Dubai, UAE – His Excellency President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Cirro) of the Republic of Somaliland has commenced a high-level working visit to the United Arab Emirates, leading a ministerial delegation. The visit is anchored by the President’s participation as a distinguished guest at the annual World Governments Summit in Dubai, a premier global forum for shaping future governance.
This strategic diplomatic mission positions Somaliland directly among the world’s nations, offering a platform to share its unique narrative with an audience of over 130 governments, international organizations, and thought leaders. President Abdullahi’s presence at this influential gathering is a significant marker of Somaliland’s evolving international profile.
During a plenary session, President Abdullahi will present Somaliland’s distinctive story—a three-decade journey of grassroots state-building, democratic consolidation, and economic self-reliance. His address, titled “From Post-Conflict to Progressive Governance: The Somaliland Model,” will detail the nation’s homegrown frameworks for maintaining peace, conducting successive democratic elections, and fostering development, positioning it as a critical anchor of stability in the Horn of Africa.
Parallel to the summit agenda, the President and his delegation will engage in a series of targeted bilateral meetings. These discussions aim to translate diplomatic recognition into tangible partnerships, with a focus on:
· Economic & Developmental Cooperation: Attracting investment in key sectors such as infrastructure, renewable energy, and port logistics.
· Trade & Connectivity: Expanding market access and strengthening Somaliland’s role as a regional trade hub.
· Security Collaboration: Deepening dialogue on shared regional security interests and capacity-building.
· Multilateral Engagement: Advancing Somaliland’s interests on the global stage.
Somaliland’s formal participation in the World Governments Summit represents more than diplomatic outreach; it is a powerful affirmation of its institutional maturity and the international community’s growing confidence in its governance. This visit represents a proactive step toward securing the partnerships necessary for the nation’s next chapter of growth and international engagement.
The formalization of mutual recognition between the Republic of Somaliland and the State of Israel on December 26, 2025, constitutes one of the most significant shifts in the diplomatic architecture of the Horn of Africa and the broader Red Sea basin since the end of the colonial era.
This development does not merely represent a bilateral diplomatic success for two traditionally isolated actors but serves as a profound challenge to the established international legal order, which has long prioritized the principle of territorial integrity over the de facto realities of statehood in the Somali peninsula.
The act of recognition, signed in a joint declaration by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, and the Republic of Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, invokes the “spirit of the Abraham Accords” to justify a departure from the “One Somalia” policy that has guided international relations in the region for over three decades.
To fully understand the legal and political ramifications of this watershed event, it is necessary to conduct a rigorous examination of the underlying legal principles, the historical precedents of the Republic of Somaliland’s sovereignty, the strategic imperatives of the Israeli state, and the critical findings of the 2005 African Union Fact-Finding Mission, which remains the most authoritative multilateral assessment of Somaliland’s claim to statehood.
📍Theoretical Foundations of Statehood and Recognition
The legal discourse surrounding the Republic of Somaliland’s status is anchored in several core concepts of international law. The tension between the recognition of the Republic of Somaliland and the sovereignty of the Failed Tribal Federal Republic of Somalia is essentially a conflict between competing interpretations of these foundational terms.
📍The Montevideo Criteria for Statehood
🗂 The primary legal standard for determining statehood in the modern era is the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. Article 1 of this convention outlines four objective criteria that an entity must satisfy to be considered a state: a permanent population, a defined territory, an effective government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.
“In the case of the Republic of Somaliland, its legal proponents argue that the republic has satisfied these criteria more effectively than many recognized UN member states for over thirty years”
The Republic of Somaliland maintains a permanent population of approximately 3.5 to 4.5 million people. Its territory is clearly defined by the borders of the former British Somaliland Protectorate, established by international treaties in the late 19th century, the government in Hargeisa exercises exclusive and effective control over the majority of this territory, maintaining a standing army, a national currency, and a democratic system characterized by the peaceful transfer of power, most recently demonstrated in the November 2024 presidential elections.
✳️ Finally, its capacity to enter into relations has been proven through high-stakes agreements with foreign entities, including the DP World port deal, the 2024 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Ethiopia, and the 2025 mutual recognition with Israel.
📍Declaratory vs. Constitutive Theories of Recognition
The debate over the legal effect of Israel’s recognition hinges on two competing theories, the Declaratory Theory, which is favored by the majority of modern legal scholars and reflected in Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention, posits that statehood is a question of fact. If an entity meets the objective criteria, it is a state under international law, and recognition by other states is merely an acknowledgment of that existing reality. Under this theory, the Republic of Somaliland has been a state since 1991, and Israel’s 2025 act simply formalizes a legal truth that the international community had previously chosen to ignore for political reasons.
🔆 Conversely, the Constitutive Theory suggests that an entity only becomes a state through the act of recognition by other states. Proponents of this view, including the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the African Union (AU), argue that without widespread recognition, the Republic of Somaliland remains a sub-state entity or a secessionist province, regardless of its internal stability or effective governance. The 2025 recognition by Israel is seen by these actors as an illegal attempt to “constitute” a state from territory that is de jure part of Somalia.
Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity
Sovereignty refers to the supreme authority of a state to govern its territory and population without external interference. In the context of this dispute, Somalia asserts its sovereignty over the entire territory of the former Somali Republic, including the Republic of Somaliland, based on the principle of territorial integrity enshrined in Article 2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter. This principle prohibits states from using force or taking actions that undermine the unity and territorial boundaries of a recognized member state.
The Republic of Somaliland, however, argues that its sovereignty was never legally extinguished by the 1960 union and was successfully reclaimed in 1991 following the collapse of the central Somali state and the commission of genocidal acts against northern populations. From Hargeisa’s perspective, territorial integrity cannot be invoked by a “parent state” that has failed to protect its citizens and has lacked effective control over the territory in question for decades.
Uti Possidetis Juris and the African Border Policy
The principle of uti possidetis juris (as you possess under law) mandates that newly independent states should retain the internal administrative borders or colonial boundaries that existed prior to their independence. This doctrine was adopted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the 1964 Cairo Resolution to prevent a “Pandora’s box” of secessionist movements that could destabilize the continent.
The Failed Tribal Federal Government of Somalia utilizes this principle to argue that the only legitimate borders are those of the 1960 Somali Republic. However, the Republic of Somaliland presents a counter-interpretation:-
🔹️It argues that its claim upholds uti possidetis juris because it seeks recognition within the exact colonial borders of the British Somaliland Protectorate as they existed upon its independence on June 26, 1960. By reverting to its 1960 borders.
🔹️The Republic of Somaliland asserts it is not creating new borders but respecting the original ones, a distinction noted by the AU’s own experts in 2005.
Entity acting as a state without full de jure status.
• The Republic of Somaliland’s Application:-
Fulfilled since 1991 through effective governance.
Israel’s 2025 act is a validation of legal fact.
Reclaimed after the dissolution of a failed union.
Reversion to 26 June 1960 British borders.
Transitional status held from 1991 to 2025.
• Somalia’s Application:-
Unfulfilled; Somaliland is a regional administration.
Israel’s 2025 act is an illegal breach of sovereignty.
Continuous and indivisible since 1960.
Maintenance of 1 July 1960 Republic borders.
An illegal entity occupying Somali territory.
Historical Legal Architecture of the Republic of Somaliland’s Independence
To analyze the 2025 recognition, one must first deconstruct the legal history of the Somali union and its subsequent dissolution, the Republic of Somaliland’s claim is unique because it is rooted in state succession and the restoration of a prior status, rather than a simple act of secession.
The British Protectorate and the State of the Republic of Somaliland (1960)
Unlike the Trust Territory of Somalia (former Italian Somaliland), which was a UN trust territory, the Republic of Somaliland was a British Protectorate. Its legal relationship with the United Kingdom was defined by 83 treaties signed between 1884 and 1894 between the British Crown and the traditional elders of the northern clans. These treaties established Somaliland as a separate international legal entity.
On June 26, 1960, the British Somaliland Protectorate became the “State of Somaliland,” an independent sovereign nation. In its five days of independence, it was recognized by over 30 countries, including the United States, and received formal messages of congratulations from the United Nations.
This brief period of independence is a critical legal anchor; it proves that Somaliland once existed as a recognized state within the international system, separate from the southern territory.
The “Defective” Union of July 1, 1960
The merger of the State of Somaliland and the Trust Territory of Somalia on July 1, 1960, was intended to form the Somali Republic. However, legal analysis of the “Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law” reveals a critical procedural failure. The act of union was never formally ratified as a bilateral treaty. The northern legislature passed its version of the law, but the southern legislature failed to pass an identical instrument. Consequently, a unified legal document signed by both parties never existed.
⚖️ This legal “defect” was compounded in 1961 when a constitutional referendum was held. While the constitution passed in the south, it was rejected by a majority of voters in the north, who felt marginalized by the new central government in Mogadishu. A 1961 court case in Hargeisa further solidified this legal ambiguity. When a group of British-trained northern military officers launched a coup to restore the Republic of Somaliland’s independence, a British judge acquitted them, ruling that in the absence of a ratified act of union, the officers could not be guilty of treason against a state (the Somali Republic) that had no valid legal authority over their territory.
🔹️The 1991 Restoration of Sovereignty
The collapse of the Somali Republic in 1991 followed a decade of civil war and a systematic campaign of state-sponsored violence against the Isaaq clan in the north. This campaign, which included the aerial bombardment of Hargeisa and the mass execution of civilians, created what legal scholars term a “remedial right to self-determination”.
At the Burao Conference in May 1991, the Republic of Somaliland’s traditional leaders and the Somali National Movement (SNM) did not declare a new independence but rather “withdrew” from the failed union of 1960. Legally, they asserted the right of state succession: the union was a voluntary association that had been breached and dissolved, allowing the Republic of Somaliland to resume its prior sovereign status.
Under the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, a state emerging from a dissolved union has the right to resume its original sovereignty.
The 2005 African Union Fact-Finding Mission: An Exhaustive Analysis
The mutual recognition by Israel in 2025 brings renewed attention to the findings of the African Union Fact-Finding Mission, which visited the Republic of Somaliland from April 30 to May 4, 2005. Led by Patrick Mazimhaka, the Deputy Chairperson of the AU Commission, the mission’s report remains the most significant challenge to the AU’s own policy of non-recognition.
Mandate and Methodology of the Mission
The mission was dispatched by AU Commission Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare following successive visits by the Republic of Somaliland leadership to Addis Ababa in 2003 and 2004.
Its objective was to assess the political, security, socio-economic, and humanitarian situation on the ground and to hear the Republic of Somaliland’s case for statehood.
The mission conducted wide-ranging consultations in Hargeisa, Berbera, Sheikh, Burao, and Borama, meeting with government officials, opposition leaders, civil society, and traditional elders.
Detailed Findings on Governance and Stability
The mission’s report was startlingly positive, concluding that the Republic of Somaliland had successfully laid the foundations of a “modern state”. It highlighted several key factors:-
1️⃣. Democratic Consolidation: The AU noted the functional co-habitation of traditional governance (the House of Elders or Guurti “Golaha Guurtidda JSL”) and modern elected representatives. It praised the 2003 referendum and the subsequent democratic processes as “internally driven” and “home-grown”.
2️⃣. Security and Disarmament: Unlike southern Somalia, which was mired in warlordism, the Republic of Somaliland had successfully executed a total disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process without external military intervention.
3️⃣. Territorial Control: The mission witnessed an effective government with a clear mandate to defend its “territorial integrity” based on the 1960 colonial borders.
Clarification on the Legal Argument of “Reclaimed Independence”
One of the most critical aspects of the AU report is its support for the distinction between secession and the dissolution of a union. The report explicitly states that the union between the Republic of Somaliland and Somalia “was never ratified” and “malfunctioned” during its thirty-year existence. By acknowledging the 1960 independence of the Republic of Somaliland as a historical and legal fact, the AU mission provided a roadmap for recognition that sidesteps the “Pandora’s box” of illegal secession.
The report argues that the Republic of Somaliland’s case is “historically unique” because it involves a former independent state reclaiming its status after the failure of a voluntary merger.
The “Pariah Status” and Humanitarian Concerns
The mission observed that the lack of international recognition has made the Republic of Somaliland a “pariah region” by default. This status “ties the hands” of local authorities, preventing them from accessing international financial institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), which are essential for reconstruction and the mitigation of the humanitarian legacy of the civil war (including landmines and mass graves). The mission recommended that the AU find a “special method” of dealing with this case, judging it from an “objective historical viewpoint and a moral angle”.
• AU Mission Category:-
State Building.
Borders.
Union Status.
Stability.
Recommendation.
• Key Findings in 2005 Report:-
Foundations of a “modern state” established through home-grown processes.
Respect for 1960 colonial borders inherited from Britain.
The 1960 union was never formally ratified and failed in practice.
Internally driven peace, security, and democratic transitions.
Use a “special method” to recognize Somaliland’s “unique” case.
• Legal and Political Implications:-
Validates “effective government” criterion of Montevideo.
Aligns with uti possidetis juris; avoids secessionist precedent.
Supports the “dissolution of union” vs. “secession” argument.
Demonstrates Somaliland’s capacity as a reliable international partner.
Suggests AU policy should evolve beyond rigid territorial integrity.
Israel’s Recognition: A New Strategic and Legal Paradigm (December 2025)
The December 26, 2025, announcement that Israel would become the first UN member state to formally recognize the Republic of Somaliland marked the end of Hargeisa’s three-decade diplomatic isolation. This move was not merely a symbolic gesture but a calculated strategic act with immediate legal consequences.
The Joint Declaration and Bilateral Framework
The recognition was formalized through a “Joint Declaration of Mutual Recognition” signed during a videoconference between The Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu – בנימין נתניהו and President Cabdiraxmaan Cirro. This document established full diplomatic relations, including the exchange of ambassadors and the opening of embassies. Netanyahu framed the decision as being in the “spirit of the Abraham Accords,” signaling a desire to incorporate the Republic of Somaliland into a regional network of normalization and security cooperation.
Strategic Imperatives: The Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb
Israel’s primary motivation for recognition is its strategic depth in the Red Sea. The Republic of Somaliland’s location along the Gulf of Aden provides a critical vantage point for monitoring Houthi activity in Yemen and Iranian proxy networks:-
Military and Intelligence Cooperation: Reports indicate that the recognition is a precursor to a formal security pact. Discussions include the establishment of Israeli intelligence facilities and potential access to the Berbera International Airport for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) The proximity of Berbera to Sana’a (approximately 550 km) provides a 70% reduction in response time for Israeli airstrikes against Houthi targets compared to current basing.
Maritime Security: As a “state-level partner” in the Horn of Africa, the Republic of Somaliland can participate in formal agreements regarding navigation rights and maritime security in the strategic Bab al-Mandeb strait.
The Role of Intelligence and Diplomacy
The recognition process involved high-level clandestine engagement facilitated by the Mossad and its director, David Barnea. This underscores the security-first nature of the relationship. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gideon Sa’ar – ENG visit to Hargeisa on January 6, 2026, further institutionalized these ties, with the two sides pledging “no limits” to their cooperation in defense, agriculture, technology, and health.
Legal Refutation of Palestinian Relocation Allegations
Following the recognition, Somalia and several Arab nations alleged that the Republic of Somaliland had agreed to accept the forced relocation of Palestinians from Gaza in exchange for Israeli recognition. Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Somaliland, issued an emphatic denial.
On January 1, 2026, stating that its engagement with Israel is “purely diplomatic” and conducted with “full respect for international law”. The ministry characterized these claims as “baseless allegations” intended to undermine its diplomatic progress and mislead the international community.
The Global Legal Clash: Perspectives from Somalia and the International Community
The State of Israeli recognition of the Republic of Somaliland has triggered a massive legal and political pushback from Mogadishu and its regional allies, highlighting the deep divide in the interpretation of international law.
Somalia’s Legal Argument: “Null and Void”
The Failed Tribal Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has reacted with what it terms “all necessary diplomatic, political, and legal measures” to defend its sovereignty. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the Somali Parliament declared the Israeli recognition “null and void” and a “flagrant assault” on the country’s unity:-
• Breach of UN Charter: Somalia argues that the recognition violates Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, framing it as an act of aggression and a “naked invasion” of its territorial integrity. Mogadishu asserts that the Republic of Somaliland is legally “incapable” of entering into any international agreement.
• Retaliation Against Partners: In January 2026, Somalia terminated all security and defense agreements with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a key regional ally of Israel that has long invested in the Republic of Somaliland’s Berbera port. This move illustrates Somalia’s willingness to use diplomatic ” scorched earth” tactics to punish those who engage with Hargeisa on a sovereign level.
Regional and Multilateral Condemnation
The response from international bodies has been overwhelmingly supportive of Somalia’s position, prioritizing the stability of existing borders over the de facto reality of Somaliland’s governance:-
1️⃣. African Union (AU) “African Union”: The AU Commission Chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, unequivocally rejected the recognition, stating it undermined the principles of the AU Constitutive Act and risked setting a “dangerous precedent”.
2️⃣. Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC): The OIC’s 22nd Extraordinary Session on January 10, 2026, condemned the recognition as an “illegal measure with no legal effect” and a violation of public international law. The (OIC) resolution categorically rejected any foreign military presence on Somali territory, specifically targeting potential Israeli bases in Somaliland.
3️⃣. Cross-Regional Group of 22 Countries: A group of nations including Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Nigeria issued a joint statement condemning the move. They warned that recognizing “parts of states” threatens international peace and security and constitutes a “full and blatant disregard for international law”.
The Role of Major Powers and the “Domino Effect”
While the United States and the European Union “European Commission” have reiterated their support for Somalia’s territorial integrity, the Israeli move has introduced significant internal friction. In the U.S., there is growing bipartisan pressure—notably from Republican Senator Ted Cruz—to consider recognizing the Republic of Somaliland as a reliable security partner in the Red Sea. The Donald J. Trump administration in early 2026 signaled it was “looking into” the issue, though it remained cautious about following Jerusalem’s lead immediately.
The Republic of Somaliland’s leadership remains hopeful that the Israeli act will act as a “cracked dam,” eventually leading to a cascade of de jure recognitions from other states that value effective governance and strategic alignment.
Comparative Analysis and Future Legal Trajectory
The recognition of the Republic of Somaliland by Israel provides a fascinating case study in the selective application of international legal principles.
The Republic of Somaliland 🆚️ Palestine: A Study in Legal Disparity
A recurring theme in the scholarly analysis of the 2025 events is the comparison between the Republic of Somaliland and Palestine. Legal experts note that while 157 nations have endorsed Palestinian statehood despite its lack of a unified government and contested territory, the Republic of Somaliland satisfies all Montevideo criteria yet has been ignored for 34 years. Proponents of the Republic of Somaliland argue that the world has “weaponized statehood” as a political tool, elevating dysfunctional entities for geopolitical reasons while punishing the Republic of Somaliland’s successful democratic project. Israel’s recognition of the Republic of Somaliland is framed by some as a defense of the “rule of law” and the declaratory theory of statehood.
📍Impact on Regional Stability and Security
The long-term legal and political consequences of this recognition will depend on the evolution of the security situation in the Horn of Africa:-
1️⃣. Militarization of the Horn: The potential for an Israeli military presence has already led to a counter-alliance between Egypt, Turkey, and Somalia. This “strategic encirclement” of Ethiopia and the Republic of Somaliland could lead to increased regional tensions and the militarization of the Gulf of Aden.
2️⃣. Counter-Terrorism Efforts: Somalia and various international observers warn that the fragmentation of Somalia could create “vulnerable environments” exploitable by Al-Shabab and other extremist groups. Conversely, the Republic of Somaliland argues that its recognition would provide it with the legal standing and resources to better combat regional terrorism.
The Future of the “One Somalia” Doctrine
The mutual recognition between the Republic of Somaliland and the State of Israel has effectively ended the era of “near-universal diplomatic quarantine” for Hargeisa. Whether this leads to a permanent alteration of the regional order depends on the resilience of the (FGS) and the AU’s adherence to the principle of territorial integrity.
If the Republic of Somaliland continues to operate as a stable, democratic state with a major power partner, the legal fiction of its inclusion in Somalia will become increasingly untenable for the international community to sustain.
Conclusion
The mutual recognition between the Republic of Somaliland and the State of Israel in December 2025 is a definitive challenge to the post-colonial legal framework of Africa:-
🅰️ For the Republic of Somaliland, it represents the legal validation of its claim that it is a state by virtue of its historical independence, the flawed nature of the 1960 union, and its successful three-decade democratic project.
🅱️ For Israel, it is a lawful exercise of sovereign discretion that secures vital strategic interests in the Red Sea basin.
However, this act directly confronts the “One Somalia” policy and the AU’s rigid interpretation of uti possidetis juris, which prioritizes the preservation of existing borders over de facto governance.
The findings of the 2005 AU Fact-Finding Mission provide a potential legal path forward, emphasizing that the Republic of Somaliland’s case is “unique and self-justified” and does not constitute an illegal secession.
Ultimately, the 2025 recognition shifts the debate from whether the Republic of Somaliland should be a state to how the international legal system will adapt to the fact that it is a state:-
The future will be defined by the tension between the declaratory reality of Hargeisa’s sovereignty and the constitutive resistance of the international organizations committed to Mogadishu’s territorial integrity.
In this new geopolitical landscape, the Horn of Africa has become the primary theater where the future of international recognition and the sanctity of post-colonial borders will be decided.
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Hargeisa, 01/02/2025– The Daami Youth Development Organization (DYDO) has distributed sustainable Solar Livelihood Pods to 120 households in the Iidaan Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Camp. This initiative is a key component of the Youth Climate Innovation & Renewable Energy Acceleration Program.
Speaking at the handover ceremony, Mr. Mahmoud Abdi of DYDO emphasized the program’s goals: “Today, we officially entrust these solar lamps to the Iidaan Camp Committee for distribution. This ‘Solar Livelihood Pods’ solution is designed to promote green jobs, renewable energy, and youth entrepreneurship, specifically for displaced and marginalized communities in Hargeisa.”
The project, implemented in partnership with the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family (MoLSAF), Save the Children, and DANIDA Somaliland, addresses urgent energy and safety challenges in displacement settings.
“Providing safe, clean energy is fundamental to improving the security and well-being of vulnerable families,” Mr. Mahmoud added. “These lanterns offer a foundation for displaced communities to pursue better living standards and opportunities, despite ongoing hardships.”
The clean, reliable solar lighting directly enhances household and community safety—particularly for women and children—while extending hours for education and income-generating activities. By replacing hazardous and polluting light sources, the solution also contributes to environmental protection and climate resilience.
The handover to the camp committee reinforces community ownership and sustainable management, ensuring the project remains responsive to residents’ needs.
Through this project, DYDO showcases how youth-led innovation and renewable energy can deliver practical, scalable, and climate-smart solutions for Somaliland’s most vulnerable populations.
Project Summary:
· Project: Solar Livelihood Pods
· Program: Youth Climate Innovation & Renewable Energy Acceleration Program
· Lead Implementer: Daami Youth Development Organization (DYDO)
· Key Partners: Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family (MoLSAF), Save the Children, DANIDA Somaliland
· Location: Iidaan IDP Camp, Hargeisa
· Primary Focus: Fostering green jobs, renewable energy adoption, and entrepreneurship among IDP and minority youth.
Hargeisa — Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (lrro) convened a meeting with the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and leaders of the three national political parties—WADDANI, KAAH, and KULMIYE—to review the timeline for parliamentary and local council elections, currently scheduled for 31 May 2026.
A statement from the Presidency reported that the NEC informed the assembly that holding the elections as planned is not feasible. The Commission cited technical, security, and humanitarian challenges, including a widespread drought, localized security issues, and delays stemming from disagreements over voter registration procedures.
To address these obstacles, the NEC has stated it requires an extension of ten months beyond the original date of 31 May 2026. This period would be used to complete voter registration, update electoral equipment, and finalize all logistical arrangements for the polls.
The political parties expressed divergent views on the proposed delay. While KAAH opposed postponing the elections, both WADDANI and KULMIYE voiced support for the NEC’s technical assessment.
In response, President Cirro underscored the critical importance of national unity and constructive dialogue. He reaffirmed the government’s commitment to fully finance the electoral process, with the ultimate goal of ensuring that the elections are inclusive, transparent, and conducted peacefully.
Hargeisa — The National Electoral Commission (NEC) of Somaliland has postponed the Parliamentary and Local Council elections, which were originally scheduled for 31 May 2026.
In a statement released on 31 January 2026, the Commission explained that the decision follows a thorough legal, technical, and security review conducted in accordance with the General Election and Voter Registration Law (Law No. 91/2023).
Key factors cited for the delay include widespread drought, security concerns in several regions, and protracted political disagreements regarding the voter registration framework.
The NEC indicated that the additional ten months—beginning 31 May 2026—will be used to finalize technical preparations for voter registration, enhance the accuracy of voter data, modernize registration equipment, and complete all arrangements necessary to ensure the elections comply with constitutional, legal, and international standards.
The Commission emphasized that the postponement aims to uphold the credibility, transparency, and integrity of Somaliland’s electoral process and to preserve public trust in the nation’s democratic institutions.
The assessment, commissioned by British International Investment (BII) and conducted by Itad and Steward Redqueen, examines the impact of a multi-year modernisation of Berbera Port led by DP World in partnership with the Government of Somaliland.
British International Investment joined the project as a minority investor in early 2022 through its Africa Gateway partnership with DP World.
Located on the Gulf of Aden, Berbera occupies a strategic position along one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes and has long been viewed as a potential alternative trade corridor for landlocked Ethiopia. The evaluation finds that targeted investment in port infrastructure has significantly upgraded Berbera’s capacity and performance, enabling it to compete more effectively with established regional ports.
Berbera expansion overview
Source: Itad and Steward Redqueen study
Container handling capacity at Berbera has more than tripled, increasing from 150,000 to 500,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). This expansion has been supported by new quay infrastructure, deeper draught and modern cargo-handling equipment, allowing the port to accommodate larger vessels and higher volumes of traffic.
Operational efficiency has also improved sharply. Average vessel turnaround times fell from 64 hours in 2018 to around 25 hours in 2024, a reduction that has helped lower costs for shipping lines and cargo owners. According to the report, these improvements have repositioned Berbera as a credible regional competitor and contributed to rising container traffic through the port.
As a result, Berbera’s share of regional container trade has increased steadily, reaching 14% in 2024, up from 9% in 2017. Modelling cited in the evaluation suggests the port now offers cost-competitive access to parts of eastern Ethiopia and Somaliland that were previously underserved, particularly areas beyond the Addis Ababa–Djibouti transport corridor.
Increase in port efficiency as measured by operational KPIs
Source: Itad and Steward Redqueen study
Business and societal impact
The efficiency gains are translating into meaningful savings for businesses. Transport cost reductions for importers and exporters using Berbera were estimated at $8.4 million in 2024, or $6.9 million after adjusting for new users attracted by the expanded port. Environmental benefits have also emerged, with improved logistics and shorter vessel waiting times cutting carbon emissions by an estimated 7,651 tonnes a year.
Beyond trade flows, the evaluation highlights a material contribution to Somaliland’s economy. In 2024, the upgraded port and the adjacent Berbera Economic Zone supported around 2,490 jobs and added $45.1 million in value to the economy. Of this, 921 jobs and $16.7 million in economic output were directly attributable to the port expansion, equivalent to roughly 0.4% of Somaliland’s gross domestic product.
Container throughput (TEU) at Berbera Port and share of ports in the region
Source: Itad, National statistics for respective countries, Rebel analysis
More to come
The study notes that the full impact of the investment has yet to be realised, with current trade volumes not yet requiring the port’s full capacity. External factors, including disruptions linked to the Red Sea crisis, have also affected shipping patterns.
In addition, some benefits – such as the impact of cheaper imports on living standards and wider spillovers into neighbouring Ethiopia – are not fully captured in the analysis.
Nonetheless, the evaluation concludes that well-structured infrastructure investment in underserved frontier markets, when combined with experienced global operators and complementary logistics ecosystems, can unlock substantial trade, economic and environmental gains.
On 26 December 2025, Israel became the first state to formally recognize Somaliland as a state. The reactions of the international community have ranged between negative, cautious, neutral and silence. While Somaliland has welcomed Israel’s recognition, others have argued that its recognition is unwise, dangerous and illegal.
This contribution will explore the legal contours of state recognition and whether the recognition of Somaliland is a breach of international law. At the outset it should be said that I have advised the government of Somaliland on matters of recognition in the past, though this contribution is in my personal capacity.
Somaliland and Israeli recognition
The British protectorate of Somaliland became independent on 26 June 1960. On 1 July 1960, it unified with Italian Somaliland to form the Republic of Somalia. Somalilanders were marginalized and discriminated against during unification and the two entities – comprised of distinct clans – never fully integrated. During the civil war that broke out in 1988, the forces of Somali President Siad Barre committed widespread atrocities against the Isaaq clan, the dominant clan in Somaliland. Thousands of civilians were killed (estimated at 50,000—60,000) and roughly a million people fled Somaliland. As calamity overtook Somalia, in contrast, by January 1991, the Somali National Movement (the SNM, which despite its name was an Isaaq-led organization based in Somaliland) consolidated its position in Somaliland, effectively controlling the territory (see Amnesty International, Mburu and Bradbury, pp. 32-49). On 18 May 1991, a national congress was convened in Somaliland, whereas Somaliland decided to resume its independence. Later on, the Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland was adopted by the parliament on 30 April 2000 and approved by a referendum held on 31 May 2001, when 97% of the voters voted in its favor (the referendum was viewed by outside observers to be “conducted openly, fairly, honestly, and largely in accordance with internationally recognized election procedures”). The governments of Somaliland and Somalia have held talks in 2013 and in 2023, in an attempt to reconcile their differences, to no avail.
Since then, the Republic of Somaliland has existed de facto as an independent state, free of Somali or other foreign presence. It has a permanent population of roughly 6 million people and its permanent boundaries are that of the former British protectorate of Somaliland (notwithstanding a disputed boundary with Puntland in Somalia in the east). As opposed to Somalia, Somaliland is relatively stable and safe, has held several democratic elections with peaceful transitions of power, with a government that maintains public order, services and infrastructure (see Crawford, pp. 412-415; Lewis, pp. 30-72; Prunier; Bradbury, pp. 4-5, 184-219). While states have refrained from recognizing Somaliland until now, Somaliland nevertheless exercises foreign relations with a range of states and international organizations. Prominent examples are agreements with Ethiopia establishing a consulate in Hargeisa (which Somaliland claims has been upgraded to an embassy), the building of a Somaliland embassy in Addis Ababa, and the agreement with United Arab Emirates (UAE) state-owned port operator, DP World, to develop and manage the port in Berbera. In addition, the UAE and the European Union (EU) have provided training and support to Somaliland’s security forces. At the same time, the lack of recognition has barred assistance from organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, signed a declaration recognizing Somaliland and “its right of self-determination” on 26 December 2025, “in the spirit of the Abraham Accords, signed at the initiative of President Trump”. He noted the close informal relations between the two parties and that Israel intends to cooperate with and assist Somaliland in the fields of agriculture, health, technology and economic and social development (see also here). Israel’s Foreign Minister, Gideon Sa’ar, paid an official visit to Somaliland in early January 2026. He stated that Israel “will determine for itself who it recognizes”.
Commentators note the strategic location of Somaliland along the Gulf of Aden near the entrance to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. It can offer Israel access to the region, in particular as a potential base for operations against the Houthis across the Gulf in Yemen. The Houthis, for their part, have stated that any Israeli presence would be considered a target by them. Others suggest that Israel’s decision is part of a broader move related to regional competition, in collaboration with the UAE, another state with close ties to Somaliland, intended to counter increased Iranian and Turkish influence in the region, (see here, here, and here).
Reactions to Israel’s recognition of Somaliland
The President of Somaliland, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi, welcomed Israel’s “historic and principled” decision as a “milestone in Somaliland’s longstanding pursuit of international legitimacy, reaffirming its historical, legal, and moral entitlements to statehood”. He further conveyed Somaliland’s intention to join the Abraham Accords and “deepen cooperation across a broad range of sectors”. Mass celebrations have been reported in Somaliland following the recognition.
A 28 December 2025 statement by the foreign ministers of 22 Muslim, Arab and African states, organizations and entities rejected Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as “a grave violation of the principles of international law and the United Nations Charter, which explicitly stipulates the imperative of protecting the sovereignty of states and their territorial integrity”. They also warned that recognition threatens international peace and security. The statement further rejected “any potential link between such measure and any attempts to forcibly expel the Palestinian people out of their land” (see also here and here), referring to reports in the media of discussions between Israel, Somalia, Somaliland and the US on the transfer of Palestinians from Gaza—reports that Somalia and Somaliland have denied. Among states that did not join this statement are the UAE, Bahrain and Morrocco, all parties to the Abraham Accords.
Somaliland’s recognition follows a recent wave of recognitions of Palestine, including by several western states, a matter that was raised in a meeting of the Security Council on 29 December 2025. During the meeting, the US stated that Israel has the same right to conduct itself as other States that have recently decided to unilaterally recognize “a nonexistent Palestinian state”. It added that its own position on the statehood of Somaliland had not changed. Slovenia rejected this comparison, stating that it has recognized Palestine “in response” to the “undeniable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination” and that “Palestine is not part of any state – it is illegally occupied territory as declared by the International Court of Justice”. Slovenia then asserted that recognizing Somaliland “goes against…Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter”. As will be explained below, the recognition of Somaliland is much more comparable to that of Kosovo, not Palestine.
Speaking in the Security Council, Somalia – also on behalf of Algeria, Guyana and Sierra Leone – described the recognition as “an act of aggression”. Somalia also asserted that the recognition was a violation of the United Nations Charter and “a breach of a cornerstone of international law: respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other States”. On 12 January 2025, Somalia announced that it was terminating agreements with the UAE in light of what it perceives as the latter’s involvement in facilitating Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. Türkiye has called the recognition “a clear violation of international law” and an “interference in Somalia’s internal affairs”.
Several states and organizations expressed their support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the need for dialogue between Somalia and Somaliland and the potential destabilizing effect of the recognition (China, Denmark, France, Slovenia, Somalia,Russia, UK, EU). Some states have taken the view that the recognition is a potential threat to regional peace and security that reinforces Al-Shabaab’s insurgency in the region (Somalia, Russia, UK). For the African Union (see also here) in particular, recognition of Somaliland raises the fear of encouraging secessionist movements across the continent and their subsequent recognition, counter to the principle agreed by its member states in the 1964 Cairo Declaration, to “respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence”, reflective of the wider principle of territorial integrity, discussed below. Israel was further condemned by the Organisation of Islamic Collaboration, and the Arab League.
Noticeable silence on the recent development has come from two powerful regional powers, Kenya and Ethiopia. The latter had agreed in a memorandum of understanding in July 2024 to recognize Somaliland in exchange for Somaliland’s agreement to establish an Ethiopian naval base in its territory.
The (non)legal dimensions of recognition
The recognition of Somaliland undoubtedly raises wide-ranging and significant issues, as well as concerns for both the well-being of the affected people and for the security and stability of the region. The legal arguments concerning the act of recognition, however, are much narrower. When a state is created on part of the territory of an existing state which continues to exist, it can be generally referred to as ‘secession’. As reflected above, the main legal arguments raised are that recognition of a secessionist entity as a state constitutes a use of force under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter (or aggression) against its parent state, breaches the obligation of non-intervention, or is a breach of its territorial integrity.
At the outset, a declaration of recognition does not involve use of force and therefore cannot be said to be in breach of Article 2(4) or an act of aggression. Territorial integrity is only mentioned in the Charter in the context of the use of force, and non-intervention under Article 2(7) only applies to the United Nations, not member states.
But a more difficult question is whether recognition can breach the wider principle of territorial integrity or the principle of non-intervention under customary international law, reflected in the Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970. As Pellet notes (p. 274), it is unquestionable that secession undermines the territorial integrity of the parent state, but that effect in itself does not dictate that secession by a non-state actor is illegal, and that recognizing a seceding entity is illegal, absent an international rule to that effect (ibid).
Under the constitutive theory of state recognition, an entity becomes a state by the act of recognition itself. Recognition then is purely a matter of states’ discretion (Talmon, p. 102; Crawford, pp. 4-5). The dominant theory of state recognition in the literature, however, is the declaratory theory, under which a state’s existence “is a question of fact” (Badinter Commission), independent of recognition. In the words of Crawford (p. 93), “an entity is not a state because it is recognized; it is recognized because it is a state”. As such, Somalia is correct to assert that the recognition of Somaliland does not alter the latter’s status, but that does not mean that its recognition is a breach of international law.
Rather, as stated by the Supreme Court of Canada, though “there is no right, under the Constitution or at international law, to unilateral secession…this does not rule out the possibility of an unconstitutional declaration of secession leading to a de facto secession” (Reference re Secession of Quebec, para. 155). International law is neutral when it comes to secession. It is neither legal nor illegal, but a legally neutral act that produces consequences for the international community (Crawford, p. 390). There is no principle of international law that forbids an entity to secede. While assisting a non-state actor in attempting to secede could arguably be a breach of the principle of non-intervention, when a seceding entity is able to meet the requirements of statehood on its own, and particularly demonstrate the requisite level of effectiveness and independence, it is thus established in fact. While examples in the United Nations era are rare, international law does not prohibit states from recognizing the seceding entity’s existence as a state (Crawford, pp. 390-391, 415-418 (also here, p. 282); Milanović, pp. 33-34; Pellet, pp. 274-276; Weller, p. 136; see also here, para. 401).
Finally, it should be mentioned that there is also a process-oriented approach to secession, according to which, as Milano explains, international law does not prohibit secession, but it “regulates the processes by which secession is produced” (pp. 195, 214). It does so, in practice, by assessing factors such as whether a secessionist ‘state’ is a result of an external military intervention, if it clearly manifests the will of its local population in favor of secession, whether it made reasonable efforts to reach a compromise solution with the existing state, and whether its establishment respects the principle of uti possidetis (pp. 195-201). Even under this ‘processual’ approach, it should be noted, an “irreversible status quo” of an entity demonstrating the required effectiveness of a state may ultimately be recognized by other states, as “territorial integrity and inviolability of international borders, even when framed in terms of uti possidetis, are not norms of a peremptory character and no secondary rule of general international law imposes on third states a duty not to recognise the new situation as lawful under international law” (pp. 209-210; see also International Law Commission (ILC), Draft articles on State Responsibility, Art. 41 with commentaries).
When may recognition be considered illegal?
While the decision to recognize thus operates in the political rather than the legal sphere, there are nevertheless three well-established scenarios in which recognition of a secessionist entity will be considered a breach of international law. The first is ‘premature recognition’. This occurs under the declaratory theory when a state recognizes an entity before it meets the requirements of statehood (see Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, §202, para. f; Thürer and Burri, para. 40). (Under the constitutive theory recognition cannot be premature, as recognition itself brings the state into being). This argument has been mentioned, for example, with respect to some of the early recognitions of Kosovo, as well as Croatia and Slovenia (Tomuschat; Oeter). In any event, in the case of recognizing Somaliland, which has functioned as a de facto state independent of Somalia for decades, premature recognition is unlikely to be at issue.
In addition, according to Crawford (p. 387), a right of self-determination may “legitimize recognition that would otherwise be premature”. If the doctrine of remedial secession – allowing the exercise of external self-determination – is part of customary international law, which is controversial (Kosovo Advisory Opinion, paras. 82-83; Milanović, p. 34), it can reasonably be said to apply to Somaliland, as the mass crimes committed by Somalia against Somaliland during the civil war – amounting to war crimes, crimes against humanity and likely exhibit the facts and special intent present in acts of genocide against the Isaaq clan – were gross violations of the fundamental human rights of Somalilanders and are a solid basis for the rise of a right to remedial secession (Poore; Carroll and Rajagopal, pp. 666-674; Mburu, pp. 36-42; Klich, p. 116; Keinard and Einashe; International Crisis Group, pp. 5-6).
Second, recognition may be illegal if an entity is constituted by “the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens)” (Kosovo Advisory Opinion, para. 81; ILC, Art. 41; Crawford, p. 160; Milano, pp. 195-197). An often quoted example is the obligation not to recognize the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, established following Türkiye’s illegal use of force against Cyprus (Milano, p. 195; Vidmar, p. 382, fn. 147; Milanović, p. 33). This scenario is not applicable to Somaliland, which established and sustains its independence from Somalia without any foreign military intervention.
Third, and not unrelated to the previous scenarios, recognition is illegal where the Security Council has adopted a resolution obligating states not to recognize an entity as a state or part of another state. For example, in resolution 662 (1990), the Security Council decided that “that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any form and whatever pretext has no legal validity, and is considered null and void”. No such decision has been taken in the case of Somaliland.
But, as explained above, international law does not prohibit recognition of a seceding entity that meets the criteria for statehood in the absence of these three scenarios. Alternatively, Somaliland may be recognized under the ‘processual approach’, if one were to apply it: Somaliland was established within its administrative boundaries and those of the former British protectorate, thus conforming to the uti possidetis principle; its statehood reflects the overwhelming wishes of the local population as reflected in a free and fair referendum; it has attempted dialogue with Somalia; and it is an effective entity established without foreign military intervention. Thus, the recognition of Somaliland by any state is unlikely to be a breach of international law.
The example of Kosovo
Slovenia is correct to assert that the statehood of Palestine is in the context of a foreign occupation and therefore its recognition is inherently dissimilar to that of a secessionist entity such as Somaliland. While each case may be said to be different, the recognition of Somaliland is more comparable to that of Kosovo, and its declared independence from Serbia. But as a matter of law, as with Kosovo (and with Palestine, where differences of views exist as to whether it meets the criteria for statehood, compare Milanović with Verdirame), it is most likely that the US is correct that the recognition of Somaliland is within the political prerogative of a state.
In the Kosovo advisory proceedings, a small minority of States argued that the principle of territorial integrity applies to internal actors and, therefore, this principle and that of non-intervention bar other states from recognizing a seceding state (e.g., Cyprus, paras. 82-89; Serbia, paras. 423-424; Spain, paras. 2-5; see also Milanović, p. 43; Crawford, pp. 282-283). The Court, however, referring to the Friendly Relations Declaration, concluded that “the scope of the principle of territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of relations between States”, and does not apply to non-state actors (Kosovo Advisory Opinion, para. 80; for the opposite view see the dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma, paras. 19-26). Though the direct issue of recognition by states was not addressed by the Court, according to Crawford (p. 283), the Court effectively endorsed the view that states are within their right to recognize Kosovo or not (see also Pellet, p. 276; Weller, p. 135).
To date, 121 states have recognized Kosovo, including Israel, as well as states that have argued that recognizing Somaliland is illegal, such as Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia, and Türkiye. It is worth mentioning that in the case of Somaliland there is no question of a link between a likely illegal foreign military intervention (the NATO military intervention of 1999) and independence, as opposed to Kosovo. In addition, at no point has Somaliland been in danger of collapsing, under threat of being consumed by its ‘parent’ state, or reliant on international actors to sustain its independence, as can be argued with respect to Kosovo (see Tomuschat, pp. 38-39; Tancredi, pp. 105-106). At no point has Somaliland been dependent on outside actors for its existence.
There does not seem to be any principled difference between the recognition of Kosovo’s secession from Serbia to that of Somaliland from Somalia.
Final thoughts
This recent development brings with it both opportunities and risks. For the people of Somaliland, this has been seen as a momentous occasion—the first of potential future recognitions, as it attempts to join the community of nations. For Somalia, the region, and more broadly, it presents an increased risk of further destabilization in an already volatile region. From a legal perspective, it further demonstrates the astuteness of Crawford’s observation that secession is a legally neutral act and its recognition is not governed by law, but “the consequences of which are regulated internationally”, and produce “important legal and political effects” (Crawford, pp. 27, 390).
Israel’s December 26, 2025, recognition of Somaliland triggered sharp condemnation from Mogadishu. Somali officials framed the decision as a violation of sovereignty and a threat to regional stability. Yet this reaction obscures a deeper reality: The controversy is less about borders and diplomatic protocol and more about Somalia’s unresolved state failure and the strategic recalibration unfolding along the Red Sea corridor. Recognition did not create Somalia’s crisis; it exposed it.
For more than three decades, Somaliland has operated as a functioning entity. It controls territory, conducts elections, maintains internal order, and administers civilian institutions with a level of continuity absent across much of southern Somalia. Mogadishu’s attempt to portray Somaliland as merely another separatist project ignores these operational realities and misrepresents the historical record.
1961
Somaliland entered a rushed union with Italian Somaliland five days after independence, but the legal foundation of the union was flawed from the outset. Somaliland passed its Union Act on June 27, 1960, while no corresponding ratification occurred in the South, leaving no jointly ratified Act of Union in force on July 1, 1960. The retroactive union law adopted in 1961 was an attempt to repair this defect. In legal terms, the union was politically proclaimed but never constituted at inception, rendering it—by juristic standards—defective ab initio.
The political trajectory that followed deepened this structural weakness. The 1969 coup dismantled constitutional governance in Mogadishu and entrenched centralized rule that eroded the original political bargain. When the Somali state collapsed in 1991, the union lost its institutional foundation entirely. Somaliland’s withdrawal was therefore not ideological fragmentation, but institutional self-preservation following systemic collapse.
From Israel’s perspective, the recognition was strategic rather than symbolic. The Horn of Africa has become an extension of Middle Eastern security competition. Red Sea chokepoints and commercial shipping routes now sit at the center of regional power calculations. Somaliland’s proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait places it along one of the world’s most consequential trade arteries. Facilities such as Berbera provide logistical depth and leverage that carry strategic value beyond domestic Somali politics. In this environment, states do not select partners based on constitutional theory but, rather, upon on territorial control, reliability, and institutional continuity. Somaliland offers predictability in a region defined by fragmented authority and political volatility.
By contrast, Somalia’s federal government continues to struggle with structural incoherence. National authority remains divided across parallel political and security frameworks. Electoral processes are routinely delayed or contested. Constitutional harmonization remains incomplete. Economic governance varies sharply across regions.
This governance deficit weakens Mogadishu’s ability to project itself as the uncontested center of authority. International actors increasingly distinguish between formal sovereignty and functional capacity. Investment flows, security cooperation, and diplomatic engagement reflect this distinction.
No other Somali region possesses Somaliland’s historical independence status or international legal continuity from decolonization.
Somalia’s warning that Somaliland’s recognition will trigger regional fragmentation is overstated. No other Somali region possesses Somaliland’s historical independence status or international legal continuity from decolonization. Federal member states formed after 1991 through negotiated political settlements. They do not carry comparable sovereign lineage. The feared cascade effect does not exist.
What does exist is a gap between political claims and operational realities. For Israel and other security-focused actors, engagement will prioritize maritime stability, regional access, and dependable partners. That calculus is unlikely to change in response to diplomatic protests.
<span;>If Somalia seeks to alter this trajectory, the solution is not external pressure campaigns but internal reconstruction: consolidating national authority, restoring institutional coherence, and rebuilding political legitimacy. The hard truth is Somaliland recognition will reoccur wherever functionality outperforms fiction. States that govern territory effectively become partners. States that rely on symbolic sovereignty without institutional capacity will lose diplomatic ground. Recognition is not the destabilizing force. State failure is.
Why did Israel officially recognise Somaliland, the Muslim-majority breakaway African state that had, until Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s unexpected announcement on December 26, spent 34 years being internationally ignored?
During a phone call with Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said the two countries shared a “seminal and historic” friendship and would work together across economic, agriculture, and social development fields.
For Somaliland – a territory on the very tip of the Horn of Africa that broke away from Somalia in 1991 and has fought for international recognition ever since – the news was met with literal cheers on the streets and fireworks.
While the two countries may appear on the surface to be odd bedfellows, they have more than one might expect in common, especially when it comes to their respective high-tech industries and ongoing problems with terrorists on their respective doorsteps.
All about Somaliland
Somaliland split from Somalia in 1991 after the latter’s government collapsed – although there had been an independence movement underway since the early 1960s – and has remained an unofficial but functional country ever since.
But Somaliland has a longer history than that. It was a separate British protectorate between 1884 and 1960, gaining independence on June 26, 1960 – after which it was recognised by 35 countries, including Israel, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, and France. It voluntarily united with Somalia shortly afterwards, although problems arose almost immediately.
Somaliland’s break with Somalia came in the wake of a state-sponsored genocide of civilians from the Isaaq tribe between 1987 and 1989 by the Somali Democratic Republic, under the dictatorship of Siad Barre. The number of civilian deaths in this massacre is estimated to be between 50,000 and 200,000, according to various sources. The majority of Somalilanders are Isaaqs.
Despite these origins, Somaliland has been the sort of success story to which many African countries aspire. It has achieved genuine internal peace, political stability, and democratic elections, and has a promising free market-based economy.
Somaliland isn’t even the only breakaway state from Somalia; Puntland declared itself an autonomous state in August 1998. And although not as successful as Somaliland – armed conflict and piracy remain – Puntland is an important destination for Somalis to escape from the endemic violence that has been a result of Somali state collapse since 1991.
Countries such as the United Kingdom, Denmark, Taiwan, Ethiopia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Kenya have liaison offices in Somaliland, and it has trade with Oman, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti and Ethiopia, plus an inventory of foreign investors. This is despite not having access to many global institutions, such as the international financial system, due to its unofficial status.
While the territory still grapples with many issues, including high unemployment and relatively low GDP, its peace and stability are a genuine success story achieved almost entirely indigenously by Somalilanders, with very little outside assistance.
Somaliland meets the criteria to become a country
Under the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, there are four basic tenets that a territory must meet for nationhood: a government, defined territory, permanent population and “the capacity to enter into relations with other states.” Somaliland meets all those criteria, while the ‘State of Palestine’ – which has now been recognised by 157 of the 195 member states of the United Nations – clearly does not.
US-based analyst Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute, who has long advocated for international recognition of Somaliland, told AIJAC the fact that Somaliland had been denied recognition for so long was “hypocrisy plain and simple.”
While Israel’s decision was unexpected by most, it was several years in the making, and experts had pegged it as an option four years ago. While it doubtless did little to improve Israel’s international reputation in the short run, it was arguably an astute political manoeuvre for several reasons:
It meets international legal obligations to recognise a state that meets all the criteria for statehood;
It gives Somaliland an overdue and deserved reward for what it has achieved, despite extraordinary obstacles;
It will play well in many parts of Africa, where Israel is trying to build relationships, by helping display the benefits of relations with Israel; and
It provides a clear contrast with the legally unjustifiable recognition of “Palestine”, which does not meet the criteria for recognition, drawing attention to the completely political nature of the decision to do so by so many states.
It’s also, symbolically, a recognition from one indigenous people that established self-determination in the wake of a genocide to another that is doing the same.
Israel now has a partner with direct access to the Red Sea for the first time since Sudan signed the Abraham Accords in 2020 (a partnership that has effectively been paused due to Sudan’s civil war). Israel previously also had a relationship with Eritrea to allow some access, but this effectively ended a few years ago. Such access is vital for Israel as its only access to the Indian Ocean, its own Eilat Port, has been all but closed for almost two years due to Houthi attacks.
The Israel-Somaliland relationship could very well redraw the power balance in the region.
Fighting terrorism
Somaliland is surrounded by quasi-failed states, including Somalia and Ethiopia, which grapple with political corruption, terrorism, drought and extreme hunger. One of its biggest threats is the Al-Qaeda branch in Somalia, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, widely known as al-Shabaab, which has been fighting the Somali government for years and controls large swaths of that country.
Economically, there are clear mutual benefits to Israel-Somaliland ties. While Israel is a technology powerhouse, Somaliland – despite its struggling economy – is starting to make its own strides in hi-tech. Rubin told AIJAC that “Somaliland is not far behind Rwanda as the Silicon Valley of Africa.”
“I’ve walked from a dusty, unpaved road in [Somaliland capital] Hargeisa into the control room of the multibillion-dollar communications conglomerate Telesom and it was like entering a NASA facility.”
Mogadishu – The Somali Future Council strongly condemns the disorder that erupted today in the Federal Parliament of Somalia. This disruption stems from an attempt by the Speaker of the House of the People, Mr. Aadan Maxamad Nuur, to unilaterally advance amendments to Articles 5 through 9 of the constitution—actions taken without the broad consensus that previously accompanied revisions to Articles 1 through 4.
The Council has monitored closely how President Hassan Sheikh exerted pressure on the Speaker to pursue these constitutional changes. In response, the Speaker has engaged in the reckless dissemination of misinformation to the Somali public, falsely claiming that the proposed amendments were formally distributed to parliamentarians today.
These developments demonstrate profound political irresponsibility and a dangerous abuse of authority.
Moreover, the Council emphasises that such maneuvers are clearly designed to undermine the forthcoming national dialogue between the Federal Government and the Somali Future Council, scheduled to commence on 1 February. These talks are critical to achieving a consensual, lawful, and peaceful electoral process.
The Somali Future Council and Opposition parties holds President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud fully accountable, both politically and legally, for orchestrating this destabilising event.
The Council reiterates its firm opposition to any unconstitutional amendments and calls for the immediate cessation of all illegal efforts to alter the foundational charter, which was originally established through national consensus.
