By Said Mohamud Ahmed
The Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait are once again under intense strain, reminding the world that maritime security in the Horn of Africa is not a peripheral issue. In this environment, Western governments need dependable partners. Somaliland has already shown itself to be one of the region’s most stable and capable actors, yet it remains denied formal recognition.
For more than three decades, Somaliland has built and maintained a functioning political order under difficult conditions. It has developed its own institutions, currency, border controls, and electoral system. Its elections have produced competitive contests and peaceful transfers of power, a record that is rare in the Horn of Africa. On the ground, it governs as a state even if the international system refuses to acknowledge it as one.
That disconnect has created a policy contradiction. The United States and its allies continue to affirm Somalia’s territorial integrity while increasingly engaging Somaliland for security cooperation, maritime monitoring, and regional stabilization. In practice, Somaliland is expected to perform like a sovereign state while being denied the legal and diplomatic standing that sovereignty requires.
This approach is no longer sustainable. It weakens a partner that is already contributing to regional stability and limits the strategic options available to Western governments.
Somaliland’s importance is not abstract. Its coastline along the Gulf of Aden places it on one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors. The development of Berbera Port and broader investment in logistics infrastructure have further increased its relevance in regional trade and security planning. In a period defined by shipping disruptions, strategic competition, and rising uncertainty, this location matters.
Yet Somaliland’s lack of recognition limits its ability to access international financial institutions, secure development assistance at scale, and attract the level of investment needed to expand its infrastructure and security capacity. That is not only a burden for Somaliland. It is also a missed opportunity for partners seeking reliable regional cooperation.
The main objection to Somaliland’s recognition has long been the fear that it could encourage secessionist claims elsewhere in Africa. That concern deserves to be taken seriously, but it does not fully fit Somaliland’s case. Somaliland was a separate political entity under British rule, gained independence in June 1960, and then entered a short-lived union with Italian Somalia. That union collapsed after state failure and civil conflict. Somaliland’s current claim is therefore rooted in the restoration of a previously recognized political status, not the fragmentation of a functioning state.
This history matters. It places Somaliland’s case in a different category from ordinary secessionist movements and makes the blanket application of Somalia-centered policy increasingly difficult to defend.
A more realistic approach is needed. Immediate formal recognition may not be politically feasible, but a gradual pathway is available. Western governments could expand bilateral agreements, institutionalize security cooperation, and create special or observer arrangements that bring Somaliland into international forums more fully. Such steps would recognize reality without forcing abrupt regional change.
Maintaining the current ambiguity serves limited strategic purpose. It constrains a capable partner, leaves a key maritime area vulnerable to competing influences, and creates a gap between Western rhetoric and practice. If stability in the Horn of Africa is truly a priority, then policy should reflect the actors actually delivering it.
Somaliland has demonstrated that it can govern, secure its territory, and contribute to regional order. What it lacks is not capability, but recognition. The challenge now is for the United States and its partners to align diplomatic practice with strategic reality.
