By Said Mohamud Ahmed

The Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait are once again under intense strain, reminding the world that maritime security in the Horn of Africa is not a peripheral issue. In this environment, Western governments need dependable partners. Somaliland has already shown itself to be one of the region’s most stable and capable actors, yet it remains denied formal recognition.

For more than three decades, Somaliland has built and maintained a functioning political order under difficult conditions. It has developed its own institutions, currency, border controls, and electoral system. Its elections have produced competitive contests and peaceful transfers of power, a record that is rare in the Horn of Africa. On the ground, it governs as a state even if the international system refuses to acknowledge it as one.

That disconnect has created a policy contradiction. The United States and its allies continue to affirm Somalia’s territorial integrity while increasingly engaging Somaliland for security cooperation, maritime monitoring, and regional stabilization. In practice, Somaliland is expected to perform like a sovereign state while being denied the legal and diplomatic standing that sovereignty requires.

This approach is no longer sustainable. It weakens a partner that is already contributing to regional stability and limits the strategic options available to Western governments.

Somaliland’s importance is not abstract. Its coastline along the Gulf of Aden places it on one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors. The development of Berbera Port and broader investment in logistics infrastructure have further increased its relevance in regional trade and security planning. In a period defined by shipping disruptions, strategic competition, and rising uncertainty, this location matters.

Yet Somaliland’s lack of recognition limits its ability to access international financial institutions, secure development assistance at scale, and attract the level of investment needed to expand its infrastructure and security capacity. That is not only a burden for Somaliland. It is also a missed opportunity for partners seeking reliable regional cooperation.

The main objection to Somaliland’s recognition has long been the fear that it could encourage secessionist claims elsewhere in Africa. That concern deserves to be taken seriously, but it does not fully fit Somaliland’s case. Somaliland was a separate political entity under British rule, gained independence in June 1960, and then entered a short-lived union with Italian Somalia. That union collapsed after state failure and civil conflict. Somaliland’s current claim is therefore rooted in the restoration of a previously recognized political status, not the fragmentation of a functioning state.

This history matters. It places Somaliland’s case in a different category from ordinary secessionist movements and makes the blanket application of Somalia-centered policy increasingly difficult to defend.

A more realistic approach is needed. Immediate formal recognition may not be politically feasible, but a gradual pathway is available. Western governments could expand bilateral agreements, institutionalize security cooperation, and create special or observer arrangements that bring Somaliland into international forums more fully. Such steps would recognize reality without forcing abrupt regional change.

Maintaining the current ambiguity serves limited strategic purpose. It constrains a capable partner, leaves a key maritime area vulnerable to competing influences, and creates a gap between Western rhetoric and practice. If stability in the Horn of Africa is truly a priority, then policy should reflect the actors actually delivering it.

Somaliland has demonstrated that it can govern, secure its territory, and contribute to regional order. What it lacks is not capability, but recognition. The challenge now is for the United States and its partners to align diplomatic practice with strategic reality.

By Jama Ayaanle Feyte

For over three decades, the Republic of Somaliland has defied the odds. While the Horn of Africa burned—while Mogadishu became a byword for anarchy, piracy, and al-Shabaab terror—Somaliland built a functioning democracy from the rubble of genocide. We have held uninterrupted elections. We have maintained a professional army and intelligence service that keeps the Gulf of Aden secure. We issue our own passports, manage our own borders, and have sustained a social contract that many recognized nations envy.

Yet, when the United States Congress recently mandated a “Report to Congress on Potential Areas for Improved United States Engagement with Somaliland,” Washington revealed a truth that every citizen of Hargeisa already knew: the United States does not see us as a partner. It sees us as a tool.

The report, while listing security, diplomatic, and economic areas for cooperation, anchors every sentence to a devastating disclaimer: “The United States recognizes the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia, which includes the region of Somaliland.”

This is not a minor legal formality. It is a declaration of permanent subordination. It tells the world that Somaliland is a “region” of a failed state that cannot provide security, basic services, or political stability to its own people. It tells investors that any deal with Berbera is a deal with a breakaway province. And it tells our people that three decades of democratic sacrifice are worth less than a 1991 policy memo.

It is time to stop pretending. Somaliland must immediately cease all operational cooperation with the U.S. Embassy in Somalia. Furthermore, we must formally request that the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of African Affairs establish a separate, direct, and permanent communication mechanism with Hargeisa—one that bypasses Mogadishu entirely. The current system does not serve our interests. It actively undermines them.

Part One: The Security Farce – Fighting Terror Through a Broken Lens

The report correctly notes that Somaliland’s location near Yemen and the Bab al-Mandab Strait is strategically vital. It acknowledges that AFRICOM is “exploring areas for potential cooperation” to monitor connections between Houthi terrorists and al-Shabaab, al-Qa’ida’s wealthiest affiliate.

Let us be brutally honest: Somaliland is already doing the work. Our maritime police forces patrol coastline that American drones cannot cover. Our intelligence services share real-time data on extremist movements along the Red Sea. We are the first line of defense against a scenario where the Houthis arm al-Shabaab with Iranian-made missiles—a nightmare that would threaten commercial shipping and U.S. naval assets alike.

But here is the rub: by insisting that all engagement flow through Embassy Mogadishu, the United States forces our commanders to coordinate with a capital that has no control over our territory. Mogadishu cannot authorize a joint patrol in Berbera. Mogadishu cannot vet our security personnel. Mogadishu cannot—and should not—speak for us.

The current arrangement is not only inefficient; it is dangerous. Operational security requires clear chains of command. When U.S. officials travel to Hargeisa under the authority of an embassy based in a city where al-Shabaab controls rural districts, they bring with them a compromised context. Sensitive information shared in Hargeisa could theoretically be routed back to Mogadishu, where leaks are commonplace. We have no guarantee of confidentiality. We have no guarantee of respect.

Worse, the report states that U.S. government travel to Somaliland is subject to the “same security requirements as the rest of Somalia,” necessitating “non-commercial aircraft and other resource-intensive security measures.” This is a bureaucratic insult. Somaliland is not Somalia. Hargeisa is not Mogadishu. By treating our capital as a war zone, the United States actively discourages its own officials from engaging with us meaningfully. The result is a handful of fleeting visits per year, followed by months of silence.

We cannot build a counter-terrorism partnership on crumbs. Either the United States establishes a direct security dialogue with Somaliland’s Ministry of Defense, or we will assume that Washington prefers the chaos of the current arrangement. And if chaos is the preference, let them manage it without our cooperation.

Part Two: The Diplomatic Humiliation – Why Embassy Mogadishu Cannot Speak for Us

The report boasts that “Embassy Mogadishu conducts regular, periodic visits to Somaliland to engage on matters of mutual interest.” Let us translate that diplomatic language into reality.

An American diplomat based in Mogadishu—a city they rarely leave without heavy armed escort—flies into Hargeisa for 48 hours. They meet with our President. They listen to our concerns. They nod sympathetically. Then they fly back to Mogadishu and file a report that disappears into the bureaucracy of an embassy whose legal mandate explicitly excludes our recognition.

What concrete outcome has ever emerged from these visits? Has a single trade agreement been signed? Has a single development project been scaled up? Has a single statement from the U.S. Embassy ever referred to Somaliland as anything other than a “region”?

No. Because Embassy Mogadishu is structurally incapable of advancing Somaliland’s interests. Its entire reason for existence is to support the Federal Government of Somalia. Every ambassador, every political officer, every aid coordinator in Mogadishu is evaluated based on their relationship with the Somali President in Mogadishu—not with the people of Hargeisa.

Expecting that embassy to advocate for Somaliland is like expecting the Israeli Embassy in Cairo to advocate for Palestine. It is a conflict of interest baked into the architecture of American diplomacy.

We must therefore demand a clean break. The Bureau of African Affairs at the U.S. Department of State must establish a dedicated liaison office for Somaliland, physically separate from the Mogadishu embassy structure, reporting directly to Washington. This office need not be an embassy—we understand the political constraints of full recognition—but it must be a direct channel.

How would this work in practice? A senior U.S. official, based in either Nairobi or Addis Ababa for logistical reasons, would be designated as the “Special Envoy for Somaliland Affairs.” This envoy would have a mandate to negotiate security, trade, and humanitarian agreements without seeking sign-off from Mogadishu. They would travel to Hargeisa regularly—not as visitors from the Somali embassy, but as representatives of a distinct bilateral relationship.

The alternative is the status quo: an endless loop of periodic visits, resource-intensive security measures, and zero progress. Somaliland has waited 34 years for a change. We will not wait 34 more.

Part Three: The Economic Dead End – Why Investment Will Never Come Under This Policy

The report acknowledges that Somaliland’s Berbera port represents “potential alternatives to other congested regional facilities” and that the ongoing development of the airport and seaport could create “increased opportunities for U.S. investment.”

Then, in the very next sentence, it admits the truth: “regional security concerns and the dispute over Somaliland’s status, including its refusal to cooperate with national authorities, present challenges for investment, banking, and trade.”

Read that again. The United States is actively telling American investors that Somaliland is a risky bet because the United States itself refuses to recognize our legal status. This is a self-inflicted wound.

No major American bank will finance a port expansion in a territory that the U.S. government labels a “region” of a failed state. No American insurance company will underwrite a shipping contract to Berbera if the political status is disputed. No American mining company will bid on mineral extraction rights if the title deeds could be challenged in an international court.

The absurdity is breathtaking. The United States has the power to unilaterally change the risk calculation overnight—not by granting full recognition, but by issuing a simple executive branch statement clarifying that for purposes of trade and investment, Somaliland will be treated as a distinct economic zone. They have done this for Kosovo. They have done this for Taiwan. They can do it for us.

But they will not, as long as we continue to cooperate with the Embassy in Somalia. Why would they change a system that costs them nothing? Currently, the U.S. gets all the benefits of Somaliland’s stability—counter-terrorism intelligence, port access, regional security—without paying the political price of recognition. We have become the unpaid subcontractors of American foreign policy.

Part Four: The Way Forward – A Concrete Proposal for Direct Engagement

Somaliland is not naive. We know that full recognition is a long-term goal, not an immediate ask. But there is a vast middle ground between zero recognition and full sovereignty. We demand that the United States occupy that middle ground.

Specifically, we call on the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of African Affairs to implement the following three measures immediately:

1. Establish a direct communication protocol – A secure, encrypted channel between the Somaliland Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hargeisa and the Bureau of African Affairs in Washington, bypassing Embassy Mogadishu entirely. This channel would be used for all security, humanitarian, and economic discussions.
2. Appoint a dedicated U.S. official for Somaliland affairs – This official, with the rank of Senior Coordinator or Special Envoy, would be based in the region (Nairobi or Addis Ababa) and would travel to Hargeisa at least quarterly. They would report directly to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, not to the Ambassador in Mogadishu.
3. Issue a trade and investment clarification – The U.S. Department of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative should issue joint guidance stating that, for commercial purposes, Somaliland is a permissible destination for American trade and investment, subject to the same due diligence as any other non-recognized entity with whom the U.S. maintains de facto relations.

If the United States refuses these three modest requests, then Somaliland must draw the logical conclusion: Washington does not actually want improved engagement. It wants a cheap security partnership without diplomatic cost. It wants our cooperation without our consent.

Conclusion: Walk Away from the Table

There is an old Somali proverb: “A man who is not welcomed at the door will not guard the house.”

Somaliland has guarded the house of regional stability for three decades. We have kept the Red Sea lanes safe. We have prevented al-Shabaab from establishing a foothold on our coast. We have shown the world that democracy is possible in the Horn of Africa. And what have we received in return? A report that calls our nation a “region.” Visits from an embassy that does not represent us. Investment promises that evaporate upon contact with reality.

Enough.

We must stop working with the U.S. Embassy in Somalia. We must refuse their periodic visits. We must decline their security cooperation requests until they meet us as equals—not as subordinates. And we must formally request that the Bureau of African Affairs establish a direct, separate mechanism for communication.

If the United States says no, then we will have lost nothing except a relationship that was never truly reciprocal. If the United States says yes, then we will have taken the first real step toward the recognition we have earned.

Somaliland has survived without American recognition for 34 years. We can survive 34 more. But we will no longer participate in a diplomatic fiction that demeans our democracy and endangers our future.

The door in Hargeisa is open. But it will no longer be opened from Mogadishu.