This blog post was first published on Military Balance+ on 26 January 2025
On 26 December 2025, Israel became the first country to formally recognise the Republic of Somaliland. Several indicators suggest that the development of diplomatic and other relations between the two may lead to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) gaining access to facilities in East Africa.
Israel’s declaration came two weeks before a visit to Somaliland by Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gideon Sa’ar. At a 6 January meeting with the president of Somaliland and Somaliland’s military chief of staff, Sa’ar said that ‘we will also cooperate on defence and develop a strategic partnership’.
Meanwhile, Israeli media cited the director of the political department of Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation as saying that a military base ‘is on the table and being discussed’. The chairman of the governing Waddani party, Hersi Ali Haji Hassan, did not deny the prospect, saying that it is a question to be asked ‘when the time comes’.
Should these discussions lead to access or basing arrangements, they could widen Israel’s military options in the region, but they could also risk additional vulnerabilities, as well as diplomatic friction with other regional states.
The ability to operate from Berbera International Airport on the Gulf of Aden could be beneficial to Israel by enabling the Israeli Air Force (IAF) to expand the range of missions that it conducts in the region and the assets it employs. Berbera is just 550 kilometres from Sanaa, whereas current basing in Israel is at least 1,800 km away – a 70% reduction in distance. IAF aircraft operating from Berbera airport would have significantly reduced response times for strikes against Ansarullah (Houthi) targets, and could also provide enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance coverage in the region.
The present status of Berbera airport is unclear, however, despite recent activity that has upgraded the facilities.
Berbera airport was constructed by the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s and served as an emergency landing location for NASA’s Space Shuttle from 1980–91. More recently, the site was upgraded following an agreement between Somaliland and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that granted the latter access to naval and air facilities in Berbera to support its operations in Yemen. The improvements included paving the 4,000-metre-long runway in 2018 and, between 2018 and early 2019, the construction of an apron. However, in September 2019, shortly after the UAE announced a partial withdrawal from Yemen, then Somaliland president Muse Bihi Abdi announced that Berbera airport, ‘which was being built by the UAE and designed to be a military base will become a public airport for civilians’.
The airport is listed as a public/military site, but despite the presidency of Somaliland announcing in March 2025 that it was open to global trade, there has been little sign of commercial activity. This may be because Somaliland’s Hargeisa International Airport has the capacity for current traffic demands, but it has also been suggested that Somaliland has delayed civilian use while it considers offering access to the United States.
This draws attention not only to recent US military visits to Berbera – the commander of US Africa Command visited the airport in 2022 and again in June 2025 – but also to how these discussions can reflect tensions between Somaliland and Somalia. March 2025 saw Somalia’s president send a letter to US President Donald Trump offering access, and four months later, the president of Somaliland suggested there are ongoing discussions over access.
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There are indications that the UAE has used the airport for military and logistics purposes already, including a 22 September 2025 cargo flight that followed the Bosaso–Berbera–Abu Dhabi route, and on 7 January 2026 for the evacuation of Aidarous al-Zubaidi, the then-leader of the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen.
Recent work at Berbera airport points to its military utility. In late 2023, as Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping intensified, construction started on the first of three storage facilities, all of which feature semi-buried structures and berms consistent with the storage of fuel and ammunition. An initial seven buried structures were built next to the apron, and new groundworks identified in this area in January 2026 indicate possible expansion. A second storage area to the north was also built in late 2023, comprised of 20 bermed bays housing containers and three larger structures. This area is now undergoing extensive expansion, with indications that the number of bays will at least quadruple. Construction of the third facility to the south with 14 buried structures began in late 2025 and is still ongoing.
By early 2024, additional aircraft shelters had been erected on the apron, the designs of which are commonly associated with supporting combat aircraft. At the end of 2025, the apron was also expanded to the northeast. As of January 2026, the construction of three new structures is visible on the apron, including what are likely to be two aircraft shelters or hangars.
The construction of a number of raised earth platforms in October 2025 likely indicates plans to install air-defence systems at the airport. The distinctive raised positions could help to provide greater coverage, particularly against lower-flying targets, while the through-access ramps that are present at three platforms suggests a realistic possibility that they are intended for mobile air-defence systems.
It remains unclear who is behind the expansion, but interviews and analyst reports have indicated that the UAE was involved in previous developments at Berbera.
Options for Israel and risks for Somliland
Basing access in Somaliland would give the IDF facilities much closer to the Houthis, potentially enabling them to monitor the Gulf of Aden and southern Red Sea, providing valuable information about the Houthis and patterns of life near Yemen’s shores.
Striking Yemen from Israel is a long-range mission, requiring at least two air-to-air refuelling serials for most IAF combat aircraft. With a facility in Berbera, IAF aircraft could land post-strike, refuel, and return to Israel using external fuel tanks. A deployment to Berbera airport would increase Israel’s ability to launch strikes at much shorter notice in Yemen and the Gulf of Aden. It would also enable the use of shorter-range uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs), increasing ISR and strike options for Israel to further degrade the Houthis and disrupt maritime smuggling routes supplying the group.
For Israel, operating from Berbera would risk adding considerable friction to its relationships with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye, which all suspect that Israel is encouraging local separatism across the region. In addition, geographical proximity and the airport’s fixed location would heighten the risk of Houthi strikes on Israeli assets at the site.
Israel’s use of Berbera airport would also come with risks for Somaliland, and could exacerbate its international isolation by antagonising the African Union, China, Somalia, and other countries. An Israeli military presence could also provoke UAV and missile attacks from the Houthis, who have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to strike at long distances and have threatened to target any Israeli presence in Somaliland. Meanwhile, a spokesperson for Somalia-based Al-Shabaab also said the group will fight against Israel’s attempt to use what they perceive as their land. If so, Houthi attacks may not be limited to Berbera airport, and they could also choose to target the port of Berbera, Somaliland’s economic lifeline.
Author
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Albert Vidal Ribe
Research Associate for Middle East Defence Industry and Procurement
https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2026/01/extended-reach-diplomatic-recognition-paves-the-way-for-idf-basing-in-somaliland/?fbclid=IwdGRjcAPmoL1jbGNrA-afgGV4dG4DYWVtAjExAHNydGMGYXBwX2lkDDM1MDY4NTUzMTcyOAABHmBp-0TVfJEuSxDYSW7b1y6Qr47pz_4-3DNfcA5Wg0mGn7QD4M5reN-umO84_aem_AnnEIflh_2uLZ0JzlUZ3xg
