The First Instance Court of the Mudug Region delivered the verdict against Hodan Mohamud Diiriye on Monday following a hearing that was streamed live for hours, drawing widespread public attention. The court also sentenced Hodan’s 65-year-old husband to one year in prison and a $500 fine for his involvement in the case.
Although Hodan denied killing the girl, she admitted in court to repeatedly torturing her. Prosecutors presented evidence that convinced the court she was directly responsible for Sabiriin’s death.
Both defendants were granted one month to file an appeal. Their defense lawyer stated he disagreed with the judgment and confirmed that an appeal had already been submitted on Hodan’s behalf.
Sabiriin’s body, which had been held pending the court proceedings, is expected to be released to her family for burial.
The killing of the young girl had sparked public outrage and protests in Galkayo. Demonstrations last week resulted in one death and significant property damage.
