Kismayo – Jubbaland State President Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Ahmed Madobe) declared on Thursday that President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud should not enforce policies and practices that he himself opposed when campaigning for office.
Speaking at the opening of the Somali Future Council conference in Kismayo, President Madobe stated that the gathering aims to address Somalia’s overarching political challenges and formulate decisions in the national interest.
“No one will accept today what President Hassan rejected yesterday,” Madobe said. “We will not allow the country to be destroyed.”
He emphasized that governance in Somalia must not revolve around a single individual clinging to power, insisting that leadership should be founded on consultation and collective responsibility.
“This conference is about saving the country and its people. Governance is not about one person holding on to power,” he stated. “Our disagreement with President Hassan concerns his attempt to retain power and monopolize resources—something we can neither accept nor legitimize.”
The Jubbaland leader’s remarks come as Somali and international observers closely monitor the outcomes of the Somali Future Council conference, which commenced this week in Kismayo.
The conference has attracted a broad spectrum of senior political figures, including former President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, former Prime Ministers Mohamed Hussein Rooble, Hassan Ali Khayre, and Abdi Farah Shirdoon (Saacid), former Puntland President Abdirahman Farole, former minister Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame, and other prominent leaders.
Borama – The Somaliland government has confirmed that 19 people were killed and 214 others injured during protests earlier this month in Borama, the capital of the Awdal region. The casualties followed clashes between security forces and demonstrators.
The newly appointed governor of Awdal, Abdirashid Hassan Mataan, announced that the fatalities included one woman. Of the injured, 194 sustained minor wounds, while 20 remain hospitalized in Borama and two others are receiving treatment in Hargeisa.
Governor Mataan added that nine people were initially transferred to Hargeisa Hospital. Of those, seven were later flown by the government to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for advanced medical treatment. He stated that the condition of the injured is improving.
Speaking after assuming office on Thursday, the governor expressed confidence that the unrest in the region could be brought under control. He noted that the people of Awdal played a key role in Somaliland’s independence struggle and continue to contribute significantly to its development.
Somaliland’s Minister of Interior, Abdalle Mohamed Arab, described Awdal as one of the safest regions in Somaliland. He stated that the incident leading to the deaths was not a deliberate act aimed at harming Somaliland but rather an unplanned event that resulted in tragic and unexpected losses.
Meanwhile, Somaliland Vice President Mohamed Ali Aw Abdi urged residents of Borama and other western regions to remain vigilant against further unrest. He called on communities in the area to coexist peacefully, emphasizing the importance of maintaining long-standing social harmony.
The violence erupted after the Somaliland government authorized a commemoration of Xeer Ciise, the traditional customary law of the Somali-Issa communities in Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia, which is officially recognized by UNESCO. The decision sparked anger among sections of the Borama community, triggering protests that escalated into violent confrontations with security forces.
Addis Abeba – For decades, Djibouti’s formidable geography has been its principal currency. Its position at the mouth of the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait has secured its place as a host for the world’s most powerful militaries, transforming its sovereignty into a lucrative real estate operation. Yet the unanimous vote by the Djiboutian parliament in October 2025 to abolish the presidential age limit of 75 represents a significant and troubling pivot. As Al Jazeera reported, this decision strategically clears the last constitutional hurdle for the 77-year-old President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh to run for a sixth term in April 2026.
This action is not merely the final, cynical act of a personalist ruler, but a profound and intentional signal that Djibouti’s regime has prioritized its internal political survival over constitutional stability, directly threatening the very regional security it claims to protect.
The constitutional amendment does not occur in a vacuum; it is the calculated endpoint of a two-decade-long erosion of institutional checks. As the International Monetary Fund warns of the nation’s acute debt distress, and Ethiopia aggressively pursues alternative port access, this political entrenchment reveals a regime now conflating its own indefinite survival with the stability of the state. The implications of this move, far from being a domestic concern, constitute a direct threat to regional security and to the global integrity of the Red Sea and demand a clear-eyed reassessment of the Horn’s strategic partnerships. Amid this escalating uncertainty, the endogenous governance model of the Republic of Somaliland offers a powerful counterpoint and a necessary pathway toward durable security that international partners can no longer afford to ignore.
The final act of constitutional dismantling completes a process that began in earnest in 2010 with the removal of presidential term limits. While that earlier revision was a significant blow to democratic transition, it at least retained the structural possibility of a leadership change based on age. The 2025 amendment, however, eradicates that final safeguard, effectively paving the way for a presidency for life.
The argument presented by the regime, articulated by officials like Speaker of Parliament Dileita Mohamed Dileita, posits that such indefinite incumbency is a necessary price for maintaining stability in a turbulent region. This rationale dangerously equates the longevity of one man with the security of the nation, a profound fallacy that undermines the very institutional foundations upon which long-term stability is built. By systematically dismantling the foundational guardrails of its own political system, the Guelleh regime signals a reliance on personal power over constitutional order, inviting the very type of elite factionalism and succession crises that have plagued neighboring states.
The purported unanimous parliamentary consensus, as documented by Africa24TV, masks the reported and intensifying tensions among political and clan elites regarding an unresolved succession. The vote reflects not genuine political unity but a system held together by coercive loyalty, patronage, and the systematic shrinking of civic space. This reality is underscored by the condemnation from opposition figures who argue that true stability lies with the Djiboutian people, not a single individual. The indefinite continuation of Guelleh’s rule is an attempt to defer an inevitable political crisis, but in doing so, it only guarantees that the eventual transition will be more sudden, volatile, and dangerous for the entire region. The erosion of constitutional guardrails transforms the presidency into a personal fiefdom, making the state brittle and structurally unsound, a powder keg waiting for the spark of succession.
Economic vulnerability, debt-fueled fragility
The urgency of this constitutional gambit is inextricably linked to Djibouti’s profound and mounting economic vulnerabilities. The nation’s economic model, long praised for its strategic leveraging of geography, rests upon three increasingly precarious pillars: rents from foreign military bases, revenues from port and logistics operations, and its role as the primary conduit for Ethiopia’s external trade. This narrow base is cracking under immense strain.
A debt-fueled infrastructure boom, financed largely by Chinese creditors, has pushed public debt to unsustainable levels. The International Monetary Fund’s 2025 Article IV Consultation explicitly states that Djibouti faces a high risk of debt distress, highlighting concerns over fiscal vulnerabilities and the financial health of state-owned enterprises. China is the country’s single largest creditor, having financed crucial infrastructure like the railway and the multi-purpose port. This deep financial dependency on Beijing not only compromises Djibouti’s economic sovereignty but also functions as an autocratic subsidy for the Guelleh regime. By continuing to finance debt and roll over loans, China provides the essential liquidity that insulates the Guelleh regime from the political consequences of its poor governance and allows it to repress dissent while maintaining infrastructure investments. This Chinese financial lifeline is a crucial external element stabilizing the autocratic rule of President Guelleh, creating a profound moral hazard for Western powers.
The constitutional amendment does not occur in a vacuum; it is the calculated endpoint of a two-decade-long erosion of institutional checks.
This fiscal fragility is acutely exposed by external shocks. The ongoing instability in the Red Sea, driven by Houthi attacks on commercial shipping, has severely disrupted maritime traffic, forcing many insurers and commercial vessels to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope. This diversion directly erodes the port revenues that Djibouti’s treasury depends upon, exacerbating the debt crisis.
Compounding these pressures is a dire social crisis, with youth unemployment estimated at 76% in 2024, creating a tinderbox of discontent that the regime seeks to manage through political repression rather than economic opportunity. The debt crisis and the resulting youth demographic time bomb combine to form an internal pressure cooker that the regime attempts to relieve by manufacturing external disputes.
Erosion of Strategic Leverage: Ethiopia’s pivot
Furthermore, Djibouti’s once-unassailable strategic leverage is being systematically diluted. For years, its position as the near-exclusive gateway for Ethiopia’s trade—handling over 95% of its neighbor’s import-export volume—granted it significant economic and political capital. This dynamic has been fundamentally altered by Ethiopia’s determined and public shift toward port diversification.
The January 2024 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland is the most potent symbol of this reorientation. By securing access to the Port of Berbera and pursuing a path toward formal recognition, Ethiopia has signaled a clear intent to break its dependency on a single, increasingly unstable corridor. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has consistently framed sea access as an “existential matter” for Ethiopia, a statement that has translated into tangible action through the accelerated development of the Berbera Corridor and the exploration of other alternatives.
This strategic recalibration by the region’s largest economy directly threatens Djibouti’s core revenue stream and, by extension, undermines a key pillar of the Guelleh administration’s political and economic calculus. The economic pressure from Ethiopia’s diversification forces Djibouti’s leadership to double down on autocratic consolidation, seeking to maintain control through internal coercion as external rents diminish.
Axis of instability
Facing this potent combination of internal fragility and eroding external leverage, the regime in Djibouti has adopted a foreign policy of provocative brinkmanship. Crucially, this strategy is executed in tandem with an informal but potent alliance of external and internal actors—the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in Mogadishu and the powerful patrons of both states, China, Djibouti, and Turkey. This collaboration transforms a domestic crisis into a coordinated regional destabilization campaign, designed to discredit the Somaliland model and halt Ethiopia’s port diversification strategy, thereby protecting the status quo interests of the axis members.
The FGS has emerged as a willing partner in this strategy, aligning with Djibouti to undermine the evolving Somaliland–Ethiopia dynamic. The FGS’s own political architecture is inherently fragile, beset by persistent disputes with federal member states and constant security threats from Al-Shabaab. In an effort to manage these domestic pressures and shore up a precarious political base, the FGS leadership has deliberately mobilized nationalist sentiment, adopting a rigid and openly hostile posture toward Somaliland that leaves little room for negotiation.
This campaign has centered on economic and technical forms of disruption, with the FGS leveraging its internationally recognized status to wage what amounts to administrative warfare. Mogadishu has sought to assert control over the Hargeisa Flight Information Region (FIR) through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), transforming airspace administration into a political instrument used to harass commercial aviation and assert symbolic sovereignty. Such actions introduce tangible safety risks for overflying aircraft, politicizing a domain that is meant to remain strictly technical and, in doing so, placing international aviation safety at risk.
In parallel, the FGS has pursued economic interference by repeatedly attempting to invalidate international agreements, most notably the DP World concession at Berbera Port. It has also imposed administrative obstacles, including the extension of the Electronic Cargo Tracking Note (ECTN) scheme to Berbera. This measure is intended to enforce double taxation and erode the efficiency of Somaliland’s maritime trade, amounting to an economic proxy war against Hargeisa’s development and, by extension, Ethiopia’s logistical security.
China’s role in this alliance is primarily financial and geopolitical. China is Djibouti’s single largest creditor. China’s continued financial support stabilizes Guelleh’s personal rule, effectively subsidizing an autocratic regime whose growing instability runs counter to long-term Western security interests. This strategic choice by Beijing complicates any attempt by Western powers to apply political conditionality to the regime, allowing the constitutional dismantling to proceed unchecked. Furthermore, any successful development of Berbera as a counterweight to Djibouti would threaten a port that represents one of Beijing’s most significant investments in the region, aligning China’s core economic interests with the preservation of the current geopolitical status quo.
A third significant pillar supporting the axis of instability is Turkey. Ankara has invested deeply in military, security, and economic partnerships with the FGS in Mogadishu. Turkey maintains its largest military base abroad in Mogadishu, the TURKSOM facility, which trains the Somali National Army and is a visible symbol of external support for the FGS. This security backing provides the FGS with the diplomatic and political confidence to maintain its hostile stance against Somaliland, knowing it has a powerful, non-Western patron willing to support its nationalistic claims without democratic conditionality. The Turkish-backed administration of Mogadishu’s port and airport further provides the FGS with crucial revenue streams.
Regional security imperative, counterpoint to autocratic decay
This aggressive posture, driven by the coordinated interests of Djibouti and Mogadishu and supported by China and Turkey, is not merely a bilateral dispute; it is a profound threat to regional security. It risks igniting a broader conflict that would further destabilize the Horn of Africa, directly endanger the vital sea lanes of the Bab el-Mandeb, and sabotage the most promising avenue for economic diversification and resilience in the region.
For Ethiopia, a peaceful and prosperous Somaliland is not a peripheral interest but a strategic imperative for its multi-port policy and national economic security. The destabilization campaign led from Djibouti and Mogadishu therefore constitutes a direct challenge to Ethiopia’s core economic interests and its vision for regional integration. The escalation of tensions in the Gulf of Aden—a region already struggling with Houthi attacks and piracy—is exactly the scenario the international community should seek to prevent. The collective actions of the Axis partners prioritize regime survival and nationalistic rhetoric over the long-term collective security of the Horn.
In this context of democratic backsliding, financial fragility, and manufactured crises, the presents a stark and instructive contrast. Its governance model, built over three decades after withdrawing Republic of Somaliland from the union with Somalia in 1991, is anchored in a unique blend of traditional consensus and modern, multi-party institutions. This endogenous model of resilience has ensured that its stability is not purchased through authoritarian endurance or the rental of sovereignty to foreign powers but is earned through a deep-seated social contract that emphasizes dialogue and accountability.
As Djibouti approaches the predetermined April 2026 election, the Horn of Africa stands at a strategic inflection point.”
Somaliland has successfully established a multi-party political system and institutionalized a capacity for localized conflict resolution that consistently manages disputes without recourse to the kind of constitutional manipulation or state collapse seen elsewhere in the region. The very existence of open political competition, a free press, and an established rule of law demonstrates a qualitative difference from the suffocating autocracy next door. Somaliland’s proven capacity to maintain peace and political order through internal consensus, including multiple peaceful transfers of executive power, makes it a critical and reliable node of stability in the volatile Horn.
International complicity, strategic reckoning
The strategic value of Somaliland’s stability is increasingly clear and aligns with the long-term interests of international partners, including the United States. As noted in the 2025 report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), the Horn of Africa is situated in the “midst of the world’s hottest geopolitical competition,” making stable, pro-Western partners invaluable. Somaliland, with its pro-Western orientation, functional governance, and control of the strategic Berbera port, represents a viable and principled alternative to an increasingly unstable and autocratic Djibouti.
Its longstanding partnership with Taiwan, as highlighted in a 2025 letter from U.S. Senator Ted Cruz advocating for recognition, demonstrates a foreign policy alignment that stands in direct opposition to Beijing’s core interests. Furthermore, security analyses, such as those from Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), acknowledge Somaliland’s growing potential as a security partner in securing vital Red Sea shipping lanes against threats from non-state actors. The logical strategic reassessment would naturally position Berbera’s deep-water port and its massive Cold War-era airstrip as a credible contingency for Western powers seeking true diversification away from the risks of a Chinese debt trap and autocratic decay.
The international community, particularly the major powers with military assets in Djibouti—the United States, China, and France—bears a significant share of responsibility for the current trajectory. A policy approach that prioritizes uninterrupted access to basing rights over the long-term health of Djibouti’s polity has been short-sighted. By providing consistent financial and diplomatic support with few political conditions, these powers have effectively insulated the Guelleh regime from the consequences of its authoritarian consolidation and economic mismanagement. Their collective silence in the face of the constitutional coup of 2025, alongside China’s active financial support and Turkey’s strategic backing of the FGS, amounts to a de facto endorsement of the entire axis of autocratic stability and regional provocation.
Djibouti’s 2026 Election: Crossroads of stability, chaos
As Djibouti approaches the predetermined April 2026 election, the Horn of Africa stands at a strategic inflection point. The path of regression—marked by entrenched personalist rule, deepening debt dependency, and reckless regional aggression—leads inexorably toward state fragility. A Djibouti that becomes a source of instability rather than a pillar of it would be a catastrophe for regional commerce and security. The confluence of the FGS’s nationalist rhetoric, China’s stabilizing finance, and Turkey’s security shield creates a powerful, systemic threat to the region’s hard-won, if imperfect, stability.
For the wider international community, a serious recalibration is overdue. Engagement with autocracies like Djibouti must be conditioned on demonstrable progress toward democratic norms and respect for constitutional order. Simultaneously, a forward-looking strategy must acknowledge and deepen engagement with existing pillars of stability in the region. The Somaliland Partnership Act, passed by the U.S. Congress, already provides the legislative framework for this distinct, security-focused engagement, treating cooperation with Hargeisa separately from the FGS. This differentiated policy approach is the only way to safeguard democratic values and long-term security interests in the face of escalating autocratic consolidation.
Conclusion: Urgency of strategic reassessment
The constitutional crisis in Djibouti, buttressed by the geopolitical ambitions of Mogadishu, China, and Turkey, is a regional security alert. It demonstrates that stability secured through autocratic endurance is inherently brittle and ultimately corrosive. The contrasting example of Somaliland proves that durable peace is built upon consensus, accountability, and institutional legitimacy. The choice for the international community is not one of picking sides in a complicated secessionist dispute, but one of strategically supporting proven models of governance that enhance collective security and economic resilience. To ignore this reality is to remain complicit in the deterioration of a critical region and to cede influence to external powers whose interests are antithetical to constitutional democracy. The time for a principled and strategic reassessment is now, before Djibouti’s fatal gamble precipitates a crisis from which the entire Horn will struggle to recover. AS
Editor’s Note: Adam Daud Ahmed is a political and security analyst specializing in the Horn of Africa, with expertise in democratization, conflict, and regional dynamics. He can be reached at aadan7333@hotmail.com
HARGEISA – In a move that underscores regulatory oversight of political party operations, Somaliland’s Committee for Registration of Political Associations and Approval of National Parties (GDUS&AAQ) has formally approved the Kulmiye Party’s request to hold its Central Committee meeting in late July 2026.
The approval, detailed in an official resolution and notification letter dated December 18, 2025, mandates that the ruling party’s key leadership gathering must complete all agenda items required by national law and the party’s own constitution. The decision cites several legal provisions designed to uphold internal party democracy, signaling the committee’s active role in enforcing political regulations ahead of the nation’s electoral calendar.
Translation for Media Publication
Document 1: Official Resolution
The Committee for Registration of Political Associations and Approval of National Parties (GDUS&AAQ) issued the following resolution:
Preamble:
Having reviewed the summons for the General Assembly and Central Committee meeting under theKulmiye Party Constitution;
Committed to upholdinginternal party democracy and ensuring compliance with the National Constitution, Law No. 14/2023, the Party Constitution, and all relevant agreements;
Acting under the authority granted by theLaw on the Regulation of Associations and Political Parties (No. 14/2023);
The Committee hereby resolves:
To formally approve the schedule for the Kulmiye Party’s Central Committee meeting, set for July 28–29, 2026. The meeting must address all agenda items mandated by Law No. 14 and the Party Constitution.
That the Kulmiye Party must adhere strictly to the official procedures and templates for conducting the meeting.
Signed by GDUS&AAQ Members:
Siciid Maxamed Cilmi (Siräädie)
Maxamuud Ismaaciii Xasan (Bede)
Cumar Cali Cabdillaahi
Siciid Axmed Cabdikariim
Cabdalle Ibraahim Maxamed
Maxamuud Axmed Obsiye
Muxyadiin Yuusuf Ibraahim
Document 2: Official Notification Letter
Republic of Somaliland
Committee for Registration of Political Associations and Approval of National Parties (GDUS&AAQ)
Date: December 18, 2025
Reference: GDUS&AAQ/66/25
To:
The Chairman, Kulmiye Party
Party Headquarters, Hargeisa
Copied to:
Kulmiye Party Leadership, Central Committee, and Executive Committee
Subject: GDUS&AAQ Decision on the Schedule of Kulmiye Party Meetings
This letter serves as official notification of the Committee’s decision regarding the meeting schedule submitted by the Kulmiye Party (Ref: XK/XG/00421/2099/2025, dated December 15, 2025).
Legal Basis for Decision:
The Committee’s decision is grounded in the following legal provisions:
· Article 9(1) of the Somaliland Constitution – guaranteeing a multi-party democratic system.
· Articles 40 & 41 of Law No. 14/2023 – governing General Assembly and Central Committee meetings of political parties.
· Article 4(4) of Law No. 14/2023 – stating the law’s purpose to strengthen internal democracy within political parties.
· Article 10(6) of Law No. 14/2023 – mandating the Committee to ensure parties conduct free and fair internal elections and adhere to democratic principles.
[Page 1 of 2]
This concludes the official text of the notification.
A new report by British International Investment (BII), the UK’s development finance institution, has highlighted the ongoing modernization of Berbera Port as a strategic project with significant and wide-ranging economic potential.
The report underscores that the port’s expansion, led by global logistics leader DP World, exemplifies how investment in critical port infrastructure within emerging markets can unlock new commercial opportunities, drive down transportation costs, and catalyze broader economic growth.
BII’s analysis emphasized the critical importance of partnering with experienced international operators. It also pointed to the synergistic value of integrating the port with other major developments, notably the Berbera Economic Zone (BEZ).
In conclusion, the report argues that the true benefits of the Berbera Port project extend far beyond its core function as a maritime gateway. It is attributed with a deeper strategic importance, positioning it as a future cornerstone for economic diversification, job creation, and sustainable development in Somaliland and the wider Horn of Africa region.
Hargeisa – A conference to analyze the obstacles preventing the Somaliland government from implementing the National Disability Commission was held today at the Hargeisa office of the national organization AWVO (Al-kownin Women Voluntary Organization).
Attended by scholars, persons with disabilities, legal experts, and civil society representatives, the meeting focused on the rights of persons with disabilities, the critical importance of establishing the Committee for the Protection of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the challenges currently faced by the disabled community.
Following extensive discussion, participants recommended consulting the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs and Family (MESAF). The goal is to reinstate the legislative proposal for establishing the disability rights committee, a draft law reportedly abolished recently by the Ministry. This effort is proposed in collaboration with the Somaliland Disabled People’s Federation (SNDF).
The conference further proposed that if the Ministry refuses to revive the draft law, the following constitutional steps should be taken:
Submitting a petition signed by 5,000 citizens to the Somaliland House of Representatives.
Convincing 11 members of the House to formally submit the draft law for establishing the committee, enabling its formulation and implementation.
Experts at the conference emphasized that “ensuring the rights of people with disabilities depends on the establishment of a committee dedicated to their protection.”
To conclude, the meeting decided to appoint a follow-up committee of ten scholars to monitor progress on the agreed actions.
Hargeisa, Somaliland – In a major development for its energy sector, Somaliland has announced plans to commence oil well drilling in early 2027, with the possibility of some operations beginning as early as 2026.
The announcement was made by the Minister of Energy and Minerals, Honorable Ahmed Jama Barre, who cited ongoing logistical preparations as a cause for optimism. “There is great hope that the drilling of Somaliland’s oil wells will begin at the start of 2027, and some may even start earlier during 2026,” Minister Barre stated. “Exploration companies have now awarded contracts to bring rigs and essential equipment into the country.”
This move follows years of geological assessment indicating strong hydrocarbon potential, with onshore basins bearing similarities to productive structures in neighboring Yemen. Major international interests are already positioned in the region, including UK-based Genel Energy, the operator of the promising SL10B/13 block in partnership with Taiwan’s CPC Corporation.
Recent updates from various partnerships suggest accelerating timelines. Collaborative projects between Taiwanese and Somaliland entities are specifically targeting a 2026 start for drilling in certain blocks, aligning with the government’s push to expedite development.
The minister’s statement underscores a concerted effort to attract investment into Somaliland’s largely untapped basins, which are estimated to hold prospective resources amounting to billions of barrels.
A successful transition to oil production could prove transformative for Somaliland’s economy, which has historically relied on sectors like livestock exports. It is also anticipated to spur significant infrastructure development, particularly around key areas such as the port of Berbera.
Officials note that concurrent negotiations with international partners are focused on ensuring operational security, adherence to environmental standards, and securing equitable benefits for local communities. This planned drilling initiative marks a pivotal step in Somaliland’s broader strategy for economic growth and energy sector partnerships.
In a landmark moment for the Somaliland-American community, Boston stepped into the spotlight this month as the Somaliland Professionals Association of America (SLPA) hosted its 5th Regional Event – the first gathering of its kind in the city since the early 1990s.
Over 70 members, community leaders, and supporters converged from across New England, with attendees traveling from Massachusetts, Maine, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and even students from Vermont.
The event underscored the power of intentional community building, drawing professionals from diverse fields like healthcare, law, architecture, engineering, and accounting. Notably, participants hailed from prestigious institutions including Harvard, MIT, Yale, Middlebury, Dartmouth, Tufts, Cornell, and Columbia – serving as beacons of inspiration for younger members pursuing academic and career excellence.
The day began with welcoming remarks from host Fahima Ali, followed by a moving Qur’an recitation by Sheikh Abdiqadir, Imam of the Islamic Society of Boston (ISB), New England’s largest mosque. Long-standing leaders from Massachusetts, Maine, and Connecticut shared poignant reflections on leadership, service, and passing the torch to the next generation.
Highlights included inspiring talks from rising stars: Sahra Jama, an Abaarso School alumna and Brandeis graduate, who spoke on resilience, faith, and personal growth; and Abshir Sudi, a Middlebury graduate and founder of AHDI Promise – a Boston-based nonprofit advancing education in Somaliland since 2019.
A standout moment was the presentation of the Achievement Award for Boston Community Impact, Leadership, and Education to Mubarak, an early SLPA member, Abaarso alumnus, and MIT graduate – recognizing his trailblazing contributions. Abaarso School of Science and Technology in Somaliland, alma mater to many event honorees and speakers.
The keynote address came from Dr. Jamal Ali Hussein, a former Citigroup Managing Director with an MBA from Harvard and a PhD from Johns Hopkins. He delivered powerful insights on building legacy, personal development, and sustained collective action for Somaliland’s progress and local diaspora communities.
The event concluded with a shared meal from Nubian Markets and extended networking at Luzuri Turkish Café, fostering deeper connections.SLPA, a growing network of Somaliland-connected professionals in the U.S., continues to bridge diaspora talents with opportunities back home.
Organizers expressed profound gratitude to local volunteers for orchestrating this impactful reunion, reigniting a sense of unity and purpose that hadn’t been felt in Boston for over three decades.kaaltv.com
As one attendee noted, “This wasn’t just an event – it was a reminder of what we can achieve when we come together.” For the Somaliland diaspora in New England, Boston has truly made history once again.
Hargeisa, Somaliland – The Somaliland Institute of Diplomacy and International Affairs (SIDIA) has celebrated a national milestone with the graduation of its inaugural class of diplomats, the first cohort to complete an intensive, five-month professional training program conducted entirely within the country.
The ceremony in the capital, Hargeisa, culminated a rigorous course led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Hon. Abdirahman Dahir Aden Bakaal, and Director General Mohamed Abdirahman Hassan. The event was attended by SIDIA Director Dr. Madar Abdi and the program’s concluding instructor, Dr. Brook.
This achievement represents a significant advancement in Somaliland’s institutional capacity, establishing for the first time a systematic, in-country pipeline for training diplomatic personnel to serve national interests.
In his address, Director General Mohamed charged the graduates with upholding the highest standards of dedication and integrity. “Your training has equipped you to be essential contributors to realizing Somaliland’s foreign policy objectives,” he stated.
The program underscores the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ strategic commitment to professionalizing its diplomatic corps and strengthening Somaliland’s engagement on the international stage.
Officials have hailed the graduation as a historic stride toward greater self-sufficiency in diplomatic education and a new chapter in the region’s professional development.
The President of the Republic of Somaliland, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi Irro underscored the fact that the nation of Somaliland is a credible, reliable, trustworthy and dependable country as far as international investments, commercial partnership or associated collaborations are concerned.
The Head of State expressed the sentiments as he on Monday officially inaugurated the Somaliland Minerals Expo 2025 at the Mansoor Hotel. The exhibition is scheduled to run for two days.
The Somaliland Minerals Expo, the first event of its kind to be held in the country, was organized to international standards by the Ministry of Energy and Minerals, in collaboration with mineral resource companies and key stakeholders.
The primary objective of the expo is to professionally showcase Somaliland’s diverse mineral resources and natural wealth to both international investors and local citizens, highlighting the country’s untapped potential in the mining sector.
In a keynote address at the opening ceremony, President Abdirahman Irro expressed his gratitude and appreciation to senior officials and staff of the Ministry of Energy and Minerals, as well as the countries, companies, and individuals who contributed to the successful organization of the exhibition.
The President pointed out that Somaliland is a trustworthy destination for all forms of investment, including partnerships, joint ventures, financing, and broader international commercial engagement. He emphasized that the country has in place the necessary laws, policies, regulatory frameworks, and administrative systems that enable investors to operate smoothly and with confidence.
He stated that the economic agenda of the ‘Unity and Delivery’ administration government prioritizes the responsible and transparent development of Somaliland’s natural resources, with the aim of ensuring that resource utilization contributes to stability, sustainable development, and shared prosperity, while safeguarding the environment and long-term social and economic balance.
The event also featured speeches from the Chairman of the Waddani Party, Hirsi Ali Haji Hassan, the Minister of Investment, Hon. Said Mohamed Buraale, the Minister of Energy and Minerals, Hon. Ahmed Jama Barre. And the Director General of the Ministry of Energy and Minerals, Dr. Shu’ayb Osman Mohamoud,
In addition, international experts attending both in person and via virtual video link shared insights on global mining trends and investment opportunities.
President Abdirahman Irro further highlighted that Somaliland’s stability, democratic governance system, internal and border security, and judicial framework are all aligned with international standards, providing strong assurance to global investors.
He reaffirmed to the international investment community that Somaliland is a reliable and credible partner, fully prepared to engage in fair, transparent, and mutually beneficial development of its rich natural resources.
