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John Peter Pham Likely to Become US Envoy to Africa And Sudan

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Politico magazine, which specializes in US national security affairs, said that Mr. John Peter Pham will be a candidate to become the next US envoy to Africa and will take over the Sudan file in the new administration of President Donald Trump.

The magazine said, quoting what it described as “three American security sources” within the Trump administration, that Trump’s potential envoy to Africa will be the veteran Republican expert on African affairs, “John Peter Pham,” who will become the highest-ranking official in the State Department overseeing US-African affairs.

The magazine, which specializes in security affairs, added that according to three sources familiar with the file and authorized to speak – without revealing their identity – to discuss internal transition issues, Pham, who previously served as a special envoy to the Sahel and Great Lakes region in Africa during Trump’s first term, is the strongest candidate for the position and will succeed Mr. Tom Perrilio, President Joe Biden’s envoy.

The magazine added that if he is confirmed, Pham will be tasked with dealing with some of the most thorny issues of US national security on the agenda of the next administration, “including the ongoing threat from ISIS and other terrorist groups in Africa, China’s growing geopolitical influence across the continent, and the deadly civil war in Sudan.”

The sources said that the new administration is taking into account that the conflict in Sudan has turned the country into what is considered the worst humanitarian crisis in the world “and a hotbed of activity by foreign powers competing for influence there.” The magazine pointed out that the previous administration – Biden – accused and named one of the warring parties in Sudan, the “Rapid Support Forces militia” – a term that had not been used by semi-official media outlets before – of committing genocide this month, nearly a year after congressional leaders urged it to do so.

The magazine noted that it sought an official comment from a spokesman for the Trump transition team, but he did not comment, while Pham himself declined to comment on the news of his appointment.

The Atlanta Center for Strategic and National Studies describes John Peter Pham as a distinguished American academic and author specializing in international relations with a focus on African affairs.

Pham was the U.S. Special Envoy for the Sahel in Africa from March 2020 until the end of the Trump administration in January 2021. He specializes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, East, North, and West Africa, Southern and Central Africa, and Sudan. He is fluent in three languages: English, French and Italian.

Pham is currently a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council since March 2021, after completing his public service as the U.S. Special Envoy for the Sahel with the personal rank of Ambassador.

Pham wrote in his academic biography on the Atlantic Center that he has written more than 300 articles and reviews and is the author, editor, or translator of more than a dozen books, including, most recently, *Somalia: Fixing Africa’s Most Failed State* (Tafelberg, 2013; co-authored with Greg Mills and David Kilcullen).

Dr. Pham also contributes to several publications including The National Interest and Foreign Policy, and appears regularly as a commentator on U.S. and non-U.S. print, broadcast, and radio media including CBS, BBC, Voice of America, CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, NPR, BBC, Reuters, Associated Press, Agence France-Presse, Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Washington Post, Washington Times, USA Today, Newsweek, U.S. News & World Report, Times of London, New Statesman, Maclean’s, Le Monde, and Le Tan.

He has been described as a strong advocate of strong U.S. engagement with Africa and served as a member of the USAID-funded International Republican Institute delegation to observe Liberia’s historic post-conflict national elections in 2005. He also served on IRI’s pre-election assessment (2006) and election observation delegations to Nigeria (2007, 2011) and Somaliland (2010).

Ambassador Pham has received numerous decorations and awards from African nations in recognition of his contributions throughout his career to strengthening U.S.-Africa relations, including the Commander of the National Order of Mali, the Commander of the National Order of Burkina Faso, the Officer of the National Order of Merit of Niger, the Commander of the National Order of Merit of Gabon, and the Commander of the Order of Friendship Among the Peoples of Burundi.

https://sudanhorizon.com/john-peter-pham-likely-to-become-us-envoy-to-africa-and-sudan/

Somaliland’s Taiwan Ties: A Strategic Move or a Diplomatic Gamble?”

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Somaliland’s Taiwan Ties: A Strategic Move or a Diplomatic Gamble?”
By Prof. Nassir Hussein Kahin, Hargeisa, Somaliland.
The opposition party’s recent criticism of Somaliland’s partnership with Taiwan, branding it as offering “nothing but second-hand shoes and medical supplies,” oversimplifies a carefully crafted diplomatic relationship. While concerns about provoking China are understandable given its global influence, dismissing the Taiwan-Somaliland relationship ignores the strategic and developmental benefits it brings.

Taiwan has emerged as a valuable partner, supporting Somaliland in areas such as healthcare, technology, and education. From delivering critical medical aid to sharing expertise in agriculture and innovation, Taiwan’s contributions have tangible impacts that go beyond material goods. This relationship is not merely transactional—it reflects a shared commitment to mutual respect and growth, offering Somaliland opportunities to assert itself on the global stage.

The opposition’s warnings about destabilizing relations with China highlight a genuine risk. However, Somaliland’s foreign policy is not about choosing sides in a global power struggle but about safeguarding its sovereignty and advancing its quest for recognition. Engaging with Taiwan does not preclude dialogue with China, should Beijing be willing to approach Somaliland with respect for its aspirations. Sovereign nations must navigate such complexities with care, but retreating from partnerships under external pressure undermines Somaliland’s ability to act as an independent and credible international actor.

Calls for greater American involvement in mitigating potential tensions with China are valid but should not overshadow Somaliland’s capacity for proactive diplomacy. While U.S. support would strengthen its position, Somaliland cannot afford to delay meaningful partnerships while waiting for external guarantees. The decision to engage with Taiwan demonstrates a pragmatic approach, emphasizing Somaliland’s ability to balance risks while advancing its national interests.

Rather than creating divisions over this relationship, Somaliland’s leaders—both in government and opposition—must recognize the value of presenting a united front in its pursuit of recognition. Criticism is essential in a democracy, but it should aim to strengthen the nation’s strategy, not undermine its credibility. The Taiwan partnership is a reflection of Somaliland’s determination to forge its own path, and this independence should be celebrated, not questioned.

As Somaliland navigates the challenges of global diplomacy, unity, and foresight are more critical than ever. The relationship with Taiwan is not a gamble but a calculated step toward Somaliland’s broader ambitions, underscoring its resilience and ability to stand firm in the face of international complexities.

A Land Divided: Water, Trade, and the Unyielding Conflicts in the Horn of Africa

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By Prof. Nassir Hussein Kahin

In the arid expanse of the Ethiopian Somali Region, where life revolves around scarce water points and shifting trade routes, survival is a battle as much against nature as against neighbors. The recent Gaashaamo and Da’awalley massacres have thrown this precarious balance into stark relief, highlighting the deep-seated challenges faced by pastoral nomads whose livelihoods depend on the region’s fragile resources. Here, violence is not just the result of long-standing clan rivalries—it is a symptom of a larger crisis ignored for far too long by local leaders and the international community.

The massacres, both stemming from disputes over access to water and grazing land, reveal how resource scarcity has transformed into a deadly flashpoint. Despite warnings from organizations like the Water, Peace, and Security Partnership, which has consistently underscored the role of water insecurity in fueling violence, little has been done to address these grievances. Their predictive tools and advocacy for collaborative water resource management have yet to find traction among policymakers. The results, as seen in the scorched earth of the Hawd Reserve and the disrupted lives of pastoralist families, are as tragic as they are preventable.

These issues are not confined to Ethiopia’s borders. The ripple effects extend into Somalia, Somaliland, and Kenya, where nomadic movements are increasingly constrained by conflict zones. Disrupted trade routes have paralyzed the economy, leaving livestock markets empty and the pastoralists who rely on them destitute. Such disruptions reinforce a vicious cycle: poverty exacerbates competition for resources, which in turn breeds more violence.

The international community has not been silent. Regional organizations like IGAD have called for a unified protocol to manage shared water resources, but negotiations remain stalled. Meanwhile, cross-border tensions simmer, fueled by a zero-sum mentality that pits one group’s survival against another’s demise. As the massacres demonstrate, this mindset not only perpetuates cycles of violence but also undermines the fragile interdependence that sustains life in this harsh environment.

The parallels to other crisis zones are striking. In Mali, for instance, water scarcity and mismanagement have similarly amplified local conflicts, prompting comparisons between the Horn of Africa and other regions battling the effects of climate change and fragile governance. Experts have pointed to models like the Nile Basin Initiative or Southern Africa’s River Basin Organizations, where nations have managed to forge cooperation from chaos. But the lessons remain unheeded here.

The stakes could not be higher. As the Water, Peace, and Security Partnership has warned, the failure to act is not just a humanitarian tragedy but a destabilizing force for the entire region. “Water scarcity has become a weapon of war,” one analyst observed, “and unless we address it, the bloodshed will continue.” This sentiment was echoed by IGAD officials, who lamented the lack of political will to tackle the underlying causes of conflict.

Yet, history offers hope. Regions like Rwanda and South Africa have shown that even the deepest divisions can be healed with the right mix of political courage, grassroots engagement, and international support. The Somali Region, and its troubled neighbors, must embrace a similar transformation, replacing zero-sum competition with a collaborative framework that values shared survival over mutual destruction. Only then can the blood-soaked earth of Gaashaamo and Da’awalley give way to a landscape of peace and resilience.

International recognition for Somaliland should be conditioned on concrete economic and political reforms

On Somaliland’s historical political economy, and how best outsiders can help Somalilanders take charge of their destiny in the quest for continued economic and political development.

Ken Opalo

I: Why ruin a plucky would-be state’s economic and political development with immediate full recognition?

The U.S. government under Donald Trump will most likely recognize Somaliland as a sovereign state in a move that will likely be followed by other governments in Africa and around the world. A bill has already been introduced in the U.S. legislature to this end. This post discusses the pros and cons of international recognition for Somalia’s most successful breakaway region.

The main argument below is that while the people of Somaliland deserve and have a strong case for international recognition, such a development at this time would very likely take away the very incentives that have set them apart from the rest of Somalia over the last 33 years.

To be blunt, achieving full sovereignty with de jure international recognition at this time would do little beyond incentivizing elite-level pursuit of sovereign rents at the expense of continued political and economic development. What has made Somaliland work is that its elites principally derive their legitimacy from their people, and not the international system. Stated differently, full sovereignty runs the risk of separating both the Somaliland state and ruling elites from the productive forces of society; which in turn would free politicians (and policymakers) from having to think of their people as the ultimate drivers of their overall economic wellbeing. Just like in the rest of the Continent, the resulting separation of “suspended elites” from the socio-economic foundations of Somaliland society and inevitable policy extraversion would be catastrophic for Somalilanders.

The last thing the Horn needs is another Djibouti — a country whose low-ambition ruling elites are content with hawking their geostrategic location at throwaway prices while doing precious little to advance their citizens’ material well-being (Djibouti’s poverty rate is a staggering 70%).

With this in mind, it would be ideal if Somaliland achieved full legal sovereignty after making strides in improving its human capital base (the education budget remains atrociously low), figuring out how to be a productive logistics and business services hub, and broadly diversifying its economy beyond relying on remittances, animal exports, financial services, and gold mining.

In addition, it would be preferable to prioritize further political institutionalization before recognition. Somaliland’s “pastoral democracy” characterized by the institutionalization of elections and presidential turnovers is certainly commendable. However, international praise of its democratic traditions ignores quite a few red flags. The fact of the matter is that Somaliland has what can at best be described as “managed democracy” with restrictions on party formation (only three are allowed per time), a moribund upper legislative chamber in desperate need of reform, and an enduring vulnerability to fractious and exclusionary (and at times violent) clan politics. External praise of Somaliland’s democracy often comes with standard issue fetishization of ritual electoralism and turnover, instead of a clear-eyed understanding of the real features of its current stage of political development.

Presidential turnover is great, but what’s even more important is having a political system that is broadly inclusive and responsive, and that delivers on basics such as personal safety, education, health, and essential infrastructure. This isn’t intended to downplay the demonstrated elite commitment to power-sharing over time. I fully appreciate the fact Somaliland’s elite political stability stretches back to even before their declaration of independence. Throughout the resistance against Siad Barre’s autocracy the SNM admirably avoided personalism and maintained a strong civilian presence in its leadership (unlike most rebel groups on the Continent). But elite pacts anchored on age-based hegemony over society are not enough. Somaliland must aspire to modernize both its politics and economy.

It is not obvious to me how full recognition would resolve the many challenges currently faced by Somalilanders. To the contrary, it’s very likely that it would lock in these suboptimal elements of Somaliland’s political economy, or make them worse. Which is why friends of Somaliland ought to consider conditioning future recognition on concrete political and economic development milestones. Despite the noises from Mogadishu and elsewhere on the Continent, nothing currently stops Somaliland and its international partners from making progress on the points highlighted above. Recognition will mean nothing if it doesn’t come with serious attention to expanding economic opportunities and material improvements in human welfare. That should be the focus of elites in Hargeisa, not a rush to recognition in search of sovereign rents.

Finally, while accepting that it’s ultimately Somalilanders’ decision to make, I’m personally partial to the idea of a strong Federal Republic within current borders or even the emirates model from the Gulf as the best mechanisms for managing Somalia’s complicated tapestry of historical facts on the ground. That, in my view, would avoid the sociopolitical stagnation/decay and wanton external predation that will most certainly follow a breakup of Somalia into weak statelets. After Somaliland, Jubaland and Puntland would likely want out, too.

II: On paper, Somaliland’s case for independence is strong; and there are good reasons to suspect that it would succeed as a full member of the international state system.

Somaliland’s strongest case for independence is that it is a viable polity. The territory’s political history over much of the last century sets it apart from the rest of Somalia. The current boundaries along the “Rodd line” took shape back in 1897 when British colonial occupation stalled Ethiopia’s post-Adwa imperial expansion under Menelik II. In subsequent decades, “British Somaliland” was governed separately from “Italian Somalia” to the South. Before that coastal Somaliland’s orientation was towards the Egyptian world, while Somalia’s coastal urban centers were under Zanzibari/Omani control and influence. And even before that sections of Somaliland’s current territory were for centuries part of the Adal Sultanate and later the Isaaq Sultanate. Before Zanzibaris showed up to dominate its coast, Central Somalia was dominated by the Ajuran empire.

Of course shared historical unitary stateness isn’t the only metric for evaluating claims to autonomy. Quests for state/nation building are deliberate sociopolitical projects that live or die with the choices people make and effort they put into them. History is not destiny as all borders are arbitrary reflections of human agency and limits. Therefore, Somali nationalists who have a strong desire to see socio-cultural and political unity across “Greater Somalia” shouldn’t be dismissed offhand. The point of looking at historical Somali stateness is to show that besides ethnicity/religion/common xeer (which are powerful unifying forces in their own right) there isn’t a deep political basis for uniting all the Somali lands into “Greater Somalia” across Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia.

The union of “British Somaliland” and “Italian Somalia” in 1960 was a conscious choice, albeit one that a majority of Somalilanders came to regret barely two years later. Pan-Somali nationalism (somalinimo) in the lead up to independence and the quest to eventually unite all Somali lands dovetailed nicely with Somalilanders’ desire to regain access to the grazing lands on the Hawd plateau that found themselves on the wrong side of the “Rodd Line.” However, the union would be short-lived. In a cruel twist of historical irony, the quest for Somali unity eventually broke post-independence Somalia. The sponsoring of irredentist claims against Kenya and Ethiopia fermented wariness against a strong Mogadishu in Nairobi and Addis Ababa which persists to this day (it’s no coincidence that both countries are friends of Somaliland, while Kenya is a strong booster of Jubaland). Most significantly, Siad Barre’s failed invasion of Ethiopia to conquer the Ogaden in 1977 sparked a civil war from which Somalia is yet to recover. It’s in the midst of this civil war that Somaliland withdrew from Somalia in 1991.

In total, Somaliland’s peacetime existence as an integral part of modern Somalia barely lasted 20 years.

Clan structure across “Greater Somalia” across Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia. Source: Wikipedia

Human geography and political economy also set Somaliland apart from the core heartland of Somalia. Somalia’s densest population centers are in the central Shebelle river valley and central Somaliland (which places Somalia in the “bad geography” column on the Herbst scale). It doesn’t help that successive governments after 1960 did little to connect central Somaliland to Mogadishu, whether through infrastructure, effective elite cooptation (beyond adopting English as the national language), or even mass-based nation-building. This despite the fact that, according to a Somaliland government report, in 1960 Somalia accounted for less than one percent of Somaliland’s trade, and barely any Somalilanders having ever been to Mogadishu.

Somaliland partially avoided the worst of Somalia’s negative clan politics by chance. Its clan structure is considerably less fractious than Somalia’s as a whole. The Isaaq demographically dominate its central core as well as its politics and economics. Furthermore, Somaliland’s experience during the brief union and later civil war — especially Siad Barre’s harsh prosecution of the war in the north — helped forge a strong Somaliland identity beyond the Isaaq that was the foundation of the declaration of independence on May 18, 1991.

The war also exiled significant numbers of Somalilanders whose remittances, trade connections, and interest to mobilize for peace help the country avoid self-destructive negative clan politics (it’s an indictment of Somali nationalists who carry the torch of Sayyid Mohammed Abdalla Hassan that they’ve never overcome the bastardization of clan identities for narrow political ends — by far the biggest obstacle to Somali state-building and economic development over the last two centuries).

While not particularly conducive to rapid economic growth and development, Somaliland’s political economy fosters peace and stability. Cross-border trade, financial services, and remittances are the mainstays of the economy, and have over the years proved valuable for coordinating elite-level convergence on peace among different factions as well as durable political settlements. Key to this success has been the concentration of ownership, which in turn reduces transaction costs among economic elites. Pastoralism’s mass-level ethos of egalitarianism (reinforced by respect for elders and intra-communal self-policing) further reinforces elite-level commitments to the prevailing “managed democracy” (unfortunately, socio-political egalitarianism under low state capacity also entrenches tolerance of economic inequality and under-development). The relatively small number of politically relevant clans (further reinforced by the constitutional limit of political organization to just three parties) also helps reduce transaction costs associated with enforcing intra-elite pacts. Constitutional restriction on the proliferation of parties — public votes for the three parties every decade — helps strengthen intra-coalition, stability, monitoring, and sanctioning.

III: There are good reasons to recognize Somaliland. But doing so right now will likely rob Somalilanders of the core drivers of their successes so far.

Somaliland’s strong case for independence aside, gaining full international recognition would rob the breakaway region of an important driver of its success so far: the fact that it’s elites are inward-focused and derive their legitimacy from the people.

The underlying drivers of the current momentum for recognition are ominous. Somaliland elites definitely deserve credit for getting their house in order and then persistently lobbying major global powers for recognition. In particular, the long game of mostly focusing their efforts on American conservatives finally paid off with the second coming of a highly transactional Donald Trump. It also helps that all this is happening at a time when the United Arab Emirates has emerged as a major geopolitical/geoeconomic player in the Horn, with its sights on the ports in Berbera and Bosaso, a potential military base, a logistical corridor into Ethiopia, and likely investments in energy and mining. Finally, the United States and its Abraham Accords allies in the Middle East are salivating at the prospect of military installations in Somaliland in the hopes of being able to more effectively prosecute the war on Yemen and beef up overall presence in the wider Red Sea region. The U.S. also views Somaliland as an extension of its Taiwan policy — and a chance to stick it to China which opposes recognition (Somaliland recognizes Taiwan, not China).

My biggest fear is that Somaliland is unlikely to maintain enough of its present institutional character and agency to survive this frenzied attention from outsiders.

First to suffer will likely be Somaliland’s storied elite political stability and well-managed system of electoral accountability. Somaliland’s success is founded on businesses being able to discipline politics and influence public opinion (see all the peace and governance conferences since 1981); as well as its citizens’ egalitarianism and communal self-governance. Full sovereignty will blow up this balance by significantly strengthening the state vis-a-vis businesses, clan elders, and the general public. Flush with cash, focused on their narrow interests, as well as a strong preference for stability, foreign players will undoubtedly seek to attenuate democratic influences on the Somaliland state. You can already see this in the fetishization of electoralism, which deliberately ignores all the work that still needs to be done to strengthen democracy in Somaliland.

Second will be Somaliland’s economic prospects. With foreign geopolitical attention will come an even deeper NGO-ization of Somaliland’s economic life and a severe case of policy extraversion. Uncoordinated and failing “development projects” will bloom. Hargeisa will crawl with “technical experts” out to dabble in the latest faddist trend. The cost of doing anything in the public sector will balloon beyond belief. Eventually, these new players will crowd out the influence on the state from Somaliland’s businesses, diaspora remittances, clan elders, and voters. There will be a lot of externally-facing “reforms,” but with little tangible benefit to Somaliland’s businesses or general public.

These are important factors to consider because lost in all the worm glow of electoral turnovers and relative stability is the fact that Somaliland is still a very poor country that must do all it can to avoid becoming an aid-dependent basket case that plays host to foreign geopolitical contests.

Distribution of government spending patterns. Source: Ministry of Finance & Development (Somaliland).

There is no way to sugarcoat the dire material conditions faced by most of Somaliland’s over 6.2m people. Per capita income of stands at $1,361. Life expectancy is a mere 56 years. Barely more than a fifth of children are born in hospitals. The maternal mortality rate stands at a dizzying 732 women per 100,000 live births. Only about 34% of primary school age children attend school. Close to 40% of children are malnourished. Meanwhile, more than a third of the government budget of about US$ 4.4b goes to security.

These are not stats describing a flourishing would-be country — hence the need for Somaliland elites to consider how full recognition would impact their ability to meaningfully address these challenges.

The third negative consequence of recognizing Somaliland will be rising instability in the Horn. From a geopolitical standpoint, Ethiopia, the UAE, and Kenya will be the clear beneficiaries of such a change to the status quo. However, Somalia (and Puntland), Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia will likely not take this shift without a fight. Conflicts along the disputed boundary with Puntland and intra-clan skirmishes within Somaliland will escalate (and gobble up more scarce resources). The rump Somalia will also be destabilized by nationalist furor over its dismemberment (with Al-Shabaab being a clear beneficiary). The apparent rapprochement between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa will most certainly collapse. In the face of these likely upheavals, Somaliland’s international partners won’t have much to offer. When the rubber meets the road, they’ll do just enough to protect their interests and ignore the rest of the chaos. And when that fails they’ll cut and run.

Faced with the real risks outlined above, it would be beneficial if instead of recognition Somaliland would proceed as a de facto state as it consolidates its economy and politics. Such a path forward would still allow for it to engage foreign powers interested in its geostrategic offerings, but with the caveat that it’s ruling elites would not be entirely freed from relying on local businesses and communities as the main sources of legitimacy. Military bases and international logistical corridors could still be built. Investments in mining, telecoms, business services, and light manufacturing can still take place. Donor funds for education, healthcare, irrigation, water and sanitation, veterinary services for Somaliland’s vast herds, and governs reforms would still flow.

The only difference is that all these interventions would be channeled via the current formal and informal institutions (with their checks and legitimation norms intact), and not a small group of state elites newly freed from their people and totally dependent on foreigners. Indeed, true friends of Somaliland would condition future recognition on concrete economic and political achievements accompanied by observable improvements in human welfare and freedoms.

IV: Conclusion

To reiterate, Somalilanders have a strong case for independence. However, the international conversation around this issue shouldn’t start and end with praise for Somaliland’s nascent democracy and its strategic usefulness to outsiders. Above all else, Somaliland’s independence must be founded on a concrete promise of material prosperity for its people.

To this end, the ideal way forward would be for friends of Somaliland to use commitments to future recognition to incentivize elite behavior in service to further political and economic development. In addition, it would be important to invest in a legitimation process through the African Union — which, in acknowledging that Somaliland is a unique case, all but asked Mogadishu to accept the breakaway region’s eventual independence. To the extent possible, recognition shouldn’t be done in a manner that increases conflict and general instability in the Horn.

https://www.africanistperspective.com/p/international-recognition-for-somaliland?utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web

Somaliland Aviation industry stakeholders in consultative meeting

By M.A. Egge

The Somaliland Aviation Ministry has organized a consultative conference for aviation industry stakeholders over the week at the Ambassador Hotel in Hargeisa.

The meeting was attended by the Minister of Aviation and Airports Development, the Minister of Finance and Economic Development, airlines officials, officials from the police and the immigration services departments.

The aviation minister Hon. Fuad Ahmed Nuuh pointed out that the consultative meeting was generally a technical one.

Whereas the minister elaborated on the undertakings of the civil aviation services, he noted that the department mainly worked with the finance, customs, security sector and immigration departments to comprehensively dispense the needed services.

The meeting focused on the challenges facing the aviation sector and how to find solutions to address them.

He stated that such meetings with line agencies were imperative to be held occasionally.

The minister added that during this meeting, existing complaints will be discussed and how to improve what has been done.

On his part the finance minister Hon. Abdillahi Hassan Adan said that airports are important mirrors that reflected the country’s image. He added that the ministry has always stood side by side with the Ministry of Aviation and the development of airports, foremost being the airport in the capital of Somaliland, the Egal International Airport. He expressed his appreciation of the meeting organized by the Ministry of Aviation and Development.

He also added that the development of airports boosts the country’s economy and said that if the country’s economy is developed, it will contribute to achieving stability and security.

In conclusion, other officials from the line agencies pledged that they would double the services they provide at the airport and that they are ready to do everything to ensure that the airports provide sufficient services to travelers using the facilities.

Somaliland: Agriculture minister meets FAO head

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By M.A. Egge

The Minister of Agriculture Hon. Mahmoud Ige Yusuf, together with his deputy Hon. Mukhtaar Haji Muxumed Farah, and the Director General of the ministry Mr. Abdikarin Aaden Adde, received on Monday the Head of the FAO Agency in Somaliland Mr. Abdulkarim Baha who was accompanied by officials from the agency.

The meeting had two objectives: to introduce the new Ministry of Agriculture and the Head of the FAO Somaliland Office to each other and for the provision of details on the projects supported by the agency.

After the introduction of both parties, the Head of the FAO in the Somaliland Office, and other FAO heads responsible for Somaliland, provided a detailed explanation of the projects such as projects related to improving production and combating locusts and other pests that harm agriculture.

They also provided details on the training support provided to the Ministry of Agriculture officials and farmers in the country, as part of efforts to increase agricultural crop production.

The Minister thanked the heads of the FAO office in Somaliland for their support and their readiness to work with the Ministry of Agriculture in its efforts to ensure that Somaliland achieves food self-sufficiency.

AU mission hails Ethiopia-Somalia agreement to restore diplomatic ties after year-long hiatus

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The African Union Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) has welcomed the agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia to fully restore diplomatic relations, following discussions between Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Addis Ababa on 11 January 2025.

In a statement, Ambassador Mohamed El-Amine Souef, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (SRCC) for Somalia and Head of AUSSOM, described the agreement as “an important milestone in bilateral relations” and a reaffirmation of commitments made under the Ankara Declaration.

Ambassador Souef noted the significance of “enhancing diplomatic ties, strengthening security cooperation, and promoting economic integration” as essential steps for advancing “regional peace, stability, and shared prosperity.”

He stated that AUSSOM “remains committed to supporting Somalia’s stabilization efforts and regional partnerships,” aligning with the aspirations of the Somali people and the African Union’s vision for a peaceful and prosperous continent.

The agreement, outlined in a joint communiqué issued on 11 January, 2025, announced the decision to “restore and enhance their bilateral relations through full diplomatic representation in their respective capitals.” It also stressed the need for “closer cooperation in multilateral and regional forums to address matters of mutual interest.”

The communiqué also highlighted security concerns, stating, “The stability of the region requires strong cooperation between the two countries.” Both leaders agreed to direct their respective security agencies to “bolster cooperation in addressing the serious and evolving threat posed by extremist militant groups.”

The restoration of ties comes after a year-long diplomatic hiatus, which followed tensions over Ethiopia’s Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland. The MoU, which sought to grant Ethiopia sea access in exchange for potential recognition of Somaliland, had strained relations between Addis Abeba and Mogadishu.

At the time, Somalia announced that Ethiopia’s Ambassador Muktar Mohamed Ware “has been informed to depart from Somalia within the next 72 hours.” Somalia also recalled its Ambassador to Addis Abeba for “comprehensive consultations.”

In October 2024, the Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared an Ethiopian diplomat persona non grata, ordering his departure within 72 hours, citing his “engagement in activities inconsistent with his diplomatic role.”

However, the Ankara Agreement, facilitated by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, helped defuse tensions and create a framework for renewed engagement.

This latest development, following the Ankara Agreement, saw, among other steps, Somalia reverse its previous decision that Ethiopia “will not be part of the AU-led forces” replacing ATMIS.

 

The Critics of Somaliland’s Taiwan Envoy Risks National Unity in Push for Recognition”

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By Prof. Nassir Hussein Kahin

In a striking display of political maneuvering, the critics of Somaliland’s newly elected government which was swept into office after a historic landslide of free and fair elections, have wasted no time in attacking its recent foreign ministry appointments. The focus of their ire is the appointment of Danjire Maxamuud Adan Jaamac Galaal (a seasoned diplomat with academic credentials) the new Ambassador to Taiwan, whom one critic has labeled him as part of a team “selected for foreign ministry – the Minister, the DG, and the Ambassador are unfit for the purpose of pursuing recognition.”

The timing and nature of this critique raise concerns about its impact on Somaliland’s unity, especially as the nation strives for the elusive goal of international recognition.

The critics claim centers on the Ambassador’s prior remarks, where he expressed mixed views about the relationship between Taiwan and Somaliland. While supporting the bilateral partnership in one instance, he also noted that it might not necessarily advance Somaliland’s quest for global recognition.

Despite these remarks, the new administration chose him to represent Somaliland in Taiwan, a decision that was met with full acceptance by Taiwan. Some of the critics have questioned both the appointment and Taiwan’s willingness to accept a diplomat who once expressed skepticism about the partnership’s strategic value.

Selective Criticism or Strategic Undermining?
A deeper look at the ambassador’s past statements reveals a more nuanced position rather than outright inconsistency. His acknowledgment of the complexities surrounding the Taiwan-Somaliland relationship reflects a level of pragmatism that could be an asset in diplomacy. By ignoring this context, the critics appears to be cherry-picking facts to create a narrative of incompetence.
It is also worth noting that Taiwan, a vital partner in Somaliland’s diplomatic efforts, has made no objections to the appointment. On the contrary, Taiwan welcomed the ambassador and validated the new government’s decision. This tacit approval undermines their claims. It also casts their critique as a potentially destabilizing distraction rather than a substantive policy debate.
Risks of Politicizing Diplomacy
By launching these accusations just weeks after the new government’s landslide victory, the critics risk undermining national unity and diplomatic credibility at a critical juncture. Somaliland’s push for international recognition—a cause that transcends partisan divides—depends heavily on presenting a unified front to the world. Publicly questioning the government’s foreign policy decisions not only risks dividing the nation but could also send mixed signals to international partners.
Historically, countries with similar diplomatic struggles have recognized the importance of internal cohesion in foreign affairs. For example, in the United States, opposition parties traditionally refrain from publicly undermining critical foreign policy decisions during sensitive negotiations. Similarly, South Korea’s political factions often maintain a unified stance on key diplomatic issues to safeguard the nation’s strategic interests. Somaliland’s critics would do well to heed these examples.
A Strategic Appointment?
Far from being a misstep, the appointment of the new ambassador may represent a calculated move by the government. The ambassador’s nuanced understanding of the Taiwan-Somaliland relationship could enable him to navigate its complexities while advancing Somaliland’s interests. Moreover, this decision signals continuity and stability, ensuring that previous diplomatic foundations are not abandoned but built upon. By making such appointments independently, the new government also asserts its sovereignty and demonstrates that its foreign policy is guided by national priorities rather than external pressures.
The Bigger Picture
Ultimately, their criticism appears less about policy and more about political posturing. The new government, still basking in its electoral victory, deserves the benefit of the doubt as it begins to implement its foreign policy strategy. Taiwan’s acceptance of the ambassador’s credentials reinforces the legitimacy of this decision, and the absence of any diplomatic fallout further discredits the critic’s claims.
At this critical juncture, Somaliland’s critics —both in government and opposition—must recognize the importance of unity in pursuing recognition. Partisan disputes have their place, but diplomacy should remain above the fray. Undermining the government’s credibility on the international stage risks derailing a shared national goal, one that demands collective effort and unwavering resolve.

Somaliland Archaeologists claim they have located the Site of Divine Egyptian Kingdom

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Archaeologists in Somaliland have unveiled what they believe to be the site of the ancient “Land of Punt,” a fabled kingdom thought to have flourished thousands of years ago in the Horn of Africa.

The discovery, led by Isaaq Yusuf of Somaliland’s Archaeology Organization, is centered on an ancient map unearthed in the region. The map, Yusuf explained, guided the team to a hidden underground city that experts believe may have served as the capital of the Punt kingdom.

“It took eight months to decipher the map. Once I understood it, it led to a city with pyramids concealed underground,” Yusuf told MMTV. “We believe it was the administrative and spiritual center of Punt. This discovery places Somaliland at the heart of ancient global trade and culture.”

Known as the “Land of the Gods” by ancient Egyptians, Punt was celebrated for its wealth in incense, gold, and exotic animals. Egyptian pharaohs dispatched expeditions to Punt for both trade and religious purposes, emphasizing its importance in the ancient world.

To verify the findings, Yusuf worked with a team of international archaeologists who agreed that the site matched historical descriptions of Punt, a key player in ancient trade networks. The team’s findings suggest that a queen once ruled Punt and commissioned the construction of the underground city to safeguard the kingdom’s treasures during times of conflict.

“Our findings suggest that Punt was not only a hub of trade but also a sophisticated society capable of large-scale engineering,” Yusuf said.

The team has presented their findings to Somaliland’s government, urging the implementation of laws to protect and preserve archaeological sites. Yusuf emphasized the need to secure these treasures for future generations while also showcasing them to the world.

Somaliland’s potential identification as Punt aligns with its rich archaeological history. Sites such as Laas Geel, featuring rock art dating back 12,000 years, and Dhambalin, known for 5,000-year-old paintings, underscore the region’s significance in early human civilization.

Yusuf’s team investigations at Laasgeel, Aw-Barkhadle, and the Naaso Hablood mountains have revealed additional artifacts, including inscriptions suggesting that prophets may have travelled through the region.

 

Several Daesh fighters killed in Somalia’s Puntland state

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A member of the Somali security forces patrols along the coast of Qaw, in Puntland, northeastern Somalia on December, 18, 2016. (AFP)

MOGADISHU: Somali security forces said they killed several Daesh fighters and seized eight terrorist outposts during ongoing military operations in the semi-autonomous Puntland region.

Daesh has a relatively small presence in Somalia compared to the Al-Qaeda-linked Al-Shabab, but experts have warned of growing activity.

A United Nations counter-terrorism official last year warned of increased attacks by Daesh affiliates in Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia.

Somali military officials said Monday’s operation in the northern province was centered around the Cal Miskat mountains in the Bari region.

“The security forces took control of eight Daesh military outposts including a major one in the Cal Miskat mountains; several gunmen including foreign fighters had been killed in the military operations” the Puntland army said in a statement.

“The army shot down around nine drones loaded with explosives which Daesh tried to attack and detonate on the security forces during the fighting,” it said.

“The security forces are advancing onto key hideouts of the terrorists to flush them out.”

According to Ahmed Rage, one of the military commanders in the area, heavy fighting was underway as the Daesh “militias took positions inside a cave in the mountain,” but he added that the army was making “progress and continues to advance onto the stronghold positions.”

According to experts and officials, Daesh in Somalia is run by Abdul Qadir Mumin, a Puntland native.
“He is the most important person, the most powerful one, he is the one controlling the global Daesh network,” said Tore Hamming from the International Center for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR).