Hargeisa – Armed men who opened fire on the Hargeisa local government headquarters have reportedly fled the scene following the attack.
Police forces responded to the incident immediately, and an investigation is underway to locate the group responsible for the assault.
By Goth Mohamed Goth
HARGEISA, Somaliland – The Ministry of Local Governments and Urban Development has officially authorized an extraordinary session of the Hargeisa District Council, clearing the way for a formal vote on the removal of the city’s Mayor and Deputy Mayor.
In a directive issued on May 11, 2026, Minister Hassan Ahmed Ducaale (Macalin) approved the session in response to a written request submitted by six council members on May 9, 2026. The letter, bearing reference number WDH&HM/XW/484/09/2026, was addressed to the Governor of Maroodi-Jeeh, the Mayor of Hargeisa (who also chairs the District Council), the Deputy Mayor, and all council members, with copies sent to senior ministry officials.
Legal Framework Cited
The Minister’s decision invokes Article 51, Section (B) of the Regional and District Administration Law No. 23/2019, which grants one-third of a district council’s members the right to petition for an extraordinary session. The approval also references Article 51, Section 4, requiring that the rationale for such a session be explicitly outlined in the meeting agenda
According to the letter, the six council members have proposed a motion of no confidence specifically seeking the removal of both the Mayor and their Deputy — a significant political step under Somaliland’s local governance laws
Session Scheduled for Tuesday
The extraordinary session is set to take place on Tuesday, May 12, 2026, at 7:30 AM local time. The Minister has further instructed the Governor of Maroodi-Jeeh region to ensure the session is duly convened.
The letter concludes with a standard Islamic invocation, “ALLA MAHAD LEH” (Praise be to God), and was issued from the Ministry’s office in the Shacab area, behind the Ministry of Livestock, in Hargeisa.
Political Implications
The approval marks a rare and accelerated procedural move within Hargeisa’s local government. Should the session proceed as scheduled, council members will deliberate and vote on the motion — a process that, if successful, would trigger a leadership vacuum and likely require the election of a new mayor. Observers note that the short timeline between the request (May 9) and the approved session (May 12) underscores the urgency or political weight behind the six members’ initiative.
As of this writing, no public statement has been issued by the Mayor’s office or the council members who submitted the motion
Based on official correspondence from the Ministry of Local Governments and Urban Development of the Republic of Somaliland, dated May 11, 2026.
By Jama Ayaanle Feyte
Hargeisa – The government of the Republic of Somaliland has appointed a diplomatic envoy to represent its interests in Greece.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Somaliland has named a special diplomatic envoy to Greece: Dimitrios Tourikis, a Greek national.
This appointment marks a step forward in Somaliland’s ongoing efforts to strengthen international relations and diplomatic cooperation with European countries.
The appointment of a Special Envoy to Greece carries several important implications for Somaliland, including:
· Deepening diplomatic engagement with Greece, especially following recent reports of active bilateral diplomatic contact.
· The new envoy could also play a key role in attracting investment and fostering cooperation across various sectors.
Sheikh Sharif: “We do not seek war, but the situation in Mogadishu shows that the system is steadily weakening.”
He added that troops have been deployed around his area, and that some members of parliament and other individuals who were on their way to him have been prevented from reaching the house where he resides.
He accused the government of trying to block opposition gatherings, stating that such measures are only increasing political tensions.
Somalia’s former president, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, called on all parties to avoid anything that could lead to bloodshed, stressing that the opposition only wants to hold peaceful protests.
“We want peace; we do not want war. We want the Somali people to have the opportunity to make their voices heard,” he said.
By Khadar Afrah
On the evening of 6 May 2026, in the Warlaliska neighbourhood of Deyniile district in Mogadishu, federal government forces opened fire on civilians. The clashes were not triggered by Al-Shabaab. They were triggered by the government’s own land clearance operations, the forced removal of residents from public and private land that the federal administration has been conducting across the capital in recent weeks. A three-year-old child, Musamil Yusuf Osman, was killed. Casualties were reported on multiple sides. Former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, condemning the attack as a criminal act, warned publicly that a dangerous threshold had been crossed and called on Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to stop abusing state power and looting public assets.
This is not an isolated incident. It is a destination. The Deyniile clashes are the foreseeable endpoint of two years of decisions that have systematically dismantled Somalia’s institutional safeguards, concentrated power in a single man’s hands, alienated the international partners keeping the state alive, and created the conditions for exactly this kind of violence. The question Somalia faces on 7 May 2026, eight days before the presidential mandate expires, is no longer whether the crisis is serious. It is whether the country can pull back from the edge before it goes over.
The Policy Behind the Killing
The fighting in Deyniile did not begin with guns. It began with eviction notices.
Across Mogadishu’s districts, the federal government has been conducting forced removals of residents from public land. Opposition figures, civil society organisations, and affected residents have documented the pattern: families are removed from plots, including in some cases privately owned land with legal documentation, and the cleared properties are subsequently transferred to individuals with business connections to the presidency. The proceeds are unaccounted for.
The government calls this a public land clearance programme. The residents of Warlaliska called it what it was. When federal forces arrived to enforce the removals, they fought back. A child died in the crossfire. Sharif Sheikh Ahmed did not equivocate in his response. He described the attack as criminal, demanded accountability, and said directly to the president: a dangerous threshold has been reached. Stop abusing the power of the state. Stop looting the assets of the people.
Those are not the words of a politician positioning himself. They are the words of a man who watched a child die during a government land clearance operation and felt obliged to name what he saw.
This is the government Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has built. Not the government he was elected to build. The government that exists tonight in Mogadishu.
Expelling the Monitors, Keeping the Money
To understand how Somalia arrived at this moment, it is necessary to understand what has been systematically removed over the past two years.
On 10 June 2025, the Federal Government sent a letter through State Minister Ali Omar demanding the dissolution of the C6+. The group comprising the UN, the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, the African Union, IGAD, Ethiopia, and Kenya had served as Somalia’s primary external accountability mechanism for governance and electoral conduct. Ali Omar’s letter called it “outdated and counterproductive.” The dissolution came months before a scheduled election whose framework remained unresolved, at the precise moment when questions about the president’s constitutional conduct were becoming impossible to ignore.
The C6+ had helped end the 2021-2022 electoral crisis. It asked hard questions. When those questions became inconvenient, it was ended. The questions did not go away. They went unanswered.
What makes this decision so damaging is what it was paired with. Somalia’s 2025 federal budget stands at $1.32 billion. Sixty-seven per cent of it — $870 million — comes from external donors. The AU stabilisation mission AUSSOM, which provides the security buffer keeping Al-Shabaab from the capital, runs on a budget of $166.5 million a year. The African Union contributes $20 million of that. Twelve per cent. The rest comes from Western governments. The EU has contributed nearly €2.8 billion to AU peacekeeping in Somalia over two decades. Norway, the third-largest donor to the World Bank’s Somalia trust fund, has contributed NOK 890 million since 2015 and announced NOK 102 million more in April 2026. In December 2023, multilateral creditors cancelled $4.5 billion in Somali debt.
This is the partnership Hassan Sheikh Mohamud dismantled the oversight of. He expelled the watchers and kept the cheques. He called it sovereignty. It was something closer to its opposite: a government that cannot function without external financing, demanding that the people providing that financing ask no questions about how it is used.
The cost of that calculation is visible. US senators introduced the AUSSOM Funding Restriction Act in 2025. The UN Security Council failed to lock in the Resolution 2719 hybrid financing framework by its May 2025 deadline. The mission between Mogadishu and Al-Shabaab is running on contingency pledges. A government that spends two years undermining donor confidence while depending on donors for 67 per cent of its budget is not managing a difficult situation. It is manufacturing a worse one.
The Looting That Has No Paper Trail
The Deyniile evictions are one face of a broader pattern of resource extraction that has operated without accountability throughout this administration.
The 2024 energy agreements with Turkey’s state oil company TPAO grant exploration rights in three offshore blocks. According to multiple credible reports, TPAO can recover up to 90 per cent of operational costs before revenue-sharing begins. Somalia’s royalty is approximately five per cent. The agreements reportedly include no signature, development, or production bonuses and TPAO is said to be exempt from domestic taxation. The Çağrı Bey drillship departed in February 2026 escorted by three Turkish naval frigates, with F-16 fighters already positioned at Mogadishu airport. Not one of these terms was subject to published parliamentary scrutiny. The contract has not been made public.
Somalia’s offshore resources belong to the Somali people. A deal that delivers five per cent in royalties, no bonuses, and probable tax exemption to a foreign state company conducted without parliamentary oversight and without disclosure of its terms is not a development agreement. It is an extraction arrangement negotiated in the dark.
The land evictions and the energy deal share the same logic: state assets are being converted into private value, outside any accountability framework, by a government that has removed the mechanisms that would normally ask where the money went. The energy contract is unpublished. The parliamentary chamber that might ask questions has been converted into a vehicle for ratifying decisions already made.
Threatening the People It Is Supposed to Protect
The Defence Minister told Mogadishu that anyone who attempted to take up arms would regret it. He explicitly invoked the 2021 crackdown in which protesters were killed. That statement was not a security assessment. It was a threat to the civilian population of the capital, delivered through a subordinate, aimed at people whose demand was nothing more than a legitimate election.
In September 2025, opposition leaders including former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed visited Warta Nabadda police station in the Wardhigley district to advocate for a civilian detainee whose violent arrest had caused public outrage. Gunfire erupted. One opposition bodyguard was killed. Civilians were injured. The Prime Minister called it a coup attempt. A former head of state, at a police station, speaking for a detained civilian, was labelled an insurrectionist.
Now, in May 2026, the same pattern has produced a dead child in Deyniile.
The trajectory is not difficult to read. A government that deploys armed force against civilians to clear land, that labels a police station visit by a former president a coup, that issues public threats invoking past crackdowns against protesters who ask for elections, is a government that has normalised the use of state violence against its own population as a political instrument. That normalisation is not stable. It escalates. The events of 6 May 2026 are not an endpoint. They are a warning of what comes next if the direction does not change.
The International Community: Present, Silent, Complicit
What makes Somalia’s current crisis so dangerous is not only what the president has done. It is what the international community has failed to do about it.
Western governments fund 88 per cent of AUSSOM. They have contributed billions to Somalia’s reconstruction over three decades. They cancelled $4.5 billion of Somalia’s debt in 2023. They are the reason the federal government in Mogadishu functions at all. And they have watched, largely in silence, as the government they finance has expelled its accountability mechanisms, conducted forced evictions, signed opaque energy deals, extended a presidential mandate through a parliament of expired mandates, and now killed a child in a land clearance operation.
The argument offered for this silence is pragmatic: Somalia cannot be sanctioned without collapsing; it cannot be abandoned without handing a strategic victory to Al-Shabaab; a compromised government is better than none. That calculation may have been defensible at some point. It is not defensible tonight, with a three-year-old buried in Deyniile and a mandate expiry eight days away and no agreed electoral process in sight.
When international partners fund a government’s security and say nothing about its governance failures, they do not maintain stability. They communicate to every actor in Somali politics that accountability has no price. They tell the president that Western engagement is unconditional. That message is the seed of exactly the anti-Western sentiment that Al-Shabaab needs. The partners planting that seed with their silence are not protecting their investment. They are destroying it slowly.
The African Union Commission, under Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, has been equally absent. The AU spoke correctly and loudly when Israel recognised Somaliland. It has said nothing about the parliamentary term extension, nothing about clan-aligned battalion deployments inside Mogadishu, nothing about unrecorded land revenues, and nothing about the evictions that produced last night’s killing. The AU deployed 84 observers to Uganda’s January 2026 elections. Somalia’s collapsing electoral process has attracted no comparable institutional attention. That silence gives Hassan Sheikh Mohamud continental cover. It tells him that what he is doing carries no African cost either.
Silence from partners is not neutrality. It is permission. And permission granted now, in these eight days, will be paid for at a far higher price later.
What Civil War Looks Like Before It Starts
Somalia has been to this place before. The Somali civil war did not begin suddenly. It began with a government that decided power-sharing was a threat, that concentrated authority in fewer and fewer hands, that used state forces against political opponents and called it governance, that alienated its international partners and called it sovereignty, that looted public resources and called it development. The country did not fall suddenly. It fell after the social contract collapsed under the accumulated weight of those decisions.
The conditions accumulating in Mogadishu in May 2026 are not identical to 1991. The institutions are different. The international presence is different. The political configuration is different. But the logic is recognisable: a government using force to resolve political disputes that require negotiation, creating enemies faster than it can suppress them, degrading the institutions that might otherwise contain the pressure, and moving towards a confrontation it cannot win cleanly but refuses to avoid.
The elite battalions deployed along sub-clan lines within Mogadishu are not a security architecture. They are a civil war waiting for a trigger. The land evictions radicalising civilian populations in Deyniile and beyond are not governance. They are recruitment. The unanswered questions about the energy deal and the land sales are not technical failures. They are grievances being stored for a moment when the political temperature rises high enough to ignite them.
Al-Shabaab advanced to less than 50 kilometres from Mogadishu by July 2025. Foreign embassies withdrew non-essential staff to Nairobi. The security gains of 2022 and 2023 have been reversed. The resources that should have sustained the counter-insurgency were redirected into suppressing domestic political opposition. The greatest external beneficiary of Somalia’s current internal crisis is the organisation the international community has spent three decades and billions of dollars trying to defeat.
The president has eight days left on his constitutional mandate. He has no agreed successor process. He has a capital city where government forces just killed a child in a land clearance operation. He has international partners whose patience with unconditional engagement is visibly exhausting. He has a political opposition that has been threatened, shot at, and labelled insurrectionist for asking for elections. He has a national army fractured along clan lines. And he has an African Union that is watching all of this and saying nothing.
This is what a country looks like on the verge of collapse. Not after the violence starts. Before it.
What Must Happen Now
The president still has the ability to change course. The mandate expires on 15 May. There is still time to convene a genuine, inclusive process, to reach an agreement with the opposition and the federal member states, to produce a credible electoral framework, and to begin a transition that does not require a confrontation nobody can afford.
International partners must stop calculating that silence is safer than engagement. It is not. Public conditionality — clearly stated, consistently enforced, coordinated across bilateral and multilateral channels — is the only tool that has a realistic chance of altering the trajectory before the trajectory becomes irreversible. The EU, the UK, Norway, the United States, and the AU all have leverage. They have chosen not to use it. That choice now has a name: Musamil Yusuf Osman, three years old, killed in Deyniile on 6 May 2026 during a government land clearance operation.
The Somali people did not elect this president to evict them from their homes, sign away their offshore resources in unpublished contracts, extend his own mandate through a parliament of expired terms, and then shoot at the civilians who object. They elected him to build a country.
Eight days remain. The choices made in those eight days will determine whether Somalia steps back from this edge or goes over it. The evidence of the past two years leaves little room for optimism. But the alternative to demanding better is accepting what happened last night in Deyniile as the new normal. That is not a price the Somali people should be asked to pay. It is not a price their partners should be willing to fund.
Khadar Afrah
By Said Mohamud Ahmed
The geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa continues to highlight the contrast between the Republic of Somaliland and its neighbors, particularly the Federal Government of Somalia. As of early May 2026, public discussion has centered on President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, known as Dr. Irro, and his extended absence from the country, raising questions about what such travel means for state continuity and diplomatic strategy. Somaliland’s constitutional framework and political institutions help explain why an extended presidential absence does not automatically signal instability.
I wrote this blog post in response to concerns raised within the Somaliland diaspora about President Irro’s whereabouts, the length of his absence, and whether the silence surrounding the trip reflects hidden problems. Drawing on constitutional sources, regional reporting, and diplomatic context, this analysis aims to clarify the issue in a balanced way. My purpose is not to sensationalize the matter, but to show how Somaliland’s institutions can sustain governance while high-level diplomacy remains deliberately low profile.
President Irro’s reported travel to the United Arab Emirates in late April 2026 fits a broader pattern of discreet diplomacy in Somaliland’s external relations. Reporting on the trip suggests that the visit was linked to ongoing discussions with the UAE, a state that has long played an important economic role in Somaliland, including through investment connected to Berbera Port and related infrastructure. In a region shaped by Red Sea tensions, such engagements are best understood as part of Somaliland’s effort to advance economic and strategic interests through carefully managed diplomatic channels.
The limited public information surrounding the visit appears consistent with the confidential nature of sensitive diplomatic talks. In practice, governments often avoid disclosing full details of negotiations until outcomes are secure, both to preserve leverage and to reduce unnecessary political distraction. In Somaliland’s case, this discretion may also serve to protect the negotiation process from premature speculation and external interference.
Somaliland’s resilience during presidential travel rests on a constitutional framework that provides clear lines of authority. The Constitution establishes the executive branch as separate and independent, with the President at its head, the Vice-President empowered to act in the President’s absence or illness, and the Council of Ministers charged with assisting in the execution of government policy. Article 85 limits the President’s absence from the country to 45 consecutive days unless the absence is for health reasons, while Article 91 authorizes the Vice-President to act as President in the President’s absence. Article 94 further ensures continuity by assigning the Council of Ministers collective responsibility for state policy and administration.
This framework is important because it shows that continuity in Somaliland does not depend on constant presidential visibility. Instead, it depends on institutions that can absorb temporary absence without creating a constitutional vacuum. The presence of an active Vice-President and a functioning cabinet allows the state to continue operating while the President carries out external engagements.
Somaliland’s broader governance model also helps explain this stability. Alongside elected institutions, the political system incorporates the House of Elders, or Guurti, which has historically played a role in sustaining clan consensus and political balance. That hybrid arrangement has long contributed to conflict management and continuity in a society where formal state institutions and customary authority remain closely connected.
Irro’s victory in the 2024 presidential election, with 63.92 percent of the vote, marked a significant political transition and ended years of delayed electoral cycles. His mandate matters because it provides political space for a more active diplomatic agenda, including high-level engagement with foreign partners. Even so, the strength of that mandate should not be confused with immunity from domestic scrutiny, especially on issues of public services, transparency, and communication.
Somaliland’s foreign policy orientation has increasingly emphasized strategic visibility in the Red Sea and Gulf region. Public reporting and policy commentary indicate that the territory’s diplomatic relevance has grown in discussions involving Israel, the United States, and the UAE, especially as regional actors assess maritime security and Red Sea instability. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in late 2025 also intensified international attention to Somaliland’s external posture, although the practical consequences of that recognition remain unfolding and should be described carefully rather than overstated.
Domestic criticism has not disappeared, and it should not be ignored. Concerns about public service delivery, governance controversies, and online dissatisfaction among younger citizens remain part of the political landscape. These critiques matter because they remind policymakers that diplomatic success is most durable when paired with visible domestic performance and clear communication to the public.
Somaliland’s position becomes even more striking when viewed beside Somalia’s current political uncertainty. Reports in March and April 2026 described contentious constitutional changes and parliamentary maneuvers in Mogadishu that may affect presidential and parliamentary timelines, while opposition figures challenged the legality and legitimacy of those changes. That contrast does not mean Somaliland is free of political contestation, but it does show that its institutions have so far been more effective at preserving continuity during executive travel and transition.
Over more than three decades, Somaliland has developed state practices that allow it to combine institutional continuity with diplomatic experimentation. President Irro’s UAE mission may eventually produce concrete economic or strategic gains, but its deeper significance lies in what it reveals about Somaliland’s governing style: deliberate, cautious, and institutionally anchored. The challenge ahead is to ensure that this diplomatic confidence is matched by domestic transparency, service delivery, and sustained public trust.
Said Mohamud Ahmed
Doctoral Candidate in Educational Leadership.
By Jama Ayaanle Feyte
As Somaliland continues to consolidate its democratic gains and seek international recognition, the question of leadership becomes ever more critical. Among the contenders for the nation’s highest office, Hersi Ali H. Hassan, Chairman of the WADDANI Party, has emerged as a uniquely viable future leader. His blend of deep political experience and genuine engagement with diverse segments of society sets him apart in a crowded political landscape.
Political Maturity Forged Through Experience
Hersi Ali H. Hassan is not a novice in the corridors of power or the challenges of statecraft. Having served in senior governmental roles—including as Minister of Livestock and Fisheries, a portfolio vital to Somaliland’s economy—he understands both policy and public administration from within. His tenure in parliament further honed his legislative skills, giving him a comprehensive grasp of Somaliland’s legal and institutional frameworks.
Unlike leaders who rely solely on charisma, Hersi brings a track record of navigating complex political negotiations, managing resources in a resource-constrained environment, and advocating for Somaliland’s interests both locally and internationally. This depth of experience translates into readiness: he would require little on-the-job training to steer the nation through security, economic, and diplomatic challenges.
Engaging the Full Fabric of Society
What truly distinguishes Hersi is his deliberate, consistent outreach beyond traditional power bases. While many politicians focus on their clan or regional strongholds, Hersi has invested in building bridges across Somaliland’s diverse communities.
· Youth and Women: Under his leadership, WADDANI has actively created platforms for young people and women to participate in decision-making. Hersi regularly holds town‑hall style meetings in urban centers and rural areas alike, listening to the aspirations of first‑time voters and marginalized groups.
· Business and Diaspora: Recognizing that economic revival requires private sector dynamism, he has worked closely with business associations and the influential Somaliland diaspora. His proposals on investment incentives and remittance-friendly policies are shaped by direct dialogue with entrepreneurs abroad and at home.
· Religious and Traditional Elders: Hersi respects the role of guurti (traditional elders) in maintaining social harmony. He has consistently consulted them on conflict resolution and resource sharing, ensuring that development plans are culturally grounded.
· Civil Society and Intellectuals: From university lecturers to human rights advocates, Hersi has fostered an inclusive political culture that welcomes constructive critique. His public forums are known for allowing tough questions—a sign of confidence in his vision.
A Unifier in Polarised Times
Somaliland’s multiparty democracy has sometimes led to political gridlock and identity-based tensions. Hersi Ali H. Hassan has positioned himself as a unifier who prioritises national interest over partisan gain. His campaign messaging emphasises economic opportunity, security sector reform, and completing the push for recognition—issues that resonate across clan lines.
By consistently showing respect for opposition voices and engaging with civil society, he has earned a reputation as a statesman who listens before deciding. In a region where strongman politics often prevail, this collaborative style is both rare and refreshing.
Conclusion: The Viable Choice
Viability as a future leader rests on three pillars: competence, inclusivity, and vision. Hersi Ali H. Hassan demonstrates all three. His proven political experience equips him to govern effectively from day one. His active, respectful engagement with every layer of Somaliland society builds the trust necessary for lasting peace. And his focus on economic development and international recognition offers a clear roadmap forward.
As Somalilanders weigh their options, Hersi stands out not as a mere candidate, but as a leader ready to unite the nation and realise its long‑deferred promise. The time for experienced, consensus‑building leadership is now—and Hersi Ali H. Hassan is that leader.
Jama Ayaanle Feyte is .Journalist, Horn of Africa Security Expert and Political Analyst
Mogadishu – Former Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo has called for the remaining days of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s term to be used to build an inclusive electoral process acceptable to all political stakeholders, in order to prevent political instability.
Speaking about the current political situation on Friday, Farmaajo noted that May 15, 2026, will mark the end of President Hassan Sheikh’s constitutional term. He stressed the need for consensus on the country’s electoral path.
Farmaajo also urged the federal government to immediately release journalists and individuals he said had defended community interests amid the ongoing political tensions. He argued that such arrests violate Somalia’s constitution and laws, and reflect what he described as a troubling political direction under the current administration.
The former president further criticized the government’s recent announcement of a housing project for displaced families in Mogadishu, describing it as an attempt to ease growing public pressure and social unrest. He questioned the feasibility of the plan, noting that no clear budget had been allocated for the initiative, especially with only a few days remaining in the government’s current term.
The remarks come amid escalating political tensions ahead of the May 15 deadline, with Somalia’s political stakeholders still divided over the electoral model and timeline, despite parliament’s approval of constitutional amendments extending federal institution mandates from four to five years
By Goth Mohamed Goth
Mogadishu – The Somali opposition, which held a meeting in Mogadishu today, has insisted that tomorrow they will proceed with a protest against what they describe as the ongoing displacement and destruction in the capital. They accuse the federal government of forcibly evicting residents from their homes.
MP Abdirahman Warsame, one of the opposition figures leading the demonstrations against the government, said the protest is peaceful and aims to defend those who have been displaced.
“This protest is a peaceful demonstration against the displacement and looting of the Somali people’s land,” said MP Abdirahman Abdishakur, alleging that hundreds of thousands of people have been evicted from their homes and businesses.
He also called on the public to take part in the rally, especially those who have been evicted, saying, “every person should return to the place from which they were displaced to assert their rights.”
Former Somali Prime Minister Hassan Ali Kheyre, for his part, said the protests will continue until the aggrieved people obtain their rights.
“The protest is not just for tomorrow. It will continue until the victims gain their rights,” Kheyre said.
Kheyre accused President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s government of suppressing and imprisoning young people and those who hold opposing views. He urged security forces not to be used against protesting civilians.
Another former prime minister, Mohamed Hussein Roble, stated that the people of Mogadishu are required to “stand up in defense of the displaced.”
“Every citizen who has suffered injustice has a day to protest tomorrow,” Roble said, describing Mogadishu as “a city known for peace and hospitality” but now plagued by “a few individuals trying to loot the people’s assets.”
Meanwhile, former Somali President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, who also chairs the opposition ‘Future of Somalia’ council, said this year has become “marked by looting and displacement.”
Sharif Sheikh Ahmed accused the government of failing to stop the demolition of homes and the eviction of poor people, stating that this is not something to be ignored.
“We oppose the oppression of people displaced from their homes,” he said, calling on the public to join the planned protests.
Opposition leaders said the gatherings will take place in several districts of the Banadir region, reiterating that they are “peaceful” protests to voice public grievances.
By Goth Mohamed Goth
Addis Ababa – The business communities of Somaliland and Israel have held a historic meeting in Ethiopia, where they discussed ways to establish bilateral economic cooperation.
The meeting was organized by the Ambassador of the Republic of Somaliland to Israel, Dr. Mohamed Haji. It was attended by a government delegation led by the Minister of Commerce and Tourism of the Republic of Somaliland, Mr. Abdirahman Hassan Nuur, accompanied by the Governor of the Central Bank of Somaliland, Mr. Abdinasir Ahmed Hirsi, the Director General of the National Insurance Agency, Mr. Abdisalan Mohamed Mahmoud (Busi), and businesspeople led by the Chairman of the Somaliland Business Guild, Mr. Jamal Aidiid Ibrahim.
On the other side, the meeting was attended by the Deputy Ambassador of Israel to Ethiopia and other diplomats, as well as the Ambassador of Israel to Somaliland, who participated remotely (online).
The meeting discussed plans to develop trade in key sectors such as agriculture, energy, technology, economic infrastructure, financial markets, and healthcare.
In his opening speech, the Minister explained the importance of this meeting, the strategic position of Somaliland, and the available trade and investment opportunities. He concluded by stating that the Government of Somaliland is ready to welcome anyone wishing to invest and do business in the Republic of Somaliland.
Finally, the businesspeople from both countries were given an opportunity to speak, and they unanimously agreed to continue the discussions and to establish a cooperation platform for discussing long-term economic development for Somaliland and Israel.
