Israel has formally recognized Somaliland, and both countries have announced the establishment of mutual embassies. In the streets of Somaliland, citizens are celebrating, waving Israeli flags. This is not diplomatic theater. This is history moving in real time.
And it sends a shockwave straight through Iran, Turkey and Qatar.
Somaliland sits at the gateway to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, where the Red Sea meets the Indian Ocean, one of the most critical maritime chokepoints on earth. For years, Iran has tried to turn this corridor into a pressure valve against Israel and the West, using proxies and intimidation to threaten global trade.
That calculus just changed.
With Israeli–Somaliland embassies now being established, Israel gains strategic depth at the precise point where Tehran has sought leverage. Intelligence cooperation, maritime security, and early warning move from theory to practice. This isn’t escalation; it’s deterrence grounded in geography.
Iran’s Red Sea playbook just got a lot thinner.
With regard to Turkey and Qatar…
Turkey has invested heavily in projecting Islamist influence across the Horn of Africa, particularly through Somalia, under the banner of military cooperation and political patronage. Somaliland has gone the other way: democratic governance, institutional stability, and a firm rejection of Islamist domination.
Israel’s recognition draws a bright line.
It places Israel alongside a pragmatic, non-Islamist partner and punctures Ankara’s ambition to dominate the region ideologically. The message is unmistakable: the future belongs to sovereign states that deliver stability, not to neo-Ottoman, Muslim Brotherhood fantasies.
The images on the Internet of Somaliland citizens celebrating this news flying Israeli flags tell you everything you need to know. This is not coerced alignment. It’s voluntary partnership.
It says Israel is seen not as a problem, but as a model, a nation that defends itself, builds institutions, and rewards reality over slogans. Recognition flowed where governance exists. That precedent matters far beyond Africa.
This move effectively extends the logic of the Abraham Accords into East Africa, linking Israel with pragmatic regional actors who value security, trade, and sovereignty. It strengthens the emerging coalition that resists Iranian proxy warfare and Turkish/Qatari jihadi Muslim Brotherhood expansion, not with speeches, but with facts on the ground.
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is not symbolic. It is strategic.
Iran’s Red Sea pressure is blunted.
The Muslim Brotherhood ideological advance of Turkey and Qatar is checked.
Israel gains depth, leverage, and allies who choose partnership openly, and proudly.
History doesn’t pause for diplomatic comfort.
Today, Israel didn’t wait. It acted, and the map just changed.
While Western politicians, governments, and international institutions remain trapped in the fantasy of inventing a terror state for a so-called “Palestinian people”, rewarding decades of terror with sovereignty to continue trying to destroy Israel, Israel is moving forward based on reality, securing its future, strengthening global security, and developing strategic shipping lanes that connect the United States to the East to directly challenge China’s grip on global trade.
We face no shortage of challenges, asserting sovereignty in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, eliminating the jihadi threat amongst us, and confronting the dangers still posed by Iran, Hezbollah, and Syria. But even in the midst of these existing challenges, good things are happening.
Strengthen your faith in God, lift your eyes beyond the noise, and internalize this truth: we are moving forward, and great times lie ahead, these are redemptive times.
The African Union Commission Chairman does not possess the mandate to take a definitive position or make declarations on behalf of the African Union concerning the recognition of Somaliland as an independent state without prior deliberation and consensus among the Member States of the Union.
According to the Constitutive Act of the African Union and established institutional practice, matters of state recognition, sovereignty, and territorial status fall under the exclusive authority of AU Member States, acting collectively through the appropriate policy organs, including the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
Any public statement, endorsement, or opposition issued by the African Union must therefore be the outcome of formal consultations, inclusive dialogue, and a duly adopted decision by Member States. Until such discussions take place and a common position is reached, the African Union Commission is obliged to maintain institutional neutrality and refrain from expressing positions that could be interpreted as prejudging the outcome of Member State deliberations.
The African Union remains committed to its foundational principles of respect for sovereignty, peaceful resolution of disputes, and the promotion of dialogue-led solutions to complex political questions on the continent.
The African Union Commission cannot speak on behalf of the AU regarding Somaliland’s recognition without prior discussion and agreement by Member States.
State recognition is a sovereign decision that must be determined collectively by AU Member States through the established organs of the AU. Until then, the Commission must remain neutral.
The African Union Commission has no legal or political mandate to take a position on the recognition of Somaliland in the absence of deliberation and consensus among AU Member States.
Under the Constitutive Act of the African Union, matters of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and state recognition are reserved for Member States acting collectively through the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.
Any statement issued without such consultation risks exceeding institutional authority and prejudging a matter that rightfully belongs to Member States. Until a common position is reached, the Commission is required to maintain neutrality and uphold established AU procedures.
The African Union Commission respectfully recalls that questions related to the recognition of states fall within the competence of AU Member States and require collective deliberation through the Union’s decision-making organs.
In the absence of formal consultations and an agreed position by Member States, the Commission is not mandated to articulate a position on the recognition of Somaliland. Accordingly, institutional neutrality must be maintained until such time as Member States reach a consensus.
This approach is consistent with the African Union’s Constitutive Act and its long-standing commitment to sovereign equality, dialogue, and consensus-based decision-making.
Within the African Union (AU) system, if a Chairperson of the African Union Commission is considered to have acted beyond their mandate—for example, by taking a position on Somaliland recognition without Member State deliberation—there are specific institutional remedies and decisions that Member States may take. These are political and administrative, not judicial.
Below are the realistic and lawful options available under AU practice:
Formal Reprimand or Censure
Decision-making body:
AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government
OR the Executive Council (Foreign Ministers)
What it means:
An official decision stating that the Chairperson exceeded their mandate.
Reaffirms that such matters require Member State consensus.
Becomes part of AU’s official record impact:
Political damage to the Chairperson’s authority
Sets a precedent limiting future unilateral actions.
Directive to Retract or Clarify the Statement
Decision-making body:
Executive Council or AU Assembly
What it means:
The Chairperson may be instructed to withdraw, correct, or clarify the statement
Reasserts institutional neutrality Impact:
Immediate correction of the AU’s public position
Often the most common and practical response.
Restriction of Mandate or Authority
Decision-making body:
AU Assembly, What it means:
Adoption of a decision limiting the Chairperson’s discretion on sensitive political matters
Requires prior authorization before issuing statements on sovereignty or recognition issues
Impact:
Reduces the institutional autonomy of the Chairperson.
Strengthens Member State control.
By Hassan Farah Mohamed, Lawyer focused on investment, Energy, Public Finance, Governance and Democratization
Email: hassanbadde@gmail.com
Abstract
This article examines the historical, legal, and political foundations of Somaliland’s independence, the post-1960 union with Somalia, and state-building efforts following the collapse of the Somali Republic. It also evaluates the strategic implications of international recognition, particularly by Israel, for regional security, maritime control, and counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa. Drawing on colonial treaties, African Union (AU) legal principles, and reconciliation processes led by traditional authorities, this study situates Somaliland as a unique case of restored sovereignty and democratic governance in a post-conflict context.
Introduction
Somaliland, situated in the Horn of Africa, was a British Protectorate from 1884 until its independence on 26 June 1960. Its colonial boundaries were clearly defined in the Anglo-French Treaty of 1888, the Anglo-Italian Protocol of 1894, and the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1897 (Saxafi Media, 2014). Following independence, Somaliland briefly existed as a sovereign state before voluntarily uniting on 1 July 1960 with the former Italian colony of Somalia to form the Somali Republic (Hashi, 2014). These borders remain consistent with the African Union’s principle of uti possidetis juris, which preserves the territorial integrity of post-colonial states (African Union, 2005).
The Defective Union and Legal Disputes
The Somaliland Legislative Assembly ratified the Act of Union on 27 June 1960, while the Somalia Trust Territory approved it only “in principle,” and no single mutually ratified treaty was ever concluded (Hashi, 2014). On 1 July 1960, a joint session adopted a draft Constitution prepared in Somalia, and a provisional presidential decree attempted to formalize the union. However, the decree never acquired legal force, and a retroactive Act of Union passed in 1961 contravened standard legal norms (Cotran, 1962). Legal analyses highlighted multiple deficiencies, including the lack of joint signatures and inconsistent enactment of the union laws, undermining their legal force (Contini, 1962). Additionally, the 1961 referendum in former Somaliland territories showed significant opposition to the Somali constitution, underscoring the absence of popular support for the union (Hashi, 2014).
The vision of “Greater Somalia,” aimed at uniting all Somali-speaking populations, failed and contributed to regional disputes with Ethiopia and Somalia’s support for the Shifta insurgency in Kenya’s Northern Frontier District (Hashi, 2014). Within Somaliland, early dissatisfaction manifested in the 1961 attempted coup and referendum rejection of the Somali constitution. This discontent intensified under Mohamed Siad Barre’s dictatorship (1969–1991), which targeted Somaliland’s elites and intellectuals, leading to systematic killings, repression, and the formation of the Somali National Movement (SNM) (APD, 2007).
Collapse, Reconciliation, and State-Building
Following the collapse of Somalia’s central government in 1991, the SNM liberated northwestern regions. Initially, law enforcement was weak, and militias organized along clan lines, complicating governance and security (APD, 2007). Traditional elders and SNM leaders convened grassroots reconciliation conferences to restore order. The Berbera conference in February 1991 aimed to halt hostilities and build trust among clans (APD, 2007).
The Burao conference (April–May 1991) formally declared Somaliland’s independence, restored sovereignty to its 1960 status, and established transitional governance under the SNM, including power-sharing between SNM-aligned and other clans (APD, 2007). The Borama conference in 1993 transferred authority to a civilian administration, elected President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal and Vice-President Abdirahman Aw Ali, and adopted a National Charter and Peace Charter to guide governance, militia disarmament, and inter-clan security (APD, 2007). These processes were indigenous, locally funded, and consensus-based, demonstrating an effective model of post-conflict governance without external intervention (APD, 2007).
Legal and Political Legitimacy
Somaliland’s independence claim is grounded in its colonial-era sovereignty, clearly defined borders, and democratic governance. The African Union’s 2005 fact-finding mission affirmed that Somaliland’s case is distinct and does not constitute a precedent for fragmentation, countering concerns of a “Pandora’s Box” effect (African Union, 2005).
Strategic Implications of Recognition
International recognition of Somaliland carries strategic significance. Israel’s recognition in December 2025 affirms Somaliland’s sovereignty and establishes diplomatic relations (Reuters, 2025). This recognition strengthens maritime security in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb corridor, enhances counterterrorism operations in the Horn of Africa, and contributes to regional and global stability. By reinforcing governance and legitimacy, such recognition positions Somaliland as a strategically indispensable partner in the region (APD, 2007; Reuters, 2025).
Conclusion
Somaliland is a unique case of post-colonial state restoration, demonstrating effective indigenous peacebuilding and governance. Its colonial-era sovereignty, contested union with Somalia, and grassroots reconciliation processes illustrate a model for post-conflict state-building. International recognition, particularly by Israel, consolidates sovereignty while enhancing maritime security, counterterrorism capacity, and regional stability in the Horn of Africa.
References:
African Union (2005) Report of the African Union Fact-Finding Mission on Somaliland. Addis Ababa: AU Commission.
APD (2007) Peace in Somaliland and Indigenous Approach to State-Building. Hargeisa: Academy for Peace and Development.
Cotran, E. (1962) The Union of Somaliland and Somalia: Legal Analysis. London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies.
Contini, P. (1962) Legal Issues in the Somali Union. Rome: Istituto di Diritto Comparato.
Hashi, I. (2014) Somaliland and Somalia: The 1960 Act of Union. Available at: http://www.somalilandlaw.com/Somaliland_Act_of_Union.htm (Accessed: 27 December 2025).
Saxafi Media (2014) Somaliland’s Statehood: A Historical and Legal Response. Hargeisa: Saxafi Press.
Israel’s decision to extend formal recognition to Somaliland marks a pivotal moment in Somaliland’s long pursuit of international legitimacy. For a territory that has functioned as a stable, democratic, and self governing state for more than three decades, this development represents not only diplomatic acknowledgment but also a strategic opening. While several neighboring and Muslim majority countries oppose or disapprove of Israel, Somaliland evaluates its foreign relations according to practical benefits rather than ideological sentiment. In this context, Israel’s recognition carries both symbolic and material significance.
Recognition as Strategic Advancement
Somaliland welcomes Israel’s recognition because it directly advances its national interests in a meaningful and practical manner. It provides a form of international validation long sought since Somaliland restored its independence in the early nineteen nineties. Israel becomes the first country in the world to formally acknowledge Somaliland’s sovereignty, lending considerable political and psychological weight to Somaliland’s statehood claim.
This moment is especially significant because statecraft is rarely driven by moral preference. Rather, nations act according to interests that reinforce stability, security, and long term geopolitical advantage. Governments often frame decisions in moral terms, but the underlying motivations typically reflect pragmatic calculations. States cooperate with partners whose values they may not share because outcomes, not ideals, shape foreign policy. Somaliland’s decision making follows this logic of realism.
Regional Reactions and Strategic Autonomy
Regional responses have been swift. Neighboring countries such as Somalia and Djibouti, along with influential regional states including Egypt and Turkey, each acting in pursuit of its own strategic interests, condemned Israel’s decision and characterized it as a threat to the political order in the Horn of Africa. For Somaliland, however, this opposition underscores the enduring challenges it faces in its immediate neighborhood and highlights the importance of cultivating alliances beyond the region. Despite this backlash, Somaliland views Israel’s recognition as confirmation of its longstanding claim to independent statehood. It signals to the broader international community that Somaliland’s stability, effective governance, and democratic practices can no longer be dismissed simply because they do not align with prevailing regional preferences.
Practical Benefits of a New Partnership
Somaliland appreciates Israel’s recognition not only for its symbolic value but also for its potential to generate tangible benefits. Israel has expressed interest in cooperating in agriculture, health, technology, and economic development, areas where Somaliland seeks partners with experience, resources, and a record of innovation. Israel’s invitation for a formal visit from Somaliland’s leadership underscores the seriousness of its engagement. In a region marked by insecurity in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, Israel also represents a potential provider of advanced security technology and intelligence cooperation. Somaliland interprets this not as an ideological realignment but as a practical response to its security environment, which is shaped by volatility, armed groups, and shifting geopolitical tensions.
A Realist Interpretation of Somaliland’s Foreign Policy
From the perspective of international relations theory, Somaliland’s position aligns with the logic of realism. In a world lacking a central authority to ensure security, political actors must rely on themselves while building partnerships that enhance autonomy and survival. Somaliland has long demonstrated the attributes of a functioning state by maintaining stability, administering services, and protecting its territory, even without extensive international recognition. Accepting Israel’s recognition is therefore a strategic decision, not an ideological one. It strengthens Somaliland’s ability to navigate an unpredictable regional landscape and to accumulate capabilities essential for long term security and institutional resilience.
Counterbalancing Regional Pressure
Israel’s recognition serves as a counterweight to the diplomatic pressure Somaliland faces from regional governments that continue to reject its independence. As these states coordinate opposition, Somaliland sees greater value in cultivating alliances with partners that possess global reach, technological expertise, and international influence. The recognition supports Somaliland’s efforts to resist political isolation and diversifies its foreign policy options beyond its immediate surroundings.
Pragmatism Over Ideology
Somaliland’s political experience over several decades has demonstrated that ideological alignment has yielded little practical benefit. Pragmatic cooperation with capable partners, on the other hand, has consistently strengthened Somaliland’s internal resilience. Many Muslim majority states shape their stance toward Israel based on sentiment or identity, but Somaliland approaches international relations through a lens of national interest. It prioritizes partnerships that deliver concrete outcomes in infrastructure, development, governance, and security, which are essential components of long term state building and the pursuit of durable sovereignty.
Conclusion
Israel’s recognition arrives at a critical moment as Somaliland seeks meaningful partnerships that affirm its stability, reinforce its sovereignty, and strengthen its standing on the global stage. In essence, Somaliland embraces Israel’s recognition because it provides legitimacy, strategic advantage, and access to opportunities that regional actors cannot or will not offer. Regional disapproval does not diminish the value of a partnership that enhances Somaliland’s sovereignty, stability, and capacity to function as an independent political entity. Somaliland’s foreign policy remains guided by practical judgment rather than ideological pressure, and Israel’s recognition represents an important step toward a future defined by self confidence, self reliance, and constructive engagement with the wider world.
Official Government Statement
Republic of Djibouti
For Immediate Release
Saturday, December 27, 2025
The Republic of Djibouti strongly and unequivocally condemns the recognition of Somaliland by the Israeli entity.
This decision violates the fundamental principles of international law, including the inviolability of borders and respect for state sovereignty.
By recognizing a territorial entity within the sovereign territory of another state, Israel’s move establishes a dangerous precedent that threatens to destabilize the entire region.
The Republic of Djibouti reiterates its steadfast support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Somalia. Furthermore, Djibouti calls upon the international community to refrain from legitimizing this action and to uphold international law in the interest of preserving regional peace and security.
The Women’s Human Rights, Education & Environment Association (WHEEA) has published an article titled about “The Cost of Backlash; How Roll Backs on Women Rights Deepen Sexual Violence in Somaliland”, a series of consultations with internally displaced women (IDPs), educated girls, and women activists.
During these discussions, participants shared their personal experiences and highlighted key concerns, including violence against women, the lack of sustainable livelihoods, environmental challenges, limited access to education and adult literacy programs, weak economic opportunities, and the underrepresentation of women in decision-making roles.
WHEEA released this statement to raise public awareness of these pressing issues and to amplify the voices of women and girls—particularly those from displaced communities. The association calls on government institutions, community leaders, and partner organizations to take concrete, actionable steps toward protecting women’s rights, promoting women’s empowerment, and strengthening women’s participation across social, economic, and political spheres in Somaliland.
The statement issued by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission regarding Somaliland reflects a political position, not an objective or evidence-based assessment grounded in African realities, international law, or the African Union’s own historical findings.
First, it is important to state clearly that Somaliland’s quest for recognition is not an attempt to undermine Somalia’s unity, but a legitimate exercise of self-determination based on historical, legal, and political facts.
Somaliland was a sovereign and independent state in 1960, recognized by over 35 countries, before it voluntarily entered into a failed and unratified union with Somalia.
That union collapsed in 1991, restoring Somaliland’s previously recognized sovereignty.
Second, the African Union cannot selectively invoke the 1964 OAU borders principle while ignoring the fact that Somaliland’s borders are colonial borders inherited at independence, identical to those of the former British Somaliland Protectorate.
Recognition of Somaliland would therefore not redraw borders, but rather restore a pre-existing internationally recognized boundary, fully consistent with AU principles.
Third, it is deeply concerning that the Chairperson’s statement ignores the African Union’s own Fact-Finding Mission to Somaliland (2005). That mission concluded unequivocally that:
Somaliland’s case is unique and self-justified;
Somaliland has demonstrated peace, stability, democratic governance, and effective state institutions for more than three decades;
The Somaliland issue should not be compared to other separatist movements in Africa;
The AU should find a special, tailored approach to Somaliland’s recognition.
Disregarding this official AU report undermines the credibility of the Commission and raises serious questions about institutional consistency and integrity.
Fourth, the reality on the ground is that Somaliland has already begun to receive international recognition, including from states acting in accordance with their sovereign foreign policies.
This trend reflects geopolitical realities, regional security considerations, and Somaliland’s strategic importance in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa.
Recognition is not a theoretical debate anymore—it is a developing diplomatic reality, and more countries are expected to follow.
Finally, it must be stated respectfully but clearly that the Chairperson of the Commission, as a former Foreign Minister of Djibouti, appears to be articulating a position closely aligned with Djibouti’s national policy, rather than speaking as a neutral custodian of African continental interests.
The role of the AU Commission requires impartiality, balance, and adherence to facts, not the projection of individual state agendas onto the entire continent.
Africa cannot continue to penalize success, stability, and democratic governance.
Somaliland has built peace where chaos once prevailed, institutions where collapse existed, and democracy where authoritarianism dominates the region.
Denying recognition in the face of these realities weakens, rather than strengthens, Africa’s credibility.
The African Union must choose between political convenience and historical truth.
Somaliland’s case deserves fairness, honesty, and the implementation of the AU’s own findings—not perpetual delay.
Mohamed Ali
Chairman of Somaliland Intellectual Organization
#Somaliland #Israel #Somalilandrecognition #AfricanUnion
On Tuesday, December 26, Dr. Badr Abdel-Aty, Egypt’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Emigration, and Expatriate Affairs, received a series of telephone calls from His Excellency Abshir Omar Jama, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Somalia; His Excellency Hakan Fidan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye; and His Excellency Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Djibouti.
The calls focused on the dangerous escalation of tensions recently witnessed in the Horn of Africa region.
The discussions specifically addressed the matter of Israel’s recognition of the Somaliland region. The ministers expressed their unequivocal and firm rejection and condemnation of this recognition. They reaffirmed their full support for the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia, and categorically opposed any unilateral measures that could infringe upon Somalia’s sovereignty or undermine the foundations of the country’s stability. Furthermore, they declared their full backing for the legitimate institutions of the Somali government and rejected any attempt to establish parallel entities or administrations that challenge the unity of the Somali state.
During the calls, it was also stressed that recognizing the independence of parts of a sovereign state’s territory sets a dangerous precedent that threatens international peace and security, and contravenes the established principles of international law and the United Nations Charter. It was affirmed that respect for the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of nations is a cornerstone of the international order, which must not be violated under any circumstances.
The ministers also clearly denounced all attempts to create faits accomplis or establish parallel structures that bypass international legitimacy and jeopardize prospects for peace, stability, and development.
Finally, they firmly rejected any and all plans to displace or resettle the Palestinian people outside of their homeland—a position shared and fully supported by the vast majority of the international community, in any form or guise.
Somaliland’s 30-year quest for recognition exposes the limits of Africa’s rigid colonial-border doctrine and challenges the African Union to confront a political and legal reality it can no longer ignore.
For over three decades, a quiet, stable democracy has flourished on the Horn of Africa, a beacon of peace in a region synonymous with chaos. This nation, Somaliland, has its own currency, its own army, its own elected government, and its own passport. Yet, in the eyes of the world, and crucially, in the eyes of the African Union (AU), it does not exist.
Somaliland’s story is not one of a typical secessionist movement. It is a profound legal and political anomaly, a direct challenge to the African continent’s most sacred, yet most problematic, doctrine: the principle of uti possidetis juris—the iron law that perpetuates colonialism on African borders.
The dilemma is stark. On one side stands the AU, fearing that recognizing Somaliland will open a “Pandora’s Box, unleashing a wave of border revisionism and fragmentation across the continent. On the other side is a fully functioning, self-governing state that claims it is not breaking a border but merely restoring one—the distinct boundary of the former British Somaliland Protectorate, which existed before a disastrous, flawed union with the former Italian Trust Territory of Somalia in 1960.
The continued non-recognition of Somaliland is more than a diplomatic slight; it is a policy failure that ignores a stable, democratic reality in favour of a rigid, theoretical principle. The question for the AU is no longer if Somaliland is a state, but whether its unique circumstances justify an exceptional, pragmatic solution that could redefine the future of African sovereignty.
The Flawed Marriage of 1960
Somaliland’s claim to independence is rooted in the argument that its union with Somalia in 1960 was legally flawed from its inception and failed catastrophically in the decades that followed.
On June 26, 1960, British Somaliland gained its independence. Five days later, on July 1, it voluntarily united with the newly independent Italian Trust Territory of Somalia to form the Somali Republic. This “come-we-stay” union, as legal scholars like Judge Eugene Cotran described it, was rushed, romantic, and ultimately, legally unsound.
The legislative instruments intended to formalize the union were never properly enacted. The Provisional President’s decree unifying the two territories was never converted into law as required by the Constitution. As Judge Cotran noted, the key legal documents—the Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law and the Somalia Act of the Union—were never formally signed by representatives of both territories.
A retroactive “Act of Union” was passed in January 1961, but this action arguably breached the very constitution it sought to uphold. The failure to properly formalize the union was a symptom of a deeper incompatibility. The two territories had inherited vastly different legal, judicial, and administrative systems from their respective colonial masters, Britain and Italy. The attempt to merge these disparate systems, along with the imposition of a highly centralized, unitary political system, disregarded the decentralized governance models, such as the traditional xeer system, prevalent in the north.
This political mismatch quickly devolved into marginalization and, eventually, brutal military suppression. The military dictatorship that seized power in 1969 focused its wrath on the northern regions (Somaliland), leading to a devastating civil war in the 1980s. The systematic bombing of cities like Hargeisa by the central government remains a scar on the national memory. Following the collapse of the central government in 1991, Somaliland declared the restoration of its independence on May 18, 1991. Since then, Mogadishu has not exercised any administrative control over the territory.
The Case for Statehood: A De Facto Reality
Somaliland’s argument for recognition rests on two pillars: its compliance with the international legal criteria for statehood and its unique historical claim.
The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933), which sets the standard for statehood, requires four qualifications: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Somaliland meets these criteria in practice, if not in name.
Criterion
Somaliland’s Evidence
Status
Permanent Population
Estimated population of 5.7 million people.
Meets Criterion
Defined Territory
The internationally recognized borders of the former British Somaliland Protectorate.
Meets Criterion
Government
A stable, functioning, and democratically elected government with effective administrative control over its territory since 1991.
Meets Criterion
Capacity to Enter into Relations
Maintains numerous “government-to-government dealings” with states (e.g., Ethiopia, Taiwan, UK, UAE) and international organizations (e.g., EU), including hosting consulates and liaison offices in Hargeisa.
Meets Criterion (De Facto)
Under the declaratory theory of statehood, meeting these factual and objective criteria should be sufficient, regardless of formal recognition by other states. The 1991 British commercial court ruling in Republic of Somalia v Woodhouse Drake & Carey (Suisse) SA further supports this pragmatic view, as the court considered the degree, nature, and stability of administrative control as a key factor in determining the existence of a government.
However, Somaliland’s most powerful argument is its historical one. Its independence is not an act of secession that seeks to create a new border, but an act of re-establishing the original colonial boundary that existed prior to the failed 1960 union. This directly invokes the spirit of the AU’s own border principle. The AU’s commitment to uti possidetis (Latin meaning “as you possess”) is to respect the “borders existing on achievement of independence.” Somaliland achieved independence within its colonial borders on June 26, 1960. Its separation from Somalia is therefore a restoration of a recognized colonial boundary, not a revisionist claim. This makes Somaliland a unique case, distinct from irredentist or sub-state secessionist movements that seek to redraw existing lines.
The Cairo Resolution and the precedent problem
The AU’s reluctance to recognize Somaliland is rooted in its interpretation of the 1964 Cairo Resolution, which is the legal foundation for the inviolability of colonial borders. The resolution states that all member states “pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence.”
The original intent of the resolution was pragmatic: to prevent interstate conflicts arising from irredentist claims, such as Somalia’s own historical claims on the territories of its neighbours. It was not explicitly designed to preclude internal boundary adjustments or the dissolution of a failed union, especially one where the internal border was itself a former international colonial boundary.
Yet, the AU has adopted a maximalist interpretation, treating the resolution as a blanket prohibition on all border changes—often incorrectly termed the “intangibility principle.” This interpretation is codified in Article 4(b) of the AU Constitutive Act.
Defenders of this rigid stance argue that recognizing Somaliland would set a dangerous precedent, potentially destabilizing countries with their own internal separatist movements. However, Somaliland counters this “Pandora’s Box” argument by pointing to two key precedents already set by the AU: Eritrea and South Sudan.
Case
Parent State
AU/OAU Stance
Key Distinction
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Recognized
Independence was based on the restoration of a distinct Italian colonial boundary and followed a prolonged war and a referendum.
South Sudan
Sudan
Recognized
Independence was achieved through a negotiated process and a referendum, following a comprehensive peace agreement. Sudan and South Sudan are separated by the 1 January 1956 British colonial boundary.
Somaliland
Somalia
Unrecognized
Independence is based on the restoration of a distinct British colonial boundary and the failure of the parent state. The lack of a negotiated settlement with Somalia is the primary obstacle.
While both Eritrea and South Sudan were ultimately recognized, the key difference for Somaliland is the lack of a negotiated settlement with Somalia. The international community tends to favour the position of the parent state, making Somalia’s assent—or at least a negotiated agreement—a likely prerequisite for full UN and AU membership. This is the political hurdle that Somaliland must clear, even with its strong legal and historical case.
A path forward: criteria for exceptionalism
The continued denial of recognition is not a defence of the uti possidetis principle, but a perpetuation of instability and an obstacle to regional integration. The AU must develop a policy framework that addresses cases of state failure and the restoration of colonial boundaries without undermining the core principle.
A criteria-based approach for exceptional cases of state dissolution and re-establishment of colonial borders is the most pragmatic path forward. This approach would allow the AU to acknowledge the reality of Somaliland’s de facto statehood while simultaneously safeguarding the continent against widespread fragmentation.
The criteria for such exceptional recognition could include the following. First, an obligation to restore a boundary existing at independence if the claim is based on the re-establishment of a distinct, internationally recognized colonial boundary that existed before the formation of the failed union. This is the unique legal hook that separates Somaliland from other secessionist movements.
Second, if there is a protracted state failure where the parent state (Somalia) has demonstrated a prolonged and irreversible failure to exercise effective sovereignty and administrative control over the territory for a significant period (e.g., three decades).
Third, if the aspiring state demonstrates a sustained record of peace, stability, democratic governance, and respect for human rights. Somaliland has held multiple successful presidential and parliamentary elections, a stark contrast to the instability in Mogadishu.
Fourth,if the aspiring state formally renounces any irredentist claims on the territory of its neighbours, thereby affirming its commitment to the existing colonial borders it seeks to restore.
The Geopolitical Chessboard
The debate over Somaliland is no longer confined to the halls of the AU. The geopolitical landscape is shifting, and major global powers are increasingly engaging with Hargeisa, driven by strategic interests.
Somaliland’s location on the Gulf of Aden, near the Bab el-Mandeb strait—a critical chokepoint for global shipping—makes it strategically vital. Concerns over counter-terrorism, maritime security, and the competition for influence in the Horn of Africa have led to increased engagement from countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates.
The US government, for instance, has shown a growing willingness to bypass Mogadishu and engage directly with Hargeisa on security and development matters. Congressional actions and the establishment of a US presence in the capital suggest that external actors are losing patience with the AU’s rigid stance. This external engagement, while beneficial to Somaliland, puts pressure on the AU to either adapt its policy or risk having its norms circumvented by international actors who prioritize stability and strategic access over adherence to a decades-old, arguably flawed, legal doctrine.
A chance to strengthen the AU
The case of Somaliland is a litmus test for the AU’s ability to evolve and adapt its foundational principles to modern realities. It is not a typical secessionist movement; it is the consequence of a failed political union and the restoration of a distinct colonial boundary.
The AU’s rigid adherence to a maximalist interpretation of the Cairo Resolution, while understandable in its goal of preventing fragmentation, ignores the unique legal and historical facts of the Somaliland case. By adopting a nuanced, criteria-based approach, the AU can acknowledge the reality of Somaliland’s de facto statehood without opening the feared “Pandora’s Box.”
Recognizing Somaliland as an exceptional case—one that affirms the original colonial boundaries rather than violates them—would strengthen the AU’s credibility, reward stability and democracy, and provide a constructive solution to a long-standing political and legal anomaly on the continent. The continued denial of recognition is not a defence of the uti possidetis principle, but a perpetuation of instability and an obstacle to regional integration. It is time for the AU to choose pragmatism over dogma and acknowledge the state that has already built itself.
Dr Wafula Okumu is theExecutive Director of The Borders Institute (TBI), Nairobi. Kenya. The views expressed in this Op-Ed article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent The Horn Tribune’s editorial policy.
In a significant diplomatic development, Israel and the Republic of Somaliland have signed a mutual recognition agreement and established full diplomatic relations, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar announced today.
In a statement, Sa’ar said he had spoken with Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (also known as Irro) on what he described as “this important day for both countries.” The agreement follows a year of comprehensive dialogue between the two sides.
“Following the decision of Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, we signed today a mutual recognition and the establishment of full diplomatic relations,” Sa’ar stated. This will include the appointment of ambassadors and the opening of embassies in each other’s capitals.
The agreement is expected to enhance cooperation in areas such as security, economic development, and regional stability, particularly in the strategic Horn of Africa and Red Sea region. Sa’ar emphasized that both nations will work together to advance relations between their peoples and promote economic prosperity.
“I have instructed my offices to act immediately to formalize ties between the countries across a variety of fields,” he added.
The agreement may pave the way for further international engagement with Somaliland, including potential involvement in broader frameworks like the Abraham Accords.
