Introduction

Hargeisa, the capital city of Somaliland, is the political, economic, and cultural center of the nation. It covers an area of 180 km², divided into nine districts, and lies at an elevation of 1,334 meters above sea level. Today, the city’s population is estimated at around 1.8 million people, making it one of the fastest-growing urban centers in the Horn of Africa. Rapid urbanization has brought growth opportunities but has also placed significant pressure on infrastructure, public services, and governance.

The city’s infrastructure remains critically underdeveloped relative to its size and importance. According to Eng. Mouktar Ali (2025), Hargeisa has a road network of 118 roads totaling 253 kilometers, combining paved and unpaved surfaces. However, many of these roads are poorly designed, lack drainage systems, and fail to meet international standards. Beyond transport, the city faces deep deficits in healthcare and public services, with a shortage of at least 30 maternal and healthcare facilities and around 15 police stations. These gaps weaken both social services and community resilience.

Youth, who represent the majority of Hargeisa’s population, face particular challenges due to limited infrastructure. With a shortage of public playgrounds and recreational spaces, many children and young people are forced to play football on roads or on rented private playgrounds, often at risk of accidents. Education infrastructure is similarly strained: in several parts of the city, one cannot find a sequence of 8 kilometers containing any government-run primary or secondary schools. This reflects the absence of a systematic approach to educational infrastructure development in line with the city’s rapid population growth.

Urban planning challenges compound these problems. Poor electrical infrastructure, with widespread overhead power cables, has contributed to frequent market and residential fires, causing loss of life and destruction of property. In addition, inadequate zoning, unregulated settlements, and weak enforcement of construction standards have produced urban sprawl, traffic congestion, and unsafe living conditions. These realities underscore the urgent need for Hargeisa to adopt a coordinated infrastructure development strategy that addresses not only roads, but also healthcare, education, electricity, safety, and recreation.

Over the past 34 years of independence, Hargeisa has been led by 12 mayors, each contributing to the city’s infrastructure in varying degrees. While recent years have seen improvements in road expansion, the overall condition of infrastructure across sectors including roads, healthcare, education, and recreation remains below the standards expected of a modern capital city. This report explores the progress made, the leadership transitions, the current infrastructure situation, and the reforms necessary to transform Hargeisa into a resilient and sustainable city.

2 –Historical Overview of Leadership and Infrastructure

Hargeisa’s mayoral history illustrates both the challenges and opportunities of municipal governance. Between 1991 and 2003, the city had eight mayors, most serving for only one to two years. These were: Barre Nuux Xaaji C/laahi (1991–1992), Cumar Boobe (1992–1993), Maxamed Xaashi Cilmi (1994–1996), Muuse Maxamed Yuusuf (1996–1997), Cali Xasan Maxamuud ‘Cali Asad’ (1997–1999), C/raxmaan Ismaaciil Cadami (1999–2000), Cawl Cilmi Cabdalle (2000–2002), and Axmed Maxamed Maxamuud ‘Axmed Dheere’ (2002–2003). The brevity of their mandates meant that long-term infrastructure planning was virtually impossible, and projects were often fragmented or abandoned.

From 2003 to 2012, Xuseen Maxamuud Jiciir served nearly a decade, providing relative stability. His leadership marked the first attempt at structured road expansion, although financing and technical standards remained weak. His administration built several key roads but struggled to keep up with the city’s rapid urban growth.

In January 2013, Yuusuf Warsame Siciid was elected mayor but unfortunately passed away after only four months in office. He was succeeded by C/raxmaan Caydiid Soltelco, who served from 2013 until July 2021. Soltelco’s period marked the most consistent road expansion in Hargeisa’s history, though issues of design quality, sustainability, and limited resources persisted.

The current mayor, Cabdikariin Axmed Mooge, elected in May 2021, has overseen significant achievements in road development, introducing 104 kilometers of new or rehabilitated roads within four and a half years. This equates to approximately 26 kilometers per year, or three kilometers per district annually. While this represents an unprecedented improvement in municipal delivery capacity, it remains insufficient compared to international standards for capital cities of similar size and importance.

3 – Current State of Infrastructure

Today, Hargeisa’s road network reflects both progress and systemic limitations. Out of the 253 kilometers of roadways, only a fraction meet basic engineering standards. Many paved roads lack proper base and sub-base layers, leading to early deterioration under traffic loads. Unpaved roads dominate large sections of the network, exposing residents to dust during dry seasons and mud during rains, while drainage deficiencies frequently cause flooding and road damage.

The City Council’s achievement of implementing 104 kilometers of roads in four and a half years is commendable. However, these projects have often been undertaken with limited feasibility studies, geotechnical investigations, or compliance with internationally recognized design standards. The result is that many roads, although newly constructed, do not achieve long service life. Internationally, well-engineered roads are expected to last 15–20 years, while in Hargeisa, premature road failures are common within 2–3 years.

At the district level, the pace of infrastructure expansion is particularly low. With three kilometers added per district per year, large parts of the city remain underserved. Road connectivity between districts is inconsistent, and major commercial hubs face persistent congestion. The lack of pedestrian walkways, traffic management systems, and road safety measures further undermines the usability and inclusiveness of Hargeisa’s infrastructure.

The city’s geographical location and elevation also create challenges. At 1,334 meters above sea level, Hargeisa experiences unique hydrological conditions requiring effective storm water management systems. Unfortunately, drainage infrastructure has not kept pace with road construction, leaving many roads vulnerable to erosion and flood damage during the rainy season.

4 – Lack of Proper Planning and Prioritization in the Last 13 Years

Over the last 13 years, Hargeisa has made visible progress in expanding its road network and urban services, but the city has consistently struggled with poor planning and weak prioritization of infrastructure projects. Many developments have been carried out reactively, responding to immediate pressures rather than being guided by a comprehensive long-term urban development plan. As a result, projects are often fragmented, poorly located, and unable to serve the broader needs of the city.

One major issue has been the absence of a city-wide masterplan that aligns infrastructure investment with population growth, land use, and economic activities. Roads have been constructed without proper integration into a transport system that connects residential areas with markets, industrial zones, and social services. Some projects have even been implemented in locations that do not correspond to the city’s most urgent needs, leaving heavily populated districts underserved while less critical areas receive investments.

The lack of prioritization criteria has further weakened efficiency. Instead of systematically addressing healthcare facilities, schools, drainage, and electricity alongside roads, Hargeisa has often allocated limited funds to projects with high political visibility but little long-term impact. For example, while road paving has increased in certain districts, many neighborhoods still lack maternal health centers, adequate policing facilities, and fire protection infrastructure. This imbalance has left communities vulnerable despite heavy investment in certain sectors.

Finally, weak institutional capacity and political pressures have limited the effectiveness of urban planning. Without technical bodies to evaluate project locations, environmental impacts, and social needs, decision-making has frequently been influenced by short-term goals or donor-driven agendas. This has prevented Hargeisa from fully leveraging its resources to achieve balanced, equitable, and resilient infrastructure growth. If not corrected, these challenges will continue to undermine the city’s ability to serve its population of 1.8 million and prepare for the next decades of expansion.

5– Hargeisa’s Drainage and Flood Management Challenges

Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland, faces persistent infrastructure problems during the rainy season, primarily due to inadequate drainage systems and weak flood control mechanisms. Despite the city’s favorable slope of 54 meters, ranging from an elevation of 1,334 meters at the highest point to 1,280 meters at the lowest, storm water does not drain efficiently across the urban landscape. This is largely because of human-induced and planning-related challenges that obstruct natural water flows. The following are the primary challenges hindering the city’s progress toward achieving resilient flood control and sustainable drainage management.

. Absence of a Comprehensive Stormwater Drainage Master Plan

A major obstacle to effective flood management in Hargeisa is the lack of an integrated master plan for stormwater drainage. Without a city-wide framework mapping natural water flows, flood-prone areas, and suitable infrastructure (such as culverts, retention basins, and storm channels), rainfall is left to follow uncontrolled paths. This causes flooding in urban roads, schools, markets, and community spaces. Current drainage efforts are fragmented and reactive; each neighborhood improvises temporary fixes that fail to solve the systemic issue. The absence of long-term planning leads to recurring damage, high maintenance costs, and disruption of economic and social activities.

1. Rapid Urbanization without Supporting Infrastructure

Hargeisa’s fast urban growth has far exceeded its infrastructure development. As new buildings and roads emerge, many are constructed on or across natural water paths, creating physical barriers that prevent normal drainage. This unregulated expansion traps rainwater in low-lying areas, resulting in recurrent flash floods. The situation is worsened by the lack of zoning laws and enforcement, causing new developments to repeat old mistakes. The cost of infrastructure repair, property loss, and business interruption continues to grow, underlining the urgent need for urban growth management and flood-sensitive planning.

3. Poor Solid Waste Management

Inadequate solid waste collection and disposal systems are aggravating Hargeisa’s flooding problem. Many residents dispose of garbage in open drains and riverbeds, which clogs natural water channels. When it rains, the blocked drains cause stagnant water, road erosion, and overflows that destroy property. Beyond the structural damage, this also creates major public health risks stagnant water fosters mosquito breeding and waterborne diseases such as cholera and malaria. Effective waste management must therefore be central to any drainage improvement plan, ensuring clean waterways and functional stormwater systems.

4. Limited Technical and Institutional Capacity

The city’s ability to design and manage sustainable drainage infrastructure is severely constrained by limited technical expertise and institutional coordination. There are few trained engineers, hydrologists, or urban planners capable of designing resilient flood management systems. As a result, most interventions are temporary, such as shallow trenches or makeshift barriers, which fail under heavy rain. Moreover, weak coordination among government agencies and poor data collection on rainfall and hydrology hinder evidence-based planning. Strengthening technical and institutional capacity is vital to ensure long-term, science-driven flood management.

5. Inadequate Funding and Dependence on Donors

Hargeisa’s stormwater management is severely underfunded. Most infrastructure budgets prioritize roads, schools, and electricity, leaving drainage as an afterthought. This financial neglect results in small, disjointed projects that fail to cover the entire city. Moreover, the heavy reliance on donor funding creates short-term and fragmented interventions often focused on isolated neighborhoods with little long-term maintenance. When donor support ends, many drainage systems deteriorate due to a lack of resources. Establishing a dedicated municipal budget and sustainable financing mechanisms is essential for lasting flood resilience.

6. Climate Change and Increasing Rainfall Variability

Climate change is amplifying Hargeisa’s flood risks. The city now experiences erratic rainfall long dry periods followed by sudden, intense storms. These extreme events easily overwhelm existing drainage systems, causing destructive flash floods that wash away roads, vehicles, and homes. The unpredictability of rainfall complicates planning and stretches already limited budgets. To adapt, Hargeisa must invest in climate-resilient infrastructure, improve forecasting, and integrate adaptive urban design principles that account for shifting weather patterns.

7. Encroachment on Natural Drainage Paths

Encroachment on natural waterways is among the most direct causes of flooding. Many residents and developers have built homes, shops, and other structures on dry riverbeds (togs) and valleys, blocking stormwater flow. This results in severe flooding of surrounding neighborhoods during rainstorms. Weak land-use regulations and poor enforcement by municipal authorities allow these risky developments to continue unchecked. Over time, such encroachments erode the city’s natural drainage capacity, transforming moderate rainfall into devastating flood events. Strict enforcement of urban zoning and relocation from flood-prone areas are crucial to restoring Hargeisa’s natural flood resilience.

6–Key Challenges Facing Hargeisa Infrastructure

The first and most pressing challenge is governance and continuity. With 12 mayors over 34 years, the city has lacked a permanent institutional framework dedicated solely to infrastructure planning and delivery. Political changes often disrupt project continuity, weaken institutional memory, and shift priorities away from long-term development.

Second, financing constraints severely limit road expansion and quality improvement. The Hargeisa City Council relies primarily on limited local taxes and irregular donor contributions. Without sustainable financing models, infrastructure projects often face cost-cutting measures that compromise durability and performance.

Third, technical standards and capacity remain insufficient. Road projects are frequently executed without detailed engineering designs, soil tests, or adherence to international best practices. Contractors and municipal engineers often work without updated guidelines, leading to weak pavements, poor drainage, and short road lifespans. The absence of independent quality control mechanisms exacerbates this challenge.

Fourth, urbanization pressures intensify the infrastructure gap. With rapid population growth and unplanned settlements, demand for roads, drainage, and public services far exceeds supply. Congestion, dust pollution, and flooding have become daily realities for many residents. Climate change further compounds these issues, exposing Hargeisa’s vulnerable infrastructure to greater risks of damage from extreme weather events.

Conclusion

After 34 years of independence, Hargeisa stands at a critical crossroads. The city’s impressive growth and emerging infrastructure improvements demonstrate resilience, ambition, and civic commitment but these gains remain fragile without coordinated, long-term planning. The recurring challenges of poor drainage, weak technical standards, unregulated urbanization, and underfunded public services reveal a city striving to modernize without the institutional tools required for sustainability. To secure its future, Hargeisa must shift from reactive governance to strategic investment, from short-term projects to enduring citywide systems, and from political fragmentation to professional, accountable management.

If the recommended actions are implemented establishing a planning authority, adopting a master plan, enforcing zoning, improving financing, strengthening technical capacity, and embedding climate resilience Hargeisa can transform into a modern, well-planned, and livable capital that reflects the aspirations of its people and the legacy of Somaliland’s hard-won independence. The next decade must be a decade of urban transformation, where leadership, planning, and innovation converge to build a city worthy of its history and future potential.

Finally, Hargeisa requires a comprehensive urban masterplan for the next 20–30 years, integrating roads, public transport, pedestrian walkways, and storm water systems. Strategic planning must align infrastructure with projected population growth, economic expansion, and climate resilience. With such reforms, Hargeisa can transition from patchwork development to a modern, well-planned city that reflects its status as the heart of Somaliland.

7– Recommendations

1. Establish a Permanent Municipal Infrastructure Planning and Coordination Authority

Hargeisa urgently needs a permanent and professional municipal body dedicated to infrastructure planning, coordination, and implementation. Frequent leadership changes, with 12 mayors over 34 years, have created gaps in continuity and accountability. A specialized Hargeisa Infrastructure and Planning Authority (HIPA) should be established with legal autonomy, technical experts, and clear mandates for urban planning, road design, flood management, and service delivery. This institution should ensure that each new mayor continues existing projects under a shared city development framework, minimizing waste and political disruption. A stable institutional framework will promote consistent standards, better coordination among sectors, and stronger partnerships with national and international development agencies.

2. Develop a Comprehensive Urban Master Plan with Integrated Infrastructure Components

The lack of a comprehensive urban master plan has resulted in fragmented, reactive development. Hargeisa must develop a modern, GIS-based City Master Plan that integrates land use, transportation, housing, drainage, water, energy, and green spaces. This plan should align population growth projections with infrastructure priorities, ensuring that schools, hospitals, markets, and roads are equitably distributed across all districts. Such a plan must be developed collaboratively, engaging urban planners, engineers, economists, and community leaders to reflect both technical and social realities. The master plan should be legally binding to guide all public and private development, prevent unregulated construction, and promote sustainable urban expansion.

3. Improve Infrastructure Financing and Establish a Dedicated Municipal Fund

Inadequate and inconsistent funding remains one of Hargeisa’s largest obstacles.To overcome this, the city should introduce a Municipal Infrastructure Development Fund supported by diverse revenue sources, including local taxes, land rates, utility levies, and partnerships with private investors. Transparent financial management and annual public reporting would enhance trust and attract donor confidence. Furthermore, the city should explore public-private partnerships (PPPs) for key projects such as roads, drainage, and waste management, ensuring quality standards and long-term maintenance. Sustainable financing mechanisms will allow the municipality to shift from short-term donor dependency to a self-reliant, planned investment model.

4. Enforce Urban Zoning, Building Regulations, and Drainage Protection Measures

Encroachment on waterways and unregulated construction have made Hargeisa highly vulnerable to floods and fire hazards. Strict enforcement of zoning laws and building codes is critical to restoring the city’s environmental balance. The municipality should demarcate and protect natural drainage paths, valleys, and green corridors to serve as natural flood buffers. Illegal structures on riverbeds should be systematically removed, with fair compensation or relocation plans where necessary. Strengthening urban inspection teams and digitalizing land permits will minimize corruption and ensure that development adheres to urban safety and sustainability standards. Such enforcement not only protects public safety but also preserves the city’s natural hydrology.

5. Strengthen Technical Capacity, Research, and Quality Control in Infrastructure Development

Hargeisa’s infrastructure quality problems stem largely from limited technical expertise and the absence of quality assurance systems. To reverse this trend, the city should establish a Municipal Engineering and Quality Control Department responsible for all technical evaluations, design reviews, and on-site inspections. Engineers and planners should receive regular professional training in modern urban design, geotechnical investigation, and climate-resilient infrastructure. Partnerships with local universities such as the University of Hargeisa can support research into cost-effective and locally adapted engineering solutions. Establishing design standards and independent testing laboratories will ensure that every project meets international safety and durability benchmarks.

6. Prioritize Drainage and Flood Management as Core Infrastructure

Hargeisa’s drainage and flood challenges demand a strategic, citywide response. The municipality should urgently develop a Stormwater Drainage Master Plan supported by detailed hydrological studies, topographic mapping, and climate modeling. Key interventions should include the construction of retention basins, underground drainage tunnels, lined channels, and routine maintenance systems. Drainage infrastructure should be integrated into every new road or housing project. Furthermore, community education campaigns should discourage dumping of solid waste in watercourses. Integrating drainage planning into all urban development decisions will prevent recurring damage, improve public health, and reduce post-rainy-season rehabilitation costs.

7. Expand Social Infrastructure: Healthcare, Education, and Recreation

Physical infrastructure alone cannot sustain a growing city without parallel investments in human and social development. Hargeisa must prioritize the construction of maternal health centers, schools, and recreational facilities in underserved districts. The absence of public playgrounds, community libraries, and youth centers has social consequences, fostering idleness and limiting children’s development. Government and local NGOs should collaborate to establish multi-purpose community centers that combine education, health, and recreation services. Ensuring equitable access to these facilities will strengthen social cohesion and improve the overall quality of life in the city.

8. Adopt Climate-Resilient Urban Design and Sustainable Practices

Given the increasing variability of rainfall and rising temperatures, Hargeisa must embrace climate-resilient infrastructure planning. This involves using permeable paving materials, green roofs, rainwater harvesting systems, and urban green belts that absorb runoff and improve air quality. Building codes should mandate the inclusion of climate adaptation features in all public and private projects. Integrating solar-powered streetlights, energy-efficient buildings, and sustainable waste management will not only reduce costs but also position Hargeisa as a model for environmentally conscious urban development in the Horn of Africa.

This report represents my contribution to the future of Hargeisa and its people, offering a roadmap for building resilient and sustainable infrastructure. As our city continues to grow, addressing the challenges of drainage, flood control, and urban planning is not just a technical necessity but a foundation for economic growth, public health, and social stability. I hope that this document will serve as a valuable reference for policymakers, urban planners, and future mayors who carry the responsibility of shaping Hargeisa into a safer and more livable city.

Drawing from more than a decade of professional experience, I have witnessed firsthand the successes and failures of infrastructure projects across Somaliland and the wider Horn of Africa. These experiences have reinforced my belief that informed planning, strong institutions, and strategic investments are the keys to sustainable development. Through this report, I aim to share both knowledge and vision that can guide the city toward solutions rooted in local realities yet aligned with international best practices.

Eng. Mouktar Yusuf Ali

Infrastructure Analyst – Somaliland Specialist in Regional Development and Infrastructure in the Horn of Africa

By Naima M. Hassan | Freelance Journalist | Hargeisa, Somaliland

The recent visit of the Jijiga Mayor to Hargeisa has sparked a public debate about women’s representation in local governance, exposing the gender imbalance within Hargeisa’s municipal leadership. What began as a routine exchange between sister cities quickly turned into a national conversation on gender equality, optics, and the limits of symbolic inclusion.

A Tale of Two Cities and Two Realities

When the delegation from Jijiga arrived in Hargeisa last week, their group immediately drew attention. The Jijiga Mayor was accompanied by three senior female officials a visible sign of women’s inclusion in leadership within the Ethiopian Somali Region. In contrast, the Hargeisa welcoming team composed of the Mayor, the Deputy Mayor, the Executive Secretary, and a local council member — was entirely male.

The official photo captured the difference starkly on one side, the Jijiga team with women leaders confidently representing their offices; on the other, the Hargeisa delegation, all men. That single image spread rapidly across social media platforms, igniting public outrage and calls for reform in Hargeisa’s city administration.

Within hours, the photo became a symbol of exclusion. Citizens, activists, and youth groups voiced frustration over what they called “a glaring display of gender imbalance.” Women’s rights advocates criticized the Mayor for surrounding himself with men in decision-making positions while women remain largely absent from leadership roles in the city government.

“This wasn’t just a photo it was a mirror held up to the Hargeisa administration,” said one women’s peace champion “It showed us how far we still have to go.”

Damage Control and a Misstep

In what appeared to be an attempt to manage the backlash, the following day the Hargeisa Mayor invited three female local government workers to join a new photo session with the Jijiga delegation. The move was quickly interpreted by the public as a last-minute attempt to save face rather than a genuine act of inclusion.

Observers pointed out that the women in the new photograph were not decision-makers but junior staff members a distinction that further fueled public criticism. “Dear Mayor,” one young female activist said, “women’s inclusion is not a photo opportunity. It is a commitment to leadership, voice, and visibility.”

A Broader Issue: Representation Beyond Symbolism

The incident has reignited discussions about women’s participation in governance across Somaliland. Although women make up a significant portion of Hargeisa’s workforce, they remain underrepresented in positions of authority within the municipal council and executive offices.

“Representation cannot be reduced to optics,” said a female lawyer interviewed after the incident. “If women are not part of the policy table — if they are not decision-makers — then we are perpetuating the same cycle of exclusion that has defined local politics for years.”

The contrast between Jijiga and Hargeisa was difficult to ignore. The Jijiga Mayor’s delegation exemplified a model of gender inclusion, where women are visibly empowered to represent their communities in high-level engagements. Many Somalilanders have called on their local leaders to follow suit not for appearance’s sake, but as a step toward fair governance.

Lessons and the Road Ahead

The Hargeisa Mayor’s attempt to stage inclusion has, ironically, deepened public scrutiny of his administration’s gender policies. Critics argue that the incident has exposed not only a lack of genuine commitment to women’s leadership but also a misunderstanding of what true inclusion entails.

Women’s organizations have since called for structural reforms within the local government including appointments of qualified women to executive positions and the establishment of a gender policy framework that ensures fair participation in decision-making processes.

Until such steps are taken, the mayor’s photo with three women will remain, for many, a symbol of tokenism a visual effort to cover a deeper imbalance.

As public debate continues, one message rings clear from Hargeisa’s streets and social media feeds alike: women’s representation cannot be manufactured for the camera. It must be lived, practiced, and institutionalized.

EPC Horn of African Studies Unit

Key Takeaways

• The federal Somali government asserts that the establishment of the new Northeastern State of Somalia stems from the aspirations of local communities and aims to promote national unity. However, both Puntland and Somaliland view this move as an infringement on their traditional spheres of influence, posing threats to their sovereignty and territorial integrity.

• Mogadishu’s sponsorship of the Northeastern State is likely to prompt a response from Puntland and Somaliland. Their reactions may range from rapprochement and cooperation in opposition to the central government, to more radical measures aimed at delegitimizing and dismantling the newly formed state.

• The future of the new state depends on its ability to consolidate itself amid political rivalries and tribal competition. Its greatest challenge will be securing legitimacy and recognition, particularly from other federal Somali entities.

In a remarkable development, an expanded local conference held in Laascaanood in July 2025 announced the formation of Somalia’s sixth federal state – the Northeastern State of Somalia, also known as Khatumo. This newly declared state encompasses the regions of Sool, Sanaag and Ayn, which remain contested by Somaliland and Puntland. These two states have rejected this development, denouncing it as a threat and a strategic maneuver by Mogadishu to reinforce its federal authority. This step risks heightening tensions and deepening political and tribal polarization in a region already plagued by a fragile and complex legal and political environment.

The sixth state and Mogadishu’s calculations

The central government in Mogadishu has maintained strong support for the emerging situation in the northeast. This started with supporting the armed tribal movement led by the Dhulbahante and Warsangali clans in February 2023. The movement gained momentum culminating in the defeat of the Somaliland army in August 2023 and the establishment of the Khatumo administration – a reality Mogadishu provisionally recognized in October 2023.

Further solidifying its support, Mogadishu formally accepted the new administration as a full member of the Somali federation, designating it as the sixth regional state. This decision followed a controversial visit by Somali Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre to Laascaanood, the capital of the new state, in April 2025. Furthermore, the Somali federal government has played a pivotal role in establishing the new state (the northeastern state) and provided it with legitimacy. This marks an important juncture in the history of this region and reflects the aspirations of marginalized communities to reclaim their key historical role in shaping Somalia’s national political framework.

The central government in Mogadishu considers itself the primary beneficiary of this new reality. Its key motives and calculations for redrawing Somalia’s political map include the following:

First, Advancing Centralist Orientations: The rise of the new state contributes to the recalibration of the federal balance of power in favor of the central government. This shift enhances Mogadishu’s weight in shaping national policy and potentially expands its reach over regional states. It also positions Mogadishu to play a decisive role in shaping the political elite of the new federal member (Laascaanood). The new state is expected to align more closely with centralist visions of governance and future power dynamics within Somalia.

Second, Undermining Somaliland’s Secessionist Agenda: Mogadishu and unionist elites in southern Somalia have taken the lead in creating the Northeastern State with the aim of delivering a severe blow to Somaliland’s long-standing bid for independence based on colonial-era borders (the former British Protectorate). The government of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has sensed troubling shifts in international and regional attitudes toward the Somali question, with an increasing interest in Somaliland at the expense of Somalia. Notably, signs of a changing mood in Washington suggest a potential reconsideration of the “One Somalia” policy, raising the possibility of formal recognition for Somaliland.

Figure 1: The Northeastern State of Somalia (Khatumo) and its geographical boundaries as they appear on the map

Third, Curtailing Puntland’s Influence: Mogadishu’s support for Khatumo reflects a desire to empower Laascaanood to chart its own course, independent of Puntland’s agenda. This approach disregards Garowe’s concerns, particularly regarding federal plans to reorganize local forces and militias – formerly affiliated with the Khatumo administration – to integrate them in the federal army. Garowe interprets these moves as a calculated move to alter regional power dynamics and impose federal control. Such changes could reduce Puntland’s territorial scope, reshape its social fabric and limit its ability to maintain influence, autonomy and strategic balance.

Fourth, Pursuing Economic, Geostrategic and Demographic Objectives: The region is believed to hold significant hydrocarbon reserves. It also occupies a key strategic location that enhances the federal state’s access to the Gulf of Aden. This positioning serves as a hedge against potential shifts in international focus toward Somaliland and Puntland, which could undermine Mogadishu’s strategic relevance. Additionally, the cental government may seek to weaken entrenched tribal dynamics which dominate the Somali political landscape by altering the demographic composition in areas dominated by rival clans. This includes challenging the influence of the Isaaq and Darood clans in Hargeisa and Garowe, respectively, while reinforcing the position of the Hawiye clan, to which President Sheikh Mohamud and most of the elites in the center belong.

Fifth, Conveying Messages to the International Community and Somalia’s Partners:  Through its actions, Mogadishu aims to project growing confidence in its ability to manage both internal and external affairs independently. In return, it expects foreign actors to recognize and engage with the federal government as the legitimate authority that is capable of guiding Somalia out of its prolonged crises. This includes asserting control over constitutional reforms, managing the relationship between the center and the peripheries and setting the terms for foreign cooperation with Somaliland and other regional states.

Somaliland and Puntland’s positions and options               

Somaliland and Puntland share common concerns regarding the fate of disputed territories, particularly Sool, Sanaag and Ayn. Somaliland has firmly rejected the creation of the Northeastern State on territories it considers “under its jurisdiction.” Hargeisa views this move as an attempt by Mogadishu to exert political influence through tribal affiliations, potentially inciting internal conflict. It also sees the development as part of a broader strategy to undermine its authority, destabilize its governance and derail its aspirations for international recognition as an independent state.

Similarly, Puntland has strongly opposed this development and pledged to confront it. Garowe perceives the move as a direct threat to its territorial integrity and political authority. It accuses the Federal Government of Somalia of complicity in fragmenting the country. Puntland officials have warned that “the federal government is attempting to divide the nation into conflicting regional entities.”

This situation may prompt both Hargeisa and Garowe to consider possible responses, ranging from reconciliation and collaboration in confronting the central government, to more aggressive actions to challenge the legitimacy of the new administration and dismantle it.

1. Reconciliation and Strategic Alignment: Despite the tension and rivalry that have characterized the relationship between the two stable neighboring regions – Somaliland and Puntland – over the past 30 years, the current crisis may present an opportunity for them to reconcile and collaborate. Recent developments suggest a potential shift in attitudes, which could strengthen their positions and complicate the central government’s efforts to assert control over the disputed territories. A united front could reshape the political landscape and challenge the federal government’s ambitions in the region.

2. Operational Escalation and Strategic Encirclement: Somaliland may view the situation as a window for decisive military action aimed at recapturing the city of Laascaanood and surrounding areas, dismantling its opponents’ presence and halting their progress toward federal integration. Puntland, meanwhile, is unlikely to remain passive in the face of such escalation by Hargeisa against Laascaanood. It could potentially find itself in conflict with the latter, particularly if the new administration crosses the boundaries set by President Said Deni, which include attempts to extend its administrative reach into areas still under Puntland’s control, including the Sanaag region.

3. Negotiation and Diplomatic Engagement: This remains the most viable path for resolving Somalia’s current political deadlock. International mediation and support could help facilitate a broader dialogue addressing key issues such as the constitutional crisis and the legal status of the new administration. However, entrenched positions and deep-seated mistrust among Somali stakeholders continue to hinder progress toward peace and reconciliation. For instance, Somaliland President Abdirahman Irro has emphasized that talks with Mogadishu cannot proceed until concerns over sovereignty violations and the establishment of a separate administration are addressed. This suggests that any revival of negotiations between northern and southern Somalia would require a shift in Mogadishu’s approach.

The consequences of the creation of the New State and its future

The establishment of the new Northeastern Somalia state carries significant implications for the country’s future. It comes at a time of political uncertainty, persistent security challenges and financial strain, compounded by declining external support due to changing priorities among donors. The federal government and its supporters view the new state as a means to enhance national unity, peace, stability and development by integrating regions into the federal framework. However, Puntland and Somaliland view the initiative as a threat to their traditional spheres of influence and sovereignty, prompting strong opposition and resistance to any redrawing of Somalia’s political and administrative map.

Meanwhile, public sentiment across Somalia is marked by a mix of anticipation and cautious optimism. Some view the development as an opportunity to strengthen and expand the federal model and rebuild Somali federalism on the principles of equitable partnership and national unity. Others fear it may further complicate Somalia’s already intricate political dynamics, potentially escalating tensions and conflict both in the region and the country as a whole. Domestic and international stakeholders remain hopeful that these significant changes will prompt meaningful political dialogue among all Somali parties and stakeholders to forge consensus and chart a stable path forward.

The success of the new administration hinges on its ability to establish itself within a politically charged environment rife with tribal rivalries. It faces considerable hurdles in establishing functioning executive and legislative institutions, securing financial and logistical support and ensuring basic security. Most critically,  it must gain recognition and legitimacy, especially from other federal entities, amid a lack of consensus at both regional and federal levels. Without garnering sufficient acceptance from neighboring states, the administration risks remaining a symbolic entity.

Even at the local level, the new federal entity still lacks inclusivity, cohesion and effective control over all the territories it claims to represent. Skepticism persists among certain tribal groups, especially the Warsangli clan, about fair representation. In the Sanaag region, divisions remain between supporters of the new entity and others who maintain allegiance to Puntland’s political and administrative structures. These tribal and regional contradictions pose significant obstacles to consolidating loyalty and building a unified governance framework.

Summary and conclusions

The declaration of a new state in the Khatumo region of northeastern Somalia has sparked political controversy and deepened divisions among the Somali population. Reactions from the federal government, Somaliland and Puntland reflect growing tensions and competing visions for Somalia’s future. The disputed region’s strategic importance is likely to grow as tribal competition and regional polarization intensify, further complicating the already fragile situation in the country.

Despite the initial enthusiasm from supporters and strong opposition from rivals, the emerging administration faces numerous challenges on its path toward full federal integration. Addressing its fragile legitimacy will require expanding its representative base, resolving tribal divisions, securing both governmental and external support, improving security and living conditions and gaining recognition from other members of the Somali Federation, particularly Puntland. Additionally, mitigating potential threats from Somaliland will be essential to ensuring the stability and viability of the new state.

Editor’s Note: This op-ed was first published by the Emirates Policy Center (EPC), an independent think tank based in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.