Remittances are Somalia’s life-support system and development engine, but the Somali remittance system is under threat
Research Report
Published: Jul 31, 2013
Publication Summary
Remittances to Somalia amount to approximately $1.3 billion a year, 16 percent of which comes from the United States. Remittances are a lifeline for many Somalis, providing them with a means to meet their immediate needs for food, shelter, clothing, and other basic necessities as well as open and sustain small businesses, send children to school, and invest in their communities.
This joint report by Oxfam America, Adeso and the Inter-American Dialogue investigates the obstacles facing the free and secure flow of remittance transfers from the United States to Somalia. It includes that the closure of Somali-American Money Transfer Operators’ (MTOs’) bank accounts in the United States may result in a substantial disruption to Somalia’s recovery and economic growth.
CHICAGO (CN) – Two men who distributed a drug-containing plant, popular in Somalia but largely unknown in the United States, out of an Indianapolis coffee shop cannot overturn drug conspiracy convictions, the 7th Circuit ruled.
“This case introduces a new drug culture to the Seventh Circuit: the underground world of ‘khat,'” Judge William Bauer began the court’s 33-page opinion.
Khat is the common name for the Catha edulis, a plant that primarily grows on the Arabian Peninsula and in parts of East Africa. When chewed or mixed in tea, khat leaves deliver stimulant effects.
The plant is legal in Somalia where “estimates put its use among Somali men as being equivalent to caffeine or tobacco use among the American population,” the 7th Circuit noted.
Although khat plants themselves are not illegal in the United States, they contain cathinone and cathine, which are schedule I and schedule IV substances, respectively.
“Not all khat leaves contain the same or similar amounts of either substance, however; some contain none,” Bauer wrote. “The regulation of khat then is dependent upon the particular chemical composition of each leaf, which may vary depending on the size of the plant and when the plant was harvested.”
An Indianapolis coffee house owned by Somalia-born immigrant Jama Mire attracted the attention of drug enforcement officers in April 2009, after a confidential human source tipped off the FBI in his attempt to “clean up” the Somali community in Indianapolis. After conducting wiretaps, surveillance and several controlled drug buys, DEA agents arrested Mire and executed a search warrant on his coffee house.
The search uncovered large bags full of dried khat, which Mire said must have been placed there by his “enemies.” Some of the plants tested positive for cathinone or cathine.
The investigation also tied another Somali man, Hassan Rafle, to cab driver Hussein Ahmed who imported khat from Europe. Rafle would drive khat shipments between Indianapolis and Columbus and wire money overseas for Ahmed.
Mire and Rafle were both convicted of conspiracy to distribute cathinone. Mire was also convicted of “knowingly using or maintaining a place for the purpose of distributing and using cathinone.”
The men brought due-process claims on appeal, claiming the statute does not give warning that possession of khat may be illegal.
“This argument is based on the fact that ‘khat’ is not listed in the CSA or the regulations, yet it still may be illegal to possess at certain times, depending on the chemical composition of a particular plant or leaf,” Bauer said.
The 7th Circuit rejected the government’s defense that information in the Federal Register rectifies the statute’s “underinclusive” nature by explaining the connection between cathinone, cathine, and khat, as well as marijuana-equivalency listings for khat-related offenses in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
Since the statutes requires scienter, meaning wrongful intent, however, their vagueness survives scrutiny, according to the ruling.
The appellate panel also rejected defendants’ claims that the DEA’s Senior Forensic Chemist tested the khat plants based on an unreliable methodology. The test conducted indicated only the presence of cathinone or cathine, not the quantity.
“In making this argument, [defendants] liken the situation here to the fact that the majority of dollar bills in the United States have traces of cocaine on them … and people are not put in jail for the possession of dollar bills. But as we pointed out at oral argument, people do not ingest dollar bills to get the effects of cocaine (at least not reasonably); people do chew khat leaves for the stimulant effects,” Bauer wrote.
“To find in the Defendants’ favor, we would have to write an additional element into the offenses: that khat leaves must have a ‘certain amount’ of cathinone versus ‘any quantity.’ That is not our job, and we decline to do so.”
The court also rejected Mire’s double-jeopardy and sufficiency of evidence claims as meritless.
Total installed electricity capacity (2008): 65 MW
Thermal : 93.3%
Hydroelectric: 4.4%
Total primary energy supply (2008): 5,352 ktoe
Biomass: 96%
Oil and oil products: 3.98%
Hydroelectric: 0.02%
Somalia has the lowest consumption of modern forms of energy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Somalia has long relied on fuel wood and charcoal, and imported petroleum to meet its energy needs. Firewood and charcoal are the major sources of energy, accounting for the vast majority of the country’s total energy consumption.
There are no large dams in Somalia, with diesel generators being the main source of energy.
Total electricity generation in 2008 was 326 GWh, with consumption being 293 GWh in the same year. Renewable sources contributed 15 GWh, or 4.4%, to this.
RELIANCE
Without proven oil reserves and only 200 billion cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves, Somalia has no hydrocarbon production up to now. Exploration activity is hindered by the internal security situation and the multiple sovereignty issues. Somalia’s petroleum consumption was estimated at 5,000 bbl/day in 2010.
The country relies heavily on imported petroleum for production of electricity. The country had one oil refinery, constructed with the aid of Iraq, which ceased operation with the onset of war in 1991.
Oil imports estimated at 3,827 bbl/day (2008).
EXTEND NETWORK
Somalia is currently divided into three regions; Somaliland, Puntland and South and Central Somalia. The regions have separate electricity networks. In Puntland, electricity is mainly accessible to major towns like Bosaso.
In South and Central Somalia, 60% of households in Mogadishu and 23% of households in Merka have access to electricity for lighting. 95% of the poorest households in the country do not have access to electricity.
CAPACITY CONCERNS
Rural and urban energy needs are primarily wood and charcoal based, though there is an increasing use of oil-based energy in urban areas. With a growth in urbanization, combined with the return of the Somali Diaspora, energy demands will increase. The view is that as an imperative for economic growth and nation building, sustainable sources of energy will be needed, combined with more efficient use of existing energy sources. The destruction of electricity infrastructure during the long period of civil conflict, and the ensuing slow pace of rehabilitation of the national electricity grid, has led many in the country to utilise self-generation, mostly from diesel sources.
RENEWABLE ENERGY
Somalia is rich in energy resources, having unexploited reserves of oil and natural gas, untapped hydropower, extensive geothermal energy resources, many promising wind sites, and abundant sunshine, which can produce solar power. The major obstacles to development of these potentially available energy resources are political, financial and institutional. Traditional biomass fuels such as firewood and charcoal, primarily used in rural and poor communities, account for 82% of the country’s total energy consumption.
Solar
Average insolation stands at 5-7 kWh/ m2/day. With over 3,000 hours of high and constant sunlight annually, Somalia is ideally placed to utilise solar energy. Solar resources have been utilised for off-grid generation in the country, as well as for water heating for municipal buildings. Solar cooking has also seen some uptake in the country, and solar power is seen as the energy source of choice for the rehabilitation of many municipal buildings in the country, particularly health centres.
Wind
Wind speeds vary from 3-11.4 m/s. Four 50 kW turbines were installed in Mogadishu in 1988, Wind energy has also been utilised for water pumping, with installations made by the UN Trusteeship Administration of Somalia from as early as the 1940s. The country has large areas of shallow sea along its coastline, particularly suitable for off-shore wind power, with the added benefit that this resource is close to a number of major load centres, including Mogadishu and Berbera. Studies estimate that approximately 50% of the land area of the country has suitable wind speeds for power generation and 95% could benefit, and profit, from replacing diesel-powered water pumps with wind systems.
Biomass
In 1985, wooded areas in Somalia were estimated to be about 39 million hectares – roughly 60% of Somalia’s land area. Due to overexploitation these figures have reduced significantly. In 2001, statistics indicate that the forest cover may have been as low as 10%. Solid and liquid biomass options in Somalia still hold a significant potential, however, primarily in the form of crop and animal wastes, and marine biomass. Sustainable charcoal production methods could also be used to great effect in the country, as current charcoal production is causing significant environmental impacts.
Geothermal
Available data indicates that the geothermal energy potential is too low to be commercially exploited for power generation.
Hydropower
Potential is estimated at 100-120 MW. As of 1985, this hydropower potential was largely untapped, with only 4.8 MW exploited on the lower Juba valley (pre-war estimates).
ENERGY EFFICIENCY
Various NGOs and charity groups, including the UN Division for Sustainable Development, have been active in the country promoting energy efficiency, particularly in the form of solar cookers, more efficient biomass stoves, and promoting more efficient charcoal manufacture. A significant proportion of the electricity generated in the country is done so through private diesel generators, often purchased second-hand.
Excerpt from Country Energy Profile of Somalia on reegle.info
Ankara, July 30, 2013 (SDN) —Turkish Parliament Speaker Cemil Çiçek paid a visit to the wounded police officers at an Ankara hospital on July 30, condemning the attack on a Turkish Embassy annex in the Somalian capital Mogadishu. Çiçek said the attack showed that Turkey’s humanitarian actions in the country “disturbed some circles.”
“We understand that we stepped on someone’s foot, because Turkey is becoming more and more effective in that region every other day. Turkey is trying to increase the living standards there through humanitarian projects and other ways and methods,” he told reporters.
“One of our security guards was martyred there [at the embassy]. Four others were brought to this hospital by our government for their further treatment. We came to say ‘get well soon,’” Cicek said, adding that the wounded were recovering.
The Parliament speaker stressed that Turkey was performing humanitarian duties in Somalia. “Turkey is doing what is necessary for a friendly country. We know that there are some powers that are uncomfortable with Turkey’s facilities and efforts in that region. Unfortunately, they used terrorist organizations once again to block Turkey’s African openings,” Çiçek said.
One Turkish security guard was killed and several others were injured while two suicide bombers were killed, in a suicide attack on July 27 in front of the staff building of the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu.
Jen Psaki
Spokesperson, Office of the Spokesperson
Washington, DC
The United States strongly condemns the terrorist attack on the Turkish diplomatic residences in Mogadishu, Somalia. We extend our condolences to the families and loved ones of those who lost their lives, and wish the injured a speedy recovery.
Turkey has played an important role in helping Somalia emerge from two decades of conflict. We stand firmly with the people of Somalia, with our Turkish ally, and all members of the international community who are working for peace and stability in Somalia.
This cowardly act will not shake our commitment to continue working for the brighter, more democratic and prosperous future the people of Somalia deserve.
The world makes much ado of people and organizations – and even governments – assisting militant, fringe organizations engaged in nefarious schemes against the larger humanity. These include ter rorists, pirates, drug dealers, and human traffickers. Among these the three most sought after, most publicized groups are terrorists, pirates and drug cartels. And the world is right to explore ways to stop organizations of this elk sell human lives cheap down the drain – each in accordance to its own, heinous code of operations. The world is also right to wage a relentless offensive against these enemies instead of hiding behind defensive measures that invariably show the chinks in the armor through which infiltrators creep in into the system to compromise it or wholly destabilize its effectiveness. Examples abound.
Realigning Policies
On occasion, good intentions open floodgates of disaster, misery and deprivation that is far worse than acts they set out to curb or prevent from happening. The May decision of the Barclays Bank to close the accounts of some 250 Money Services Businesses (MSBs) serving millions and millions of needy beneficiaries in developing countries presently tops the list of good intentions turning awry. The down turn in the Barclays decision is that it creates untold of, immeasurable agony and deprivation among millions of innocent recipients of remittances who are punished not on solid grounds but on the dictates of ‘preventive measures’ against perceived crimes that may or may not have happened at all.
The short term gains of decisions such as that of Barclays cannot balance or justify the far-reaching ramifications of residual consequences that will yet prove far more alarming than that which the Bank seeks to cover. For one, millions and millions of people who depended on relatives and friends, and made a honest living on remittances will take up the begging bowl at best joining the hordes of stateless, humiliated masses of international refugees – a state that the world can do without. Secondly, money transfer will disappear from a certifiable transaction to an unaccountable underground labyrinth of channels, driving hard earned cash right into the hands of a ruthless, manipulating underworld.
Far more thoughtlessly, decisions such as that of the Barclays denigrate the usefulness of paper trails in money transfers as it severely punishes the conscientious, law abiding practitioner for negligible oversights – if any, whilst opening limitless opportunities for shady deals and trail-less transactions.
On the other hand, it indirectly scoffs at financial regulations designed to combat money laundering and terrorist financing by exerting unbearable pressure on compliant companies that are not of western origin. The words ‘double standards’ glare out – for better or for worse.
Major MSBs that have been adversely affected by recent events, such as the Somali-origin – Dahabshiil, vigorously comply with international regulations combating terrorist financing, proliferation of weapons and the proceeds of crime. MSBs of this genre should be rewarded for fulfilling FATF expectations such as Recommendation 15 below, and not punished on the pretext of the flimsiest of reasons. The aspersion implied in the Barclays decision and the dark smudge it leaves on the shining record of blameless MSBs should be immediately retracted, and especially in the light of the decision’s ominous connotations and impact.
Recommendation 15 points out:
Countries should take measures to ensure that natural or legal persons that provide money or value transfer services (MVTS) are licensed or registered, and subject to effective systems for monitoring and ensuring compliance with the relevant measures called for in the FATF Recommendations. Countries should take action to identify natural or legal persons that carry out MVTS without a license or registration, and to apply appropriate sanctions.
Any natural or legal person working as an agent should also be licensed or registered by a competent authority, or the MVTS provider should maintain a current list of its agents accessible by competent authorities in the countries in which the MVTS provider and its agents operate. Countries should take measures to ensure that MVTS providers that use agents include them in their AML/CFT program and monitor them for compliance with this program.
The only consideration that governments, financial regulators, banking institutions, money transfer businesses and individuals should all keep uppermost in mind is to abide by the laws as best as can be implemented giving adequate allowances to cultural and geographical contexts.
Legality of Mobile Money Transfers
The UN estimates that there are around 300 million adults that would have been able to receive remittances from relatives who have currently no access to conventional money services, and have never seen the inside of a bank or another MSB for one reason or another. The system is user friendly, accessible to anybody connected to a telecommunication network, and offers the user innumerable outlets that he or she can send and receive money. It is virtually as easy as topping up mobile accounts.
On the other side of the spectrum, regulators have always had issues with mobile banking. In conventional banking and money transfer systems, financial regulators have levels of reports and documents available to them to inspect giving them the necessary base to influence these institutions’ operations. In mobile banking this is not available.
The eleventh FATF recommendation on record keeping stipulates:
Financial institutions should be required to maintain, for at least five years, all necessary records on transactions, both domestic and international, to enable them to comply swiftly with information requests from the competent authorities. Such records must be sufficient to permit reconstruction of individual transactions (including the amounts and types of currency involved, if any) so as to provide, if necessary, evidence for prosecution of criminal activity. (FATF Recommendations, p.17)
Presently, this recommendation has no apparent effect on mobile money transfers. The recommendation further establishes that all records obtained in a transaction through the customer due diligence (CDD) measures must be available to ‘domestic competent authorities’ at all times.
This makes present-day mobile money remittances marginally legal. If the system remains unchecked and unfettered for such long, mobile money transfers will predictably take the place of conventional money transfer businesses, unfairly edging them off the market. Instead of combating crime, such systems, experts believe, are more likely than any other to replenish dried up terrorist coffers and used up ammunition belts of active terrorist combatants by transferring money right into the cell phones of militants on the move.
Regulators are understandably worried that any amount of money can be sent from any mobile in the outside world to a phone number of a terrorist in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, for instance, with no intermediary, checking systems in place. No sender has to go to an office to register details of sender and receiver, and no fighter has to leave his ditch to collect money to buy ammunition, assemble bomb parts or forward costs to another commander on the front. Imagine a group of people sending to the mobile phones of 100 militants $2000 each. This is a cool $200 000. A whole city can be captured in certain parts of the world. Trainloads of people can be bombed out of their tracks. A fleet of school buses can be blown off into smithereens with a far less amount of money… A paper trail to trace origins, senders and recipients will be available to no one.
With popular hawala MSBs nothing if this kind can ever happen. They represent the only safe, legitimate access to subsistence, health, education, and investment costs to hundreds of millions of people that western banking institutions can never ever reach even with the full cooperation of local conventional banking facilities.
Regulations miss out
In their haste to come up with iron-tight shields against money laundering and the proceeds of crime, high-street banking institutions, international financial regulations and regulators seem to have missed a few crucial turns. As a result:
Anti-money laundering regulations fail to address or understand the operational mechanics of Money Service Business (MSB) that are much older than some ‘countries’. In many cases, the MSB has all the qualities, the operational strength, the network, the AML/Compliance regimes and hierarchical structure to combat laundered money, terrorism and the proceeds of crime passing through systems as legitimate earnings. And yet, much feted financial regulations such as the FATF recommendations, assume that the UK or the US is a typical, apt model that all nations should strive to emulate. Better still, nothing short of the centuries’ old financial systems said countries have adapted to through the years must be tolerated in all nations, without exception, automatically –and fully – manifested in, for instance, countries like Somalia and South Sudan instantly. Every recommendation begins with ‘countries should..’.
Mobile bank service providers are not fully regulated as electronic money issuers or as MSBs. This state leaves them wide open for a variety of abuses on the part of users.
It had not been adequately taken into account that in mobile banking, there is a failure of high profile schemes – in other words total network failure, relaxed security, absence of KYC regulation, relaxed sim card ownership, and the near total absence of due diligence and record-keeping measures which may compromise the security of the money transfer industry as a whole where, in reality, players in sector itself exercise different security regimens and, so, should be viewed each (hawala, mobile transfers, banking institution, etc. ) by merit and level, instead.
Regulators and regulations tailored to rigid cultural and geographical confines have not fully comprehended that in some parts of the world, the hawala is the only legal channel to send and/or receive money, thus becoming the only lifeline for millions of people around the globe, and that the legitimate continuation of business is to the interest of all stakeholders. Major money transfer businesses originating from non-western countries apply international anti-money laundering measures as robustly as western hawalas such as the Western Union.
In March 2010 – then a Minister in the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia – I was chosen by the Prime Minister to present to the Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council in New York the Somali Government’s reaction to the report of the UN Somalia Monitoring Group (SMG), which was released in 2010.
Likewise, in July 2012, I was a member of the Somali delegation that was dispatched to New York to present a rebuttal to the Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council on the report of Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG), released in 2012. Matt Bryden was then the Coordinator of the SEMG. His successor, Jarat Chopra, was a member of Bryden’s team. And prior to his nomination as the new Coordinator for the SEMG, he was an advisor for the Somalia and Eritrea Country Programmes of the World Bank.
In New York, in 2010 and 2012, during our meetings with the Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council, our initial reaction to the allegations of the SEMG reports included, inter alia, the following:
1. The 2010 and 2012 reports were disclosed prematurely to the media and recklessly released to the different Somali internet websites prior to their presentation to the UN Security Council and to the Somali authorities. This had undermined the overall credibility and integrity of the process. This deliberate act by the SEMG had been designed to create havoc and deviate the attention of the Somali people from the challenges of the Political Roadmap for ending transition. The idea was to jeopardize the progress that the Somali Transitional Federal Institutions were making and impede the noble tasks of the Somali Traditional Elders related to the adoption of the constitution and the selection of the new Federal Parliament of Somalia.
2. The release of the 2012 SEMG report had occured only a few weeks before the end of the transition and when the Political Roadmap was in its final conclusion. The intention was obvious: to disrupt the process and discredit the progress made in the Somali constitution-making process, in the selection process of the members of the new Somali Federal Parliament, and the election of the leadership for post-transition Somalia. Our contention was that the release of the report at that juncture was politically motivated. The objective of the SEMG report was to support the country to make further headway in its peace and stability. However, the accusations depicted in the report had unequivocally aimed to derail the Political Roadmap and impede the completion of the transition.
3. The Somali Armed Forces, alongside AMISOM, were engaged in earnest and critical efforts to bring about security in the country and eliminate the menaces posed by Al Shabaab and other terrorists associated to Al Qaeda. They had succeeded in liberating many areas that were previously controlled by Al Shabaab. Serious efforts were then being made in those areas to establish civilian administrations, launch major relief operations such as the building of schools, hospitals and other vital infrastructures, and help the IDPs return to their homes to restart their farming and rebuild their lives. We were concerned that the SEMG report would undermine those efforts by failing to give sufficient consideration to the tense and complex environment within which the Transitional Federal Institutions and their leadership were operating.
4. We were also concerned that the SEMG’s unsubstantiated allegations might have adversely impacted the peace dividends that had arisen following the defeat of Al Shabaab. Our determination to address our social ills in order to improve our security conditions and avert the re-occurrence of violence and the re-emergence of Al Shabaab could have also been seriously affected.
5. The 2010 report had claimed that there was no real structure to the Transitional Federal Government’s security sector. The reality was that there had been a clear policy and organization supported by strong political will and determined leadership, as well as by effective international technical assistance. The Government had spent a high proportion of its limited resources throughout the transitional period rebuilding the security sector in Somalia and had received praise from many quarters in the country for its efforts.
6. The 2010 report had also alleged that eighty percent of Transitional Federal Government personnel had defected to the extremists. This misguided and inflammatory claim was completely unsubstantiated and bore no correspondence to reality. It was deliberately designed to cause a reaction that would inevitably impede the significant progress made then by the Transitional Federal Government.
7. The 2010 report allegation that the extremists had obtained their arms from the Transitional Federal Government’s military forces by seizure and purchase was also exaggerated to such a degree that it had called into question the motives inspiring the UN Somalia Monitoring Group. While there might have been isolated incidents of this nature, there was no such pattern and no basis for this destructively provocative claim.
8. Allegations against some prominent business people in the 2010 report were refuted by the World Food Programme because the said allegations were based recklessly on unverifiable sources. And following the release of the 2010 Monitoring Group report, the level of humanitarian assistance to Somalia had significantly decreased. And according to a study commissioned and funded by the FAO, over 258,000 people died in southern and central Somalia between October 2010 and April 2012, including 133,000 children under the age of five.
9. During our meeting with the Sanctions Committee, we had also expressed our concern over the neutrality of Matt Bryden whose political views on “Somaliland” and its ambition to secede are well doucmented. His insistence to tarnish the reputation of the leadership in the Transitional Federal Institutions and target all regions of Somalia with the exception of “Somaliland” is tantamount to his biases and his sheer predilection to the latter’s independence and its secession.
The Transitional Federal Government had previously established a High Level Independent Commission to investigate allegations made by the Monitoring Group in its report released in 2010. The Commission’s findings had confirmed that the report was “riddled with ambiguity, irrelevant and prejudicial information, inconsistency and untruth.” The Commission had also observed that the report “failed to provide any tangible or substantive evidence to back the allegations made against the Transitional Federal Government’s officials, Puntland authority, and prominent Somali businessmen. The report lacked credence and had little or no probative value.” The report released in 2012 was found to be less credible and had also fallen seriously short of any rudimentary standards of evidence.
A quick look into the 2013 SEMG Report, it appears that many of the allegations made are based on unverifiable sources. The methodology employed in the gathering of information is not any different from the one pursued by the former Coordinator and his team. It is literally based on hearsay and on bits and pieces collected from sources that are unreliable. The current Federal Government of Somalia has every right to raise questions as to the credibility of the report and the veracity of the information contained.
My Advice to the Federal Government of Somalia
The Federal Government should ask to be given ample time to review and evaluate the content of the report very meticulously. This can be carried out by an Independent Commission, which will independently and promptly review all the claims reflected in the 2013 report and provide appropriate response for them. Members of the Commission should include a balanced selection of independent professionals of high integrity who can render an objective evaluation of the real issues. The government should be committed to undertaking appropriate action against any officials, individuals or organizations found to be engaged in criminal misconduct or other acts discrediting the government and people of Somalia.
The issue relating the alleged illegal export of charcoal from Jubaland and from Barawe in Lower Shabelle should also be investigated by the Commission. The SEMG’s accusation of Kenyan soldiers in the AMISOM of facilitating illegal charcoal exports from the port city of Kismayo is gravely serious and must be given further investigation to determine its truthfulness.
The UN Security Council banned the export of charcoal from Somalia in February 2012. The reason was to cut off one of the main source of income for Al Shabaab and not necessarily to save the Somali trees and curb deforestation. Had the UN Security Council and the SEMG been more serious about the export of charcoal from Somalia, then they should have also warned the countries that import charcoal. The charcoal importing countries are not only violating the Security Council ban, they are also violating the provisions of the United Nations Multilateral Environmental Conventions, which prohibit the export and import of charcoal.
Moreover, the Federal Government of Somalia should endevaour to dispatch a high-level delegation to New York to meet with the Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council in order to register its objections to the allegations and respectfully urge the Sanctions Committee to carefully review the findings of the SEMG report and test the reasonableness and accuracy of its findings.
If the Federal Government of Somalia and its different institutions opt to shrug off and silently reject and disregard the report’s findings, the unfounded allegations will certainly undermine the efforts and credibility of the nascent post-transition institutions and have a deleterious impact on the well-being of the people of Somalia.
The Government must officially request the Monitoring Group to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Somalia. Any attempts to micro-manage Somalia will certainly backfire and damage post-transition (re)construction and peace efforts. Notwithstanding, the leadership in the Federal Government of Somalia should reaffirm its determination to cooperate with the UN Security Council and its subordinate organs in a spirit of full transparency and mutual respect.
MOGADISHU (AFP) – At least one person was killed Saturday when a car bomb exploded in Somalia’s capital Mogadishu, the latest in a string of attacks, a local official said.
The car, a government vehicle, exploded near the Sanca intersection in the north of the capital.
“One person was killed in the blast, which destroyed a car belonging to the public works ministry,” Muhidin Hassan Jurus, Yaqshid district commissioner told reporters, adding that the authorities were still investigating.
A local resident who saw the blast, Ali Mohamed, said it looked as if a device attached to the vehicle had exploded as it drove through the district.
“I saw one person burned inside the car. It was the driver,” he said.
The incident is similar to a car bomb on Wednesday that targeted a lawmaker’s car in the capital and that killed one civilian and wounded several others.
No one has claimed this latest attack but Al-Qaeda-linked Shebab insurgents have carried out a series of bombings, attacks and killings in a bid to overthrow the internationally backed government.
Despite recent fighting in the ranks of the Shebab and the loss of a series of towns they held to a 17,700-strong African union force, analysts warn that the extremist group is far from defeated.
MOGADISHU (AFP) – At least one person was killed and several others were wounded Wednesday when a car bomb exploded in Somalia’s capital Mogadishu, the latest in a string of attacks, police said.
The blast targeted a car belonging to a member of parliament who was not hurt in the attack.
“The bomb destroyed the car of lawmaker Sheikh Adan Mader but he escaped the attack unharmed,” Somali police official Mohamed Ali said. “One civilian was killed and several others injured.”
No one has claimed responsibility for the attack, but Al-Qaeda-linked Shebab insurgents have carried out a series of bombings, attacks and killings in a bid to overthrow the internationally-backed government.
Abdulahi Elmi, a witness who was nearby when the car exploded, said he had seen seven civilians wounded by the blast.
Despite recent infighting inside the Shebab and the loss of a series of towns to a 17,700-strong African Union force, analysts warn the extremist group is far from defeated.
AAIB Insurance has become the first insurance broker to receive a licence to trade in Somalia.
The company received its ‘Special Permit And Service Certificate Of Registration As A Business’ from the Somali Ministry of Commerce and Industry in June.
The permit means that AAIB is the only foreign insurance broking company able to place insurance business from within Somalia. AAIB already has a representative on the ground in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia.
While the licence is a source of pride and competitive advantage to AAIB, its implications go way beyond the commercial interests of one company, said William Wakeham, CEO of AAIB.
“Yes this is good news for AAIB. It means we can steal a march on our rivals,” he said. “But the real significance of this permit, is that it is an important stepping stone in the development and reconstruction of Somalia after 22 years of civil war. This is good for Somalia and good for the companies that want to participate in its growth because for the first time they can get insurance cover for their operations informed by intimate local knowledge -as opposed to generic cover written at arm’s length.”
He explained that East Africa generally and Somalia in particular has become one of the most attractive areas in the world for oil and gas exploration. Late last year Somalia announced that it intends to auction 308 newly delineated blocks of oil rights.
“Without people on the ground, insurance companies find it hard to assess risk accurately. Some risks can’t be covered at all and others carry a higher than necessary premium. Now the long slow task of realising Somalia’s inherent wealth can begin in earnest,” he said.
