Nairobi, October 22, 2013-Somali authorities must work quickly to identify the motive in today’s murder attempt on a broadcast reporter and bring the perpetrators to justice, the Committee to Protect Journalists said today. The journalist, Mohamed Mohamud, has been hospitalized with serious injuries.

Unidentified gunmen in a car shot repeatedly at Mohamed’s car as he was driving to work at about 7 a.m. in the Wadajir district of the capital, Mogadishu, according to local journalists. He sustained six bullet wounds in his neck, chest, and shoulder, news reports said. He has undergone surgery at a local hospital, but is still unconscious, local journalists said.

Mohamed, 26, who is also known as “Tima’ade,” is a reporter at the private U.K.-based Universal TV. It is not clear if he had covered any sensitive stories before the attack.

Universal TV, which was established in 2005, covers news for the Somali diaspora with correspondents based in countries including Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya. In 2012, CPJ documented several attacks on Universal TV reporters. On October 23, 2012, unidentified gunmen shot dead Ahmed Farah Ilyas, a reporter for the broadcaster, and on July 7, 2012, gunmen attempted to kill Abdulkadir Omar Abdulle, a reporter and anchor for Universal TV. Abdulkadir survived the shooting.  

“The pace of attacks on journalists in Mogadishu may have slowed slightly, but the capital is still an unacceptably dangerous place for journalists to work,” said CPJ East Africa Consultant Tom Rhodes.

No one has taken responsibility for the attack on Mohamed. The insurgent militia group Al-Shabaab is routinely linked to attacks on journalists, although some cases are linked to personal grudges from officials volleying for power, according to news reports. 

Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud issued a statement condemning the attack and calling for an immediate investigation. “There must be no impunity, and the government will do everything in its power to bring to justice all those involved in the killing of our journalists or any violence committed against them.”

Somalia’s Central Investigation Department arrested three suspects today in relation to the attack, according to local journalists.

CPJ’s Rhodes welcomed the government’s pledge, saying, “The only way of curbing this brutal trend is for the perpetrators to be held accountable.”

·      For more data and analysis, visit CPJ’s Somalia page.

Contact:

Sue Valentine

Africa Program Coordinator

svalentine@cpj.org

Mohamed Keita

Africa Advocacy Coordinator

Tel. +1.212.465.1004 ext. 117

Email: mkeita@cpj.org

Tom Rhodes

East Africa Consultant

Email: trhodes@cpj.org

By Mohamud M Uluso

Analysis

A recent conference on Somalia held in Brussels has endorsed a new ‘Somali compact’ with development partners who are mainly from the North, pledging funds. The pact has many serious flaws – among them are the appointment of several foreign advisors without Somali counterparts

After one year of consultations, planning sessions, and international conferences, representatives of the International Community (Development Partners) and High level delegation led by President Hassan Sh. Mohamud of the Federal Republic of Somalia (FRS) met at Brussels, Belgium, the headquarter of the European Union (EU) on 16 September, 2013 for a conference on a ‘New Deal for Somalia’, and jointly endorsed the Somali Compact (SC) based on the ‘New Deal Strategy for Engagement in Fragile States’ adopted in Bussan, South Korea in November 2011. On the basis of the new partnership, the Development Partners (Donors) pledged 2.421 billion dollars to Somalia to implement fifty eight (58) statebuilding milestones detailed in the SC over the next three years (2014-2016). The EU, UK, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, USA, Switzerland, Ireland, Finland, Netherlands, African Development Bank and World Bank contributed 98.72 percent of the pledges. With the exception of Turkey, and the Arab and Asian countries didn’t make pledges, while Italy’s contribution was 12.47 million dollars.

Although the new partnership is better than the former abusive international relationship devised after the collapse of the Somali State, it is not free from fatal flaws and booby-traps that could cancel its promising prospect. Professor Michael Weinstein has highlighted some of the major flaws of the SC in his analysis titled ‘Somalia: the political poisoning of the FGS by Belgian Waffles’ of 21 September, 2013. Similarly, Mary Harper of the BBC cautioned in her report titled “another conference on Somalia” that ‘with so many challenges, it is possible that the Brussels meeting will simply be the latest in the long list of expensive conferences on Somalia that end with ambitious communiqués but have little or no impact on the development of the country.’

Somalia has been put on a peace and statebuilding path designed, directed and managed by the international community in concert with distrusted Somali Partners. The reestablishment of State institutions and authorities at all levels, the holding of constitutional referendum in 2015, and a political election in 2016 throughout Somalia have been made the central mission of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). It is not clear if the Development Partners, the Somali elite and people are on the same page and commit and deploy the efforts and cooperation needed to accomplish these ambitious but existential goals.

SHAMEFUL DIPLOMATIC AMBUSHES

As usual, before and during the Brussels conference, the government of Ethiopia engaged diplomatic ambushes against the sovereign leadership of the FGS to demonstrate its supreme authority over Somalia in collusion with Dr. Abdurahman Mohamed Farole, president of the regional state of Puntland. Against the protocol of the conference published in advance, the Ethiopian foreign minister arranged a publicized photo-op between president Farole and Baroness Catherine Ashton, EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, co-chair of the conference. He also lobbied to get president Farole be seated at the front row of the conference table rather than being seated behind the president of Somalia and to deliver a polemic speech, later expunged from the official record for violating the spirit of the conference and probably infuriating EU leaders. In strong disapproval, the President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel D. Barroso said in his closing remarks that ‘a country cannot live with two presidents. A country needs rule of law, of course in democracy, with inclusiveness, integrating all the parts in the federal structure of your country.’

THE PILLARS OF THE SC

The pillars of the SC include a binding and respected social contract among the Somali people through the Provisional Constitution, the existence of national (federal) representative government recognized by the international community, and the consensus that the international relations (foreign policy) of Somalia is an exclusive realm of the national (federal) government. Parallel or competing local governments in international arenas are incompatible with the New Deal for Somalia.

While the communiqué of the conference reaffirmed the unity, territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Somalia, the SC concedes that the northern regions of Somalia (Somaliland) enjoy advanced level of peace, democratic process, development and governance not achieved by the rest of Somalia. However, Somaliland has agreed to seek international development assistance as part of Somalia but with separate implementation mechanism until national integration is completed. Also, Puntland declared its commitment to contribute to the peaceful, just and productive life for “the whole of Somalia.” The South Central Somalia, the seat of the national body responsible for the representation and protection of the unity and sovereignty of Somalia, is under the stabilization plan authorized by the UN Security Council.

 THE CONTENT OF THE SOMALI COMPACT

The SC focuses on three issues: Peace and statebuilding goals in line with the five goals of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (the inclusive politics, security, justice, economic foundations, and revenue and services); the principles of partnership and the establishment of Somali Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF); and the Architecture and Monitoring Arrangement for mutual accountability and transparency. The SC lists nine principles of partnership for international assistance. The principles of Somali ownership and leadership, transparent and predictable aid, sound Public Financial Management (PFM) systems, and support of institutional development capacity offer a promising prospect.

TIMELINES AND CONSTRAINTS

The provisional constitution, the vision 2016, the national stabilization plan, and the SC, all are setting timelines for the implementation of overlapping priorities. The federal government agreed to develop an integrated plan which meets the requirements of an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (IPRS) with financial cost figures before January 2014. It has also agreed to identify limited number of top priority flagship programmers in December 2013. In consideration of the very weak human resource capacity of the FGS, the preparation and implementation of these multiple plans could take time and protracted or haphazard negotiations that will quickly dash the expectation of the Somali people.

Other constraints to the fulfillment of these deadlines include halted progress in the fighting against Al Shabab, general insecurity, resisted national integration, lack of domestic financial resources, delayed aid disbursement, weak central leadership, and corruption. The Federal Government expects to collect less than 50 million dollars per year as revenue while it needs at least one billion dollars per year to establish a functioning institutional structure at national, regional and district levels.

The SC underscores the formation of core public sector capacities as a precondition for the FGS efforts to support the functioning authorities at all levels of government. The injection of foreign advisors without capable and conscious Somali counterparts at all levels will lead to public discontent and failure.

FATAL FLAWS IN THE SC

One major fatal flaw in the SC is the contradictory positions of the Development Partners. On one hand, they emphasize the sovereign leadership of the FGS over the Somali affairs while on the other hand, they practically deal with FGS as a faction that must negotiate with militias, regions, and self organized opponents, or as a faction required to execute dictated conflicting tasks without strong diplomatic and financial backup. An urgent resolution of these contradictory positions is critical.

A second fatal flaw could come from the misinterpretation of claim made in the SC that the ‘Somaliland Special Arrangement (SSA) represents an important element of a larger shift in approach to development partners’ engagement’ and of the claim that ‘the people in Somaliland are citizens of Somaliland’ or from the use of the distinct names-Somalia and Somaliland- without qualification. On 16 September, the Foreign Minister of Somaliland, Mohamed Behi Yonis published a carefully crafted letter in which he supported the conference and explained Somaliland’s absence. In the same context, the separate security arrangement of US and UK with Somaliland without link to the overall national security structure and strategy of Somalia could trigger new grievances.

A third fatal flaw is related to the confusion surrounding the question of federalism and the tainted legacy of the UN led constitution making process. The international community is fully aware that the issue of the form of federalism in Somalia has not been settled among the Somali people and therefore, the UN has the responsibility to dispel immediately the false claims made on the basis of the provisional constitution in order to avoid protracted controversies. Territory owned/controlled in the name and spirit of clan is unconstitutional.

The Federal government must operate within the limits of the provisional constitution and should not be used as a backdoor to settle, without legitimate process, issues that have been left unresolved during the constitutional negotiation between the stakeholders of the Somali National Constituent Assembly (NCA). The legitimate scrutiny of the FGS actions under and through the agreed conditions and institutions is different from political manipulations and accusations under false claims. Somalia needs a strong democratic developmental central authority with well defined decentralized and accountable system of governance.

By Goth Mohamed Goth

The Deputy Prime and also the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in the federal government of Somalia Ms. Fowzia Yusuf Haji Aden is set to submit her resignation letter to the office of the President Hassan Sheik Mahmoud in the coming days due to long running rivalry between her and Dr. Mohamed Nur Gacan the minister of State for Foreign Affairs.

Unnamed sources close to Villa Somalia have leaked shocking revelations of increase infighting among top officials in the ranks and files in the federal of government of Somalia Foreign minister had several times before complained about the interference by the State minister to the SFG President Hassan Sheik Mahmoud and she hasn’t attended to her duties since.

President Hassan Sheik Mahmoud is in a fix and he cant have both ways the reason he has by all means failed to reconcile the pair and can’t afford to lose either ,one been a longtime ally and a fellow Dam Al-jadeed while the other is a fake symbol of  Somalia unity which he propagates as mean of convincing the world his government is a broad based one.  

It’s said the foreign minister recently sent a ministerial directive on the 12/10/2013 in which she orders the recall of twelve ambassadors from Somalia missions abroad because most  of them have been accused being engaged in corruption and embezzlement  funds  .

The list of recalled Emissaries can be seen below

1 Somalia Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
2 Somalia Ambassador to Egypt
3 Somalia Ambassador to Pakistan
4 Somalia Ambassador to the UAE
5 Somalia Ambassador to Switzerland’s
6 Somalia Ambassador to India
7 Somalia Ambassador to Turkey
8 Somalia Ambassador to Libya
9 Somalia Ambassador to Uganda
10 Somalia Ambassador to France
11 Somalia Ambassador to the UN
12 Somalia Ambassador to Russia

The ministerial directive orders were the emissaries should immediately and without delay to return to country by 20/10/2013 or else further steps shall be taken but her rival and also a close ally of the President Hassan Dam issued another one ordering the 12 Ambassadors to stay put and ignore the directive, this is when all hell broke loose and Madam Fowzia Haji Aden known for her standup attitude threatened to resign.

When the State minister was summoned by his superiors he simply answered I wasn’t informed of the directive which is seen as mare an excuse for the cover up corruption or he has the blessing of his boss who failed to punish the State minister for breaching the code of conduct.

The New Blood sect (Dam Al-jadeed), catapulted her to the second highest office in Somalia are the same ones who now  demanding at all cost the replacement of  the Foreign Minister, Fowzia Yusuf Haji Aden, as many see her position as being untenable.

SomalilandPress.Com

Saturday, October 19, 2013

A suicide bomber killed at least 16 people on Saturday in an attack on a cafe in a Somali town close to the Ethiopian border frequented by local and foreign soldiers fighting al Qaeda-linked rebels.

Al Shabaab said it had carried out the bombing, in the town of Baladweyne, targeting troops participating in an African Union peacekeeping force fighting the Somali Islamist group.

“A man with an explosives jacket entered unexpectedly in the tea shop where soldiers and civilians sat … and blew himself up,” said local elder Ahmed Nur, speaking from the scene of the blast.

At least 16 people were killed and 33 wounded, local politician Dahir Amin Jesow told Reuters by telephone from Baladweyne. “The death toll may rise.”

Somali and African forces pushed Al Shabaab out of Baladweyne, about 210 miles north of Mogadishu, more than a year ago.

But while the territory that al Shabaab controls has greatly dwindled over the past two years, it continues to control large rural areas and some towns and has ratcheted up guerrilla-style attacks.

“Our main target was Ethiopian and Djibouti troops who invaded our country,” said Al Shabaab spokesman Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab. He put the death toll at 25.

There was no independent word on whether foreign soldiers were among the casualties.

Horn of Africa analyst Rashid Abdi said: “Al Shabaab is sending a message that it has the will and the capacity to carry out these kinds of attacks. They are also sending a message that they have huge geographic reach.”

DESTABILISING KEY TOWN

Al Shabaab demonstrated the capacity to strike at far-away targets last month when its gunmen raided a shopping mall in Nairobi, hurling grenades and spraying bullets at shoppers as punishment for Kenya sending troops to Somalia.

Uganda on Friday heightened its “terror” alert to maximum for the first time since bombings in 2010 that killed 79 people, citing domestic and U.S. intelligence indications of a possibly imminent attack by al Shabaab.

Abdirahman Omar Osman, spokesman for President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, said of Saturday’s bombing: “That suicide attack was deliberately aimed at destabilize the city and this is something we will not tolerate and it will not stop our plan to establish a local government in the region.”

Straddling a major highway that links south-western Somalia to southern and northern parts of the country, Baladweyne is the main gateway to the Ogaden region in Ethiopia and a strategically vital area that Addis Ababa has often controlled.

Analyst Abdi said Baladweyne is now probably more secure than it was a year ago despite grenade attacks and targeted killings.

“In a way this attack is also a message of weakness as al Shabaab are not able to carry out a conventional assault on the town in the way they use to two years ago,” he said.

Source: Reuters

A human rights organization in Somaliland recently conducted a pilot survey on the impact of bank accounts closures to Somali remittance companies operating from the United Kingdom.  A preliminary report it issued highlighted a number of alarming facts that prominently stood out of the findings. Among these were that illegal immigration among university-going students nearly tripled since May when Barclay’s made its intention of terminating operations with remittance companies first surfaced.

“We cannot wait for a day when there is no more hope for us to continue our University education,” a sophomore student who dropped out to prepare for an uncertain fate on the seas told the Somaliland-based human rights watch officers. “Now my uncle can at least see to it that I stand a fighting chance through the Libyan Desert onwards to a fifty-fifty survival chance to Italy by being able to send me some money before the last of the remittance companies’ accounts with Barclays finally closes”.

In a CCTV Africa story that the Chinese station aired recently, a Mogadishu University student said he will drop out of university if the Barclays decision went through. He said he was studying medicine, and had two more years left. He said his family received remittances from London. He said if remittances were affected, that will ‘severe’ the family’s lifeline, including their education and health.

Equally alarming was the despondence and resigned desperation showing among the bulk of beneficiaries receiving remittances from family members residing and/or working abroad. Even those that had no relatives in the UK felt uneasy and unsure of the negative influence the UK bank would have on others all over the world if it got away with its decision.

“The only effective social security system that Somalis always fell back on was the extended family system and the unwritten law that no family member went hungry when close relatives had something to spare him,” a University lecturer in Hargeisa told me. “Remittance beneficiaries cannot certainly live without it for a year or more until the UK government finds another ‘safe corridor’ for Somali-bound remittances,” he said.

The Presidents of Somalia, Somaliland, and of other IGAD countries all strongly pleaded with the UK government and the Bank to stop going ahead with the accounts closures.

Not only Somalis, but humanitarian organizations working inside Somali territories did not make a secret of their concern. The organizations highlighted in reports they sent to Barclays and the UK government that the lifesaving efforts on the ground will be severely curtailed if a workable solution is not found for the flow of remittances and money transfers to Somalis. Likewise, politicians, academicians, human rights organizations.

In a bid to make Barclays retract its decision, Dahabshiil, the largest African remittance company – and the last have its accounts still open with Barclays, served a high court injunction against the closure of its accounts to the Bank. The court hearing was concluded on Wednesday. A court decision is expected on Tuesday, October 22.

It is estimated that Somalis remit some 100 million Pounds from the UK.  Among these are transfers bound for humanitarian programs that international organizations and institutions, such as the DFiD, are financing to help Somalis firmly stand on their feet once more. The primary purpose of  allocated funds on the part of governments and international organizations is to avert dependence and deprivation – two certain results of the Bank’s decision if it wins on Tuesday’s ruling.

Turning a deaf ear to everybody is not an option – not for the Bank, not for the Court. If nothing else a diplomatic strain on African UK relations will ensue.

For Somalis – and Africans, in general – a court ruling in favor of the flow of remittances to Africa is the only one they can truly accept. Anything else, it is widely believed, is tantamount to a collective punishment for a crime or crimes that neither remitters nor beneficiaries were found guilty of in a court of law. The bank has proven no single case on ‘irregularities’ against Somali remittances, either.

The ‘benefit of the doubt’ considered by judges in all verdicts reached should rule in favor of beneficiaries.

The bank, working closely with regulators, has every chance to keep Dahabshiil accounts open in order not to deprive the millions of Somalis depending on the flow of remittances for basic needs such as daily subsistence, education, health and so on, and to, also, not encourage people to turn their backs on the law and go underground to send monies back home to family dependents.

Ibrahim J Abdi

A freelance writer

Nairobi, Kenya

By Goth Mohamed Goth

Dahabshil the largest money remittance company in Africa shall remain open for business until Barclays’s next week when a high court judge will hand down a verdict on an injunction sought by Dahabshil, against a decision by Barclays’s to close its account after the hearing, which took place high court before Justice Henderson, ended on Wednesday.

The CEO of Dahabshil money remittance company speaking to reporters after the court hearing said, “We are pleased to reassure customers (both individuals and NGOs) who rely on our services in the UK and across Africa that Dahabshiil remains open for business this after Barclays agreed to continue to keep our accounts open until judgment is reached.”

‘” I take this opportunity to thank all those who have campaigned for this noble cause especially Oxfam,the various international NGOs ,UN and all those people living in the UK who have been tirelessly supporting us through this period”,stated Mr. Abdirashid.

Dahabshil Mr. Abdirashid Duale, said his company is ready to work with international financial institutions to find short and long-term solutions to the fears and concerns expressed by banks and western governments.

Dahabshil lawyer said, “One of the things we have been asking Barclays bank is to extend the services provided to Dahabshil and three other money transfer companies closed earlier to further 12 months and that extra twelve month window shall allow the treasury and the UK government to put in place a safe corridor which will give the banks a new confidence to resume the services they provide to this money transfer companies,

It claimed that Barclays is abusing a dominant position by proposing to end an existing relationship without objective justification and by treating Dahabshiil differently from other customers.

Dahabshil has in the past had a “good working relationship with Barclays for over 15 years” and such short notice on the closure of accounts is “both unreasonable and unfeasible.”

Dahabshiil is also used major international charities, NGOs and UN agencies to fund their operations around the world. 95% of the funding for humanitarian projects in Somalia is transferred through Dahabshiil. In a country with no functioning financial system, “money transfer companies provide a vital lifeline to citizens,” said a statement issued by the organization.

There is a fear that closing the accounts could drive the system underground into unregulated and illegal providers.

SomalilandPress.com

Somali campaigners and Oxfam call for Barclays to reverse the decision to close accounts allowing Somalis in the UK to send money home. Photograph: Andrew Aitchison/Oxfam

Bank agrees to keep money-transfer firm’s account open until after verdict, as UK unveils moves to aid Somali remittances

October 16, 2013

A high court judge is expected to hand down a decision next week on an injunction sought by Dahabshiil, the biggest remittance company in the Horn of Africa, against Barclays’s decision to close its account.

Barclays has agreed to continue to keep Dahabshiil’s account open until after the verdict. The hearing, which took place at the high court before Mr Justice Henderson, ended on Wednesday.

“We are pleased to reassure customers (both individuals and NGOs) who rely on our services in the UK and across Africa that Dahabshiil remains open for business,” the company said in a statement. “The court hearing has now concluded, and the judge’s decision will follow later. Barclays has agreed to continue to keep our accounts open until judgment is received.”

Barclays, the last major bank providing remittance services, announced in May that it planned to shut down the accounts to about 250 money-service businesses, initially giving a 10 July deadline, citing concern over falling foul of money-laundering regulations.

But after an outcry from Somali remitters, academics and some MPs, who said the bank’s concerns were exaggerated, the deadline was pushed back. Dahabshiil, the only money-transfer organisation whose account is still open, sought an injunction to stop Barclays from shutting it down. It claimed that Barclays is abusing a dominant position by proposing to end an existing relationship without objective justification and by treating Dahabshiil differently from other customers.

Barclays had said it was closing the accounts of around 250 money-service businesses because it is obliged to follow rules and regulations set by governments.

“We understand and appreciate the important role these businesses play in helping people to transfer money around the world, in some cases to places where there is great need of financial support,” a spokesman said. “However, Barclays has an obligation to operate within the rules and regulations set by governments and regulators in the countries in which we do business. Failure to do so would result in Barclays being prosecuted by regulators around the world and potentially fined many hundreds or potentially billions of pounds.”

Somalis living in the UK send more than £100m a year for food, healthcare and education to relatives back home. Somalia is particularly depended on money-service businesses such as Dahabshiil as it lacks a formal banking system after decades of war.

“Barclays’s closure of the accounts will mean my 80-year-old mother-in-law won’t receive the money she relies on for food, rent and healthcare,” said Farhan Hassan, whose change.org petition calling on the bank not to cut the lifeline was endorsed by double Olympic gold medallist Mo Farah, and has more than 100,000 signatures.

“My relatives in Somalia know about Barclays’s decision in the UK and they don’t understand why the banks and government can’t work together on the issue. It is unwise and unethical that a gap is going to be left before a solution is put in place.”

Somalia, which is struggling to get back on its feet after decades of war, stands to be the country most affected by Barclays’s decision.

Annual remittances from the UK amount to more than £15bn worldwide, with up to 65% flowing to developing countries. The UK has one of the largest money-transfer markets in Europe as well as the largest number of money-transfer operators.

After a meeting last month, chaired by senior officials from the Treasury and the Department for International Development (DfID), the government announced several steps to deal with the fallout from Barclays’s move. The measures included a planned “safe corridor” for transferring money between the UK and Somalia.

The pilot scheme will be developed to establish and test audit mechanisms to track payments at the sending, clearing and receiving stages of the remittance process. DfID will work with the World Bank to support the development of an audit mechanism and train money-transfer operators in Somalia over the next 12 months.

The government will also form an action group to draft guidance on anti-money laundering, while the National Crime Agency will provide more detailed and specific risk assessments and alerts about the sector to banks and money-transfer companies, to help differentiate the risks involved in dealing with different money transmitters.

Development experts welcomed the government action, but expressed concern about what would happen in the short term. “The Treasury plans are interesting,” said Laura Hammond, head of development studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies, “but it will take months for them to be put in place and there is no plan for what to do to safeguard the corridor in the short run, until the proposed steps are put in place and banks agree to work with the money-service businesses.”

Source: The Guardian

Despite that Somalia enjoys territorial integrity and political independence, it has no representative government locally and internationally, no central government to look into the affairs of the State. Turmoil, chaos, disorder and anarchy prevail at its highest with insurgents, terrorists, warlords and piracy as a new scourge since 1991 when functional government ceased to exist in Somalia. Multiple sub State (Somaliland and Puntland) groups control various sections and layers of the territory or segments of the population.
UNSC resolutions give mandates to States to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international law (UNSC Resolution 1816) but they never cater for those as to who should prosecute the pirates? In the same line the UNCLOS, 1982 does not contain any definition of when an individual can be categorized as a pirate. UNSC Resolution 1851 declares that States must cooperate with the STFG to ‘undertake all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia for the purpose of suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea” but STFG is neither a State nor a functional government elected by its people for its people and has certainly no authority to rule Somalia and it has never been mandated by the Somali people to speak or to represent them. How can States cooperate with the STFG that has no power, unlike a State with a proper government per se, to, inter alia, negotiate and ratify treaties, covenants and resolutions? It is trite law that any State cannot enter into international agreements without a representative government. And this is what is happening in a divided Somalia. Under Article 39 of the UN Charter the UNSC (Chapter VII) may use force in any State provided it satisfies a sole criterion: that the State is a threat to peace and security to the international community and there is no need to have the consent of that State. However, ironically UNSC passed Resolution 1851 which stipulates that foreign troops may enter Somalia to repress and arrest pirates provided that the STFG has consented. Here, some authors suggested that UNSC resolutions are superfluous (Treves, 2009).
UN passed a certain number of resolutions (Resolution 1816, 1836, 1844, 1846, 1851 and Resolution 1897) to confirm the sovereignty of Somali. However, it is undisputed that Somalia is a ‘failed State’ (supra) which lacks government, as explained (supra), and is not in a position to negotiate actually with other States in any way. After the extradition of pirates from the Victim State or Seizure State back to Somali according to transfer of suspected persons (EU-Kenya Transfer Agreement and the EU-Seychelles Transfer Agreement for example) who will look after them since all institutions have collapsed and there is no functional police or judiciary?
Under UNSC Resolution 1851 States who still wish to cooperate with the STFG may enter Somalia to arrest pirates. UNSC Resolution 1846 (10) provides that States and organizations which are cooperating with the STFG may enter into the ‘territorial waters’ of Somalia for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea with all necessary means to repress such acts. Apart from the undisputed fact that this amounts to a violation of a State’s sovereignty (supra) who will prosecute suspected pirates once they have been captured in Somali or outside Somalia? To this question, first all institutions have collapsed and there are no courts and administrative buildings at all. Second, which States would like to enter in the troubled waters of Somali to chase pirates, civil-war insurgents, terrorists, warlords capable of engaging themselves into non-international armed conflicts. It is important to point out here that both the ReCAAP (Article 2 (5)), which is an international legal binding instrument, and the Djibouti Code of Conduct (Article 15(j)) deny any right of foreign vessels to enter another State’s territorial waters in order to counter piracy. And in no way is Somalia an exception to the general rule.
Major Problems in Somalia Unsolved
The UN fails to handle the main problems facing Somalians: poor socio-economic development; Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing (IUU); maritime poaching, free and fair election to settle back a government to deal with its socio-economic problems. Western countries, the US principally, are not willing to give support and financial aid to a country like Somalia where there is no economic benefit and material gain unlike in Iraq or Israel. One of the main offences of piracy is primarily armed robbery at sea; and where there may eventually be attacks, murder and wounds and blows; but this concept of armed robbery at sea does not even appear in the UNCLOS, 1982. Western countries have not yet participated (except the US-led Combined Task Force 151 which is deployed in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden) actively or with an intent to commit to a cause in Africa where there is no material, economic of financial gain like in Irak or strategic benefit like the Chagos Archipelagos for example. Nevertheless, NATO, the US-led Combined Task Force 151 and The European Union Naval Force Operation Atlanta have been deployed within the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy to protect maritime trade (piracy alone in the Indian and Pacific Oceans result in the loss of $ 13-15 billion annually due to maritime piracy on vessels, tankers, ransom payment which ranges from $3 to $ 5 million, and loss of materials and logistics) after an Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor has been established. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) is also playing a vital role in communication and information to eradicate piracy (329 piracy cases were reported worldwide, 23 ships were attacked by Somali pirates in 2005 with 440 hostages taken, in 2007 111 piracy cases were reported in Somalia and 217 in 2009. Pirate attacks may provoke oil leakage and oil/petrol/hazardous and dangerous products spill-over in our seas and beaches with disastrous impacts on our tourism sector and consequently income of this emerging sector in Mauritius. Maritime trade occupies approximately 80% of international trade and it is time to reflect on it now before it is too late. Finally, as far as the UNCLOS, 1982 is concerned is it obsolete? Probably yes!

References
Geib R. (2009), Armed violence in fragile States: low intensity conflicts, spill-over conflicts and sporadic law enforcement operations by third parties, 91: 873 International Review of the Red Cross 127 and 132
Geib R. and Petrig A. (2010), Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea, Volume I, Oxford University Press.
Gordon R. E. (1995), Some legal problems with trusteeships, 28 Cornell International Law Journal 301 at 332
Gunputh R.P. (2013): Dilemma of Somali Pirates and SIDS in the Indian Ocean -The Mauritian Case Study-Global Maritime Annual Conference 2013, Gujarat National Law University, Gujarat, India
Gunputh R.P. (2013), Prosecution of Non-State Actors under Municipal Law according to International Maritime Law. Some Legal Implications in a Failed State- The Somali Piracy Case Study-
Gunputh R.P.(2013): Pirates of Aden v. Governments of Eden: Myth or reality? Organised by the University of Lancashire (UClan), UK, September 2013, Garden Flower, Port-Louis, Book of Abstracts
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Source: Le Mauricien.com

Nairobi, October 16, 2013–Unidentified assailants threw two grenades at the Galkayo offices of Radio Daljir in the semi-autonomous region of Puntland on Tuesday night, according to news reports and local journalists. The Committee to Protect Journalists condemns the attack on Radio Daljir, which has been targeted in the past, and calls on authorities to identify the perpetrators and ensure they are brought to justice.

“While maintaining security in Galkayo is challenging, authorities must do their utmost to end repeated attacks on the station,” said CPJ East Africa Consultant Tom Rhodes. “They will make progress only if they thoroughly investigate and prosecute this and all previous attacks.”

Tuesday’s attack, which occurred at around 8 p.m., damaged the office wall and a vehicle, news reports said. No one was injured despite journalists and other staff members being inside the offices. The assailants fled in a vehicle with no license plates, news reports said.

Authorities are investigating the attack, but have not arrested anyone yet, local journalists said.So far, no motive has been identified.The station is able to continue broadcasting.

Some local journalists said they suspected the attacks could be linked to the station’s past programming, which included broadcasts that encouraged citizens not to join insurgent militia groups such as Al-Shabaab. Radio Daljir staff are planning to improve security around their station’s compound by installing security cameras, among other measures, local journalists said.

The station has been targeted in the past. In August 2011, assailants threw a grenade at the Radio Daljir offices in Galkayo, which injured a security guard and damaged the front of the station, according to CPJ research. An unexploded bomb was found outside the station’s gate in May 2011, according to local journalists.

Two unidentified gunmen killed Radio Daljir journalist Farhan Jeemis Abdulle in May 2012 as he walked home from work at the station, according to news reports. Local journalists said at the time that they suspected Al-Shabaab insurgents had killed Abdulle in connection with his coverage of a program that encouraged young people to lay down their guns. The perpetrators have not yet been found.

 Contact:

Sue Valentine

Africa Program Coordinator

svalentine@cpj.org

Mohamed Keita

Africa Advocacy Coordinator

Tel. +1.212.465.1004 ext. 117
Email: mkeita@cpj.org

Tom Rhodes

East Africa Consultant

Email: trhodes@cpj.org

CPJ is an independent, nonprofit organization that works to safeguard press freedom worldwide.

MOGADISHU, Somalia, Oct. 16 (UPI) — Somalia’s Western-backed government is talking to major international oil companies like Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell and BP about resuming exploration programs abandoned when the East African state collapsed into anarchy in 1991.

On the face of it, that could be an extraordinarily hard sell since Somalia remains highly volatile despite recent military setbacks for the Islamist insurgents of al-Shabaab who are linked to al-Qaida.

What makes it tougher is that Somalia’s neighbors, Kenya in particular, have their eyes on potentially large oil and gas reserves in disputed waters in the Indian Ocean.

Al-Shabaab still controls large areas of the Somali countryside and any oil company that ventures into the country risks getting caught up in sharp political rivalries between the fragile central government in Mogadishu and semiautonomous regions like Puntland and the self-declared state of Somaliland in the north. Both have deals with Western oil juniors.

A high-profile Sept. 21 attack by al-Shabaab on an upscale shopping mall in downtown Nairobi, capital of neighboring Kenya, in which at least 67 people were killed points to al-Shabaab widening its terror campaign across East Africa.

On top of this, the Kenyans, who provided troops for an African Union military force that drove al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu and other Somali cities in 2011-12, are trying to set up a buffer zone in a Somali border region known as Jubaland, the better to stake a claim on the disputed waters in the Indian Ocean.

“The world’s leading oil companies are increasingly accepting that their quest for new reserves will take them into challenging new territory,” analyst Katrina Manson observed.

“In regions such as the Arctic, the problems are technical. Around the Horn of Africa, companies must calculate whether political and security risks will put too heavy a burden on their production costs,” she wrote in The Financial Times.

“This is hazardous territory in which to operate. A chunk of Somalia is still under the control of al-Shabaab. Its waters are the hunting ground of pirates, who since 2005 have earned close to $400 million by ransoming 149 vessels.”

Despite all this, Abdullah Haidar of Somalia’s Ministry of Natural Resources reported recently that discussions in London with the major oil companies, including Conoco Phillips, Chevron Corp. and Eni of Italy, “are going well.”

These companies, along with BP and Shell, acquired onshore and offshore exploration blocks in the 1980s during the military dictatorship of Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre.

But when Somali warlords deposed him in 1991, exploration ceased as the country was torn apart by clan warfare. They declared force majeure.

Now several, such as Shell and Eni, want their blocks restored and to enter into production-sharing agreements with the 8-month-old, donor-dependent government of President Hassan Sheik Mohamed that wants to use oil to rebuild the impoverished country’s ravaged economy.

The companies are largely tight-lipped about their dealings with Mogadishu, but ENI said its chief executive met with Mohamed in September. Shell said talks are currently “of a preliminary and exploratory nature.”

But there is clearly interest because these and other majors have made big strikes across East Africa, particularly with oil around Uganda’s Lake Albert and gas off Mozambique and Tanzania.

The only Western company to sign up with Mogadishu so far is the British company Soma Oil & Gas, established in 2012 and headed by Lord Michel Howard, a former Conservative Party leader who’s held several cabinet posts.

It signed an agreement Aug. 6 and will conduct seismic surveys in designated areas on land and offshore, and update historic seismic data for the government, in return for nominating exploration and drilling rights for up to 12 blocks.

Somalia’s U.N. Monitoring Group warned in a report to the Security Council in July oil exploration across the shattered state risks “exacerbating clan divisions and therefore threatens peace and security. … Oil companies should cease and desist negotiations with Somali authorities.”

Some oil has been found in Somaliland and Puntland, which have largely escaped the violence. But the dozen or so oil companies drilling there have to be protected by militias or private forces.

“It is alarming that regional security forces and armed groups may clash to protect and further Western-backed oil companies’ interests,” the U.N. warned.