Hargeisa, Somaliland –The Founder and Managing Partner of Shield Law Firm, Lawyer Mubarak Abdi Ismail, has received a prestigious Appreciation Award at a high-level ceremony held at Damal Hotel in Hargeisa.
The award was presented in the presence of the Governor of the Somaliland Central Bank and the Minister of Trade and Tourism, Hon. Abdirahman Hassan Nur, recognizing Lawyer Mubarak’s outstanding contribution to the drafting, editing, and finalization of the Collateral Law of Banks and Financial Institutions Law No. 110/2026.
This landmark legislation is widely regarded as a major reform in Somaliland’s financial sector. The law strengthens legal protection for banks and financial institutions, minimizes lending risks, and provides structured safeguards against borrower default. It establishes a clearer collateral framework, enhancing confidence in the banking system and supporting economic growth.
During his tenure as Legal Advisor to the Somaliland House of Representatives and Special Counsel to the Budget and Commercial Committee, Lawyer Mubarak played a central role in shaping the bill. His technical expertise and persistent advocacy were instrumental in ensuring the law was thoroughly reviewed, refined, and successfully enacted within one year.
Furthermore, the Speaker of the Somaliland House of Representatives, H.E. Yasin Haji Mohamoud Faratoon, appointed him as Legal Counsel to the ad-hoc committee responsible for overseeing the bill’s legislative process.
Colleagues and officials at the ceremony praised Lawyer Mubarak’s dedication, professionalism, and commitment to strengthening Somaliland’s legal and financial framework. His contribution marks a significant milestone in the modernization of financial regulation in Somaliland.
Shield Law Firm congratulates its Founder and Managing Partner on this well-deserved national recognition and reaffirms its commitment to excellence, integrity, and leadership in legal reform.
Regional Reality or Political Hypocrisy: Erdoğan’s Double Standard on Somaliland Recognition
Ramadan Mubarak to all Muslims around the world as we begin this blessed month of reflection, justice and truth.
Today, the President of Turkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Addis Ababa and held talks with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. During their joint press conference, President Erdoğan condemned the Israeli recognition of Somaliland, arguing that foreign interference in the Horn of Africa would worsen political tensions. His remarks demand serious scrutiny.
There is a striking contradiction in Turkey’s position. For years, Turkey has maintained its largest overseas military base in Mogadishu. It trains and equips Somali forces and plays a central role in Somalia’s security and political landscape. This is not a marginal presence. It is deep strategic involvement in the affairs of the Horn of Africa.
For Ankara to warn others about foreign interference while maintaining such a footprint in Somalia raises obvious questions. When Turkey expands its military and political influence, it is described as cooperation and partnership. When another country considers recognising Somaliland, it is labelled destabilising interference. This inconsistency undermines the credibility of Turkey’s argument.
Recognition of a state is a sovereign decision. It is a fundamental aspect of international relations. No country has the authority to dictate to another whom it may or may not recognise. If Ethiopia chooses to recognise Somaliland, that decision would fall within its sovereign rights. Turkey itself recognises states based on its own national interests and strategic calculations. It cannot deny Ethiopia the same right without applying a double standard.
Somaliland has maintained relative stability for more than three decades. It has held elections, built functioning institutions and maintained control over its territory. Its political trajectory since 1991 has been markedly different from the so called Somalia. Whether one agrees with recognition or not, it is undeniable that Somaliland has operated as a self governing political entity for over thirty years. Recognition would not create a new reality. It would acknowledge an existing one.
Turkey’s position also overlooks Ethiopia’s strategic considerations. Ethiopia is a large and influential state in the region with its own security and economic priorities. Decisions about diplomatic recognition are shaped by national interests, regional stability and long term strategic planning. They are not subject to approval from Ankara or any other capital.
If Turkey truly believes in respect for sovereignty and non interference, then it must apply that principle consistently. Sovereignty cannot be defended in one context and dismissed in another. A credible foreign policy requires coherence between words and actions.
To President Erdogan, as Ramadan begins, a time traditionally associated with reflection and accountability, political leaders would do well to consider the importance of consistency and fairness in their public positions. The Horn of Africa deserves stability, mutual respect and honest diplomacy, not selective arguments that shift depending on strategic convenience.
Recognition is not an act of aggression. It is a sovereign political choice. And sovereign choices belong to sovereign nations.
Author:
Mohammed Abdi Hassan
Founder, Somaliland Institute of Security and International Contact (HALBEEG)
Hargeisa, Republic of Somaliland | 18 February 2026 – The Government of the Republic of Somaliland strongly condemns the recent remarks made by the President of the Republic of Türkiye. These statements constitute unacceptable interference in our national sovereignty and are clearly aimed at discouraging the development of constructive relations between Somaliland and our regional partners.
The Republic of Somaliland asserts that the foreign policy decisions of states in the Horn of Africa must be determined exclusively by the region’s own governments and peoples. It is imperative that external rivalries are not extended into our region in ways that risk undermining our shared stability and cooperation.
Elaboration on Turkish Interference in Somaliland’s Sovereignty
The recent remarks by the President of Türkiye constitute a multi-faceted act of interference in the internal and external affairs of the Republic of Somaliland. This interference is not merely a diplomatic disagreement; it is a direct challenge to Somaliland’s sovereign rights and a threat to the stability of the Horn of Africa region. The condemnation by the Somaliland government is rooted in the following key aspects:
Discouraging Bilateral and Regional Relations
The core of Somaliland’s foreign policy is to build peaceful and cooperative relationships with regional and international partners. The Turkish President’s statements are specifically designed to undermine this sovereign right by actively discouraging other states from engaging with Somaliland. This constitutes interference by:
· Attempting to Isolate Somaliland: By pressuring regional partners to avoid relations with Somaliland, Türkiye is attempting to dictate who Somaliland can and cannot engage with, treating the nation not as an independent actor but as a subject of external control.
· Suppressing Sovereign Decision-Making: Türkiye’s actions directly violate the principle that foreign policy decisions must be made by the region’s own peoples by trying to coerce regional partners into making decisions that align with Ankara’s interests, rather than their own or the interests of regional stability.
Projecting External Rivalries into the Horn of Africa
Somaliland’s statement warns against extending “external rivalries” into the region. This highlights how Türkiye is using its stance on Somaliland as a proxy for its own geopolitical ambitions, separate from the realities and needs of the Horn of Africa. This interference manifests as:
· Using Somaliland as a Geopolitical Pawn: Türkiye’s remarks are not made in the interest of regional peace but are a reflection of its broader strategic competition with other nations that have growing ties with Somaliland. By attacking Somaliland’s outreach, Türkiye is prioritizing its own rivalries over the region’s right to peaceful cooperation.
· Importing Conflict: This action risks importing tensions that do not originate in the Horn of Africa, thereby destabilizing a region that is actively working towards greater cooperation and mutual understanding.
Undermining Regional Stability and Cooperation
Such interference risks undermining stability and cooperation, suggesting that Türkiye’s actions have tangible negative consequences:
· Creating Division: By attempting to drive a wedge between Somaliland and its partners, Türkiye is fostering division rather than unity. This directly undermines the collective effort required to address common regional challenges like security, economic development, and counter-terrorism.
· Inflaming Tensions: The Turkish President’s remarks are perceived not as neutral or constructive, but as inflammatory and provocative, capable of escalating disputes and disrupting the peaceful diplomatic environment Somaliland seeks to foster.
Violation of Fundamental International Norms
Finally, the interference is framed as a breach of the foundational principles that govern relations between states:
· Non-Interference: This is the most direct violation. Türkiye is interfering in Somaliland’s pursuit of its national interest and its right to conduct foreign policy.
· Sovereign Decision-Making: By attacking Somaliland’s outreach and pursuit of recognition, Türkiye is challenging the very essence of Somaliland’s sovereignty—the right of its people and government to determine their own international status and future through peaceful, lawful, and democratic means.
Conclusion and Demand
We call on Türkiye to immediately refrain from taking positions that inflame regional tensions. We demand that they uphold the fundamental principles of mutual respect, non-interference in internal affairs, and respect for the sovereign decision-making of all nations.
Somaliland’s outreach to regional and international partners, as well as our peaceful pursuit of recognition, remain lawful and are firmly grounded in the democratic aspirations of our people. No external statement will deter us from this path.
Berbera – The President of the Republic of Somaliland, His Excellency Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Cirro), today officially inaugurated the Berbera Power Expansion Project. This strategic project significantly enhances energy services and economic growth throughout the Sahil region, particularly in the city of Berbera.
The Berbera Power Expansion Project (5WP PV Solar and 33KV Power Transmission Line spanning 11.2 km) formally fulfills the President’s commitment to providing the people of Berbera with affordable, reliable, and sustainable electricity. The project is designed to meet the growing demand in Berbera, which serves as a commercial hub for the nation.
The President emphasized that reliable electricity is the backbone of investment, industrial development, social services, and job creation.
This project is a key component of the government’s comprehensive plan to strengthen economic infrastructure across the country, with a particular focus on strategic cities, in order to accelerate economic growth and sustainable development.
The inauguration ceremony of the Berbera Power Expansion Project (5WP PV Solar and 33KV Power Transmission Line (11.2 km)) symbolizes a President whose vision is rooted in unity and action, demonstrating both capability and dedication to the nation’s progress.
Berbera – The President of the Republic of Somaliland, His Excellency Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Cirro), today paid a working visit to the city of Berbera, where he officially inaugurated a series of development projects set to significantly enhance the city’s growth, aesthetic appeal, public services, and economic prosperity.
During his visit, the President first cut the ribbon on several new roads constructed throughout Berbera. These vital arteries are expected to ease transportation, stimulate commercial activity, and improve connectivity between the city’s various districts.
President Cirro also officially opened Cigaal Park, a modern recreational space designed for community gatherings and leisure. This new landmark contributes to the city’s beautification and provides a welcoming environment for both residents and visitors, fostering an improved quality of life and tourism potential.
In a further boost to local governance, the President inaugurated the new headquarters for the Berbera Local Government. This contemporary administrative facility is set to enhance service delivery and operational efficiency, marking a significant step forward in institutional capacity building and good governance at the district level.
All these projects, successfully implemented by the Berbera Local Government, underscore the district administration’s capability and commitment to sustainable development. They also stand as a testament to the productive collaboration between the central government and local authorities.
Concluding his visit, President Cirro praised the Berbera District Administration for its dedication to improving community services, particularly in the education and health sectors. He lauded their efforts and reaffirmed the central government’s commitment to doubling its support for the development of economic infrastructure and public services across all regions of the country.
There are several countries that have expressed different approaches to Somaliland’s quest for statehood and recognition on the global stage. The nation’s most notable in this context include Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia.
Djibouti:
This small, strategically located country, which shares a border with Somaliland, has a particularly adversarial stance toward Somaliland’s aspirations for independence. Djibouti’s government has consistently articulated its position at various international meetings and forums, emphatically asserting that Somaliland cannot be recognized as an independent entity and must be regarded as part of Somalia. The root of Djibouti’s opposition appears to stem from economic considerations. Specifically, the Berbera Port in Somaliland holds significant potential for trade, especially for Ethiopia, which relies heavily on access to ports for its imports and exports. Djibouti fears that recognizing Somaliland could undermine its own strategic position and economic benefits derived from being a transit hub for Ethiopian trade. President Ismail Guelleh of Djibouti has been notably candid about his stance, famously declaring in an interview, “I would be the last one to support recognition of Somaliland if all 193 countries in the world were to do so.” His remarks highlight that his opposition is not merely a matter of political rivalry but is intricately linked to the broader economic interests and geopolitical dynamics of the region.
Through this lens, Djibouti’s rejection of Somaliland’s statehood is rooted in a complex interplay of strategic concerns, economic competition, and regional stability, making it a key player in the discourse surrounding Somaliland’s future.
Ethiopia and Kenya
The two countries appear to support Somaliland’s quest for international recognition, although they seem to be biding their time before taking a more definitive stance. Both nations oppose the union between British Somaliland and Italian Somalia that took place in 1960. They advocate for the notion that Somaliland and Somalia should exist as distinct and separate entities rather than as a unified state. This perspective reflects their belief that a divided approach would better serve the interests and identities of the people in both regions.
The late former President of Kenya, Daniel arap Moi, was very clear and firm in his stance against the idea of a “Greater Somalia” a pan-Somali nationalist project aimed at unifying all Somali-inhabited regions in the Horn of Africa, including parts of Ethiopia (the Somali Region), Kenya (North Eastern Province), and Djibouti, alongside Somalia.
During his presidency, Moi aligned closely with Ethiopia, especially under Mengistu Haile Mariam, to counteract Somali expansionism promoted under Siad Barre’s regime in Somalia. Both Kenya and Ethiopia viewed the Greater Somalia ambition as a direct threat to their territorial integrity and national sovereignty.
The Villa-Somalia Perspective
The situation surrounding the Federal Republic of Somalia has been complicated and fraught with challenges since its inception. While the aspiration for a unified nation known as Somalia persists, this ideal lacks a solid foundation in contemporary realities. The historical context of the failed union in 1960 serves as a reminder of the difficulties that have plagued the region; it is a chapter of history that cannot simply be revived.
In contrast, Somaliland restated its independence from Somalia in 1991, marking a pivotal moment in its history. Since then, Somaliland has made significant strides in establishing a stable government and implementing a unique democratic system that sets it apart from the chaos that has characterized much of Somalia over the past 34 years. This contrast highlights the successes of Somaliland in creating a peaceful and functioning state, in stark contrast to the ongoing turmoil faced by the Villa- Somalia government .
In a recent interview with Al Jazeera, the President of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, claimed that several countries in the Horn of Africa and the wider East African region are preparing to follow Israel in extending formal recognition to Somaliland.
The Somali president framed this development as a serious threat to Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, warning that such recognition would undermine regional unity and destabilize the Horn of Africa. He emphasized the need for dialogue and collective regional engagement to counter what he described as a growing diplomatic challenge.
However, these remarks also reflect a deep anxiety within Mogadishu over shifting geopolitical realities. Republic of Somaliland’s sustained record of relative peace, functional governance, democratic processes, and effective territorial control stands in stark contrast to Somalia’s prolonged state fragility. As a result, Somaliland’s case for recognition is increasingly being discussed not as a political anomaly, but as a pragmatic response to facts on the ground.
All in all
The diverse responses from these countries highlight the intricate geopolitical dynamics that influence Somaliland’s pursuit of international recognition and statehood. Each nation’s stance is shaped by its own strategic interests, historical ties, and regional considerations, reflecting the broader complexities of international politics. As Somaliland navigates its identity and aspirations on the global stage, it becomes evident that a more nuanced and comprehensive dialogue is essential. This dialogue must address not only the legal and political aspects of its status but also the implications for regional stability, economic development, and diplomatic relations with other states. Engaging in such conversations can encourage a better understanding of Somaliland’s unique situation and contribute to more constructive international engagement.
About the AuthorEngineer Abdi Ali Barkhad is a senior consultant. He has also studied international diplomacy and is a political analyst and writer known for his detailed commentary on the politics of the Horn of Africa and international relations. He has published numerous articles analyzing current policies in the region and is a strong supporter of the cause of the Republic of Somaliland.Related Topics Somaliland
Mogadishu – The influx of advanced warships, military personnel, and heavy weaponry into Somalia, orchestrated by Turkey and Egypt, presents a profound and multi-faceted risk, not only to the stability of the region but specifically to the peace and security of the Republic of Somaliland. Framing this military build-up as mere “maritime security cooperation” dangerously obscures its potential to destabilize the entire Horn of Africa. The core risks are as follows:
The Risk of Diversion to Non-State Actors and Militias: The Somali federal government, despite international support, has a limited and inconsistent record of controlling territory and securing weapons within its borders. A significant influx of sophisticated arms dramatically increases the risk of these weapons being diverted, sold, or captured. They could easily fall into the hands of:
· Al-Shabaab: The militant group still controls vast rural areas and has a history of infiltrating government installations. Access to advanced anti-ship missiles, MANPADS (Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems), or sophisticated explosives would be a catastrophic game-changer, allowing them to threaten international shipping and civilian aircraft.
· Clan Militias: In a political system where federalism is weak and often gives way to clan-based loyalties, powerful militias could acquire heavy weaponry, escalating local conflicts into (large-scale) regional wars and further entrenching the cycle of violence.
The Risk of Provoking an Arms Race with Somaliland: The stated or unstated intent of this build-up is perceived in Somaliland as a direct threat to its sovereignty. In response, Somaliland will feel compelled to bolster its own defenses. This creates a dangerous dynamic:
· Escalation: What begins as a “security cooperation” mission can quickly escalate into a conventional arms race between Somalia and Somaliland, diverting precious resources away from development and towards militarization.
· Miscalculation: Increased military posturing on both sides of a contested border raises the risk of a small incident—a patrol crossing a line, a misunderstood signal—spiraling into an armed confrontation that neither side may have originally intended.
The Risk of Empowering a Proxy Conflict: The arrival of Egyptian forces, motivated by its dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), explicitly injects a major interstate rivalry into Somalia’s fragile internal dynamics.
· Ethiopian Response: As your statement notes, this directly threatens Ethiopia’s interests. Addis Ababa may feel compelled to respond, potentially by deepening its engagement with Somaliland (including the recent MoU for naval base access) or by more directly supporting allied factions within Somalia. This turns Somali territory into a potential battleground for Egyptian-Ethiopian tensions.
· Gulf Rivalry Spillover: The move is also a clear gambit by Turkey and Egypt to counter the influence of the UAE in the region. This transforms Somalia and Somaliland into a new arena for the ongoing geopolitical struggle between these Gulf powers, with local populations bearing the brunt of the instability.
The Risk of Undermining the Fragile Somali Federal Project: Pouring heavy weaponry into the hands of the central government in Mogadishu, without a parallel and successful effort to integrate or disarm federal member state forces, fundamentally undermines the concept of a shared national army. It empowers the center at the expense of the periphery, which could lead federal member states to further resist Mogadishu’s authority, seek their own external patrons, or even accelerate moves towards greater autonomy or independence, ironically fueling the very fragmentation the international community claims to want to prevent.
The Risk of Destabilizing Somaliland’s Peace: Somaliland has been an oasis of relative peace and democratic stability for over three decades. The primary threat to this peace is not internal, but the spillover of conflict and instability from Somalia. The introduction of foreign armies and advanced weaponry next door creates immense pressure:
· Refugee Flows: Any armed conflict in southern or central Somalia would trigger a new wave of refugees, placing a massive strain on Somaliland’s resources and social fabric.
· Terrorist Infiltration: Increased military activity could displace militant groups like Al-Shabaab, pushing them northwards and forcing them to seek new havens, potentially across the border into Somaliland.
· Direct Provocation: The military build-up could embolden elements within the Somali government to believe a military solution to the Somaliland issue is now viable, a catastrophic miscalculation that would shatter regional stability.
In conclusion, delivering offensive weaponry to a fragile and unstable Somali government, particularly under the shadow of external rivalries, is not a recipe for security. It is a dangerous gamble that risks arming terrorists, igniting a regional arms race, and setting the stage for a proxy war that would inevitably consume the peace and sovereignty of the Republic of Somaliland. The true path to stability lies in recognizing and engaging with the existing peaceful entities in the region, like Somaliland, not in militarizing a failed state.
Somaliland, a small territory on the Gulf of Aden, has long sought independence yet received little international attention. But on December 26, 2025, Israel announced its official recognition of the enclave as a sovereign state.
Israel’s announcement went largely unnoticed—until it met a wave of international condemnations. Despite this pushback, Jerusalem’s recognition of Somaliland could transform the Red Sea and Horn of Africa’s geopolitical balance and global trade flows.
Israel’s decision is neither hasty nor provocative. It is historically, legally, and strategically coherent. Further, Western nations’ hesitancy to follow suit reveals contradictions between their stated moral and strategic aims and their actions.
Context
Somaliland is not an opportunistic, secessionist entity, as some suggest. It has a distinct historical trajectory that predates the collapse of Somalia. The Somali people did not draw the borders of Somalia, but instead European powers merged distinct colonial jurisdictions and political-clan systems under a single state framework, despite the absence of a shared institutional or constitutional foundation. Today’s Somaliland was a protectorate of the United Kingdom (British Somaliland), while Italy held the other Somali territory until World War II. After gaining independence in June 1960, Somaliland voluntarily chose to unite with the Somali territory under United Nations and Italian administration. Therefore, Somaliland has existed longer as a separate entity than as part of the subsequent union. The territory’s authorities also never properly formalized the union—which was poorly formalized in legal terms—and later Mogadishu unilaterally created the consolidated country, leaving it fundamentally defective under international law. The union ended three decades later in manifest failure. In 1991, following the collapse of the Somali state, Somaliland reclaimed its independence.
Since then, Somaliland has stood in stark contrast to its larger, internationally recognized neighbor. Despite massive institutional and financial support from the UN and other bodies, Somalia has suffered chronic instability—civil war, endemic corruption, piracy, and the entrenched presence of Islamist groups such as al-Shabaab. Somaliland has followed the opposite path. With little international aid, it rebuilt itself through endogenous mechanisms: clan conferences, local political compromises, and the gradual consolidation of institutions. The result is a largely controlled territory, though there are localized and intermittent challenges in its eastern regions. Still, its government has regular elections, peaceful transfers of power, a currency, security forces, and a functioning state apparatus. Somaliland therefore appears to be a durable, successful state in all but official title.
Israel-Somaliland relations date back to even before the 1991 collapse. In the late 1980s, Israel alerted international bodies, including the UN, about the Siad Barre regime’s massive, systemic repression and abuse of the Isaaq people, who comprise most of Somaliland’s population. But these warnings were largely ignored. For the last two decades, Israel and Israeli nongovernmental organizations have provided medical aid to Somaliland, a vital diplomatic and humanitarian effort.
Strategic Importance
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is not just a matter of history or morality. It is above all a strategic decision that reshapes the regional balance of power. The enclave sits along the Gulf of Aden near the entrance to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a vital passage linking the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea, Suez Canal, and Mediterranean Sea. Stability in this corridor affects a major share of global trade. The Iran-backed Houthis’ strikes against maritime traffic in the area underscored both the passageway’s vulnerability and its importance. The United States’ primary objective for intervening against these strikes was not to defend Israel, but to prevent the Houthis from paralyzing international commerce.
In this context, Somaliland is a major strategic asset. It controls the deep-water port of Berbera, which investments by the United Arab Emirates have modernized. This port could, in time, become an essential foothold for Western-aligned powers in the Horn of Africa, enabling them to counterbalance Iran’s influence in Yemen and Qatar’s ideological activism.
Israel has therefore taken a major step toward securing a contested, strategic gateway to one of the planet’s most sensitive chokepoints. This gives Jerusalem a critical geopolitical vantage that enhances its situational awareness and strategic depth vis-à-vis the Red Sea corridor as the Houthis, who have declared war on Israel, continue to target Israeli cities and maritime traffic. Israel has accomplished this without any ambition of establishing a military base. This decision also fits Israel’s broader strategy to counterbalance Turkish expansionism. To that end, Jerusalem has recently worked to strengthen its alliances with the Eastern Mediterranean states of Greece and Cyprus.
Why the US and Its European Allies Should Recognize Somaliland
Ultimately, Somaliland is everything the US and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies claim to seek in a regional partner: a stable, democratic, and pro-Western government that is opposed to political Islam and is in a strategically important location. To deny the enclave recognition in the name of selectively applied principles is to privilege diplomatic fiction over geopolitical reality. The clear benefits of expanding ties to Somaliland, and the relative absence of counterarguments, accentuate the strategic incoherence of many NATO states. Several European countries have espoused support for the recognition of a Palestinian state despite Palestine’s failure to meet even the minimum criteria of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933).1 Refusing to even consider recognition for Somaliland, which has met these criteria for more than 30 years makes international law an arbitrary instrument that policymakers invoke when it serves their purposes and ignore when it contradicts them.
However, recognizing Somaliland comes with significant political risks and cost-benefit questions that extend well beyond the territory itself. Such a move could undermine the international norm of territorial integrity upheld by the African Union and weaken international law–based arguments against unilateral secessions. But the African Union position on the topic is not monolithic, and incremental recognition by a few key states would normalize the issue over time. A similar situation occurred in Kosovo and South Sudan.
One should also not ignore the security risks of Somalia reacting violently to this recognition. After all, jihadist groups and other malign actors could exploit this diplomatic turbulence. Establishing ties with Somaliland may also complicate US and European efforts to increase cooperation with Turkey.
But many of these dynamics are already unfolding, and dire predictions of systemic collapse often overestimate second-order effects—as illustrated by earlier forecasts of regional war following the killing of Qassem Soleimani or the relocation of the US embassy to Jerusalem, neither of which produced a crisis.
Moreover, networks linked to Iran and to the Muslim Brotherhood—notably those supported and financed by Qatar—are escalating their destabilization operations in Europe. Recognizing Somaliland could be part of a broader and more coherent European strategic posture against this interference. Ties with Somaliland would help construct a robust anti-Islamist coalition anchored both on the Continent and along key strategic corridors, sending a powerful political signal. Such a move would demonstrate the West’s renewed willingness to confront this threat directly, not only through rhetoric or defensive measures, but also through concrete geopolitical moves that reshape alliances, secure critical regions, and reassert strategic initiative. Washington has also historically preferred strategic ambiguity while deepening its informal engagement with certain partners, which Somaliland could become. Furthermore, recognition could help the US diversify basing options (it already operates Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti), reduce its dependence on a single host country, provide a more reliable counterterrorism partner against al-Shabaab, and maintain a way to shape the Red Sea’s security architecture.
The question, therefore, is not whether recognition of Somaliland is legitimate, but how much longer Western nations will look the other way at the cost of their.
The President of Somaliland, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, in an exclusive interview with CNN, has unveiled major plans that could impact the economic and security future of the Horn of Africa region.
The President stated that Somaliland possesses significant resources and oil reserves reaching billions of barrels. It has signed agreements with two companies to begin official oil drilling in the year 2027 in order to benefit from it.
President Abdirahman emphasized Somaliland’s strategic importance, noting that they control an 850-kilometer coastline along the vital Red Sea shipping lane.
“Somaliland will help the world achieve secure trade. We are ready to cooperate with the world to achieve stable and peaceful international trade,” the President said.
The President confirmed that negotiations are currently underway with Ethiopia concerning the finalization of an agreement related to trade, transit, and transportation.
This agreement is seen as strengthening economic cooperation between the two countries, particularly concerning the use of the port of Berbera.
This interview comes at a time when Somaliland is actively pursuing international recognition and seeking to attract foreign investment.
This oil plan for 2027 and its role in maritime security appear to position Somaliland on the international diplomatic map involving major powers.
Israel’s Somaliland recognition generated unusual cohesion in Africa and beyond, but condemnation hasn’t delivered a consensual solution.
Israel’s December 2025 recognition of Somaliland, a secessionist northern part of Somalia, set off a series of political and diplomatic shockwaves in the Horn of Africa and Arabic Peninsula. In a region already facing acute tensions amid global geopolitical reconfigurations, how the African Union (AU) handles the fallout will be key.
Somalia rejected the move as an infringement on its territorial integrity. Most regional and international organisations including the AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, United Nations (UN), European Union and Arab League condemned Israel’s actions, citing violations of international law, the AU’s Constitutive Act and the UN Charter.
Some countries known for their opposition to Somaliland’s independence, such as Djibouti, Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, reacted similarly. Others kept silent in an attitude of ‘wait and see’.
For the AU, any unilateral claim of sovereignty is an irritant. Its highest decision-making body, the Peace and Security Council, strongly condemned Israel’s position, saying: ‘No actor has the authority or standing to alter the territorial configuration of an AU Member State.’ However, this strong wording froze the discussion without providing a consensual solution.
Somaliland’s quest for international recognition symbolises various dimensions of African post-colonial statehood. It raises questions around the criteria for sovereignty and has legal, political, geopolitical and regional implications.
The AU is wary of setting a precedent in the only region where secession has led to the creation of new states
Somaliland gained independence from Great Britain on 26 June 1960. After Somalia secured independence from the Italian-administered UN Trusteeship on 1 July 1960, the Republic of Somalia was formed as a union of former British Somaliland and Somalia Italiana. However, following the outbreak of civil war in 1969 and the collapse of Somalia’s central government, Somaliland declared independence in 1991.
From a strict legal perspective, the AU often invokes the commitment of its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity, to the intangibility of borders inherited from colonisation. The principle was established in 1964 in Cairo to avoid the multiplication of irredentist claims that could have destabilised newly established states. The Cairo Declaration has since been a cornerstone of the AU’s normative framework.
However, advocates of Somaliland’s independence use the same principle to justify its quest for sovereignty. The entity’s independence was achieved within the borders of British Somaliland. The decision to form a union with Somalia was its own, and so, supporters say, Somaliland has the right to reverse its decision.
The relative stability and regular alternation of power in Somaliland’s elections are also cited by advocates of the country’s independence.
Rather than making a legal case, the AU would be better served by advancing a political argument grounded in respect for the territorial integrity of its member states. That paves the way for political solutions as the preferred means of resolving internal tensions. The AU is also wary of setting a precedent that could have far-reaching consequences in the Horn of Africa, the only region where secession has led to the creation of new states.
Eritrea and South Sudan seceded from Ethiopia and Sudan in 1993 and 2011 respectively. The severe post-liberation challenges these two newly established countries face, characterised by authoritarian repression and intense internal conflict, do not serve Somaliland’s cause.
National cohesion isn’t just a product of demographic uniformity, but of state-building and diversity management
New states in the region tend to inherit the same problems as pre-existing states. Their structural foundations were compromised long before the clamour for independence. As a result, new states fail to realise their envisioned objectives, owing to numerous factors, including the act of separation itself.
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has generated an unusual degree of cohesion among regional actors and AU member states against Somaliland. This is because it stems from the actions of an external actor and violates a sacrosanct AU principle: respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.
For the AU, the Somaliland question represents a particularly acute challenge: it has reiterated a normative principle in the face of a crisis, but lacks the operational means to enforce it. At a time when the AU’s peace and security framework is under review, member states should propose innovative ways to empower the AU Commission to enforce its principles.
The Somaliland question is also a reminder that, despite being deployed in Somalia since 2007, the AU has allowed this issue to fester until it became vulnerable to instrumentalisation by external actors.
For Somalia, Somaliland’s pursuit of international recognition, combined with the strong internal support it enjoys, directly undermines pan-Somalism, the country’s implicit state ideology. Somali nationalism is grounded in the idea that all Somalis should be united in a single nation, as they share a common identity, culture, and language.
AU efforts to stabilise Somalia must include a political dimension related to dialogue with Somaliland
The pursuit of that political project led to wars in East Africa. Over the years, Somalia has gradually abandoned its ambition of unifying Somali-inhabited territories in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti.
In this context, Somaliland’s entrenched secessionist project questions not only the viability of Somalia within its current borders, but also challenges the foundations of pan-Somalism, an ideology grounded on contested assumptions.
This failure of pan-Somalism challenges a more widespread assumption in Africa’s public debate that instability is primarily the result of arbitrarily drawn colonial borders that created artificial states with high levels of ethnic diversity. The de facto secession of Somaliland since 1991 provides a rebuttal to this line of thinking, which correlates ethnic homogeneity with stability.
Empirical evidence from other parts of Africa also reveals that ethnically homogeneous societies are no less prone to violent conflict than their more heterogeneous peers. This shows that national cohesion is not just a product of demographic uniformity, but the result of state-building strategies, effective diversity management and political legitimacy.
The AU Peace and Security Council’s communiqué has frozen the discussion about Somaliland’s quest for independence. Longstanding AU efforts to stabilise Somalia must include a political dimension related to dialogue with Somaliland. This will increase the AU’s legitimacy on the matter and prevent additional external actors from following Israel’s precedent.
