Mogadishu: The United States Embassy in Mogadishu has warned that the personal data of more than 35,000 travelers may have been exposed after unidentified hackers allegedly breached Somalia’s electronic visa system. The incident raises urgent concerns about digital security amid an escalating political dispute over immigration authority, airspace control, and financial transparency.
In a security alert issued Thursday, the embassy said it received credible reports on November 11 indicating that Somalia’s e-visa platform had been compromised. The breach potentially leaked applicants’ names, photographs, birth details, email addresses, marital status, and home addresses. While the embassy stated it is “unable to confirm whether an individual’s data is part of the breach,” it urged all applicants for a Somali e-visa to assume they may be affected.
By Friday, the federal government had not issued a public response, even as the breach threatens to undermine confidence in a system that has been at the center of one of the most contentious political confrontations in recent years.
Somalia introduced its mandatory e-visa system on September 1, 2025, describing it as a cornerstone of immigration modernization, security screening, and revenue transparency. The platform requires all foreign travelers to apply online before entry.
However, regional governments immediately rejected the system. Somaliland insisted that only visas issued by its own immigration authority are valid in its territory, while Puntland declared the federal e-visa “illegal,” maintaining that regional administrations control airports and borders.
This rejection has caused widespread travel disruptions. A BBC Somali journalist traveling from Nairobi to Bosaso was forced to buy a second visa after Puntland officials refused to recognize her federally issued e-visa. Other travelers reported being stranded at foreign airports or charged additional entry fees upon arrival in Somaliland or Puntland.
The Somali Civil Aviation Authority (SCAA) escalated the situation by instructing carriers, including Flydubai and Ethiopian Airlines, to deny boarding to passengers traveling to Hargeisa without a federal e-visa, warning that airlines risked fines or suspension for noncompliance. This move left several Somaliland-bound passengers stranded in Dubai and other transit hubs.
In response, Somaliland asserted full control of its airspace. Aviation Minister Fu’aad Ahmed Nuuh stated that roughly 90 aircraft cross Somaliland airspace daily and that operators refusing to comply were told to reroute. He indicated Somaliland had already taken “two steps” and planned further measures depending on developments.
Senior Somaliland officials have framed the federal directives as political aggression. Foreign Minister Abdirahman Dahir Aden told diplomats that Mogadishu’s policies were intended to “destroy Somaliland,” while the Minister of the Presidency, Khadar Hussein Abdi, described the confrontation as “a direct war between Somaliland and Mogadishu.”
Cybersecurity analysts say the alleged breach raises serious questions about the e-visa platform’s resilience and whether adequate safeguards were implemented during its rollout. Many warn that the exposed data could be used for identity theft, digital impersonation, phishing campaigns, and targeted scams against Somali diaspora communities and foreign nationals.
The U.S. Embassy advised applicants to monitor updates from the Somali Immigration and Citizenship Agency (SICA), review Federal Trade Commission resources on responding to breaches, and enroll in the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP) to receive alerts. U.S. citizens were directed to contact consular services in Nairobi for assistance.
Launched to strengthen Somalia’s border management, streamline travel, reduce corruption, and support the country’s integration into the East African Community, the e-visa initiative has instead exposed deep constitutional disputes, triggered aviation standoffs, and fueled political rhetoric across Somali regions.
The reported breach adds a new layer of uncertainty. If confirmed, it would mark one of the largest data exposures in Somalia’s recent history and could force the federal government to reassess both the system’s security architecture and its broader strategy for centralizing travel administration.
HARGEISA, Somaliland – The Central Bank of Somaliland (CBS) has issued a firm denial of any involvement in the financial collection of Somalia’s e-visa fees, seeking to quell public speculation and protect the integrity of its national financial system.
In an official press release dated November 13, 2025, the Bank clarified that the agreement for the controversial e-visa service is registered in Somalia and utilizes an international payment gateway unaffiliated with Somaliland’s financial institutions.
”The e-visa service agreement is registered in Somalia, and the Premier Bank of Somaliland has no role in this matter,” the statement read, emphasizing that all banks under its purview “operate under the financial laws and regulations of Somaliland.”
The clarification comes amid ongoing political disputes over airspace management between Somaliland and Somalia. The Bank noted that these tensions have spilled onto social media, sparking “public debates concerning the transfer of illegal remittance funds for the e-visa fee imposed by Somalia.”
In a subsequent notice, the Central Bank issued a strong warning to the public and media. “We warn citizens writing on social media and the media in general to refrain from making unsubstantiated allegations,” the Bank stated, urging anyone with evidence of wrongdoing to contact official legal institutions instead.
Reiterating its core mandate, the CBS affirmed its “determination to maintain the integrity, stability, and transparency of the country’s financial system.” It further announced that it is actively developing plans to more clearly distinguish between financial institutions operating within Somaliland and those in neighboring countries.
The Bank concluded by calling for responsibility and patriotic zeal from all sectors of society, asserting that this is crucial to strengthening the confidence of both citizens and foreign investors in Somaliland’s financial system.
Addis Abeba – The January 2024 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland was not merely a diplomatic agreement but a potential seismic shift in the Horn of Africa’s geopolitical architecture. Emerging from Ethiopia’s historical maritime anxieties and Somaliland’s protracted quest for legitimacy, this accord represented one of the most ambitious attempts to redraw the region’s strategic map since the colonial era. For Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most populous nation and once the region’s undisputed hegemon, the MoU promised to break a geographical constraint that has shaped its foreign policy for decades: landlocked status. For Somaliland, a territory that has maintained de facto independence for over three decades while building functioning democratic institutions, the agreement offered the tantalizing prospect of international recognition through the backdoor of strategic partnership.
Currently, the Horn of Africa represents one of the world’s most complex geopolitical landscapes, where colonial boundaries, post-colonial state formation, and contemporary great power competition intersect with devastating consequences. In this context, the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU emerged as a bold experiment in realpolitik—an attempt to transcend the region’s entrenched pathologies through pragmatic deal-making. The agreement’s swift unraveling, therefore, offers critical insights not only about the parties involved but also about the broader challenges of strategic innovation in a region bound by rigid diplomatic orthodoxies and complicated by multiplying external interventions.
This article argues that the collapse of the MoU represents the central failure of Ethiopia’s contemporary foreign policy—not because of the agreement’s inherent flaws, but because of Addis Abeba’s catastrophic inability to execute its own strategic vision. Ethiopia’s hesitation created a geopolitical vacuum that accelerated Somaliland’s recognition momentum while exposing the profound structural weaknesses that now constrain Ethiopian statecraft. The episode reveals the emergence of a new, performance-based paradigm of sovereignty in the Horn of Africa, where governance capacity and strategic utility increasingly compete with—and sometimes override—traditional diplomatic recognition. As regional and global actors recalibrate their positions in response to these developments, the lessons of the failed MoU extend far beyond bilateral relations to touch upon fundamental questions of statehood, regional order, and great power competition in one of the world’s most strategically vital regions.
Weight of geography, history
To understand the significance of the 2024 MoU, one must appreciate the deep historical currents that shaped both signatories’ strategic calculations. Ethiopia’s relationship with the sea represents one of the most persistent themes in its modern history—a story of access gained, lost, and perpetually sought. The country’s current landlocked status dates only to 1993, when Eritrean independence severed Ethiopia’s direct access to the Red Sea. Yet this recent history resonates with much deeper patterns: the Aksumite Kingdom’s maritime trade, the Ottoman and Portuguese competition over Red Sea ports, and Emperor Haile Selassie’s persistent efforts to secure guaranteed port access all testify to how maritime access has been intertwined with Ethiopian statecraft for centuries.
The post-1991 order created what Ethiopian strategists came to call the “Djibouti dilemma”—near-total dependence on a single corridor for approximately 95% of Ethiopia’s external trade. This dependency created not just economic vulnerability but strategic constraint, as Ethiopia’s regional ambitions became hostage to its logistical chains. The 2018 peace agreement with Eritrea briefly raised hopes of diversified access, but these remained largely unrealized, reinforcing the perception in Addis Abeba that Ethiopia’s rise as a regional power required solving its maritime constraint.
Somaliland’s trajectory represents a different but equally compelling historical narrative. As a former British protectorate distinct from Italian Somaliland, it entered a troubled union with the south in 1960 that progressively deteriorated into repression and armed conflict. The 1991 collapse of Siad Barre’s regime provided the opportunity for Somaliland to reclaim its independence, launching one of the most remarkable state-building projects in modern African history. While the international community maintained the fiction of a unified Somali state, Somaliland painstakingly constructed the apparatus of a functioning government: a hybrid political system blending traditional clan governance with modern institutions, a stable security apparatus, and multiple peaceful transfers of power through elections.
The MoU, even in its failed state, served as a diplomatic trial balloon ….”
The convergence of these two historical trajectories—Ethiopia’s quest for maritime access and Somaliland’s pursuit of recognition—created the conditions for the 2024 MoU. The agreement represented a potential historical compromise: Ethiopia would gain the strategic access it craved, while Somaliland would achieve the legitimacy it had earned through three decades of effective governance. That this compromise collapsed so quickly reveals much about the contemporary constraints on strategic innovation in the Horn of Africa.
From Strategic Vision to Diplomatic Reversal: Unraveling “Two-Water Policy”
The MoU emerged as the operational centerpiece of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s “two-water policy”—a strategic doctrine envisioning Ethiopian access to both the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. This was not merely a logistical framework but what military strategists would recognize as a comprehensive theory of victory: by securing diversified maritime access, Ethiopia would transform from a landlocked regional power to a maritime stakeholder with influence over the critical sea lanes connecting Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.
The intellectual foundations of this policy reflected a sophisticated understanding of twenty-first-century geopolitical trends. Ethiopian strategists recognized that in an era of supply chain competition and maritime chokepoint politics, control over logistics corridors would increasingly determine political influence. The “two-water policy” thus sought to position Ethiopia not just as a continental power but as an Indian Ocean stakeholder—a vision that aligned with the country’s historical identity while addressing its contemporary vulnerabilities.
Berbera port represented the perfect instrument for this strategy. Its deep-water capacity, ongoing modernization by DP World, and strategic location overlooking the Bab el-Mandeb strait offered Ethiopia everything it needed: redundancy from Djibouti, access to new trade routes, and potential naval positioning. For Somaliland, Ethiopian recognition—even if initially implicit—promised to break the three-decade diplomatic isolation that had constrained its economic development and international engagement.
The international backlash, however, was both swift and structurally predictable. Somalia immediately condemned the agreement as “an act of aggression” and launched a diplomatic offensive that leveraged multiple international platforms. The African Union, invoking its foundational principle of border inviolability, pressured Ethiopia to retreat. The Arab League, reflecting both pan-Arab solidarity and specific Gulf state interests, added its weight to Mogadishu’s position. What proved remarkable was not the backlash itself, but Ethiopia’s apparent failure to anticipate and prepare for it.
Within weeks, the Ethiopian government executed what can only be described as a strategic retreat—issuing clarifying statements that reframed the MoU as a technical port-access agreement and systematically downplaying the recognition elements that had constituted its strategic core. As Redwan Hussein, Ethiopia’s National Security Advisor, explained, the MoU included provisions for the Ethiopian government to undertake an “in-depth assessment” regarding its position on Somaliland’s efforts to gain international recognition. This reversal transformed the agreement from a potential geopolitical realignment into yet another provisional access arrangement, sacrificing long-term strategic positioning for short-term diplomatic convenience.
The unraveling revealed several critical vulnerabilities in Ethiopian statecraft. First, it demonstrated a fundamental gap between strategic vision and execution capacity—the ability to conceive bold policies without developing the diplomatic, military, and political means to see them through. Second, it exposed Ethiopia’s declining influence within continental institutions like the African Union, where it once served as a founding anchor but now found itself isolated. Third, it highlighted the absence of what game theorists call “credible commitment mechanisms”—the ability to convince partners that Ethiopia would honor its agreements despite external pressure.
Ethiopia’s reluctance, geopolitical vacuum
At its core, Ethiopia’s failure was one of strategic hesitation—the inability to move decisively at a pivotal historical moment. This hesitation stemmed from multiple sources: internal bureaucratic divisions, overestimation of international pushback, and fundamental misreading of the regional balance of forces. The consequences, however, extended far beyond the immediate collapse of the agreement.
By creating then retreating from the recognition question, Ethiopia inadvertently demonstrated that the traditional diplomatic consensus surrounding Somaliland’s status was more fragile than previously assumed. The MoU, even in its failed state, served as a diplomatic trial balloon—revealing that the international community might be more receptive to creative solutions for Somaliland than conventional wisdom suggested. This revelation created what strategists call a “focal point” around which other actors could coordinate alternative approaches.
The emergence of a potential recognition coalition involving up to twenty states represents the most direct consequence of Ethiopia’s hesitation. When the United States, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, and other powers began serious deliberations about Somaliland recognition, they were effectively building on the diplomatic space Ethiopia had opened then abandoned. These states recognized what Ethiopia initially grasped but failed to execute: that Somaliland’s strategic value increasingly outweighed the diplomatic costs of challenging African Union orthodoxy.
For the United States and European powers, Somaliland offers a stable partner in a volatile region—an entity capable of contributing to counterterrorism efforts, combating piracy, and providing reliable access to critical maritime chokepoints. For Gulf states like the UAE, Somaliland represents both an economic opportunity and a strategic asset in their ongoing competition with rivals like Turkey and Qatar. For all these actors, the calculus is increasingly pragmatic rather than ideological: Somaliland works as a state, and in a region where functional governance is scarce, this functionality commands strategic value.
Ethiopia’s failure to anticipate this emerging consensus represents a catastrophic intelligence and analytical failure. Rather than positioning itself as the architect of a new regional order, Ethiopia found itself marginalized as other powers began exploring the possibilities it had unleashed but failed to consolidate. The lesson is stark: in multipolar environments, strategic initiatives cannot be pursued half-heartedly; they either advance decisively or create opportunities for competitors.
Structural Causes: Domestic foundations of strategic paralysis
The collapse of the Somaliland MoU cannot be understood without examining the domestic structural constraints that now shape Ethiopian foreign policy. These constraints operate at multiple levels, creating what systems theorists would identify as a “failure cascade”—where weaknesses in one domain amplify vulnerabilities in others.
The collapse of the Somaliland MoU cannot be understood without examining the domestic structural constraints that now shape Ethiopian foreign policy.”
The most immediate constraint is institutional fragmentation. The Ethiopian state has evolved into a polycentric system where authority is dispersed across competing institutions: the Prime Minister’s office, the military establishment, intelligence services, party structures, and regional governments. This diffusion, while perhaps managing internal diversity, creates debilitating incoherence in foreign policy execution. In the case of the Somaliland MoU, different institutions pursued contradictory agendas: the military focused on immediate security concerns, the diplomatic corps sought to maintain regional relationships, and political actors calculated domestic ethnic politics. The result was not a unified national strategy but what organizational theorists call “policy cacophony”—multiple state agencies working at cross-purposes.
This institutional weakness intersects with profound economic constraints. Ethiopia’s foreign policy ambitions dramatically outstrip its economic capacity. With external debt exceeding 30% of GDP, chronic foreign exchange shortages, and dependence on international financial institutions, Ethiopia lacks the economic leverage to underwrite ambitious strategic partnerships. When competing for influence in Somaliland against powers like the UAE—which can deploy billions in investment and aid—Ethiopia’s economic limitations become strategic limitations. The country’s material weakness transforms what might be visionary statecraft into empty rhetoric.
Perhaps the most complex constraint is Ethiopia’s constitutional architecture. The ethno-federal system, designed to manage the country’s extraordinary diversity, creates a fundamental paradox in foreign policy: a state built on the principle of self-determination for its constituent units cannot easily endorse similar claims beyond its borders. The potential recognition of Somaliland resonated dangerously with Ethiopia’s own internal politics, where multiple regions maintain active secessionist movements or significant autonomy aspirations. This constitutional bind illustrates a broader challenge in international relations: how states manage the tension between their internal political structures and external strategic interests.
Compounding these structural issues is what might be termed epistemic decay—the erosion of the institutional knowledge and analytical capacity that once made Ethiopian diplomacy formidable. The country’s traditional diplomatic corps, renowned for its expertise and strategic patience, has been marginalized in favor of personalized diplomacy and ad hoc decision-making. The result is a foreign policy apparatus increasingly prone to misreading international dynamics, underestimating partners, and overestimating constraints.
Together, these structural factors create a state that is effectively “self-neutralizing”—its internal contradictions and capacity limitations systematically undermine its external ambitions. The Somaliland MoU was not defeated primarily by external pressure; it collapsed under the weight of Ethiopia’s own governance challenges.
Regional consequences, global implications
The failure of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU has triggered a fundamental reconfiguration of regional relationships and power dynamics—a process that continues to unfold with implications for every state in the Horn of Africa.
For Djibouti, the agreement’s collapse represents both reprieve and warning. As the primary beneficiary of Ethiopia’s landlocked status, Djibouti has built an economic model around port fees and logistics services that account for the overwhelming majority of Ethiopian trade. A successful Ethiopia-Somaliland partnership would have challenged this monopoly, potentially diverting significant traffic to Berbera and undermining Djibouti’s strategic position. Yet the mere fact that Ethiopia pursued this option so aggressively signals that Djibouti’s position is less secure than previously assumed. The result is likely increased Djiboutian efforts to diversify its own economic relationships while leveraging its strategic location to maintain influence over Addis Ababa.
Eritrea’s calculations have been equally transformed by the MoU’s failure. Having fought a brutal border war with Ethiopia and maintained hostile relations for decades, Eritrea now sees opportunity in Ethiopia’s strategic dilemma. By offering alternative port access through Assab or Massawa, Eritrea could potentially extract significant concessions from Ethiopia while repositioning itself as a Red Sea power broker. This possibility illustrates how the MoU’s collapse has created new avenues for regional realignment—ones that could potentially marginalize Ethiopia further if not carefully managed.
The responses of other regional actors like Kenya and Uganda reflect a broader pattern of pragmatic adaptation. Rather than treating Somaliland as a diplomatic pariah, these states are increasingly engaging it as a functional economic partner. Kenya’s consideration of Berbera as complementary to its LAPSSET corridor project exemplifies this trend: ideological commitment to Somali unity is gradually giving way to practical economic and security calculations. This subtle but significant shift suggests that even if formal recognition proceeds slowly, functional engagement with Somaliland is becoming normalized across the region.
Most significantly, the regional balance of power is shifting from Ethiopian hegemony to a more diffuse, multipolar arrangement. Where Ethiopia once anchored regional institutions, mediated conflicts, and set the diplomatic agenda, it now reacts to initiatives launched by others. This transition from rule-maker to rule-taker represents perhaps the most profound consequence of Ethiopia’s strategic failure—one that will shape regional dynamics for years to come.
The reverberations of the Ethiopia-Somaliland episode extend far beyond regional politics to touch upon vital great power interests in one of the world’s most strategically significant waterways. The Red Sea corridor, through which approximately 10% of global trade passes, has emerged as a critical arena for twenty-first century great power competition. The failure of the MoU and Somaliland’s subsequent diplomatic ascent have accelerated this competition while creating new opportunities and challenges for external powers.
For the United States and European powers, Somaliland represents a rare opportunity to engage a stable, pro-Western partner in an otherwise volatile region. The strategic value is multifaceted: counterterrorism cooperation, maritime security in the Bab el-Mandeb strait, intelligence gathering, and potential logistical support for naval operations. As China expands its Indian Ocean presence through its “String of Pearls” strategy, Western powers increasingly view reliable partners like Somaliland as essential for maintaining balance. The potential for U.S. and U.K. recognition reflects this strategic calculation—a willingness to challenge diplomatic conventions in pursuit of concrete security interests.
The United Arab Emirates has emerged as perhaps the most influential external actor in this drama. Through DP World’s massive investment in Berbera port, the UAE has embedded itself strategically in the Horn’s economic and security architecture. For Abu Dhabi, Somaliland represents both an economic opportunity and a strategic asset in its broader competition with regional rivals like Turkey and Qatar. The UAE’s ability to shape developments in Somaliland—contrasted with Ethiopia’s failure to do so—illustrates a broader trend: the increasing influence of middle powers with focused interests and flexible diplomacy.
China’s position reflects its characteristically cautious approach to diplomatic recognition. While officially supporting Somali territorial integrity, Beijing has maintained discreet channels with Hargeisa, recognizing Somaliland’s potential utility for its Belt and Road Initiative. This dual-track approach allows China to preserve relationships while positioning itself to capitalize on any recognition breakthrough. Russia similarly watches these developments closely, seeing potential opportunities to expand its limited foothold in the Horn amid its broader confrontation with Western powers.
The regional balance of power is shifting from Ethiopian hegemony to a more diffuse, multipolar arrangement.”
The collective effect of these external engagements is the further “internationalization” of the Horn of Africa’s politics. Local and regional dynamics increasingly intersect with global strategic competition, creating a complex multilayer game where developments like the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU have implications far beyond their immediate context. For Ethiopia, this internationalization represents a particular challenge: as external powers deepen their engagement with Somaliland, Ethiopia’s own influence diminishes, creating a vicious cycle of strategic marginalization.
AU’s Dilemma: Normative orthodoxy vs. empirical governance
The Ethiopia-Somaliland crisis has placed the African Union (AU) at the center of a profound normative conflict—one that challenges the organization’s foundational principles while testing its capacity for institutional adaptation. The AU’s strict adherence to the principle of territorial integrity, inherited from its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), represents one of the cornerstones of the post-colonial African order. This principle, embodied in the concept of uti possidetis (the inviolability of colonial borders), has maintained remarkable resilience despite its frequent tension with empirical realities across the continent.
Somaliland represents perhaps the most direct challenge this principle has faced. As documented in the AU’s own 2005 fact-finding mission, the territory has established a record of governance that exceeds many recognized African states: peaceful political transitions, functional security institutions, and consistent revenue generation. This empirical reality creates what philosophers would recognize as a legitimacy crisis—a growing gap between legal norms and political facts that increasingly undermines the normative framework’s credibility.
The potential recognition of Somaliland by a coalition of external powers would represent an existential challenge to the AU’s authority. If significant numbers of UN member states, particularly permanent Security Council members, extend recognition, the AU would face an impossible choice: maintain its orthodox position and risk irrelevance, or adapt to the new reality and potentially trigger similar claims across the continent. This dilemma illustrates a broader pattern in international relations: how international organizations navigate the tension between normative consistency and pragmatic adaptation.
Ethiopia’s role in this drama is particularly ironic. As the traditional host and anchor of African multilateralism, Ethiopia has historically been the foremost defender of AU principles. Its initial willingness to challenge these principles through the Somaliland MoU—followed by its rapid retreat—demonstrates both the system’s growing fragility and Ethiopia’s declining influence within it. The episode suggests that the African order may be entering a period of significant transformation, where external powers and pragmatic considerations increasingly override continental diplomatic conventions.
Conclusion
The collapse of the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU will likely be remembered as a turning point in the Horn of Africa’s geopolitical evolution—the moment when the region’s traditional hegemon revealed its strategic limitations while creating opportunities that other actors were quick to exploit. The agreement’s failure was overdetermined: it reflected Ethiopia’s internal governance challenges, its economic constraints, its constitutional paradoxes, and its analytical failures. Yet its consequences extend far beyond bilateral relations to touch upon fundamental questions of regional order, sovereignty, and great power competition.
Several key lessons emerge from this episode. First, it demonstrates that in an increasingly multipolar world, strategic initiatives cannot be pursued tentatively. States that open diplomatic possibilities and then retreat from them create vacuums that competitors eagerly fill. Ethiopia’s hesitation transformed it from architect to spectator in a regional realignment it initially set in motion.
Second, the case illustrates the growing tension between performance-based legitimacy and traditional diplomatic recognition. Somaliland’s ascent reflects a broader global trend where governance capacity and strategic utility increasingly compete with—and sometimes override—formal sovereignty. This trend poses particular challenges for international organizations like the African Union, which must navigate the gap between their normative frameworks and empirical realities.
Third, the episode highlights the complex interplay between domestic governance and international influence. Ethiopia’s internal fragmentation, economic challenges, and constitutional architecture directly constrained its external strategic options. This connection between domestic capacity and international agency represents a crucial insight for understanding contemporary great power competition in regions like the Horn of Africa.
Finally, the MoU’s collapse underscores the accelerating internationalization of regional politics. What begins as a bilateral agreement quickly engages continental institutions, great powers, and middle powers—creating complex multilayer games that states must navigate with sophisticated strategy and consistent execution.
As the Horn of Africa continues its transformation from Ethiopian hegemony to multipolar competition, the lessons of the failed MoU will remain relevant. For Ethiopia, the challenge is fundamental: addressing the structural constraints that undermined its strategic vision. For Somaliland, the opportunity is historic: converting its governance success and strategic value into lasting international legitimacy. For regional and global actors, the imperative is analytical: understanding how performance-based sovereignty and great power competition are reshaping one of the world’s most strategically vital regions. The 2024 MoU may have collapsed, but the forces it unleashed will continue to transform the Horn of Africa for years to come. AS
Editor’s Note: Gulaid Yusuf Idaan is a senior lecturer and researcher specializing in diplomacy, politics, and international relations in the Horn of Africa. He can be contacted at Idaan54@gmail.com
Hargeisa – The Commander of the Somaliland Coast Guard, Admiral Ahmed Hure Hareeye, today held a meeting with the Deputy Defence Attaché of the British Embassy in Nairobi, Mr. James Tait. He was accompanied by the Head of the British Office in Hargeisa, Mrs. Caitlin.
The Commander and the officials discussed strengthening bilateral relations between the two nations and enhancing cooperation between the Somaliland Coast Guard and the British Office. The British delegation expressed their appreciation for the meeting with the Commander and pledged to collaborate with the Coast Guard and the Republic of Somaliland in general.
They also stated their intention to organize training related to coast guard operations and presented plans for future maritime training programs.
The Commander was accompanied at the meeting by the 1st Commander of the Coast Guard, Col. Khadar Mohamed Aw Ciise, the 2nd Commander of the Coast Guard, Col. Ali Hassan, and the Head of Coast Guard Operations, Col. Abdurahman Nur Col-haye
Hargeisa – In a firm response to escalating tensions, the government of the Republic of Somaliland has condemned Somalia for what it describes as the deliberate disruption of regional air traffic, vowing to assert full control over its sovereign airspace. The announcement was accompanied by the disclosure that approximately 40% of international airlines have already agreed to adhere to new aviation regulations issued by Hargeisa.
During a high-level briefing for the diplomatic community on Wednesday, a presidential ministerial committee provided foreign envoys and UN agency heads with a detailed account of the dispute.
The committee asserted that the Somali government in Mogadishu “is waging campaigns that undermine peace, democracy, and the very existence of the Republic of Somaliland,” identifying it as the “primary instigator” of the instability affecting flights over the region.
Officials urged the attending diplomats to convey Somaliland’s firm stance to their capitals, warning that Hargeisa is prepared to “take every necessary measure” to counter Somalia’s alleged “malicious plans.”
Foreign Minister Abdirahman Bakaal explained that the briefing aimed to alert the international community to “the conflict and disruption in the airspace caused by the government in Mogadishu,” which he stated is intentionally designed to hinder Somaliland’s progress and stability.
A significant development was announced by the Minister of Civil Aviation and Air Transport, Fuad Ahmed Nuh, who reported concrete progress in enforcing the new airspace policy. “We issued a resolution stipulating that only aircraft from countries granted our permission may transit our airspace,” he declared.
With an average of 90 commercial flights traversing its airspace daily, the government formally notified all operators of the new mandate. Minister Nuh confirmed that “nearly 40% of these carriers have already agreed to comply with Somaliland’s regulations.”
Airlines that did not respond or seek permission were issued a final notice on November 11 to avoid Somaliland-controlled airspace. Nuh confirmed that some carriers have already diverted their routes and indicated that “further measures will be taken” against those who remain non-compliant.
Minister of the Presidency Khadar Hussein Abdi framed the situation as a broader conflict, urging national unity. He called on citizens to “stand together as one people” against what he characterized as a campaign to threaten Somaliland’s peace and stability.
The government reiterated its commitment to transparently informing international partners of any further steps it takes to defend its sovereignty over its air, land, and maritime territories.
Though not formally recognized as a sovereign state, Somaliland has functioned as an independent entity since 1991, operating its own civil aviation authority, airports, and immigration systems.
A three-day meeting involving members of the Somali Future Council, in conjunction with the Forum for the Salvation of Somalia, the Jubaland administration, and the Puntland administration, concluded today in Nairobi, Kenya. This meeting followed earlier sessions held from 5th to 8th November 2025 by a technical committee tasked by the Council with formulating its policies, plan, and preparing for the Council’s major conference.
The discussions focused on the overall situation in the country, particularly security and political matters related to the preparation for the 2026 elections of the Federal Government institutions. During the meeting, the Council’s technical committee presented a preliminary report on the completion of its assigned tasks and the preparations for the Somali Future Council’s major conference.
The following key resolutions emerged from the meeting:
In light of the current volatile security situation, political instability, and the damage inflicted on national unity and solidarity, the Council has decided to hold its major conference inside Somalia, in accordance with the schedule set by the technical committee.
To preserve the positive tradition of democracy where federal institution elections have been held every four years, the Council resolved that its conference must deliver a prosperous future for the Somali people and ensure the execution of an agreed-upon and timely election.
Grounded in the country’s Provisional Federal Constitution (2012) and referencing the agreements that form the basis of the Somali state, the Somali Future Council hereby issues a warning against the unconstitutional measures championed by the President of the Federal Republic. If left unchecked, these actions threaten to derail statehood and the federal system.
These violations include:
· The usurpation of state powers.
· Unlawful attempts to amend the Provisional Federal Constitution.
· The dismantling of constitutional institutions.
· The unlawful arrest of citizens.
· The misappropriation and plunder of national resources.
· The displacement of impoverished citizens.
· Policies that restrict internal travel within the country.
· The crippling of passport and immigration services.
· The unlawful use of security agencies.
The Somali Future Council also explicitly declares its opposition to the following, to the Federal Government leadership, Federal Member State leaders not part of the Council, and the Somali people at large:
a) Any past or future amendment to the 2012 agreed-upon Constitution that does not adhere to the amendment process stipulated within it.
b) Any step that leads to a term extension for the Federal institutions whose mandates are concluding.
c) Any outcome resulting from a non-consensual election conducted by the FGS at any level in the country.
d) The politicization and obstruction of travel within the country, driven by the FGS leadership’s personal financial interests, which jeopardizes national unity and solidarity.
The Somali Future Council once again calls upon the President of the Federal Government to return to adherence to the country’s agreed-upon Constitution and to participate in saving the nation from a constitutional and governance crisis. This is fundamental for holding an open, agreed-upon, and timely election.
Finally, the Somali Future Council calls upon the Somali people to strengthen their unity and solidarity and to prepare to participate in saving the country’s future, with the priority being to avert a crisis surrounding the elections for the Federal Institutions of Somalia.
Mogadishu: Employees at the Aden Adde International Airport in Mogadishu staged a work stoppage today. They are protesting a recent decision by Favori LLC, the company managing the airport, which terminated several of their colleagues.
Reports from within the airport indicate that up to 15 employees were laid off. A list of their names and employee identifications was displayed during the protest.
The employees, dressed in their work uniforms, were seen inside the airport grounds demonstrating. They held signs expressing their rejection of and grievance with the management’s decision.
The protesters are calling for the Federal Government of Somalia to intervene in the matter to secure a just resolution and the reinstatement of the dismissed workers.
One of the employees stated that the decision to terminate their colleagues was unlawful and has negatively impacted the airport’s daily operations.
Thus far, there has been no official statement from the management of Aden Adde Airport or Favori LLC regarding the employees’ grievances and the work stoppage. The situation at the airport remains tense as the staff demand that their concerns be heard.
Mogadishu: The Somali government has announced the arrest of three men suspected of being behind the shocking recent incident on the outskirts of the Wanlaweyn district in the Lower Shabelle region, where a man suffering from a physical disability was killed and his body subsequently burned.
The victim, identified as Ishaaq Da’uud Mohamed, was stabbed to death in the Dudumaay area on Friday afternoon. A video of the horrific act was widely circulated on social media, sparking outrage and profound grief among the Somali public.
The Somali National Army Headquarters stated that a joint operation conducted by the Somali military and the Southwest Darawish police led to the arrest of the suspects responsible for the crime.
The Commander of the Somali Ground Forces, General Khalid, confirmed to the media that the arrested individuals are named as Salah Hussen Ali, Abdihamid Abdullahi Siidow, and Dahir Mukhtaar Shiribow.
The General also stated that the suspects have been handed over to the Military Court to ensure justice is served. He emphasized that the government will not allow brutal acts of this nature to occur in the regions of the country.
MOGADISHU – Somalia’s official e-visa portal has been abruptly shut down after a catastrophic data leak exposed the sensitive personal information of tens of thousands of international travelers, marking one of the nation’s most severe cybersecurity failures.
The breach, first identified in late October by a Somali-American cybersecurity researcher, stemmed not from a complex external hack, but from a fundamental design flaw. As initially reported by the Somaliland Chronicle, application files were left accessible to anyone who manipulated sequential numbers in the website’s URL, requiring no login or password.
For weeks, a vast trove of data—including passport scans, personal photographs, travel itineraries, and application details from applicants in the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and across Europe and Africa—remained freely downloadable. It is estimated that over 35,000 records were compromised, with the data appearing on social media and likely the dark web.
On November 10, the original site, evisa.gov.so, was quietly replaced with a redirect to a new platform, etas.gov.so, run by the Immigration and Citizenship Agency (ICA). While the new site allows users to track or submit applications, it contains no acknowledgment of the breach or the mass data exposure.
The Somali government has yet to issue any official statement, confirm the scale of the compromise, or notify affected individuals.
This silence has provoked sharp criticism from cybersecurity professionals and diaspora groups. “The individuals traveling to Somalia—diplomats, aid workers, journalists—are already in high-risk roles. For their personal data to be laid bare is a profound security failure,” one expert noted.
The leak places affected travelers in immediate peril, exposing them to risks of identity theft, sophisticated phishing attempts, and physical targeting by militant groups like al-Shabaab, who could use the information to track foreign movements within the country.
In response, the ICA has advised applicants to contact embassies directly and avoid third-party visa services. However, early reports suggest the replacement portal, etas.gov.so, shares concerning structural similarities with its flawed predecessor, raising questions about whether core vulnerabilities have been resolved.
International partners, including the European Union which assisted Somalia’s digital migration, have remained publicly silent. Diplomatic sources indicate that embassies are privately warning citizens to presume their data is compromised.
The e-visa system, launched in August 2025 and mandated from September 1, faced controversy from its inception. It was widely perceived as a patronage mechanism, with allegations that visa fees were funneled to private accounts instead of the official treasury—a clear breach of financial protocol.
The policy also intensified political fractures. Mogadishu’s assertion that the e-visa was required for travel to all Somali territory, including the autonomous region of Somaliland, was seen as a direct challenge to Somaliland’s self-governance. Somaliland authorities promptly rejected the decree, banning airlines from enforcing the requirement and escalating a separate airspace dispute.
The semi-autonomous state of Puntland also resisted the mandate, decrying it as federal overreach. The data breach has since vindicated these criticisms, with detractors labeling the system a “corrupt and illegitimate fiasco.”
All individuals who applied through the evisa.gov.so portal are urged to contact their national data-protection authorities and vigilantly monitor for fraudulent activity.
The portal’s failure represents a major setback for Somalia’s ambitions to modernize its governance and attract foreign investment, highlighting the immense difficulty of establishing secure digital infrastructure in a state struggling with fragility and deep political divisions
In a powerful demonstration of self-determination and advanced capabilities, the Republic of Somaliland has officially implemented its long-awaited aviation directives today, requiring all aircraft to secure prior authorization before entering its airspace.
This milestone, coupled with the firm rejection of Somalia’s e-visa system, underscores Somaliland’s unwavering commitment to independent governance and national security.
During an exclusive interview with the BBC Somali, Minister of Aviation and Airport Development Hon. Fu’ad Ahmed Nuh proudly announced the successful rollout of these measures. “Starting today, November 10, no aircraft can transit Somaliland’s airspace without our permission,” the Minister declared. “We have established direct, real-time communication with all flights crossing our borders using state-of-the-art equipment. Many airlines have already responded positively and confirmed their full compliance with Somaliland’s laws.”
Minister Nuh highlighted the seamless execution: “Our advanced systems allow us to contact aircraft directly in the airspace, sharing our orders and requirements instantly. The response has been outstanding – numerous carriers are eager to adhere to our regulations.” He added that any non-compliant flights would be promptly diverted, emphasizing Somaliland’s resolve and technical prowess.
This historic step also reinforces Somaliland’s independent immigration policies, with the government formally banning recognition of Somalia’s e-visa introduced in September. Travelers are warmly welcomed through Somaliland’s efficient visa-on-arrival and diplomatic channels, ensuring smooth entry for tourists, investors, and diaspora alike.
Today’s achievements mark a new chapter in Somaliland’s journey toward greater autonomy and international engagement. With robust infrastructure, proactive leadership, and widespread airline support, the republic is soaring higher in asserting its rights and delivering safe, sovereign skies.
Somaliland invites the world to experience its stability, hospitality, and progress firsthand – a beacon of peace in the Horn of Africa region.
