DYDO handed over the solar lamps to the Iidaan IDP Camp committee for camp-wide distribution, and clearly framed as a solution:
Initiative: Youth Climate Innovation & Renewable Energy Acceleration Program Focus: Green Jobs, Renewable Energy And Entrepreneurship for IDP and minority youth
Iidaan IDP Camp, Somaliland — In a significant step toward enhancing safety and sustainability for displaced communities, hundreds of solar light lamps have been distributed to families at the Iidaan Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Camp. The initiative, led by the Daami Youth Development Organization in partnership with the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, and Family (MoLSAF) and Save the Children Somaliland, aims to address critical energy poverty and reduce nighttime risks.
The handover, conducted directly with the camp’s community committee, is part of the broader Youth Climate Innovation & Renewable Energy Acceleration Program, which promotes renewable energy solutions to meet humanitarian and environmental needs.
For residents of Iidaan Camp, where darkness once heightened dangers and limited daily activities, the solar lamps represent a transformative intervention. Many families previously relied on kerosene lamps or candles, which posed health hazards from indoor air pollution, contributed to carbon emissions, and increased fire risks.
“This is more than just light—it is security, opportunity, and a step toward a healthier environment,” said a representative from Daami Youth Dev Org. “By using solar energy, we are tackling several challenges at once: protecting vulnerable families, especially women and children, after sunset; extending time for children to study and adults to work; and reducing harmful emissions.”
Key impacts expected from the solar lamp distribution include:
· Enhanced Safety: Improved lighting in households and communal areas to prevent accidents and promote safer movement at night.
· Livelihood and Educational Support: Extended hours for studying, small-scale income activities, and household tasks after dark.
· Environmental Benefits: A shift away from polluting fuel-based lighting, supporting climate resilience and cleaner air indoors.
· Community Ownership: Management of the lamps by the camp committee ensures the initiative is locally sustained and responsive to residents’ needs.
The collaboration underscores how youth-led innovation, supported by government and humanitarian partners, can deliver tangible solutions in displacement settings. “Addressing energy access is crucial in IDP camps,” noted a Save the Children Somaliland representative. “Sustainable light improves well-being, dignity, and the capacity of families to rebuild their lives.”
MoLSAF officials highlighted the initiative’s alignment with national efforts to improve living conditions for displaced populations while embracing green energy. “This partnership shows our shared commitment to practical, sustainable support for vulnerable communities,” a ministry representative said.
As solar lights begin to glow each evening in Iidaan, they symbolize a brighter, safer, and more sustainable path forward—one powered by community collaboration and renewable energy.
Through this solution, DYDO continues to demonstrate how youth-led innovation and renewable energy can deliver practical, scalable, and climate-smart outcomes for displaced and marginalized communities in Somaliland.
Project: Solar Livelihood Pods
Program: Youth Climate Innovation & Renewable Energy Acceleration Program
Implementer: Daami Youth Development Organization (DYDO)
Partners: MoLSAF, Save the Children & DANIDA Somaliland
Location: Iidaan IDP Camp, Hargeisa
Focus: Green jobs, renewable energy, and entrepreneurship for IDP and minority youth.
As the terms of the President and Parliament near their end and national elections approach, any rash attempt to amend the Constitution is an irresponsible act that betrays the national interest. This move exposes an agenda driven by personal ambition and partisan gain, eroding the legitimacy of state institutions and undermining public trust.
Somalia stands at a critical juncture, grappling with assaults on its unity, severe security threats, crippling drought, and economic distress. This moment demands national cohesion and leadership characterized by responsibility and accountability. Rushed constitutional amendments, pursued without due consideration, will only deepen existing societal fractures and fuel instability, sabotaging hard-won progress in state-building and national reconciliation.
Ultimately, the Constitution serves as the foundational social contract for the nation’s unity and future. To alter it through illegitimate means risks triggering severe repercussions and entrenched division. Any constitutional change must emerge from a legitimate, inclusive, and transparent process—guided by a shared national vision, not narrow self-interest.
Mr. Jama Ayaanle Feyte, Somaliland-born politician, Journalist, and Horn of Africa political analyst
Nairobi, 28 January 2026 – A high-level delegation from the Republic of Somaliland, led by the Director General of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Mr. Maxamed Xasan Saleebaan, participated in a critical meeting in Nairobi today concerning the restructuring of the World Bank-funded Strengthening Economic Resilience Program (SERP).
The SERP Project is central to Somaliland’s efforts to enhance public financial management, focusing on accountability, transparency, and the empowerment of state institutions tasked with managing public resources. It plays a pivotal role in advancing domestic revenue mobilization, fiscal management, and the overall improvement of public administration.
Scheduled to run for three days, the meeting will conduct a comprehensive review of the SERP Project’s restructuring process. Key discussion points include potential adjustments to the project’s scope, its various components, and its outcome indicators. The objective is to ensure the project is implemented effectively, completed on schedule, and aligned with the core developmental priorities of Somaliland.
Accompanying the Director General at the meeting are:
· Chairman of the Civil Service Commission
· Chairman of the Good Governance Commission
· Director General of the National Tender Board
· Director General of the Civil Service Reform and Employee Rights Agency
· SERP Project Coordinator
· Senior officials from the Office of the Auditor General and the Office of the Accountant General
· Deputy Directors from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
· Members of the SERP Project implementation team
The World Bank delegation is led by May, supported by Kandi and Vikram.
On the sidelines of the main meeting, Director General Mr. Saleebaan is also scheduled to hold separate talks with Hideki Matsunaga and other current and future World Bank project leaders for Somaliland. These discussions aim to strengthen partnership and expedite the implementation of priority development projects
Berbera, Somaliland – The Commander of the Somaliland Coast Guard, Admiral Ahmed Hure Haariye, led a strategic site visit to key facilities at the Coast Guard’s 1st Base in Berbera. The inspection was conducted alongside a high-level delegation from the European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP), headed by Mr. Pateth from the Netherlands.
The delegation toured several critical infrastructure sites, including:
· The Headquarters of the 1st Coast Guard Base.
· The modern communications building of the Coast Guard (CIX).
· The naval vessel dry dock facility.
· The boat mooring jetty.
· The base’s vehicle maintenance depot.
The assessment noted substantial progress on several ongoing projects, with plans to expand and upgrade additional facilities in the coming months.
The primary objective of the visit was to evaluate the operational developments and infrastructure advancements achieved by the Somaliland Coast Guard, with a specific focus on enhancing the capabilities and readiness of its premier base in Berbera.
Mogadishu – A special session of Somalia’s parliament, convened to introduce significant constitutional amendments, collapsed in disorder and was forced to adjourn after opposition lawmakers staged a vociferous protest.
Opposition members, who have long argued that the amendment process is being rushed without adequate consultation or legal foundation, escalated their dissent into direct action. Their protest erupted into a raucous demonstration inside the chamber, with lawmakers marching through the aisles and publicly shredding the session’s agenda.
The political theater reached a symbolic climax when the opposition bloc united to sing the Somali national anthem, a gesture that silenced the chamber and served as a potent rebuke of the government’s agenda, framing their stance as one of patriotic defense.
The contentious amendments, championed by President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud’s administration, include a proposed 40-day extension of the current parliamentary term and revisions to key constitutional articles concerning governance. This push persists despite a formal appeal from the Somali National Consultative Council—comprising federal member states like Puntland and Jubaland—which recently called for an immediate halt to the process, citing national instability.
With tensions at a peak, all eyes now turn to a crucial summit scheduled for next week in Mogadishu between the Federal Government and the Council. The constitutional crisis is poised to be the central, and most divisive, item on the agenda.
Somaliland has built a stable, democratic, and self-governing state through locally grounded institutions and disciplined patience—long before the world was willing to recognize it.
By Mohamed Nouh Rakaab
Since reasserting its sovereignty in 1991, Somaliland has pursued a deliberate and internally driven project of state-building that sets it apart from much of the Horn of Africa. While the region has often been defined by institutional fragmentation and recurring conflict, Somaliland has moved—patiently and largely out of international view—toward democratic consolidation, internal security, and social cohesion.
The break with the former Somali Republic followed a brutal civil war and the near-total collapse of central authority. At that historical juncture, Somaliland faced choices that would prove decisive. Rather than reverting to centralized autocracy or adopting a fragile, clan-based federalism, it pursued a path anchored in self-determination and negotiated consensus. This was not simply a matter of survival. It was an exercise in political construction, premised on the belief that legitimacy, security, and social trust had to precede external validation. Over time, that choice produced a functioning polity capable of governing territory, mediating conflict, and sustaining public order.
What distinguishes Somaliland’s formation is its rejection of externally imposed governance models in favor of a bottom-up approach rooted in local practice. In the years immediately following the 1991 declaration of independence—while international attention remained fixed on Mogadishu—Somaliland’s leaders turned inward. A series of national conferences between 1991 and 1997, most notably the 1993 Borama Conference, became the forum through which peace was negotiated and authority reconstituted. These were not symbolic gatherings. They were prolonged, often arduous deliberations involving clan elders, religious figures, and civic leaders, drawing on customary law to resolve grievances, demobilize militias, and articulate a shared political framework.
The result was a social contract that enjoyed broad legitimacy precisely because it emerged from within society rather than being imposed from above. This process endowed Somaliland’s early institutions with a durability uncommon in post-conflict settings. Peace was not enforced by foreign troops or underwritten by external guarantors; it was bargained, internalized, and defended by local actors with a stake in its survival.
Women in the Somaliland, wearing the colors of the Somaliland flag, participating in a parade for UCID party prior to parliamentary elections in 2005. (Wikimedia)
From this foundation emerged a hybrid political system that fused traditional authority with modern state institutions. Central to this arrangement was the formal incorporation of elders into national governance through the Guurti, or House of Elders, which functions as the upper chamber of parliament. The Guurti has served as a stabilizing mechanism, mediating political disputes and ensuring that modernization did not rupture social continuity. Its role in conflict resolution and security oversight helped prevent political competition from sliding into violence and contributed to the consolidation of a national monopoly on force.
As a result, Somaliland developed unified national security institutions rather than the fragmented militia structures common elsewhere in the region. A centralized army and police force now maintain internal order, enabling the state to secure its borders and contribute meaningfully to regional security efforts, including counter-piracy and counter-extremism initiatives along the Gulf of Aden.
Over time, this system evolved. What began as a consensus-driven, clan-mediated order gradually transitioned into a competitive, multi-party democracy grounded in universal suffrage. Over the past three decades, Somaliland has conducted repeated municipal, parliamentary, and presidential elections. International observers have generally described these contests as credible and peaceful. More telling than procedural benchmarks, however, has been Somaliland’s record of orderly transfers of power. Presidents have conceded defeat. Opposition parties have assumed office. Constitutional authority has prevailed over personal rule.
In a region where incumbency often hardens into permanence, this pattern marks a genuine political maturation. Somaliland’s use of biometric voter registration—implemented earlier than in many more affluent states—reflects both institutional ambition and a sustained commitment to electoral integrity. These practices reinforce the reality that Somaliland functions not as a provisional authority but as a self-governing democratic state.
Political stability, in turn, has enabled a measure of economic resilience. Lacking formal recognition, Somaliland has been excluded from international financial institutions and most bilateral aid frameworks. Yet this isolation has fostered fiscal restraint and a reliance on domestic revenue and private enterprise. The economy remains anchored in livestock exports, supported by an unusually advanced telecommunications sector that has expanded access and lowered costs nationwide.
Geography has further shaped Somaliland’s economic strategy. Its long coastline along the Gulf of Aden, and particularly the port city of Berbera, has become central to its regional ambitions. Investments in port modernization and logistics infrastructure aim to position Somaliland as a critical trade corridor for the Horn of Africa, especially for landlocked Ethiopia. These projects are not merely commercial. They assert Somaliland’s relevance to global supply chains and maritime security amid renewed international attention to the Red Sea.
Despite these achievements, Somaliland has operated for more than three decades in a diplomatic vacuum. The absence of de jure recognition has constrained access to credit, limited foreign direct investment, and excluded Somaliland from formal participation in international institutions. In response, Somaliland has pursued what might be described as a diplomacy of pragmatism—engaging states and organizations on the basis of functional cooperation rather than formal status.
Through security partnerships, trade agreements, and development cooperation, Somaliland has secured growing de facto acknowledgment of its sovereignty. It operates its own currency, passport, flag, and national institutions. It does not function as a subordinate federal unit awaiting direction from Mogadishu, but as a parallel and autonomous political entity.
That long campaign of patience and self-reliance reached a turning point in late 2025. On December 26, Israel became the first United Nations member state to formally recognize Somaliland as a sovereign and independent nation. The joint declaration, signed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, marked a diplomatic breakthrough with far-reaching implications.
Recognition transformed Somaliland’s international standing almost overnight. What had long been described as a “silent success” was suddenly a visible strategic partner. The agreement opened new channels for diplomatic engagement and accelerated reassessments in capitals that had previously maintained only informal ties with Hargeisa. Countries including the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, and Ethiopia began reviewing their positions, drawn by Somaliland’s strategic location near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and its demonstrated capacity for governance and security.
The implications extend beyond bilateral relations. As global attention returns to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, Somaliland’s control over key maritime corridors positions it as a central actor in regional stability. Its trajectory since 1991 challenges prevailing assumptions about post-conflict reconstruction, suggesting that durable peace is more likely to emerge from locally grounded institutions than from externally engineered solutions.
Somaliland’s experience does not offer a universal blueprint. But it does present a compelling case: that democratic legitimacy, patiently constructed and culturally rooted, can endure even in the absence of international recognition. In an era of renewed geopolitical competition, Somaliland stands as a reminder that sovereignty is not conferred solely by diplomacy—it is built, sustained, and defended over time.
Mohamed Nouh Rakaab is a Somalia-based social researcher and political analyst specializing in governance, state-building, and political stability in fragile and post-conflict contexts, with a focus on Somaliland and the wider Horn of Africa. His work combines field-based research and political analysis to inform international debates on sovereignty, legitimacy, and sustainable governance.
The Puntland Non-State Actors Association (PUNSAA) has issued a sharp critique of the process behind the recent parliamentary approval of amendments to Somalia’s constitution, calling it opaque, exclusionary, and a potential threat to national unity.
In an open letter addressed to the highest levels of Somali government and the international community, the prominent civil society network—which coordinates over 120 organizations—stated it was completely sidelined during the critical deliberations.
Key Criticisms Outlined
The statement centers on amendments to the 4th Chapter of Somalia’s Provisional Constitution, passed by the Federal Parliament today. PUNSAA asserts the process “lacked proper procedure and transparency” and was finalized “without the consultation and unanimous consent of all Federal Member States.”
Furthermore, the association challenges the claim by the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission (ICRIC) of having consulted civil society. “PUNSAA…was not once invited or shared any document throughout the debates,” the letter states, adding that any organizations that did participate do not represent the broader Somali civil society.
A Warning of National Risk
The association framed its concerns within Somalia’s fragile political context, warning that the move “could endanger the unity and cohesion of the Somali community and the long-standing efforts of Somali state-building.”
It emphasized that the amendments come at a sensitive time when the nation is grappling with political disputes that affect statehood, territorial integrity, and internal security—a likely reference to tensions between Mogadishu and Federal Member States like Puntland.
A Call for Consensus
Concluding its statement, PUNSAA made an urgent appeal to Somalia’s federal and state-level leadership to return to a collaborative path. It called for work towards “a consensual constitution that has been carefully considered from all perspectives,” arguing this is essential to complete the state-building process and achieve national reconciliation.
Background
PUNSAA is one of Somalia’s largest civil society umbrella bodies, with deep roots in the Puntland region. Its public condemnation adds a significant civil society voice to the growing political debate surrounding constitutional reforms, a process central to defining Somalia’s future federal structure and political system.
Israel’s recognition of the Republic of Somaliland could lead to the IDF gaining access to facilities in the territory, particularly Berbera International Airport, access that would broaden its military options in the region.
This blog post was first published on Military Balance+ on 26 January 2025
On 26 December 2025, Israel became the first country to formally recognise the Republic of Somaliland. Several indicators suggest that the development of diplomatic and other relations between the two may lead to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) gaining access to facilities in East Africa.
Israel’s declaration came two weeks before a visit to Somaliland by Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gideon Sa’ar. At a 6 January meeting with the president of Somaliland and Somaliland’s military chief of staff, Sa’ar said that ‘we will also cooperate on defence and develop a strategic partnership’.
Meanwhile, Israeli media cited the director of the political department of Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation as saying that a military base ‘is on the table and being discussed’. The chairman of the governing Waddani party, Hersi Ali Haji Hassan, did not deny the prospect, saying that it is a question to be asked ‘when the time comes’.
Should these discussions lead to access or basing arrangements, they could widen Israel’s military options in the region, but they could also risk additional vulnerabilities, as well as diplomatic friction with other regional states.
The ability to operate from Berbera International Airport on the Gulf of Aden could be beneficial to Israel by enabling the Israeli Air Force (IAF) to expand the range of missions that it conducts in the region and the assets it employs. Berbera is just 550 kilometres from Sanaa, whereas current basing in Israel is at least 1,800 km away – a 70% reduction in distance. IAF aircraft operating from Berbera airport would have significantly reduced response times for strikes against Ansarullah (Houthi) targets, and could also provide enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance coverage in the region.
The present status of Berbera airport is unclear, however, despite recent activity that has upgraded the facilities.
Berbera airport was constructed by the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s and served as an emergency landing location for NASA’s Space Shuttle from 1980–91. More recently, the site was upgraded following an agreement between Somaliland and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that granted the latter access to naval and air facilities in Berbera to support its operations in Yemen. The improvements included paving the 4,000-metre-long runway in 2018 and, between 2018 and early 2019, the construction of an apron. However, in September 2019, shortly after the UAE announced a partial withdrawal from Yemen, then Somaliland president Muse Bihi Abdi announced that Berbera airport, ‘which was being built by the UAE and designed to be a military base will become a public airport for civilians’.
The airport is listed as a public/military site, but despite the presidency of Somaliland announcing in March 2025 that it was open to global trade, there has been little sign of commercial activity. This may be because Somaliland’s Hargeisa International Airport has the capacity for current traffic demands, but it has also been suggested that Somaliland has delayed civilian use while it considers offering access to the United States.
This draws attention not only to recent US military visits to Berbera – the commander of US Africa Command visited the airport in 2022 and again in June 2025 – but also to how these discussions can reflect tensions between Somaliland and Somalia. March 2025 saw Somalia’s president send a letter to US President Donald Trump offering access, and four months later, the president of Somaliland suggested there are ongoing discussions over access.
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There are indications that the UAE has used the airport for military and logistics purposes already, including a 22 September 2025 cargo flight that followed the Bosaso–Berbera–Abu Dhabi route, and on 7 January 2026 for the evacuation of Aidarous al-Zubaidi, the then-leader of the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen.
Recent work at Berbera airport points to its military utility. In late 2023, as Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping intensified, construction started on the first of three storage facilities, all of which feature semi-buried structures and berms consistent with the storage of fuel and ammunition. An initial seven buried structures were built next to the apron, and new groundworks identified in this area in January 2026 indicate possible expansion. A second storage area to the north was also built in late 2023, comprised of 20 bermed bays housing containers and three larger structures. This area is now undergoing extensive expansion, with indications that the number of bays will at least quadruple. Construction of the third facility to the south with 14 buried structures began in late 2025 and is still ongoing.
By early 2024, additional aircraft shelters had been erected on the apron, the designs of which are commonly associated with supporting combat aircraft. At the end of 2025, the apron was also expanded to the northeast. As of January 2026, the construction of three new structures is visible on the apron, including what are likely to be two aircraft shelters or hangars.
The construction of a number of raised earth platforms in October 2025 likely indicates plans to install air-defence systems at the airport. The distinctive raised positions could help to provide greater coverage, particularly against lower-flying targets, while the through-access ramps that are present at three platforms suggests a realistic possibility that they are intended for mobile air-defence systems.
It remains unclear who is behind the expansion, but interviews and analyst reports have indicated that the UAE was involved in previous developments at Berbera.
Options for Israel and risks for Somliland
Basing access in Somaliland would give the IDF facilities much closer to the Houthis, potentially enabling them to monitor the Gulf of Aden and southern Red Sea, providing valuable information about the Houthis and patterns of life near Yemen’s shores.
Striking Yemen from Israel is a long-range mission, requiring at least two air-to-air refuelling serials for most IAF combat aircraft. With a facility in Berbera, IAF aircraft could land post-strike, refuel, and return to Israel using external fuel tanks. A deployment to Berbera airport would increase Israel’s ability to launch strikes at much shorter notice in Yemen and the Gulf of Aden. It would also enable the use of shorter-range uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs), increasing ISR and strike options for Israel to further degrade the Houthis and disrupt maritime smuggling routes supplying the group.
For Israel, operating from Berbera would risk adding considerable friction to its relationships with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye, which all suspect that Israel is encouraging local separatism across the region. In addition, geographical proximity and the airport’s fixed location would heighten the risk of Houthi strikes on Israeli assets at the site.
Israel’s use of Berbera airport would also come with risks for Somaliland, and could exacerbate its international isolation by antagonising the African Union, China, Somalia, and other countries. An Israeli military presence could also provoke UAV and missile attacks from the Houthis, who have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to strike at long distances and have threatened to target any Israeli presence in Somaliland. Meanwhile, a spokesperson for Somalia-based Al-Shabaab also said the group will fight against Israel’s attempt to use what they perceive as their land. If so, Houthi attacks may not be limited to Berbera airport, and they could also choose to target the port of Berbera, Somaliland’s economic lifeline.
Author
Albert Vidal Ribe
Research Associate for Middle East Defence Industry and Procurement
In December, as it often has during the ongoing war between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the British government urged accountability, expressing concerns about the mass-scale death and devastation that civilians have suffered.
But reporting has shown that, behind the scenes, the United Kingdom rejected more ambitious plans to prevent atrocities as violence escalated in the diplomatic framing of the war”.
Asked about its approach to Sudan, the UK Foreign Office told Al Jazeera: “The crisis in Sudan is the worst we have seen in decades – the UK government is working with allies and partners to end the violence and prevent further atrocities from occurring.
“We need both the parties to support a ceasefire; this means unrestricted humanitarian access and a peace process with transition to a civilian government.”
Recognise Somalia, do business with Somaliland
The Foreign Office did not respond to questions about the UK’s role in Somalia or its commercial engagement in Somaliland, where scrutiny has increasingly centred on the port of Berbera.
The British government co-owns the port through its development finance arm, British International Investment (BII). The port is jointly owned by the UAE-based logistics firm DP World and the government of Somaliland – even though the UK does not officially recognise that government. The UAE, too, formally does not recognise Somaliland.
Berbera sits near one of the world’s most important maritime corridors linking the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. An impact assessment commissioned by the UK Foreign Office described it as “a strategic gateway” to Somaliland and a potential alternative trade corridor for Ethiopia, language that places it firmly within the region’s geopolitical architecture.
The port’s strategic value is not new. Matthew Sterling Benson, a social and economic historian of Africa at the London School of Economics (LSE), noted that Berbera has repeatedly been treated by external powers as strategic infrastructure first, and a political community second. It has served at different points as a British coaling station, a Soviet naval base during the Cold War, and now a commercial logistics hub shaped by Gulf and Western interests.
The Sudan-Somaliland link
That wider architecture has become more politically charged as Sudan’s war has spilled across borders.
Observers have suggested that Berbera is part of a broader Emirati logistics network that United Nations experts and international media have linked to alleged supply routes used to arm the RSF. The UAE has consistently denied these allegations.
For critics, the UK’s commercial entanglement with that alleged network raises uncomfortable questions. While London publicly calls for accountability in Sudan, it remains financially tied, via the BII, to a port operated by the UAE, a close regional partner accused of backing one side in the war next door.
Abdalftah Hamed Ali, an independent Horn of Africa analyst, said this highlights what many critics see as “a gap between principle and practice”.
“Even if London disputes those linkages,” he said, “the perception problem remains.”
The sensitivity has deepened as Somaliland’s political status has returned to the diplomatic spotlight. Last month, Israel became the only country to formally recognise Somaliland’s independence, a move condemned by Mogadishu and rejected by the wider international community.
For analysts, these developments underscore why claims that economic engagement can be kept separate from politics are increasingly difficult to sustain.
Ali said Berbera cannot be treated as a neutral commercial asset.
“Ports in the region are not just economic assets; they are nodes in a security and influence ecosystem,” he said. “When investment touches ports, free zones, and long-term trade access, it becomes politically legible. People interpret it as strengthening one authority’s bargaining position, whether that is the intention or not.”
In Somaliland’s case, that political legibility cuts several ways: Reinforcing its de facto autonomy, reshaping regional alliances, and entangling external actors, the UK included, in a dispute London – officially – says should be resolved through dialogue rather than external alignment.
Ali described the UK’s approach as a “dual-track” policy.
“Britain maintains its formal diplomatic line with the recognised Somali state, but it also works with Somaliland as a de facto authority because it is stable and functions and controls territory,” he said.
LSE’s Benson explained that after declaring independence in 1991, Somaliland was excluded from international recognition and large-scale foreign aid. Early governments were forced to rely on locally raised revenue, particularly taxation linked to Berbera port, a dependence that gave domestic actors leverage to demand representation and accountability.
In 1992, when a transitional government attempted to seize control of Berbera by force, local clan authorities resisted. The standoff ended in compromise, helping to entrench Somaliland’s power-sharing system.
Benson, who also serves as Sudan’s Research Director at LSE, described this dynamic as a “revenue complex”, in which fiscal control and political legitimacy are tightly intertwined.
Large external infrastructure investments, he warned, risk undermining that bargain.
“When states can finance themselves through deals with external investors rather than negotiations with local constituencies, the fiscal contract changes,” Benson said.
Such projects, he added, reconfigure who controls revenue flows, who benefits from the port economy, and who gains political leverage. In territories with unresolved political status, infrastructure investment can enable what he described as “governance through commercial presence” – allowing external actors to extract strategic value while avoiding explicit political responsibility.
Ambiguity by choice
The UK’s position, Benson argued, exemplifies this ambiguity.
British formal support for Somalia’s territorial integrity, paired with deepening commercial and security engagement with Somaliland, he said, gives it port access, counterterrorism cooperation and commercial returns, while avoiding the political costs of a clear position.
Over time, this can undermine institutional consolidation on both sides: Allowing Mogadishu to avoid meaningful negotiations over Somaliland’s status, while weakening Somaliland’s domestic accountability mechanisms by bypassing local political bargaining.
The UK’s posture in Somaliland has drawn scrutiny before. In 2023, Declassified UK reported that the British government suppressed the release of a report into the killing of civilians during clashes in Somaliland, a decision critics then said prioritised political relationships over transparency and accountability. British officials said at the time that decisions around the report were taken in line with diplomatic and security considerations.
Read together, analysts say the UK’s decisions in Sudan and Somalia reflect a single approach applied in different contexts: Preserving access and partnerships while avoiding moves – diplomatic pressure, public confrontation or policy shifts – that would narrow its room for manoeuvre.
Ali argued that while this approach may secure short-term influence, it carries longer-term costs, particularly in a region as politically entangled as the Horn of Africa.
“In the Horn, where alliances overlap with regional rivalries and the conflict economy, mixed signals can quickly become a liability,” he said. “You lose the moral authority to press for political compromise if local actors think your incentives lie elsewhere.”
Hargeisa, Somaliland – The President of the Republic of Somaliland, H.E. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi (Cirro), accompanied by the Vice President, H.E. Mohamed Ali Aw Cabdi, today convened an extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers. The purpose was for the President to deliver a comprehensive briefing on his historic participation in the Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland.
President Cirro informed the Cabinet that this marked Somaliland’s inaugural participation in a forum of this global stature, placing the nation alongside heads of state, world leaders, and international investors. This engagement, he stated, projected Somaliland’s image and elevated its international standing to an unprecedented level in over three decades.
The President characterized the Davos Forum as a decisive platform where Somaliland successfully asserted itself within global political and investment spheres. He detailed how he utilized this opportunity to convey clear, resonant messages about the Republic of Somaliland, emphasizing three core pillars:
Readiness for Recognition: Somaliland is a nation prepared for and deserving of formal recognition by the international community.
Open for Investment: Somaliland is an open, stable, and welcoming destination for international investment and economic partnership.
A Democratic and Stable State: Somaliland is a peaceful, democratic, and functioning state whose sovereignty merits full acknowledgment.
Highlighting the tangible outcomes, President Cirro reported that the delegation secured significant high-level international connections through direct engagements with global politicians, influential investors, and major media outlets.
He further stated that his presence in Davos served to clearly demonstrate to the world that Somaliland is a mature nation with a strategic vision and credible diplomacy—a reliable partner whose stability is crucial for the security and prosperity of the Horn of Africa and the vital Red Sea and Gulf of Aden waterways.
In his concluding remarks, the President stressed that the diplomatic successes achieved in Davos must now be translated into concrete action. He charged the Cabinet with developing and implementing steps to bolster national security and defense, reinforce social cohesion, and decisively advance Somaliland’s journey toward universal recognition. He also directed the government to proactively inform the public of this new diplomatic chapter and its historic significance.
The Council of Ministers unanimously commended the President on the historic national achievement, affirming that the gains from Davos substantially enhance Somaliland’s global reputation, political capital, and economic prospects.
The initiative, led by the Daami Youth Development Organization in partnership with the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, and Family (MoLSAF) and Save the Children Somaliland, aims to address critical energy poverty and reduce nighttime risks.
The handover, conducted directly with the camp’s community committee, is part of the broader Youth Climate Innovation & Renewable Energy Acceleration Program, which promotes renewable energy solutions to meet humanitarian and environmental needs.
