Michael Ashcroft visited the Berbera port in Somaliland, observing firsthand the ongoing modernization efforts. The port, which serves both Somaliland and landlocked Ethiopia, has undergone significant upgrades to increase capacity and efficiency. These developments are expected to boost regional trade and provide critical access for Ethiopian imports and exports. The strategic expansion underscores Berbera’s role as a key trade hub in the Horn of Africa, supporting economic growth and improved logistics for the region.
Representatives of the 15,000-strong Somaliland community in Wales have released details of their own manifesto in advance of the Senedd election.
Drawn up by Eid Ali Ahmed and Ali Abdi, two leading members of the community, whose members live predominantly in Cardiff, Swansea and Newport, the manifesto calls for a series of initiatives aimed at improving the prosperity and health of Somalilanders in Wales.
Somaliland, a former British colony, broke away from Somalia in the early 1990s and has pursued a democratic path while its neighbour is, in effect, a failed state with large parts of it run by Al-Shabab, an Islamist terrorist group.
Despite its success in running a de facto independent state for more than 30 years, Somaliland has found it difficult to gain official international recognition. The manifesto states: “We ask all candidates to commit to meaningful partnership with Somali communities and to support the following priorities across three key areas.
Under the heading Livelihoods (Economic Empowerment & Opportunity), the key issues are listed as high unemployment and under-employment; barriers to fair access in the labour market; lack of targeted business support; and skills under-utilisation.
The community’s asks are:
Commit to fair access to employment through targeted pathways for Somali communities;
Support community-led employment programmes aligned with local labour markets;
Invest in entrepreneurship and small business support for Somali-led enterprises;
Ensure public sector employers lead by example on diversity and inclusion;
Fund skills recognition and progression pathways, especially for migrants.
The desired outcomes are a reduced unemployment gap; increased representation in key sectors; growth in Somali-led businesses; and stronger economic contribution to Wales.
Under Health & Wellbeing, the key issues are said to be health inequalities and poor access to services; cultural stigma around mental health; limited culturally competent provision; and barriers in dementia care and long-term conditions.
The community’s asks are:
Invest in culturally appropriate health services;
Support community-led mental health awareness programmes;
Improve access to primary care and preventative services;
Fund initiatives addressing health inequalities in ethnic minority communities;
Work with communities to co-design dementia and elder care services.
The desired outcomes are improved health outcomes; increased trust in health services; reduced stigma around mental health; and better support for elders and vulnerable groups.
The third heading in the manifesto is Community Support & Civic Participation. The key issues are said to be under-representation in decision-making; barriers to civic engagement; youth disengagement and limited opportunities; and a lack of sustainable funding for grassroots organisations.
The community’s asks are:
Strengthen community infrastructure funding for Somali-led organisations;
Support youth engagement programmes focused on leadership, skills and wellbeing;
Increase representation in public bodies and decision-making spaces;
Promote active citizenship and voter engagement initiatives;
Recognise and invest in community-led solutions.
The desired outcomes are stronger, more resilient community organisations; increased civic participation; empowered youth leadership; and more inclusive public policy.
Consulted
Eid Ali Ahmed said: “We consulted the community and drew up the manifesto based on their ideas.
“People in the community have different ideas about which party to support in the Senedd election. It’s not for us to suggest which party they should vote for.
“We hope that the incoming government will look at our manifesto asks sympathetically, and help us to achieve them.”
Oil tanker hijacked off coast of Yemen and taken towards Somalia Gulf of Aden (file photo)
Somali pirates have hijacked an oil tanker off the coast of Yemen, according to multiple Somali security officials that spoke with the BBC.
The Yemeni coastguard earlier said the tanker MT Eureka had been hijacked and was headed towards Somalia. Sources said it was overrun by pirates in the Gulf of Aden, near the port of Qana.
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The pirates departed a remote coastal area near the seaside town of Qandala, which sits on the Gulf of Aden, according to three separate security officials from the semi-autonomous Puntland region who spoke with the BBC.
It marks the second hijacking of an oil tanker in the area in a 10-day period, following the hijacking of Honor 25 by Somali pirates on April 22.
Honor 25 was carrying 18,500 barrels of oil bound for Mogadishu.
MT Eureka was sailing on the flag of the west African nation of Togo prior to the hijacking and was overrun by the gunmen at 5:00 AM local time (03:00 BST) this morning, the security official went on to tell the BBC.
It is now sailing in the Gulf of Aden between Yemen and Somalia, and is expected to anchor in Somali waters in the coming hours.
In a separate incident, the United Kingdom Maritime Transportation Operation (UKMTO) reported on Friday that “armed persons” on a “skiff” approached a bulk carrier near Al-Mukala, Yemen.
Those armed persons departed a remote coastal area near the fishing town of Caluula (Alula), according to three separate security officials. Caluula is 209km (130 miles) from where hijackers departed to seize the MT Eureka.
The two separate incidents indicate piracy is expanding across Somalia’s vast coastline, which is the longest in mainland Africa at 3,333km (2071 miles).
Today’s hijacking marks the fourth successful pirate hijacking in two weeks.
Somali authorities and the European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR), which oversees anti piracy operations in Somali waters, are yet to address the latest hijacking.
Somali piracy, which was on the decline since 2011, has surged again since late 2023, when Houthi rebels began attacking ships in the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea. The attacks forced international navies to instead tackle the Houthi threat, thus allowing armed groups on the Somali coast to take advantage of the security lapse.
<span;>”The on-going crisis with the pirates is much worse than many realize. There are increasing movements (of armed groups) all over the coast” a security official from the semi-autonomous Puntland region told the BBC.
MOGADISHU, Somalia – Somali opposition leaders have warned that the country faces a constitutional crisis if the government proceeds with any form of term extension, following President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s signing of a revised constitution that introduces five‑year mandates.
At a press conference on Saturday, the opposition said the president’s constitutional term expires on May 15, 2026, after which he “will be regarded as an ordinary citizen.” They rejected any non‑consensual elections or extension of power beyond constitutional limits, vowing peaceful resistance, public mobilization, and national dialogue to prevent a political vacuum.
The opposition claimed to have consulted elders, civil society, and international partners including the U.S., UK, EU, Turkey, and the UN. They also accused the government of forced evictions, home demolitions, and unlawful arrests of young people, demanding the release of several detainees.
Reaffirming their commitment to the 2012 provisional constitution, the opposition called for immediate regional elections and insisted that the Somali National Army remain neutral. The revised constitution, which replaces four‑year terms with five‑year terms, has been rejected by the opposition due to a lack of consensus.
Opposition leaders called on Somalis to unite behind what they termed a legitimate, people‑centered government after May 15
For years, the UAE operated within established regional frameworks, frequently aligning with Saudi Arabia and the wider Arab consensus. That approach is evolving. Today, the UAE is confident in charting its own course, even when it diverges from traditional structures.
The evidence is already visible. From Yemen to Sudan, and in its approach to Israel and emerging global partnerships, the UAE has shown it is prepared to move early wherever it sees a long-term advantage. Leaving OPEC follows this exact logic: prioritizing control over coordination, and long-term value over short-term alignment.
This matters beyond energy. It points to a foreign policy that is increasingly shaped by outcomes rather than obligations. That is where Somaliland comes into the conversation.
The UAE’s engagement in Somaliland is not theoretical; it is built on real investment, a long-term presence, and strategic positioning in Berbera. This is no longer exploratory. It is embedded.
Recognizing Somaliland would not be a reckless step. Its case is grounded in history, legal standing, and more than three decades of functioning governance. It meets the core criteria of statehood and has delivered stability in a region where such an achievement is rare. The debate is no longer about whether Somaliland qualifies; it is about when others are prepared to act.
The argument that recognition is unlikely often rests on the assumption that the UAE remains bound by Arab League or GCC consensus. Recent decisions, however, suggest a different trajectory. Operating within these frameworks has not stopped the UAE from taking independent positions before—the Abraham Accords being a prime example of a move that boldly broke with prevailing regional norms.
Leaving OPEC reinforces this pattern. It demonstrates a clear willingness to step away from structures that no longer serve a long-term strategy. For Abu Dhabi, the gap between economic independence and political independence is rapidly narrowing.
This does not mean the UAE acts without calculation. Granting diplomatic recognition carries a different weight than exiting an economic organisation. Yet, in Somaliland’s case, the question of sovereignty is not theoretical—it is rooted in its 1960 independence and its subsequent restoration in 1991. The calculus is shifting, and the cost of waiting is beginning to outweigh the risk of acting.
As the UAE expands its partnerships across the United States, Israel, and India, its room to manoeuvre continues to grow. It is significantly less constrained than it was a decade ago, and far more capable of shaping outcomes rather than merely reacting to them.
While recognizing Somaliland would carry a different geopolitical weight than the Abraham Accords, it would follow a highly familiar pattern. Act early, shape the narrative, and allow others to follow.
The most likely path forward is not hesitation, but deliberate sequencing. The UAE will continue to deepen its presence, strengthen its strategic footprint, and expand its engagement in Somaliland. Formal recognition, when it comes, will be calculated and aligned with a broader shift in the international landscape.
The decision to leave OPEC proves that the UAE is prepared to act when the costs of the status quo outweigh the benefits. On Somaliland, that same calculation is rapidly coming into focus.
Ultimately, this is no longer a question of whether the UAE can act independently. It already has. It is simply a question of when it decides to make its next move.
Bashe Awil Omar is a diplomat and politician. He served as the Somaliland Representative to the UAE (from 2015-2018) and Kenya (from 2018-2021).
The Chairman of the WADDANI Party, Hirsi Ali H. Hassan, has underscored the vital role of skilled workers in advancing national development, warning that persistent negative societal attitudes and unemployment continue to hinder progress in Somaliland.
In a statement shared on his Facebook page, the chairman noted that the country still struggles with how it values technical professionals—a factor he believes has significantly undermined overall development. He argued that a lack of recognition and encouragement for skilled workers has led to stagnation in key sectors.
“We are a society that often looks down on its own skilled workforce, and that is one of the main reasons we have not advanced as expected,” he said. He added that failing to appreciate and support technical workers has resulted in missed opportunities for growth.
The chairman further observed that, globally, both developed and developing nations agree that labor and skilled workers form the backbone of civilization and economic progress. He also stressed that Islam places a high value on work and productivity.
Addressing economic realities, he pointed out a paradox facing Somaliland: the simultaneous existence of unemployment and labor shortages. He noted that many young people tend to avoid certain types of work, leading to a growing reliance on foreign labor—even as concerns rise that such workers are displacing local job seekers.
Concluding his remarks, the chairman called for a fundamental shift in public perception toward technical and vocational professions. He urged greater support and encouragement for young people to pursue practical skills, describing them as essential pillars for sustainable economic growth and long-term societal development.
A term extension is a legal decision to maintain elected officials in office beyond the expiration of their original mandate, in order to avoid a constitutional vacuum until a new election can be held.
In Somaliland, a lawful extension of term is carried out in accordance with Article 42(3) and Article 83(5) of the Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland, which state as follows:
Article 42: Period of Office and Election Term
If the election of the House of Representatives cannot be conducted because of dire circumstances, the outgoing House shall continue in office until the end of these circumstances and a new House is elected. Dire circumstances are: a wide war, internal instability, serious natural disasters, such as earthquakes, epidemic diseases, (and) serious famines; and shall be determined and resolved by the House of Elders on the proposal of the Council of Government.
Article 83: Election Procedures
If on the expiry of the term of office of the President and the Vice-President, it is not possible, because of security considerations, to hold the election of the President and the Vice-President, the House of Elders shall extend their term of office whilst taking into consideration the period in which the problems can be overcome and the election can be held.
There is also a provision known as Article 19, which has become the mechanism for the excessive term extensions of the Somaliland House of Elders.
This provision originates from the law governing the indirect election of the House of Elders, which was not approved in its entirety. Instead, only Article 19 was extracted and specifically approved by the Somaliland House of Representatives in March 2003
It provides that The election of the House of Elders shall always take place one year after the elections of the House of Representatives and the Presidency.
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On the other hand, the Local Councils of Somaliland have been granted term extensions on several occasions, despite the absence of a law that clearly regulates such extensions. In 2007, when a term extension was first required, the authority to grant it was informally, and without a clear legal basis, delegated to the House of Elders (Guurti). Since that time, the same approach has consistently been used to extend the terms of the Local Councils.
We will go through, one by one, the days of the term extensions of the parliamentary, local council, and presidential institutions:
FIRST TERM EXTENSION
19 APRIL 1994
Owing to the civil war that was ongoing in the country, both Houses of Parliament extended the term of the President and the National Charter by one and a half years (18 months), from 16 May 1995 to 16 November 1996. Likewise, Parliament extended its own term for the same period. Accordingly, this became the first term extension carried out since Somaliland regained its independence. It was the first ever term extension to take place in Somaliland, and the only one that was made for a justified reason.
During that period, the nation was governed under a National Charter that contained no provisions regarding the extension of the term of office. Consequently, the matter was referred to the bicameral Parliament of the time. Following a joint session, they resolved to implement the necessary term extension themselves
SECOND TERM EXTENSION
During the period when President Egal was engaged in the effort to transition the country toward a multi-party system, his constitutional term of office came to an end. Consequently, he submitted a request for a term extension to the House of Elders, in accordance with Article 83 of the Constitution
12 JANUARY 2002 The House of Elders of Somaliland granted a one-year term extension to President Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal and his Vice President, starting on 23 February 2002 and ending on 23 February 2003. This became the first extension made after the new Constitution came into effect.
THIRD TERM EXTENSION
On 05 March 2002, the President of the Republic of Somaliland, Mr. Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, submitted a letter to the Somaliland House of Elders informing them that the term of the House of Representatives had come to an end.
27 APRIL. 2002. The House of Elders of Somaliland granted a one-year extension to the House of Representatives, beginning on 25 May 2002 and ending on 25 May 2003, in accordance with Article 42(3) of the Constitution. This marked the First time the House of Representatives received a term extension since the Constitution came into force, and it was also the Second overall term extension granted to the House of Representatives of Somaliland.
FOURTH TERM EXTENSIONS
President Rayaale, who intended to hold one-person-one-vote elections, submitted a request for a term extension to the House of Elders. The Somaliland House of Elders thus carried out the fourth term extension in the country.
18 JANUARY 2003
The House of Elders of Somaliland extended the term of the President and Vice President by 81 days, starting from 23 February 2003 and ending on 15 May 2003. This was the Third presidential term extension in Somaliland.
FIFTH TERM EXTENSIONS
03 MARCH 2003 The House of Elders of Somaliland granted the House of Representatives a two-year term extension, running from 25 May 2003 to 25 May 2005. This marked the Third term extension granted to the House of Representatives.
SIXTH TERM EXTENSIONS
28 MAY 2005 The House of Elders of Somaliland granted the House of Representatives a 143-day term extension, running from 25 May 2005 to 15 October 2005. At the same time, the House of Elders itself received a term extension of one year and 143 days, which was set to end on 31 October 2006.
This marked the Fourth term extension received by the House of Representatives and the Second term extension received by the House of Elders.
SEVENTH TERM EXTENSIONS
22 APRIL 2006 President Rayaale submitted a written request to the Constitutional Court of Somaliland seeking a legal advisory opinion on whether the House of Elders (Guurti) could extend its own term of office.
On 24 APRIL, the Court ruled that the House of Elders has the right to extend its own term of office, reasoning that the Constitution permits term extensions for other national institutions such as the President and the House of Representatives and therefore the House of Elders also possesses an equivalent authority to extend its own tenure.
06 MAY 2006 The Somaliland House of Elders granted itself a four-year term extension, running from 31 October 2006 to 31 October 2010.
This became the Third term extension received by the House of Elders.
EIGHTH TERM EXTENSION
12 DECEMBER 2007 The House of Elders of Somaliland granted the local councils a six-month term extension, which started on 26 December 2007 and ended on 1 July 2008. It was the First term extension granted to the local councils.
There was no law stating how the terms of the councils could be extended or which authority had the power to extend them. However, the House of Elders assumed that authority. This extension did not cause political conflict, as the political parties and the government had already agreed to prioritize the holding of the presidential election.
NINTH EIGHTH TERM EXTENSION
10 APRIL 2008 The Somaliland House of Elders extended the term of office of the President and Vice President by one year, from 15 May 2008 to 16 May 2009. This became the Fourth term extension related to the Somaliland presidential electoral cycle.
TENTH TERM EXTENSION
28 MARCH 2009 The House of Elders of Somaliland extended the term of President Dahir Rayaale and his vice president by five months and thirteen days, effective from 16 May to 29 October 2009. The Elders also proposed that the presidential election be held on 29 September 2009.
This became the Fifth term extension related to the Somaliland presidential electoral cycle.
ELEVENTH TERM EXTENSION
25 SEPTEMBER 2009 Friday is a day of worship and a public holiday for the people of Somaliland and Muslims, but the Somaliland House of Elders held an unprecedented session. On the morning of Friday, 25 September, after 77 members of the House of Elders gathered in the chamber, they extended President Rayaale’s term without specifying an end date, which led to violent protests in Hargeisa.
This became the Sixth term extension related to the Somaliland presidential electoral cycle.
TWELFTH TERM EXTENSION
07 SEPTEMBER 2010 The House of Elders of Somaliland extended the term of the House of Representatives by two years and eight months, from 29/10/2010 to 29/6/2013. They also granted a one-and-a-half-year extension to the local councils, from 7 October 2010 to 7/4/2012. Furthermore, the House of Elders themselves automatically received a term extension of three years and eight months, ending on 29 June 2014.
It became the first term extension granted to the directly elected House of Representatives, and also the Fifth term extension overall given to the House of Representatives.
It was also the Fourth term extension of the House of Elders, and the second term extension of the Local Councils.
THIRTEENTH TERM EXTENSION
8 April 2013 The President of the Republic of Somaliland, Mr. Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud “Silanyo”, submitted a letter to the House of Elders of Somaliland informing them that both Houses of Parliament required a term extension, as they had fallen behind the scheduled timetable.
The House of Elders then deliberated on the matter and granted the requested term extension.
15 APRIL 2013 The House of Elders of Somaliland granted a term extension to the House of Representatives of two years, one month, and 27 days, starting from 29 June 2013 and ending on 25 August 2015. The House of Elders also recommended that the election of the House of Representatives be held in June 2015. Likewise, the House of Elders extended its own term by three years, one month, and 27 days, ending on 25 August 2016
It became the Sixth term extension granted to the House of Representatives, and also the Fifth term extension of the House of Elders.
FOURTEENTH TERM EXTENSION
11 MAY 2015 The House of Elders of Somaliland extended the term of the President, the Vice President, and the House of Representatives of Somaliland by 1-year and 9-months, from 28 July 2015 to 27 April 2017. Similarly, the House of Elders itself received a 2-year and 9-month extension, setting its new term end date as 27 April 2018.
It became the first term extension granted to President Silanyo, and also the Seventh term extension related to the presidential electoral cycle. It was also the Eighth term extension granted to the House of Representatives, and the fifth term extension of the House of Elders.
FIFTEENTH TERM EXTENSION
06 MARCH 2017 The House of Elders of Somaliland granted a seven-and-a-half-month extension to the President and his Vice President, starting from 27 April and ending on 13 December 2017. Similarly, the House of Elders extended the term of the House of Representatives and the local councils by two years, from 27 April 2017 to 27 April 2019. Meanwhile, the House of Elders of Somaliland itself received a three-year extension, ending on 27 April 2020 also the Eighth term extension related to the presidential electoral cycle and It was also the Seventh term extension granted to the House of Representatives, and the Sixth term extension of the House of Elders.
SIXTEENTH TERM EXTENSION
21 JANUARY 2019 The House of Elders of Somaliland extended the term of the House of Representatives by nine months, from 27 April 2019 to 27 January 2020.
Similarly, the House of Elders itself received an extension of one year and nine months, ending on 27 January 2021. The House of Elders also proposed that the elections for the House of Representatives be held in December 2019.
It became the Eighth term extension granted to the House of Representatives, and also the Seventh term extension of the House of Elders of Somaliland.
SEVENTEENTH TERM EXTENSION
24 NOVEMBER 2019 The House of Elders extended the term of the House of Representatives by two years, from 27 January 2020 to 27 January 2022. Similarly, the House of Elders itself was granted a three-year extension, ending on 27 January 2023.
It became the Ninth term extension granted to the House of Representatives, and also the eighth term extension of the House of Elders of Somaliland.
In mid JANUARY, the President of Somaliland, Muse Bihi Abdi, submitted a letter to the House of Elders requesting a reduction of the previously granted term extension of the House of Representatives.
01 February 2021, the House of Elders of Somaliland appointed a 31-member committee to review a request from the President, the National Electoral Commission, and political parties. The request concerned aligning the previously extended term of the House of Representatives with the election timetable set by the National Electoral Commission for the House of Representatives and Local Councils. On the following day, 02 February, the House of Elders held a session in which it decided to shorten the previously granted term extension of the House of Representatives, setting it to expire on 30 June 2021.
EIGHTEENTH TERM EXTENSION
01 OCTOBER 2022 The House of Elders of Somaliland, for the First time, granted a two-year term extension to President Muse Bihi Abdi and his Vice President, running from 13 November 2022 to 13 November 2024. Similarly, the House of Elders itself was granted a four-year term extension, running from 27 January 2023 to 27 January 2027. This became the Ninth term extension related to the presidential electoral cycle, and also the Ninth term extension of the House of Elders.
NINETEENTH TERM EXTENSION
31 January 2026 The National Electoral Commission of Somaliland announced that the elections for the Local Councils and the House of Representatives, scheduled for 31 May 2026, would not be held on time.
Due to drought, conflicts, and challenges related to voter registration, the Commission proposed a ten-month extension, running from 31 May 2026 to 31 March 2027.
18 APRIL 2026 The President of the Republic of Somaliland, Mr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro,” submitted a letter with reference number JSL/XM/GG/081/2-257/042026 to the House of Elders of Somaliland. The letter contained a proposal for a term extension for the House of Representatives and the local councils. This follows the recommendation of the National Electoral Commission issued on January 31, which stated that elections could not be held on their originally scheduled date of May 31, 2026, and that an additional 10 months would be required to complete the electoral process. 20 APRIL The House of Elders of Somaliland appointed a committee of 25 members, consisting of 21 members, the THREE members of the House leadership, and the Secretary-General of the House of Elders. The committee was tasked with providing recommendations on the extension of the terms of the House of Representatives and the Local Councils of Somaliland. On 22 and 23 April, the committee met with the national political parties and the Somaliland National Electoral Commission.
28 APRIL 2026 The House of Elders of Somaliland granted the House of Representatives and the local councils a two-year and three-month term extension, running from 7 July 2026 to 7 October 2028.
Similarly, the House of Elders itself received a three-year and three-month term extension, ending on 7 October 2029. This became the First term extension received by the current House of Representatives, and the Tenth term extension overall granted to the House of Representatives and the House of Elders.
These are two situations that are less than formal term extensions
07 APRIL 2012
The previous extension granted to Somaliland’s local councils had expired, and no further extension was provided. As a result, they continued to remain in office for 235 days until the local council elections were held on 28 November 2012, without having any legal mandate.
2 APRIL 2019
The previous term extension of Somaliland’s local councils had expired, and no further extension was granted. They continued to serve in office for two years, one month, and a half until the newly elected local councils, chosen on 31 May 2021, took over their duties. This was the second time such a situation had occurred.
A joint INSS-ISRI (Somaliland) study: How the Yemenite threat impacts Jerusalem and Hargeisa, and how to address the shared challenge
INSS Insight No. 2134, April 29, 2026
Danny Citrinowicz
Hasaan Abdi
The Houthi threat has evolved into a multidimensional challenge with direct implications for Israel and growing relevance for Somaliland. While the Houthis lack the capacity to defeat Israel militarily, they have demonstrated an ability to expand the geographic scope of confrontation, disrupt critical maritime routes in the Red Sea, and serve as a key instrument of Iran’s regional strategy. At the same time, emerging dynamics suggest increasing strain on Iran’s proxy network, potentially rendering actors such as the Houthis more central, yet also more unpredictable. Against this backdrop, the emerging relationship between Israel and Somaliland reflects broader geopolitical shifts linking the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. While this convergence offers strategic opportunities, particularly in maritime security and regional positioning, it also carries significant risks, including escalation, retaliation, and diplomatic backlash.
Addressing these challenges requires a calibrated, multi-domain strategy that integrates military, economic, and diplomatic tools while avoiding destabilizing overreach. To address this shared challenge, INSS and the ISIR research institute in Somaliland have partnered to produce a joint analysis of the Houthi threat to both Israel and Somaliland, including policy recommendations on how the two sides should respond to this common threat.
Somaliland’s mutual recognition has arrived at a time when regional geopolitics in both the Horn of Africa and the Middle East are reshaping. While Somaliland and Israel have different contexts and power relations, the two have found exchangeable interests—Somaliland has been struggling to secure international recognition for its statehood for the past three decades. For this reason, it is leveraging its geographic location. Israel, on its side, is struggling for its national security interests in the Middle East and has leveraged its “recognition vote.” Jointly concerned by the Houthi disruptions in the Red Sea since 2023, Somaliland has been receiving international attention, as it is regarded as a potential partner in any attempt to improve Red Sea security.
The Houthis currently pose a multifaceted challenge, incorporating military, economic, and geopolitical elements. For Israel, their importance lies not in their ability to defeat Israel militarily, but in their capacity to expand the geographic scope of confrontation, disrupt maritime trade, and serve as a key lever in Iran’s regional strategy. At the same time, evolving regional dynamics suggest that Iran’s reliance on proxy warfare is under increasing strain, potentially making actors such as the Houthis more central—but also more unpredictable. For Somaliland, the Houthi movement represents multifaceted risk, involving direct physical attacks in the form of retaliation, complicating trade navigation, potentially affecting the cost of living, strategic entanglements in regional conflicts, and complex geopolitical rivalries.
The Missile, UAV, and Maritime Threat
The Houthis’ military capabilities have improved significantly due to sustained Iranian and Hezbollah support, including technology transfers, training, and weapons supply. Their arsenal includes long-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, advanced UAVs, and maritime strike capabilities. These capabilities have effectively erased the strategic distance between Yemen and Israel. While Israel’s missile defense systems intercept many threats, they cannot provide full protection. Even limited successful strikes or the constant need for defensive readiness impose psychological, operational, and economic costs.
Beyond direct attacks, the Houthis have demonstrated their ability to weaponize maritime disruption. Their attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait impose indirect but substantial costs on Israel and the global economy, transforming the challenge into a broader strategic issue involving freedom of navigation and regional stability.
Expanding Threat Vectors: Land and Networked Actors
Beyond missile and maritime threats, the Houthis are signaling ambitions to expand their operational reach. Their ties with Shiite militias in Iraq raise the possibility of multi-front coordination, including potential land-based threats via Syria or Jordan.
At the same time, reports of interaction with non-state actors such as Al-Shabaab and ISIS affiliates point to the emergence of cross-regional destabilization networks. While operational coordination remains limited, shared interests in weakening state structures and disrupting maritime control increase long-term strategic risk.
The African Dimension: Somaliland Between Opportunity and Risk
The Houthi threat is no longer confined to the Middle East; it increasingly intersects with the Horn of Africa, particularly Somaliland, which has gained attention as a potential partner in securing Red Sea maritime routes. For Israel, Somaliland represents a potential strategic foothold near critical shipping lanes and in proximity to Yemen. For Somaliland, engagement with Israel offers opportunities in technology, agriculture, and diplomatic advancement, especially in its pursuit of international recognition. However, this convergence introduces significant risks. Alignment with Israel against the Houthis could expose Somaliland to direct retaliation, trigger regional backlash, and undermine its recognition strategy. Somaliland’s limited defense capabilities further heighten these risks.
Strategic Considerations in Israel–Somaliland Relations
The emerging relationship between Israel and Somaliland reflects broader geopolitical shifts across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Somaliland’s geographic position, particularly around the Berbera port, makes it strategically attractive. However, framing the relationship primarily in military terms risks destabilization. For Somaliland, careful calibration is essential: maximizing economic and technological benefits while minimizing exposure to geopolitical risks and regional backlash.
Integrated Policy Approach
Given the multi-dimensional nature of the Houthi threat, responses must move beyond narrow military solutions and adopt a broader strategic framework:
Strengthening Maritime Security—Israel and Somaliland should deepen cooperation with international and regional partners to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. A sustained naval presence and coordinated maritime defense architecture are essential to counter Houthi disruption.
Expanding Intelligence and Disruption Efforts—Enhanced intelligence-sharing, particularly targeting supply lines and smuggling networks, can slow the Houthis’ military buildup and limit their operational reach.
Adopting a Multi-Theater Perspective—The Houthi challenge should be integrated into a broader strategic framework spanning the Middle East and Africa. This includes monitoring potential expansion into Iraq, Syria, and North Africa, as well as their growing influence along maritime corridors.
Building Regional Coalitions—Israel should prioritize flexible coalition-building with both Middle Eastern and African partners. Such cooperation can mitigate operational burdens and improve regional resilience against non-state actors.
Calibrating Engagement with Somaliland—For both Israel and Somaliland, cooperation should focus on low-risk, high-benefit domains such as trade, agriculture, and technology. However, avoiding the establishment of an Israeli military base in Somaliland is critical, as it would likely provoke escalation and regional backlash. Instead, gradual trust-building and economic engagement can provide strategic value without triggering destabilizing responses.
Preventing Regional Polarization—Somaliland should avoid exclusive alignments that could lead to diplomatic isolation. Maintaining balanced relations with Gulf states, Turkey, and other regional actors is essential to preserving its strategic flexibility.
Conclusion
The Houthis represent a new type of threat: a geographically distant actor capable of exerting significant strategic pressure through military capabilities, maritime disruption, and networked alliances. As proxy-based deterrence erodes, actors like the Houthis are likely to play a more central and less predictable role. For Israel, the challenge is managing an expanding multi-theater confrontation. For Somaliland, it is balancing opportunity with risk. In both cases, success will depend on careful calibration of alliances, multi-domain coordination, and long-term strategic restraint.
The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’ alone.
“We are new to this, but the world has seen that workers’ unions and political parties can cooperate and become allies.”
The Chairman of the Somaliland ruling party, Hon. Hersi Haji Ali Hassan, speaking to the Somaliland Workers’ Unions, said:
“We are very pleased with the preliminary Memorandum of Understanding between the WADDANI Party and the Somaliland Workers’ Unions. This agreement is the result of the great efforts and extensive scrutiny that the workers’ unions have put into affirming their existence, securing their rights, and advancing their interests.
To all the workers of Somaliland, we extend a platform on which we will become allies—a party that supports, champions, and sympathizes with the workers, shares their needs, and addresses their concerns.”
He added: “As a party, it was an ambition we aspired to—to develop the workers’ unions—as we articulated in our political program upon which we entered the election. We stand for creating new ideas and visions through which the country can progress and take steps forward.”
The Chairman concluded:
“If in the past the workers’ unions were oppressed, today we have become allies through cooperation between us!”
US Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) speaks during a Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee hearing on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC on April 15, 2026. Photo: Tom Williams/CQ Roll Call/Sipa USA via Reuters Connect
By David Michael Swindle
US Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) has renewed his calls for the Trump administration to recognize Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state, arguing the self-declared African republic would be a significant strategic partner if Washington were to formalize relations.
“Somaliland is a geo-strategic US maritime security partner in Africa,” Cruz said last week during a hearing on US counterterrorism approaches in Africa. “It sits along the Gulf of Aden near one of the world’s busiest shipping corridors and its forces actively contribute to counterterrorism and anti-piracy missions.”
Somaliland, which has claimed independence for decades in East Africa but remains largely unrecognized, is situated on the southern coast of the Gulf of Aden and bordered by Djibouti to the northwest, Ethiopia to the south and west, and Somalia to the south and east. It has sought to break off from Somalia since 1991 and utilized its own passports, currency, military, and law enforcement.
Unlike most states in its region, Somaliland has relative security, regular elections, and a degree of political stability.
“Somaliland stands with our allies, including Taiwan and Israel, and aligns with US interests in a region where China is aggressively expanding,” Cruz said. “Most recently, Israel’s decision to formally recognize Somaliland in December 2025 underscores its growing strategic relevance.”
In December, Israel recognized Somaliland’s independence, becoming the first UN-recognized country in the world to do so — Taiwan did in 2020 — while igniting a diplomatic firestorm in Somalia and dozens of Muslim nations which condemned the decision.
Israel announced the appointment of its first ambassador to Somaliland earlier this month. Less than two months earlier, the first official delegation from the self-declared African republic — 25 water sector workers — arrived in Israel for help on tackling their water crisis at home.
As for the US, Cruz noted that Gen. Dagvin Anderson, the Commander of US Africa Command, had met with partners in Somaliland last year “to assess the security environment and to review Berbera’s operational capacity.”
“This is the kind of partner we should be encouraging and one that will shape how we confront CT challenges in the Horn of Africa,” he added.
Anderson visited Somaliland’s capital Hargeisa and Berbera, the site of a rapidly developing trading port operated by Dubai’s DP World, one of the world’s top shipping and logistics companies which manages 10 percent of global container trade.
On Thursday, Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi visited the United Arab Emirates (UAE), responding to an official state invitation. The UAE has nurtured a longstanding relationship with Somaliland, previously supporting training for the country’s military in 2018. The deal for constructing the Berbera port will allow the UAE to maintain a presence for 30 years.
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has “solidified a ‘Berbera Axis’ (Israel-UAE-Ethiopia) centered on port access and maritime monitoring,” according to an analysis by Marie de Vries, a researcher at the French think tank La Fondation Méditerranéenne D’études Stratégiques (Mediterranean Foundation for Strategic Studies), or FMES. In contrast, she added, a “Mogadishu Axis” has emerged due to a partnership of Somalia with Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia
“I think it’s also an important element that this is a relatively well-functioning democracy, and we think the United States should encourage that,” said Rose, who also touted the strategic benefits for the US. He introduced legislation to push the US government to study boosting economic ties with Somaliland.
Cruz addressed the arguments of those who oppose recognition of Somaliland in last week’s hearing.
“Critics argue that recognizing Somaliland could introduce new CT [counterterrorism] risks or undermine our posture in Mogadishu. I would argue the opposite,” Cruz said. “Working with a capable, willing partner like Somaliland strengthens our posture, particularly when Somalia itself continues to struggle with instability and persistent terrorist threats.”
Nick Checker, senior official in the US State Department’s Bureau of Africa Affairs who testified at the hearing, said that while Somaliland has been a “very good partner” on counterterrorism, US President Donald Trump’s current position is not to support formal recognition.
“I certainly agree with you that Somaliland has been a very good partner CT and otherwise with the United States. We’ve had a positive relationship with both them and other member states,” Checker said. “But you know the policy of the administration for now is that we do continue to recognize, as you know, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the federal government of Somalia. But within that framework, we still do obviously look for opportunities to deepen our cooperation with Somaliland.”
Cruz expressed optimism that Trump would change his position.
“Well, I think the implications would be strengthening an ally, and I think clarity is powerfully effective in foreign policy and national security,” Cruz responded. “And I think that is an approach that President Trump has embodied. So, I have a high level of optimism that by the end of this term, President Trump will recognize Somaliland.”
Cruz previously called on Trump to recognize Somaliland in an August 2025 letter.
Somaliland “has proposed hosting a US military presence near the Red Sea along the Gulf of Aden and is open to critical minerals agreements that would support our supply chain resilience,” Cruz wrote in his letter. “The US-Somaliland partnership is robust, and it is deepening.”
Somaliland says it has significant mineral resources, and officials have expressed a willingness to offer the US a strategic military base at the entrance to the Red Sea and critical minerals as part of a deal that would include formal recognition.
“The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is using economic and diplomatic coercion to punish Somaliland for its support for Taiwan, as well as to undermine that support,” Cruz wrote in last year’s letter. “The government of Somalia has played an unfortunate role in these efforts: In April 2025, the CCP arranged for Somalia to bar Taiwanese passport holders from transiting into Somaliland, and Chinese support to Somalia is benefiting anti-Somaliland groups working to erode its sovereignty.”
China’s embassy in Somalia released a statement in response to Cruz’s letter declaring that Beijing “firmly opposes this misconduct. Senator Cruz’s remarks constitute serious interference in the internal affairs of Somalia and reflect the hegemonic and bullying attitude of certain US politicians towards the Somali people.”
Cruz referenced China’s response during last week’s hearing.
“Unsurprisingly, the Chinese Communist Party immediately condemned my letter, which only shows how important Somaliland is to US national security,” he said.
De Vries described in her FMES report that “recognition of Somaliland risks normalizing Taiwan’s presence in a region where China has heavily invested in ports, telecommunications, and security partnerships. China’s reaction is driven less by the legal status of Somaliland than by a broader strategic calculus focused on preventing Taiwanese visibility and safeguarding Djibouti’s role as a primary regional hub.”
China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017
