For years, Turkey has systematically obstructed Somaliland’s pursuit of international recognition while portraying itself as an impartial mediator in the Horn of Africa. This policy exposes a glaring double standard. Ankara fiercely defends and militarily protects the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, yet condemns Somaliland’s quest to restore the sovereignty it voluntarily surrendered in 1960. Turkey cannot credibly champion self-determination in Cyprus while denying Somalilanders the same right.
The comparison overwhelmingly favors Somaliland. The people of Somaliland are indigenous to their homeland. British Somaliland gained internationally recognized independence on 26 June 1960 before voluntarily entering a union with the former Italian Somalia five days later to form the Somali Republic. Following the collapse of that failed union in 1991 and after suffering the internationally documented genocide committed by Siad Barre’s regime, Somaliland reasserted the sovereignty it had previously possessed. Many Somalilanders therefore view their case not as secession but as the dissolution of a failed political union and, morally and legally, as one strengthened by the principle of remedial self-determination.
Northern Cyprus presents a very different case. It emerged following Turkey’s 1974 military intervention and survives through Ankara’s political, military, and economic support. Unlike Somalilanders, who are indigenous to their homeland, the Turkish community in Northern Cyprus traces its presence to settlement during the Ottoman Empire’s rule over the island.. Yet Turkey insists the world should recognize Northern Cyprus while simultaneously campaigning against Somaliland. Such a position is not based on principle; it is based on strategic convenience.
Turkey’s opposition has been deliberate. Former Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu publicly acknowledged challenging then British Foreign Secretary William Hague over discussions concerning Somaliland’s recognition, arguing that recognition of Somaliland would require recognition of Northern Cyprus. Davutoğlu further stated that he contacted the late Somaliland President Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud (Silanyo) and encouraged negotiations with Somalia. From Somaliland’s perspective, these talks served one overriding purpose: delaying recognition by creating the illusion that Somaliland’s political future remained negotiable.
Turkey has also repeatedly argued that Somaliland and Somalia belong together because they share the same language, religion, ethnicity, and culture. This argument collapses under even minimal scrutiny. More than twenty Arab states share Arabic language, Islam, and similar cultural traditions, yet each is an independent sovereign state. Conversely, countries such as Kenya, India, Switzerland, and Canada are multilingual and multiethnic yet remain stable sovereign states. Shared identity neither guarantees successful statehood nor obliges separate peoples to remain in a political union against their will.
The decisive issue is not ethnicity but political consent. Most Somalilanders reject reunification because their historical experience convinced them that their security, liberty, and political future are best protected through separate statehood. Respecting that democratic choice—not romantic notions of pan-Somali nationalism—is the foundation of lasting peace.
Turkey repeated the same strategic mistake when it mediated between Ethiopia and Somalia following the Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding. Instead of acknowledging Somaliland as a direct stakeholder, Ankara once again sought to preserve Mogadishu’s position and undermine an agreement that could have advanced Somaliland’s international standing. Rather than acting as an honest broker, Turkey appeared determined to prevent any diplomatic breakthrough benefiting Somaliland.
Ankara fundamentally misread the strategic landscape. Had Turkey maintained neutrality, it could have preserved influence in both Hargeisa and Mogadishu. Instead, it openly aligned itself with Somalia’s position and transformed Somaliland from a potential partner into a strategic adversary.
The consequences are now becoming evident. Having repeatedly found the door to recognition blocked by Turkey, Somaliland has increasingly sought partnerships beyond Ankara’s sphere of influence. Among those partners is Israel—Turkey’s principal strategic competitor in the Eastern Mediterranean and an increasingly influential actor in the Red Sea region. Supporters of Somaliland’s diplomatic strategy argue that Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign state marks a turning point that Turkey’s own policies helped bring about. Whether viewed through diplomacy or geopolitics, Ankara’s obstruction has accelerated the very realignment it sought to prevent.
A Somali proverb perfectly captures Turkey’s miscalculation:
“Libaax laba raq lagama wada kiciyo.”
“ A lion cannot be driven away from two carcasses one after the other.”
Turkey relied on the same strategy repeatedly—blocking recognition through mediation and preserving the status quo. Somaliland adapted. Instead of abandoning its aspirations, it diversified its alliances and sought partners beyond Turkey’s reach. This shows that Turkey has naively underestimated Somaliland’s resolve.
In the end, Turkey’s Somaliland policy has become a textbook case of strategic failure. By placing Somalia’s interests above its own long-term geopolitical interests, Ankara surrendered the opportunity to maintain influence across both sides of the Somali Peninsula. It has instead created space for Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Greece, and Cyprus to deepen their engagement with Somaliland.
History often punishes states that mistake obstruction for strategy. In attempting to deny Somaliland international recognition, Turkey has weakened its own strategic position in the Horn of Africa while pushing Somaliland toward Turkey’s regional rivals. That is not a diplomatic success—it is a self-inflicted geopolitical defeat.
