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Somaliland’s Pursuit of Recognition: A Case for Justice and Stability

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By Engineer: Ahmed Abdi Abdillahi

Somaliland’s case for international recognition is compelling and deserves serious consideration from the global community. Since declaring independence from Somalia in 1991, Somaliland has established a functioning government, held democratic elections, maintained relative peace and stability, and developed its institutions. In contrast to the turbulence in Somalia, Somaliland’s progress highlights its commitment to good governance, peacebuilding, and regional security.

The argument for recognition is bolstered by the principle of self-determination. Somaliland’s pursuit of statehood reflects the will of its people, as demonstrated by the overwhelming support for independence in a 2001 referendum. Historically, Somaliland was a separate British protectorate before uniting with Somalia in 1960 to form the Somali Republic. The union, however, proved contentious and ultimately dysfunctional, culminating in the violent suppression of Somaliland by Somalia’s central government during the 1980s. This historical context underpins Somaliland’s decision to reclaim its sovereignty.

Recognition would not only validate Somaliland’s achievements but also incentivize stability and democracy in a volatile region. It would encourage other nations in the Horn of Africa to pursue peaceful state-building, demonstrating that international legitimacy can follow adherence to democratic norms and stability. Furthermore, recognition could facilitate access to international financial systems, development assistance, and foreign investment, enabling Somaliland to tackle poverty, improve infrastructure, and bolster regional trade.

Opponents of recognition often cite concerns over precedent, fearing it could encourage separatist movements worldwide. However, Somaliland’s case is unique due to its historical boundaries, distinct colonial history, and decades of effective self-governance. Recognizing Somaliland would not undermine global stability but instead affirm the international community’s commitment to rewarding peace, democracy, and responsible governance.

The recent introduction of H.R. 10402 in the U.S. Congress marks a significant development in Somaliland’s pursuit of international recognition. Introduced by Representative Scott Perry on December 12, 2024, this bill proposes that the United States formally recognize Somaliland as a separate, independent country.

Somaliland officials have welcomed this legislative move, viewing it as a pivotal moment in their quest for sovereignty. They highlight Somaliland’s decades-long stability, commitment to democracy, and strategic importance in the Horn of Africa as key reasons for U.S. recognition

In conclusion, Somaliland has demonstrated the attributes of a viable, sovereign state. Recognition would not only acknowledge its progress but also provide a framework for lasting peace and development in the region. It is time for the world to move beyond hesitancy and engage Somaliland as an equal member of the international community

Engineer: Ahmed Abdi Abdillahi is (Chief)
Waddani Party Chairman of USA,

Somaliland Minister of Interior and Ethiopia Ambassador Discuss Peace and Security

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By Goth Mohamed Goth

Hargeisa – The Minister of Internal Security of Somaliland, Mr. Abdalle Mohamed Arab, today in his office held an important meeting with the Ambassador of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to Somaliland, Ambassador H.E Teshome Shunde Hamito.

During the meeting, the Minister of Internal security and the Ethiopian Ambassador expressed discussed security issues between the two countries and overall security in the Horn of Africa region.

Additionally, they talked about strengthening the cooperation on security relations between the Republic of Somaliland and the Federal Government of Ethiopia, agreeing that both sides should work in achieving peace in the Dacawaley area of the Somali Regional State of Ethiopia.

Amid Risks and Opposition, Somaliland Offers America a Rare Strategic Prize.

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By Prof. Nassir Hussein Kahin

The Horn of Africa is no stranger to power struggles, but one territory has quietly emerged as a linchpin for Western influence: Somaliland.

Recognizing this self-declared republic, which has defied regional instability to maintain peace and democratic governance, could be the game-changing move Washington and London need to counter rising threats from China, Russia, and regional powerhouses like Turkey.

But is it worth the risk? Critics warn that recognition could alienate key allies such as Egypt, Djibouti, and Somalia, and spark opposition from global heavyweights like China and Türkiye. Yet, the rewards of embracing Somaliland far outweigh the dangers, offering the West not only a strategic military foothold but also a chance to rewrite the region’s script.

For three decades, Somaliland has operated as an unrecognized state, fostering stability and democratic practices while Somalia grappled with terrorism and civil strife. Anchored by the Berbera Port—a critical gateway to the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea—Somaliland is poised to become a logistical powerhouse.

The West’s investment in expanding Berbera’s capacity would not only loosen Djibouti’s grip on regional trade but also provide Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most populous country, with an alternative route to the sea. This move would strengthen Somaliland’s economy, integrate it into global markets, and deepen its ties with pro-Western states like the UAE, which already manages the port.

Coupled with renewable energy investments and special economic zones, Somaliland could evolve into a critical trade and energy corridor, rivalling China’s Belt and Road ambitions. This would cement Western influence in a region otherwise dominated by Beijing’s check-book .

As China expands its military base in Djibouti and establishes maritime routes in the Gulf of Aden, the U.S. and its allies face a pressing need for a counterweight. Somaliland’s Berbera Port offers the perfect answer. Hosting a naval base in Berbera would not only secure Western interests in the Horn of Africa but also safeguard critical shipping lanes connecting Europe to Asia.

This strategic hub would enable rapid response capabilities against piracy, terrorism, and regional conflicts, while reinforcing maritime security in one of the world’s most volatile waterways. For the UAE, already operating in the region, Somaliland’s recognition would create a reliable ally capable of bolstering their interests near Yemen and the Red Sea.

Detractors argue that recognition would alienate Egypt and Turkey, staunch allies in the fight against terrorism and key trade partners. But these concerns overlook the potential for diplomatic finesse. Egypt’s fears over Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam, for instance, could be mitigated by positioning Somaliland as a neutral buffer state, facilitating regional cooperation rather than division.

Turkey’s investments in Somalia, while significant, are unlikely to deter Western recognition if Somaliland proves its value as a stabilizing force. Moreover, Ankara’s ambitions in the region could be balanced by aligning Somaliland with Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, offering Ankara limited but mutually beneficial engagements.

China, meanwhile, has tied itself to Somalia and Djibouti, leaving little room to maneuver should Somaliland gain international recognition. Beijing’s investments in the region are already being met with growing skepticism, particularly as African nations seek to reduce dependency on Chinese loans.

In an era where democracy faces mounting global challenges, Somaliland stands as a beacon of hope. Its free elections, peaceful power transitions, and emphasis on governance set it apart in a region marred by autocracy and conflict. Recognizing Somaliland would signal the West’s commitment to democratic values and provide a counterargument to critics who claim Western actions are solely driven by self-interest.

By legitimizing Somaliland’s achievements, the U.S. and UK could strengthen their moral authority and galvanize international support from other democracies. As the West struggles to rebuild its global reputation, this move could underscore its commitment to rewarding stability and governance over chaos and corruption.

Ultimately, the question isn’t whether Somaliland deserves recognition—it’s whether the West can afford not to recognize it. With its strategic location, untapped economic potential, and democratic credentials, Somaliland offers a rare opportunity to counter rivals, stabilize a volatile region, and secure critical trade and military pathways.

For Washington and London, the pathway is clear: embrace Somaliland not as a gamble, but as a calculated move to rewrite the geopolitical script. Opponents will object, but history rewards those who see beyond the immediate risks to seize the long-term rewards.

Will America rise to the occasion? The clock is ticking.

SL-SAG Condemns Somalia’s $600K Lobbying Campaign Against Somaliland’s Re-Recognition Efforts

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Press Release

The Somaliland-American Support Group (SL-SAG) vehemently condemns the Somali government’s deeply misguided decision to allocate $600,000 to a lobbying contract with the BGR Group in Washington, DC. This campaign aims to oppose Somaliland’s Re-Recognition Bill (H.R.) currently before the U.S. Congress. This decision reflects Mogadishu’s continued disregard for its own internal crises and its relentless attempts to undermine Somaliland’s sovereignty and democratic progress.

As Somaliland-American citizens, we categorically reject the misuse of taxpayer funds for such lobbying efforts. We are sharply critical of the current U.S. administration for permitting the squandering of American taxpayer dollars on endeavors that contradict the principles of democracy and progress.

For over three decades, Somaliland has stood as a beacon of stability, democracy, and economic growth in the Horn of Africa. It has consistently demonstrated a commitment to self-reliance, peacebuilding, and the rule of law—values that sharply contrast with the governance challenges and conflicts that persist in Somalia.

Rather than addressing its critical security, humanitarian, and governance issues, the Somali government has chosen to divert substantial resources toward undermining Somaliland’s legitimate aspirations. These funds would have been far better spent on supporting Somalia’s struggling citizens or rebuilding essential infrastructure. It is particularly egregious that the U.S. government recently forgave $1.1 billion in Somali debt, only to see such funds misused. SL-SAG unequivocally condemns the exploitation of American taxpayer money for lobbying efforts aimed at stifling Somaliland’s democratic progress.

“This campaign is a desperate attempt to obstruct Somaliland’s rightful pursuit of international recognition,” said an SL-SAG spokesperson. “Recognition is earned through stability, democracy, and progress—not through expensive lobbying to suppress the genuine aspirations of a thriving democracy.”

On November 13, Somaliland held its sixth presidential election, further solidifying its reputation as a stable and mature democracy. The seamless transfer of power showcased the nation’s political maturity and readiness to be a key player on the global stage. Somaliland’s stability, democratic governance, and geopolitical significance underscore its readiness to be recognized as a sovereign state.

Strategically located near the Bab al-Mandab Strait ( باب المندب ) and the Gulf of Aden, Somaliland controls critical maritime corridors and boasts the Berbera Port, one of Africa’s most important ports. This makes Somaliland a focal point in the geopolitical landscape, attracting interest from global powers such as China, Turkey, and Russia. The United States, however, has lagged behind in forging meaningful partnerships with Somaliland—a missed opportunity that SL-SAG urges President-elect Trump to address. Immediate recognition of Somaliland and the establishment of military and economic relations would advance U.S. interests in the region while countering China’s expanding influence.

The Biden administration’s adherence to the outdated and ineffective “One Somalia Policy” has failed to address the realities on the ground, wasting valuable time and resources. Somaliland’s independence and recognition are not only a matter of justice but also a strategic imperative for regional and global stability.

SL-SAG calls on the U.S. government, NGOs, and policymakers to see through this misguided lobbying effort and engage with Somaliland as a reliable partner committed to peace and prosperity. We urge all stakeholders to reject divisive tactics and support Somaliland’s legitimate aspirations for recognition.

Somaliland: President holds consultative meeting with national political parties

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He once again calls for peace and extends an olive branch to the residents of Sool regio

The President H.E. Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi Irro once again reiterated the need for the defence of the nation and at the same time similarly extended a branch of olive to the belligerent residents of Sool region and appealed for peaceful reconciliation.

The Head of State stated the facts as he held on Saturday an unprecedented national consultative meeting with the official national political parties which he said would be a constant one in his administration.

The meeting brought together the heads of the three parties viz., the ruling party WADDANI, KULMIYE and KAAH led by their consecutive chairmen Messrs Hirsi Ali Haji Hassan, Mohamoud Hashi Abdi and Mohamed Kahin Ahmed respectively.

Noting that the political parties were part of national institutions, he pointed out that they ought to be engaged in deliberations of national interests.

While thanking the political party officials for promptly heeding his call for the consultative meeting, the President underpinned the fact that the nation has to be safeguarded from within and without.

He further noted that the country was not one at war with its own but would always be diligent in their duties and aspire to the guidelines of nationhood and its governance as per expectations.

He stated that the security arms of the government have full orders and directives to handle matters that undermine national cohesion and internal security as per their duties.

The President congratulated the three political parties to have won and clinched officialdom to become the only official political parties mandated to operate for the next ten years.

In reciprocation, the chairmen of the opposition parties thanked the President for his call and pledged to work with the government as duly per national calling.

They gave their advice to the Head of State as to how national cohesion may be cemented and combatting wayward social media propaganda which undermines cohesiveness and renders populaces asunder.

They pledged that they would do their best to help foster peaceful security and stability, national economy and solid unity, hence, tether such negative and unbecoming propaganda from within the country and abroad.

They also sought from the state the bolstering of political parties to make democracy and its institutions be a formidable process in nation building.

On his part, the chair of the ruling party WADDANI echoed the sentiments of his colleagues and further underpinned the need to have concerted efforts focussed in addressing insurgency and associated miss-demeanor.

 

Somaliland government appeal for calm, says it has contacted neighbouring Somali State of Ethiopia following clashes at Da’awaley

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By M.A. Egge

The Somaliland government has revealed that they have reached to the neighbouring Somali state of Ethiopia as concerns the spate of violence that erupted at Da’awaley in Harshin district of the Somali state of Ethiopia that threatens the cross-border harmonious setting of the pastoral residents that has claimed lives and left several injured.

The Somaliland Minister of Interior Hon. Abdalle Mohamed Arab a.k.a. Sandeere said that they have made efforts as a government to quell the violence hence has reached to their counterparts in the neighbouring country.

He appealed for calm and asked the residents of the area to keep their cool as the matter is being addressed by the concerned government of Ethiopia.

He made the appeal through a press conference he called last evening in his office.

“I would like to inform you about the violence that has escalated in the fifth district, where the Somali regional government forces and people from the area fought, which resulted in casualties, deaths and injuries, and serious violence. I express my deepest condolences to the victims of the deaths and injuries. When we learned of this incident, we contacted the authorities of the Somali state of Ethiopia. We noted that since they are responsible for the people of the area, they should address the matter and calm the situation”.

Public works minister Hon. Hussein Aideed and Sports and Youth Deputy Minister Hon. Yusuf Nouh Yusuf a.k.a. Tadase who flanked the minister at the presser also expressed similar sentiments.

They all sent their condolences to the scores reportedly dead following the skirmishes and wished quick recovery to the injured.

People who were injured in the fighting in Da’awaley area have been taken to Bali-gubadle town hospital in Haut region for medical attendance.

The interior minister briefed the nation on the situation of the conflict that occurred in the area that pitted the Ethiopian regional government Liyuu police force and one of the clans of the Somali regional government, which resulted in the clash with a number of deaths and injuries.

The minister said that during the discussions with the security officials of the Somali regional government, they agreed to protect the people and that the authorities of the area.

He added that they have sent a large delegation from Somaliland and that the government is saddened by what happened.

He urged the people living in the area where the violence occur

Somaliland’s Rising Stakes: A Test of Diplomacy, Resilience, and Survival

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By Prof. Nassir Hussein Kahin

As the sun rises over Somaliland’s rugged mountains and golden coastline, it casts its light on a nation caught in the crosshairs of history. For decades, Somaliland has fought to define itself as a beacon of democracy and stability in one of the world’s most volatile regions. Its peaceful elections, marked by the triumph of Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Ciro,” have once again placed this unrecognized state under the global spotlight. Yet, even as it celebrates its democratic gains, Somaliland finds itself encircled by a web of adversaries—regional and global powers united by a singular goal: to derail its march toward self-determination.

Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, China, and Turkey—each with their own agenda—are converging in an unholy alliance of geopolitical intrigue. They see in Somaliland not just a fledgling democracy but a potential disruptor of the status quo, a nation determined to carve its destiny free from the constraints of external control. For Somalia, Somaliland’s assertion of independence threatens its territorial integrity and political narrative. Somalia’s diplomatic machinery, fueled by allies such as Egypt and Qatar, works tirelessly to choke Somaliland’s quest for recognition at every international forum.

Suffice it just to mention Djibouti, the region’s traditional trade and maritime hub, views Somaliland as an emerging rival. Its leaders understand the implications of a recognized Somaliland, with its Berbera port poised to challenge Djibouti’s stranglehold on regional logistics and trade routes. Eritrea, ever the shadowy operator, sees an opportunity to maintain its influence by ensuring Somaliland remains isolated and embroiled in regional complexities.

But the stakes rise further with the entry of global powers. China, with its insatiable appetite for strategic outposts, is determined to extend its Belt and Road Initiative into Somaliland, not as a partner but as a master. Its opaque infrastructure deals and media manipulation campaigns are aimed at embedding its influence while ensuring Somaliland remains beholden to its economic leverage. Meanwhile, Turkey, with its eyes on military and economic dominance in the Horn of Africa, seeks to align with Somalia and other regional players to block Somaliland’s aspirations.

These forces are not just vying for influence; they are engaging in active destabilization. Proxy actors, economic isolation tactics, disinformation campaigns, and military posturing are the weapons of choice. Somaliland, perched on the Gulf of Aden and near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, holds the keys to one of the most strategic maritime corridors in the world. Its geographical position is both its greatest asset and its most perilous vulnerability. The waters surrounding it are rife with piracy, terrorism, and global power competition, making Somaliland’s stability essential not just for the region but for the global economy.

And at the heart of this storm stands Dr. Ciro, a seasoned diplomat with decades of experience in navigating the treacherous waters of international relations. His victory in the polls has inspired hope among Somaliland’s people, but it has also made him a target. He inherits a nation rich in untapped resources but surrounded by adversaries eager to exploit its weaknesses. The world has seen what happens to resource-rich but vulnerable nations in Africa—Sudan’s descent into chaos, the Sahel’s spiral into extremist violence, the Congo Basin’s plunder by transnational criminals. These are cautionary tales that Somaliland cannot afford to ignore.

Dr. Ciro’s challenge is nothing short of monumental. He must walk a tightrope, balancing immediate threats with long-term ambitions. Somaliland’s democracy, still fragile, must be fortified against the external pressures of disinformation and internal cracks that adversaries will seek to exploit. The president must forge alliances not out of desperation but from a position of strength, ensuring that any agreements with foreign powers serve the long-term interests of his nation.

Recognition remains Somaliland’s ultimate goal, but it cannot come at the cost of sovereignty. Dr. Ciro understands that his nation’s rich resources and strategic location are bargaining chips in a high-stakes game. Yet, he also knows that Somaliland must not trade these assets for fleeting gains. His vision must extend beyond the immediate allure of international recognition to a future where Somaliland is a sovereign leader, respected and self-reliant.

The battle ahead will test every ounce of Dr. Ciro’s diplomatic skill, every fiber of Somaliland’s resilience. It is a battle not just for recognition but for survival in a world where power and influence often trample over principle. Somaliland stands at a crossroads, its destiny hanging in the balance. The question now is whether its leaders can rise above the machinations of those who seek to contain it, crafting a future defined by self-determination and strength.

As the world watches, Somaliland’s struggle is more than a regional story. It is a lesson in resilience, a testament to the power of democracy, and a warning to those who underestimate the resolve of a nation determined to chart its own course. And for Dr. Ciro, this moment is not just a test of leadership—it is the defining challenge of his life. And Somalilanders are confident that President “Ciro” has the ability to overcome these challenges.

Ankara Declaration Reduces Ethiopia-Somalia Tensions but Leaves Unresolved Gaps

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Author: Kathryn Tyson

Contributor: Liam Kar

Editor’s Note: The Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute publishes these updates with support from the Institute for the Study of War.

The Africa File provides regular analysis and assessments of major developments regarding state and nonstate actors’ activities in Africa that undermine regional stability and threaten US personnel and interests.

Key Takeaway: Ethiopia and Somalia agreed on December 11 to work toward securing Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea as part of a Turkish-mediated deal that will likely benefit Ethiopia and Turkey and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy. Ethiopia will likely withdraw from or at least pause its controversial naval base agreement with the breakaway Somaliland region because of the new agreement with Somalia, which is known as the Ankara Declaration. Ethiopia’s withdrawal from the Somaliland agreement would likely lead the Somali Federal Government (SFG) to reverse its decision to exclude Ethiopian troops from the new African Union (AU) mission in Somalia to combat al Shabaab in 2025. Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea would significantly benefit Ethiopia’s economy by reducing Ethiopia’s reliance on Djibouti, while the Ankara Declaration benefits Turkey by protecting Turkey’s investments and relationships with Ethiopia and Somalia and bolstering Turkey’s status as an international powerbroker and key player in the broader Red Sea area. The Ankara Declaration could cause political backlash against the SFG and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy to the benefit of al Shabaab because the deal contradicts the SFG’s earlier stances on Ethiopian access to Somalia’s coast. The agreement could lead to future tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia as it does not address Ethiopia’s naval ambitions, Somalia’s military cooperation with Egypt that was intended to counter Ethiopia, or the feasibility of ensuring safe passage between Somali ports and Ethiopia given al Shabaab’s threat throughout southern Somalia.

Ethiopia and Somalia agreed on December 11 to work toward securing Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea as part of the Turkish-mediated Ankara Declaration. Ethiopia and Somalia agreed to finalize “mutually advantageous commercial arrangements” that will allow Ethiopia to “enjoy reliable, secure, and sustainable access to and from the sea” as part of the agreement.[1] Ethiopia and Somalia signed the Ankara Declaration after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held separate talks with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in Ankara, Turkey, on December 11.[2] Turkey mediated two previous rounds of negotiations between Ethiopia’s and Somalia’s foreign ministers in July and August 2024.[3]

Ethiopia will likely withdraw from or at least pause its controversial naval base agreement with the de facto independent breakaway Somaliland region as a result of the Ankara Declaration. Ethiopia signed an agreement with Somaliland in January 2024 that granted Ethiopia land for a naval base on Somaliland’s Red Sea coast in return for Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence.[4] Ethiopian officials also said the deal included commercial aspects, but Somaliland officials maintained that the deal was naval only.[5] The Somali Federal Government (SFG) rejected the deal as an illegal violation of its sovereignty—as the SFG considers Somaliland to be part of its territory—and called for the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from the country.[6] Ethiopia has deployed approximately 10,000 troops in Somalia as part of the African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia and through other bilateral agreements to fight al Qaeda’s Somali affiliate, al Shabaab.[7] Abiy and Mohamud implied that the discussions in Ankara addressed the nearly yearlong political dispute between over the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal even though the Ankara Declaration does not directly mention the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal.[8]

Figure 1. Ethiopia-Somalia Dispute: 2024 Timeline

Source: Liam Karr and Kathryn Tyson.

Ethiopia has little room to balance between the SFG and Somaliland and their competing deals after it agreed to the Ankara Declaration due to the zero-sum positions of the SFG and Somaliland on Somaliland’s sovereignty. Somali officials insisted that Ethiopia withdraw from its deal with Somaliland in previous Turkish-mediated discussions and called the Somaliland agreement a violation of Somali “territorial integrity.”[9] The Ankara Declaration implicitly acknowledges the SFG’s position without directly mentioning Somaliland when the text says that Ethiopia and Somalia “reaffirmed their respect and commitment to one another’s sovereignty, unity, independence, and territorial integrity.”[10] Somaliland officials have insisted that Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland is required if Somaliland is to follow through on its agreement to lease Ethiopia land for a naval base.[11]

The Ankara Declaration gives Ethiopia an alternative to the Somaliland deal because the agreement theoretically provides Ethiopia access to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Ethiopia has sought to acquire sea access since it became landlocked, after Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993.[12] The Ankara Declaration recognized the “potential benefits” of Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea and stipulated that Ethiopia and Somalia will hold technical talks in February to ensure this access no later than June 2025.[13]

Officials from Somalia and Somaliland have made contradictory statements about whether Ethiopia will follow through on the Somaliland deal. Somali officials said on December 12 that Ethiopia retracted its agreement with Somaliland as part of the Ankara talks.[14] Somaliland officials said that the Ankara Declaration “does not concern” Somaliland and that Ethiopia has insisted privately that it will not withdraw from the Somaliland deal.[15]

Future international recognition of Somaliland’s statehood would give Ethiopia greater political cover and legitimacy to resume talks on a port deal with Somaliland. No countries currently recognize Somaliland, although many countries have consulates and diplomatic relations with Somaliland. US policymakers are increasingly contemplating giving US recognition to Somaliland’s independence, however. US State Department officials who worked on Africa policy during US President-elect Donald Trump’s first term have voiced public support for the US to recognize Somaliland.[16] US Republican House Representative Scott Perry introduced a bill on December 12 for US recognition of Somaliland independence.[17] The US news outlet Semafor reported in December that Trump advisers and US congressional Republicans plan to encourage Trump to recognize Somaliland’s independence when he takes office, in January 2025.[18] US recognition of Somaliland could encourage other countries, including Ethiopia, to extend recognition to Somaliland.

Ethiopia’s withdrawal from the Somaliland agreement would likely lead the SFG to reverse its decision to exclude Ethiopian troops from the new AU mission in Somalia in 2025. Somali officials in June ordered Ethiopian forces to withdraw from Somalia at the end of the current AU mission at the end of 2024 if Ethiopia followed through on its deal with Somaliland.[19] Somalia shifted its tone in the Ankara Declaration, however, and acknowledged “the sacrifices of Ethiopian soldiers within the African Union Missions.”[20] The Somali national security adviser said on December 15 that the SFG is reviewing the decision to exclude Ethiopian forces from the new AU mission.[21]

Ethiopia’s continued military presence in Somalia as part of the new AU mission would allow Ethiopia to continue fighting al Shabaab. Ethiopia seeks to maintain troops in Somalia to counter al Shabaab and create a buffer zone to prevent cross-border incursions. Al Shabaab demonstrated its strength near the Ethiopian border and threat to Ethiopia when it conducted a multiday campaign inside Ethiopia for the first time in July 2022.[22] Several hundred militants from the 2022 offensive established a rear base along Ethiopia’s southeastern border with Kenya.[23] Al Shabaab also regularly attacks Ethiopian forces in Somalia and uses anti-Ethiopian propaganda as a recruiting tool.[24] Local politicians in Somalia and Somalia’s international partners had signaled their support for Ethiopia’s continued participation in the new AU mission, and CTP previously assessed that Ethiopia would likely remain in Somalia despite the SFG’s demands.[25]

Figure 2. Ethiopian Forces and Bases in Somalia

Source: Kathryn Tyson.

It is unclear how the Ankara Declaration and subsequent agreements between Ethiopia and Somalia will affect Somalia’s military cooperation with Egypt. Somalia signed defense deals with Egypt in August 2024 for nearly 10,000 Egyptian troops to replace Ethiopian forces in Somalia, ostensibly to combat al Shabaab.[26] Egypt has also sent three shipments of weapons to Somalia since August.[27] Egypt sought to threaten Ethiopia over Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, while the SFG aimed to retaliate against Ethiopia and counter Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland.[28] Ethiopia views Egypt’s military presence on its border in Somalia as a national security risk and has warned against Egyptian military participation in the new AU mission.[29] The presidents of Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia formalized a de facto anti-Ethiopian alliance during a trilateral summit on October 10 and agreed to strengthen Somalia to “confront various internal and external challenges.”[30] The Egyptian and Somali foreign ministers discussed the Ankara Declaration on December 15 and agreed to continue joint coordination and to hold a trilateral ministerial meeting with Eritrea at an unspecified date.[31]

Ethiopian commercial access to the Red Sea through Somalia would significantly benefit Ethiopia’s economy and reduce Ethiopia’s reliance on Djibouti. Ethiopia relies on Djibouti’s main port for approximately 95 percent of its international trade and pays at least $1 billion in annual port fees to Djibouti.[32] Ethiopia previously sought to gain Red Sea access to decrease this reliance through an agreement with the SFG in 2018 to invest in ports and accompanying road links between Ethiopia and Somalia.[33] Abiy also attempted to secure a stake in the Emirati-owned and operated Berbera port in Somaliland in 2019.[34] Both efforts collapsed, however, after Ethiopia and the SFG failed to follow through on their deal and Ethiopia failed to make the necessary payments to secure its stake in the Berbera port.[35] Abiy continued to highlight Ethiopia’s landlocked status as a problem and framed Red Sea access as an existential issue and “natural right” in 2023.[36]

The Ankara Declaration does not address Ethiopia’s naval ambitions. The Ankara Declaration does not refer to any Ethiopian naval access, contrary to the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal. Ethiopia signed an agreement with France to develop Ethiopia’s navy in 2019, but France withdrew from the deal in 2021 due to human rights concerns related to the Ethiopian civil war in Tigray.[37] However, French President Emmanuel Macron is traveling to Ethiopia in late December and is reportedly prepared to reengage with the deal.[38]

Turkey benefits from its role in the Ankara Declaration as Turkey seeks to strengthen its economic, military, and political footprint in the Horn of Africa. The Ankara Declaration protects Turkey’s investments and relationships with Ethiopia and Somalia by keeping its two partners from an open conflict. Turkey has been a major defense and economic partner in Somalia since the early 2010s and signed a maritime and defense deal with the SFG in February 2024 to reconstruct the Somali Navy in exchange for 30 percent of the revenue from the Somali’s offshore economic zone.[39] Somalia and Turkey also signed an oil and gas cooperation agreement in March 2024 that allows Turkey to engage in oil and natural gas exploration in Somalia’s offshore waters.[40] Turkey is simultaneously the second-largest foreign investor in Ethiopia, with an estimated $2.5 billion in projects in the country at the end of 2021.[41] Turkey sent drones to Ethiopia to help turn the tide in the federal government’s favor during the Ethiopian civil war in 2021 and 2022.[42]

The Ankara Declaration and Turkey’s growing influence in the Horn of Africa bolster Turkey’s status as an international powerbroker and key player in the greater Red Sea area. The AU, European Union, and United States praised Turkey for its role in mediating the Ankara Declaration.[43] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan offered to mediate an agreement in Sudan’s civil war between the United Arab Emirates—which backs the opposing Rapid Support Forces—and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) during a phone call with the SAF head on December 13.[44] Turkey has also framed its naval presence in the broader Horn of Africa–Red Sea region as an opportunity to combat piracy, illegal fishing, and other multilateral issues in the area.[45]

The Ankara Declaration could cause political backlash against the SFG and undermine the SFG’s legitimacy to the benefit of al Shabaab because the agreement contradicts the SFG’s earlier stances on Ethiopian access to Somalia’s coast. The SFG played upon anti-Ethiopian sentiment to turn popular Somali sentiment against the Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal as part of its strategy to undermine the deal. Mohamud said in January that “not an inch of Somalia can or will be signed away by anybody,” and the Somali foreign minister led thousands of Somali civilians in protest against the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal in Mogadishu in January 2024.[46] Al Shabaab has attempted to exploit anti-Ethiopian sentiment repeatedly to gain recruits and accuses Ethiopia of “occupying” Somalia.[47] Al Shabaab rejected the Somalia-Ethiopia deal on December 12 and reiterated that Ethiopia seeks to “dominate Somalia.”[48] There is no immediate evidence that the Somali public or Somali government officials are widely dissatisfied with the Ankara Declaration, but protests against the SFG’s decision to mend ties with Ethiopia would indicate public dissatisfaction with the SFG.

The Ankara Declaration does not address the feasibility of ensuring safe passage for Ethiopian access to the Red Sea through Somalia. Ethiopia would presumably secure preferential access to a commercial port near or in the existing major ports in Mogadishu or Kismayo in southern Somalia. Al Shabaab maintains extortion networks in both ports, regularly carries out attacks in both cities, and also controls or heavily contests the areas and roads between both ports and the Ethiopian border.[49] These challenges previously contributed to the failure of Ethiopia’s 2018 deal with the SFG. The SFG launched an offensive in central Somalia in 2022 that cleared one of the main roadways between Mogadishu and central Somalia that runs to Ethiopia.[50] However, the SFG was unable to completely clear al Shabaab from central Somalia and failed to expand the offensive to al Shabaab’s main havens in southern Somalia due to clan rivalries and al Shabaab counterattacks.[51] A lack of security across these regions would pose significant challenges to secure any overland route for Ethiopia to transport goods to a Somali port.

Figure 3. Al Shabaab’s Area of Operations in Southern Somalia

Source: Kathryn Tyson and Liam Karr.

[1] https://x.com/MOFASomalia/status/1867120512822022244

[2] https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1866956708297179388; https://www.reuters.com/world/erdogan-meets-somalia-ethiopia-leaders-separately-amid-somaliland-dispute-2024-12-11

[3] https://www.reuters.com/world/turkey-mediating-somalia-ethiopia-talks-port-deal-officials-2024-07-01/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/second-round-somalia-ethiopia-talks-turkey-ends-with-no-deal-progress-made-2024-08-13

[4] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalias-cabinet-calls-emergency-meet-ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal-2024-01-02

[5] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia-somaliland/stakes-ethiopia-somaliland-deal

[6] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-insists-ethiopia-not-be-part-of-new-au-mission-/7858887.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-expel-ethiopian-troops-unless-somaliland-port-deal-scrapped-official-2024-06-03; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-accuses-ethiopian-troops-illegal-incursion-2024-06-24

[7] https://ecfr.eu/article/threes-a-crowd-why-egypts-and-somalias-row-with-ethiopia-can-embolden-al-shabaab/

[8] https://www.barrons.com/news/turkey-says-ethiopia-somalia-reach-compromise-deal-to-end-feud-51034d60; https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/a-port-deal-puts-the-horn-of-africa-on-the-brink

[9] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgr7v1evvgo; https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240927-ethiopian-actions-flagrantly-violate-somali-territorial-integrity-somali-pm

[10] https://www.mfa.gov dot tr/etiyopya-federal-demokratik-cumhuriyeti-ve-somali-federal-cumhuriyeti-nin-ankara-bildirisi.en.mfa#:~:text=The%20Leaders%20of%20Somalia%20and,Act%20of%20the%20African%20Union

[11] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/01/ethiopia-and-somaliland-reach-historic-agreement-over-access-to-red-sea-ports

[12] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/what-the-ethiopia-somaliland-deal-means-for-washingtons-strategy-in-the-red-sea/

[13] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/12/11/turkey-somalia-ethiopia-joint-declaration/3a2759fa-b80f-11ef-8afa-452ab71fe261_story.html; https://x.com/TheVillaSomalia/status/1866984029347803525

[14] https://x.com/TomGardner18/status/1867114091816550709; https://www.bbc.com/somali/articles/cp9n1dn2v7zo

[15] https://x.com/Ismail_Shirwac/status/1866972545712259467; https://x.com/RAbdiAnalyst/status/1867811339789271403; https://www.bbc.com/somali/articles/cp9n1dn2v7zo

[16] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somaliland-votes-with-leaders-seeing-international-recognition-reach-2024-11-13/

[17] https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/10402

[18] https://www.semafor.com/article/12/10/2024/somaliland-trump-white-house-looks-set-to-recognize-the-region

[19] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-wants-all-ethiopian-troops-to-leave-by-december/7641135.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-expel-ethiopian-troops-unless-somaliland-port-deal-scrapped-official-2024-06-03

[20] https://x.com/TheVillaSomalia/status/1866984029347803525

[21] https://www.alaraby.co dot uk/politics/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B5%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AA%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%AB-%D9%85%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%88%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A8%D8%B9%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%82%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%86%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A9

[22] https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-al-shabaab-attacks-ethiopia

[23] https://www.hudson.org/terrorism/faltering-lion-analyzing-progress-setbacks-somalia-war-against-al-shabaab-james-barnett; https://www.criticalthreats.org/briefs/africa-file/africa-file-al-shabaab-attacks-ethiopia

[24] https://jamestown.org/program/al-shabaab-threatens-ethiopian-security-ahead-of-atmis-withdrawal-from-somalia/; https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-attacks-ethiopian-military-convoys-in-somalia-/7271962.html; https://www.garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/al-shabaab-militants-launch-attack-on-ethiopian-military-base-in-somalia

[26] https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-insists-ethiopia-not-be-part-of-new-au-mission-/7858887.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-expel-ethiopian-troops-unless-somaliland-port-deal-scrapped-official-2024-06-03/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-accuses-ethiopian-troops-illegal-incursion-2024-06-24; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-september-5-2024-egypt-ethiopia-and-somalia-conflict-looms-is-gains-in-niger-russia-aids-burkina-fasos-nuclear-energy-push#Horn

[27] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cglk038p1d3o; https://www.garoweonline dot com/en/news/somalia/egyptian-warship-docks-in-mogadishu-with-third-arms-shipment-amidst-regional-tensions

[28] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-for-the-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-in-the-horn-of-africa#Somalia

[29] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/africa-file-special-edition-external-meddling-for-the-red-sea-exacerbates-conflicts-in-the-horn-of-africa

[30] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdje7pkv1zxo; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/10/somalia-eritera-and-egypt-pledge-to-bloster-security-ties; https://www.barrons.com/news/leaders-of-egypt-eritrea-somalia-meet-amid-regional-tensions-7eccc9a9

[31] https://x.com/PatrickHeinisc1/status/1868315060172640515; https://x.com/mahmouedgamal44/status/1868346810068357217; https://x.com/HarunMaruf/status/1868352708610043990

[32] https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2023/07/20/addis-djibouti-corridor-to-get-major-upgrade-that-is-key-to-unlocking-connectivity-and-trade-for-ethiopia-afe-hoa; https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/02/world/africa/ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal.html; https://www.mei.edu/publications/djibouti-needs-plan-b-post-guelleh-era; https://www.aljazeera dot com/features/2023/11/7/is-landlocked-ethiopia-starting-another-war-over-ports-in-horn-of-africa

[33] https://www.middleeastmonitor dot com/20180616-somalia-ethiopia-to-jointly-invest-in-four-seaports-on-the-red-sea/; https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/ethiopia-seeks-to-legitimise-port-deals-with-somalia-55700; https://www.reuters.com/article/world/somalia-ethiopia-to-jointly-invest-in-four-seaports-on-the-red-sea-idUSKBN1JC0JK

[34] https://www.aljazeera dot com/news/2024/1/6/why-is-somalia-angry-about-neighbouring-ethiopias-new-port-deal

[35] https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia-somaliland/stakes-ethiopia-somaliland-deal

[36] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67332811; https://www.aljazeera dot com/program/inside-story/2023/7/26/how-will-landlocked-ethiopia-get-direct-access-to-a-port

[37] https://somaliguardian dot com/news/africa/france-suspends-military-cooperation-agreement-with-ethiopia/; https://www.state.gov/war-crimes-crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-in-ethiopia/; https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/06/crimes-against-humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-ethiopias-western-tigray-zone; https://www.reuters.com/article/world/ethiopia-france-sign-military-navy-deal-turn-new-page-in-ties-idUSKBN1QT2VZ/

[38] https://x.com/Tuuryare_Africa/status/1867637502854803907; https://x.com/martinplaut/status/1866904409726206462

[39] https://www.mei.edu/publications/far-benefactor-turkish-government-exploiting-somalias-fragility; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/turkey-signed-two-major-deals-with-somalia-will-it-be-able-to-implement-them

[40] https://apnews.com/article/turkey-somalia-sign-oil-gas-agreements-312fcdf58789767f94b6c36a3444faec

[41] https://www.theafricareport.com/141761/ethiopia-turkey-ankaras-ongoing-economic-and-military-support; https://www.aa dot com.tr/en/africa/turkey-eyeing-more-investments-in-ethiopia-envoy/2144828

[42] https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/exclusive-us-concerned-over-turkeys-drone-sales-conflict-hit-ethiopia-2021-12-22; https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/20/world/africa/drones-ethiopia-war-turkey-emirates.html; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2022/ethiopia-tigray-dedebit-drone-strike/

[43] https://www.aa.com dot tr/en/africa/african-union-welcomes-somalia-ethiopia-pact-praises-mediation-by-turkish-president-erdogan/3422654; https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/ethiopiasomalia-statement-spokesperson-ankara-declaration_en; https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-welcomes-the-ankara-declaration-by-ethiopia-and-somalia

[44] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkey-can-step-resolve-sudan-uae-disputes-erdogan-tells-burhan-2024-12-13/; https://x.com/PatrickHeinisc1/status/1867562489627517116

[45] https://www.newarab.com/news/turkey-leads-anti-piracy-maritime-mission-gulf-aden

[46] https://www.aljazeera dot com/features/2024/1/4/ambiguous-ethiopia-port-deal-fuels-uncertainty-over-somaliland-statehood; https://www.ftlsomalia dot com/fiqi-addresses-huge-anti-ethiopia-protest-in-mogadishu/; https://www.aa.com dot tr/en/africa/protest-against-ethiopia-s-red-sea-access-deal-rocks-somali-capital/3106328; https://x.com/SONNALIVE/status/1742661068760006984

[47] https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-2007-01-06-voa9-66763232/563779.html; https://www.reuters.com/article/world/anti-ethiopian-protests-erupt-in-mogadishu-idUSL06725344/; SITE Intelligence Group, ”Shabaab Video Raises Alarm Over Ethiopian Ambitions in Somalia, Documents Major Ambush on Convoy Leaving 284 Dead,” April 4, 2024, available by subscription at http://www.siteintelgroup.com

[48] https://x.com/Tuuryare_Africa/status/1867261152075325683

[49] https://www.voanews.com/a/al-shabab-attacks-somali-base-handed-over-by-au-forces/7179521.html; https://acleddata.com/2023/09/01/special-report-kenya-somalia-border-rising-al-shabaab-threat-in-the-wake-of-atmis-drawdown/; https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/scores-killed-clashes-between-somali-forces-al-shabaab-2024-07-22/; https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/al-shabaab-remains-active-in-southern-somalia/

[50] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/somalias-stalled-offensive-against-al-shabaab-taking-stock-of-obstacles/

[51] https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-somali-national-army-versus-al-shabaab-a-net-assessment/; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-february-1-2024; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-march-8-2023#:~:text=Source%3A%20Kathryn%20Tyson.-,Somalia.,-The%20SFG%20will; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-march-8-2023#:~:text=Source%3A%20Kathryn%20Tyson.-,Somalia.,-The%20SFG%20will

Somaliland’s New Administration Expects to Cement People to People Ties: AU & IGAD Envoy

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Somaliland’s new administration would bolster cooperation with the peoples’ of Ethiopia, the Somaliland Ambassador expressed, as he highlighted the significant role Ethiopia has played for regional stability.

In an exclusive interview with The Ethiopian Herald, Somaliland’s Special Envoy to the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Ambassador Abdillahi Mohamed Duale, expressed his confidence in the newly appointed President of Somaliland to advance the long-standing people-to-people relations.

He also outlined Somaliland’s active engagement with IGAD and the AU, where efforts are underway to enhance the region’s perception of the state.

Somaliland’s New Administration Expects to Cement People to People Ties: Envoy
Ambassador Abdillahi Mohamed Duale, Somaliland’s Special Envoy to the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

These endeavors include promoting the state’s achievements in democratic governance and stability to strengthen its case for international recognition, he noted.

While mentioning that the former President Muse Bihi Abdi’s peaceful transition of power to Somaliland’s newly elected leader, President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi, the Ambassador described the democratic process as a hallmark of Somaliland’s political maturity in a volatile region.

From Campaigning to Governance for the 6th Somaliland President
Somaliland’s new president-elect, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi. (Photo: X)

The transition to President Abdirahman marks another milestone for Somaliland, which has consistently demonstrated its commitment to democratic principles for more than three decades. This peaceful transfer of power is being celebrated as a testament to the strength of its democratic institutions, he added.

Mohamed also stated his optimism that the new president and his cabinet would consolidate recent developments in the relations among Horn of Africa countries.

The renewed collaboration between the peoples of both countries would enhance economic and security cooperation and infrastructure development, solidifying their longstanding relationship, it was learnt.

Somalia’s Scandalous Misuse of Aid: Lobbying, Corruption, and the Desperate Fight Against Somaliland’s Independence

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By Prof. Nassir Hussein Kahin, Hargeisa, Somaliland.

In a shocking revelation that underscores the depths of Somalia’s political dysfunction, the unelected government of Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud has been caught diverting foreign aid to bankroll an extravagant $50,000-per-month contract with the Washington, D.C.-based lobbying powerhouse BGR Group. This deal, paid for with funds meant to alleviate Somalia’s worsening humanitarian crises, is part of a broader campaign to sabotage Somaliland’s growing international legitimacy.

At the same time, the cracks in Somalia’s already fragile state are deepening. With Puntland and Jubaland inching closer to full secession and Mogadishu barely holding control over its immediate surroundings, President Mohamoud’s administration has prioritized costly lobbying, clandestine arms deals, and destabilization efforts in Somaliland over addressing the urgent needs of its own people.

The deal with BGR Group, officially aimed at lobbying against Somaliland’s recognition, is emblematic of Somalia’s misplaced priorities and endemic corruption. Instead of using international aid to address the famine, poverty, and insecurity plaguing the country, Somalia’s government is funneling resources into lobbying campaigns designed to keep Somaliland under its sphere of influence—a strategy that has failed for over three decades.

This is not an isolated incident. Mogadishu has also allegedly struck deals with China and Egypt to procure weapons, which are being funneled to tribal militias in Somaliland’s eastern regions of Sanaag and Sool. These militias, armed and funded by the Somali government, are part of a deliberate effort to create chaos and project an image of instability in Somaliland. The goal is clear: to undermine Somaliland’s hard-earned reputation as a peaceful and democratic state, thereby discouraging international recognition.

Somalia’s actions against Somaliland stand in stark contrast to its own internal chaos. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud has been accused of ties to extremist group Al-Shabaab—a group he has ostensibly declared war on—and of exploiting these alleged connections to secure international counterterrorism funding. Meanwhile, Mogadishu remains isolated as Puntland and Jubaland push for greater autonomy, if not outright independence.

Somalia’s fragmentation is accelerating, and Mogadishu’s authority is diminishing. Even as its government struggles to hold the capital, it continues to squander aid on high-profile lobbying efforts that have no bearing on its immediate crises.

Meanwhile, while Somalia descends further into dysfunction, Somaliland has emerged as a rare success story in the Horn of Africa. Over the past 30 years, Somaliland has built a functioning democratic system, held peaceful elections, and maintained stability in a volatile region. It has achieved these milestones without significant international aid, relying instead on self-governance, local leadership, and the resilience of its people.

Somaliland’s achievements have not gone unnoticed. U.S. Congressman Scott Perry recently introduced a groundbreaking bill to Congress advocating for Somaliland’s recognition as an independent state. Perry’s proposal is a bold challenge to the outdated “one Somalia” policy, which he argues has failed to address the realities on the ground.

“Somaliland has proven itself to be a beacon of stability and democracy in a volatile region,” Perry said when introducing the bill. “The ‘one Somalia’ policy has achieved nothing but chaos. It’s time for the United States to recognize Somaliland’s independence and support its continued progress.”

For decades, the international community has clung to the idea of a unified Somalia, hoping to rebuild a fractured nation under a single government. But this vision has proven unattainable. Somalia remains a patchwork of rival factions, with Mogadishu unable to enforce its authority even within its borders.

The “one Somalia” policy has not only failed Somalia but has also punished Somaliland—a nation that has thrived independently for over three decades. By denying Somaliland recognition, the international community has enabled Mogadishu’s corrupt leadership to continue its destabilizing campaigns.

The BGR Group contract is a stark reminder of how far Somalia’s government is willing to go to preserve the illusion of unity. This $50,000-per-month retainer—paid for with funds meant to feed the hungry and provide shelter for the displaced—represents the ultimate betrayal of Somalia’s people.

“This is more than corruption,” said a regional analyst. “It’s a deliberate act of sabotage, not just against Somaliland but against the Somali people, who desperately need real leadership and solutions.”

Congressman Perry’s bill offers a new vision for the Horn of Africa: one that rewards Somaliland’s stability, democracy, and self-reliance. By recognizing Somaliland, the international community can send a powerful message that good governance and peace will be rewarded, not undermined.

“The time for Somaliland’s recognition is now,” Perry said. “It’s not just about acknowledging reality—it’s about supporting a nation that has done everything right, even in the face of adversity.”

As Somalia’s government continues to implode under the weight of its corruption and mismanagement, the world must act decisively. The “one Somalia” policy is a relic of the past. Somaliland’s recognition is not just a moral imperative but a practical step toward stability and progress in the Horn of Africa.

The international community faces a choice: continue enabling Mogadishu’s failed leadership or support Somaliland as a beacon of hope in a region desperate for change. One thing is clear—Somalia’s lobbying scandals and destabilization efforts have only strengthened the case for Somaliland’s independence. The time to act is now.