Mogadishu – The influx of advanced warships, military personnel, and heavy weaponry into Somalia, orchestrated by Turkey and Egypt, presents a profound and multi-faceted risk, not only to the stability of the region but specifically to the peace and security of the Republic of Somaliland. Framing this military build-up as mere “maritime security cooperation” dangerously obscures its potential to destabilize the entire Horn of Africa. The core risks are as follows:
The Risk of Diversion to Non-State Actors and Militias: The Somali federal government, despite international support, has a limited and inconsistent record of controlling territory and securing weapons within its borders. A significant influx of sophisticated arms dramatically increases the risk of these weapons being diverted, sold, or captured. They could easily fall into the hands of:
· Al-Shabaab: The militant group still controls vast rural areas and has a history of infiltrating government installations. Access to advanced anti-ship missiles, MANPADS (Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems), or sophisticated explosives would be a catastrophic game-changer, allowing them to threaten international shipping and civilian aircraft.
· Clan Militias: In a political system where federalism is weak and often gives way to clan-based loyalties, powerful militias could acquire heavy weaponry, escalating local conflicts into (large-scale) regional wars and further entrenching the cycle of violence.
The Risk of Provoking an Arms Race with Somaliland: The stated or unstated intent of this build-up is perceived in Somaliland as a direct threat to its sovereignty. In response, Somaliland will feel compelled to bolster its own defenses. This creates a dangerous dynamic:
· Escalation: What begins as a “security cooperation” mission can quickly escalate into a conventional arms race between Somalia and Somaliland, diverting precious resources away from development and towards militarization.
· Miscalculation: Increased military posturing on both sides of a contested border raises the risk of a small incident—a patrol crossing a line, a misunderstood signal—spiraling into an armed confrontation that neither side may have originally intended.
The Risk of Empowering a Proxy Conflict: The arrival of Egyptian forces, motivated by its dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), explicitly injects a major interstate rivalry into Somalia’s fragile internal dynamics.
· Ethiopian Response: As your statement notes, this directly threatens Ethiopia’s interests. Addis Ababa may feel compelled to respond, potentially by deepening its engagement with Somaliland (including the recent MoU for naval base access) or by more directly supporting allied factions within Somalia. This turns Somali territory into a potential battleground for Egyptian-Ethiopian tensions.
· Gulf Rivalry Spillover: The move is also a clear gambit by Turkey and Egypt to counter the influence of the UAE in the region. This transforms Somalia and Somaliland into a new arena for the ongoing geopolitical struggle between these Gulf powers, with local populations bearing the brunt of the instability.
The Risk of Undermining the Fragile Somali Federal Project: Pouring heavy weaponry into the hands of the central government in Mogadishu, without a parallel and successful effort to integrate or disarm federal member state forces, fundamentally undermines the concept of a shared national army. It empowers the center at the expense of the periphery, which could lead federal member states to further resist Mogadishu’s authority, seek their own external patrons, or even accelerate moves towards greater autonomy or independence, ironically fueling the very fragmentation the international community claims to want to prevent.
The Risk of Destabilizing Somaliland’s Peace: Somaliland has been an oasis of relative peace and democratic stability for over three decades. The primary threat to this peace is not internal, but the spillover of conflict and instability from Somalia. The introduction of foreign armies and advanced weaponry next door creates immense pressure:
· Refugee Flows: Any armed conflict in southern or central Somalia would trigger a new wave of refugees, placing a massive strain on Somaliland’s resources and social fabric.
· Terrorist Infiltration: Increased military activity could displace militant groups like Al-Shabaab, pushing them northwards and forcing them to seek new havens, potentially across the border into Somaliland.
· Direct Provocation: The military build-up could embolden elements within the Somali government to believe a military solution to the Somaliland issue is now viable, a catastrophic miscalculation that would shatter regional stability.
In conclusion, delivering offensive weaponry to a fragile and unstable Somali government, particularly under the shadow of external rivalries, is not a recipe for security. It is a dangerous gamble that risks arming terrorists, igniting a regional arms race, and setting the stage for a proxy war that would inevitably consume the peace and sovereignty of the Republic of Somaliland. The true path to stability lies in recognizing and engaging with the existing peaceful entities in the region, like Somaliland, not in militarizing a failed state.
Somaliland, a small territory on the Gulf of Aden, has long sought independence yet received little international attention. But on December 26, 2025, Israel announced its official recognition of the enclave as a sovereign state.
Israel’s announcement went largely unnoticed—until it met a wave of international condemnations. Despite this pushback, Jerusalem’s recognition of Somaliland could transform the Red Sea and Horn of Africa’s geopolitical balance and global trade flows.
Israel’s decision is neither hasty nor provocative. It is historically, legally, and strategically coherent. Further, Western nations’ hesitancy to follow suit reveals contradictions between their stated moral and strategic aims and their actions.
Context
Somaliland is not an opportunistic, secessionist entity, as some suggest. It has a distinct historical trajectory that predates the collapse of Somalia. The Somali people did not draw the borders of Somalia, but instead European powers merged distinct colonial jurisdictions and political-clan systems under a single state framework, despite the absence of a shared institutional or constitutional foundation. Today’s Somaliland was a protectorate of the United Kingdom (British Somaliland), while Italy held the other Somali territory until World War II. After gaining independence in June 1960, Somaliland voluntarily chose to unite with the Somali territory under United Nations and Italian administration. Therefore, Somaliland has existed longer as a separate entity than as part of the subsequent union. The territory’s authorities also never properly formalized the union—which was poorly formalized in legal terms—and later Mogadishu unilaterally created the consolidated country, leaving it fundamentally defective under international law. The union ended three decades later in manifest failure. In 1991, following the collapse of the Somali state, Somaliland reclaimed its independence.
Since then, Somaliland has stood in stark contrast to its larger, internationally recognized neighbor. Despite massive institutional and financial support from the UN and other bodies, Somalia has suffered chronic instability—civil war, endemic corruption, piracy, and the entrenched presence of Islamist groups such as al-Shabaab. Somaliland has followed the opposite path. With little international aid, it rebuilt itself through endogenous mechanisms: clan conferences, local political compromises, and the gradual consolidation of institutions. The result is a largely controlled territory, though there are localized and intermittent challenges in its eastern regions. Still, its government has regular elections, peaceful transfers of power, a currency, security forces, and a functioning state apparatus. Somaliland therefore appears to be a durable, successful state in all but official title.
Israel-Somaliland relations date back to even before the 1991 collapse. In the late 1980s, Israel alerted international bodies, including the UN, about the Siad Barre regime’s massive, systemic repression and abuse of the Isaaq people, who comprise most of Somaliland’s population. But these warnings were largely ignored. For the last two decades, Israel and Israeli nongovernmental organizations have provided medical aid to Somaliland, a vital diplomatic and humanitarian effort.
Strategic Importance
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is not just a matter of history or morality. It is above all a strategic decision that reshapes the regional balance of power. The enclave sits along the Gulf of Aden near the entrance to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a vital passage linking the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea, Suez Canal, and Mediterranean Sea. Stability in this corridor affects a major share of global trade. The Iran-backed Houthis’ strikes against maritime traffic in the area underscored both the passageway’s vulnerability and its importance. The United States’ primary objective for intervening against these strikes was not to defend Israel, but to prevent the Houthis from paralyzing international commerce.
In this context, Somaliland is a major strategic asset. It controls the deep-water port of Berbera, which investments by the United Arab Emirates have modernized. This port could, in time, become an essential foothold for Western-aligned powers in the Horn of Africa, enabling them to counterbalance Iran’s influence in Yemen and Qatar’s ideological activism.
Israel has therefore taken a major step toward securing a contested, strategic gateway to one of the planet’s most sensitive chokepoints. This gives Jerusalem a critical geopolitical vantage that enhances its situational awareness and strategic depth vis-à-vis the Red Sea corridor as the Houthis, who have declared war on Israel, continue to target Israeli cities and maritime traffic. Israel has accomplished this without any ambition of establishing a military base. This decision also fits Israel’s broader strategy to counterbalance Turkish expansionism. To that end, Jerusalem has recently worked to strengthen its alliances with the Eastern Mediterranean states of Greece and Cyprus.
Why the US and Its European Allies Should Recognize Somaliland
Ultimately, Somaliland is everything the US and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies claim to seek in a regional partner: a stable, democratic, and pro-Western government that is opposed to political Islam and is in a strategically important location. To deny the enclave recognition in the name of selectively applied principles is to privilege diplomatic fiction over geopolitical reality. The clear benefits of expanding ties to Somaliland, and the relative absence of counterarguments, accentuate the strategic incoherence of many NATO states. Several European countries have espoused support for the recognition of a Palestinian state despite Palestine’s failure to meet even the minimum criteria of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933).1 Refusing to even consider recognition for Somaliland, which has met these criteria for more than 30 years makes international law an arbitrary instrument that policymakers invoke when it serves their purposes and ignore when it contradicts them.
However, recognizing Somaliland comes with significant political risks and cost-benefit questions that extend well beyond the territory itself. Such a move could undermine the international norm of territorial integrity upheld by the African Union and weaken international law–based arguments against unilateral secessions. But the African Union position on the topic is not monolithic, and incremental recognition by a few key states would normalize the issue over time. A similar situation occurred in Kosovo and South Sudan.
One should also not ignore the security risks of Somalia reacting violently to this recognition. After all, jihadist groups and other malign actors could exploit this diplomatic turbulence. Establishing ties with Somaliland may also complicate US and European efforts to increase cooperation with Turkey.
But many of these dynamics are already unfolding, and dire predictions of systemic collapse often overestimate second-order effects—as illustrated by earlier forecasts of regional war following the killing of Qassem Soleimani or the relocation of the US embassy to Jerusalem, neither of which produced a crisis.
Moreover, networks linked to Iran and to the Muslim Brotherhood—notably those supported and financed by Qatar—are escalating their destabilization operations in Europe. Recognizing Somaliland could be part of a broader and more coherent European strategic posture against this interference. Ties with Somaliland would help construct a robust anti-Islamist coalition anchored both on the Continent and along key strategic corridors, sending a powerful political signal. Such a move would demonstrate the West’s renewed willingness to confront this threat directly, not only through rhetoric or defensive measures, but also through concrete geopolitical moves that reshape alliances, secure critical regions, and reassert strategic initiative. Washington has also historically preferred strategic ambiguity while deepening its informal engagement with certain partners, which Somaliland could become. Furthermore, recognition could help the US diversify basing options (it already operates Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti), reduce its dependence on a single host country, provide a more reliable counterterrorism partner against al-Shabaab, and maintain a way to shape the Red Sea’s security architecture.
The question, therefore, is not whether recognition of Somaliland is legitimate, but how much longer Western nations will look the other way at the cost of their.
The President of Somaliland, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, in an exclusive interview with CNN, has unveiled major plans that could impact the economic and security future of the Horn of Africa region.
The President stated that Somaliland possesses significant resources and oil reserves reaching billions of barrels. It has signed agreements with two companies to begin official oil drilling in the year 2027 in order to benefit from it.
President Abdirahman emphasized Somaliland’s strategic importance, noting that they control an 850-kilometer coastline along the vital Red Sea shipping lane.
“Somaliland will help the world achieve secure trade. We are ready to cooperate with the world to achieve stable and peaceful international trade,” the President said.
The President confirmed that negotiations are currently underway with Ethiopia concerning the finalization of an agreement related to trade, transit, and transportation.
This agreement is seen as strengthening economic cooperation between the two countries, particularly concerning the use of the port of Berbera.
This interview comes at a time when Somaliland is actively pursuing international recognition and seeking to attract foreign investment.
This oil plan for 2027 and its role in maritime security appear to position Somaliland on the international diplomatic map involving major powers.
Israel’s Somaliland recognition generated unusual cohesion in Africa and beyond, but condemnation hasn’t delivered a consensual solution.
Israel’s December 2025 recognition of Somaliland, a secessionist northern part of Somalia, set off a series of political and diplomatic shockwaves in the Horn of Africa and Arabic Peninsula. In a region already facing acute tensions amid global geopolitical reconfigurations, how the African Union (AU) handles the fallout will be key.
Somalia rejected the move as an infringement on its territorial integrity. Most regional and international organisations including the AU, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, United Nations (UN), European Union and Arab League condemned Israel’s actions, citing violations of international law, the AU’s Constitutive Act and the UN Charter.
Some countries known for their opposition to Somaliland’s independence, such as Djibouti, Egypt, Sudan, South Sudan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, reacted similarly. Others kept silent in an attitude of ‘wait and see’.
For the AU, any unilateral claim of sovereignty is an irritant. Its highest decision-making body, the Peace and Security Council, strongly condemned Israel’s position, saying: ‘No actor has the authority or standing to alter the territorial configuration of an AU Member State.’ However, this strong wording froze the discussion without providing a consensual solution.
Somaliland’s quest for international recognition symbolises various dimensions of African post-colonial statehood. It raises questions around the criteria for sovereignty and has legal, political, geopolitical and regional implications.
The AU is wary of setting a precedent in the only region where secession has led to the creation of new states
Somaliland gained independence from Great Britain on 26 June 1960. After Somalia secured independence from the Italian-administered UN Trusteeship on 1 July 1960, the Republic of Somalia was formed as a union of former British Somaliland and Somalia Italiana. However, following the outbreak of civil war in 1969 and the collapse of Somalia’s central government, Somaliland declared independence in 1991.
From a strict legal perspective, the AU often invokes the commitment of its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity, to the intangibility of borders inherited from colonisation. The principle was established in 1964 in Cairo to avoid the multiplication of irredentist claims that could have destabilised newly established states. The Cairo Declaration has since been a cornerstone of the AU’s normative framework.
However, advocates of Somaliland’s independence use the same principle to justify its quest for sovereignty. The entity’s independence was achieved within the borders of British Somaliland. The decision to form a union with Somalia was its own, and so, supporters say, Somaliland has the right to reverse its decision.
The relative stability and regular alternation of power in Somaliland’s elections are also cited by advocates of the country’s independence.
Rather than making a legal case, the AU would be better served by advancing a political argument grounded in respect for the territorial integrity of its member states. That paves the way for political solutions as the preferred means of resolving internal tensions. The AU is also wary of setting a precedent that could have far-reaching consequences in the Horn of Africa, the only region where secession has led to the creation of new states.
Eritrea and South Sudan seceded from Ethiopia and Sudan in 1993 and 2011 respectively. The severe post-liberation challenges these two newly established countries face, characterised by authoritarian repression and intense internal conflict, do not serve Somaliland’s cause.
National cohesion isn’t just a product of demographic uniformity, but of state-building and diversity management
New states in the region tend to inherit the same problems as pre-existing states. Their structural foundations were compromised long before the clamour for independence. As a result, new states fail to realise their envisioned objectives, owing to numerous factors, including the act of separation itself.
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has generated an unusual degree of cohesion among regional actors and AU member states against Somaliland. This is because it stems from the actions of an external actor and violates a sacrosanct AU principle: respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.
For the AU, the Somaliland question represents a particularly acute challenge: it has reiterated a normative principle in the face of a crisis, but lacks the operational means to enforce it. At a time when the AU’s peace and security framework is under review, member states should propose innovative ways to empower the AU Commission to enforce its principles.
The Somaliland question is also a reminder that, despite being deployed in Somalia since 2007, the AU has allowed this issue to fester until it became vulnerable to instrumentalisation by external actors.
For Somalia, Somaliland’s pursuit of international recognition, combined with the strong internal support it enjoys, directly undermines pan-Somalism, the country’s implicit state ideology. Somali nationalism is grounded in the idea that all Somalis should be united in a single nation, as they share a common identity, culture, and language.
AU efforts to stabilise Somalia must include a political dimension related to dialogue with Somaliland
The pursuit of that political project led to wars in East Africa. Over the years, Somalia has gradually abandoned its ambition of unifying Somali-inhabited territories in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti.
In this context, Somaliland’s entrenched secessionist project questions not only the viability of Somalia within its current borders, but also challenges the foundations of pan-Somalism, an ideology grounded on contested assumptions.
This failure of pan-Somalism challenges a more widespread assumption in Africa’s public debate that instability is primarily the result of arbitrarily drawn colonial borders that created artificial states with high levels of ethnic diversity. The de facto secession of Somaliland since 1991 provides a rebuttal to this line of thinking, which correlates ethnic homogeneity with stability.
Empirical evidence from other parts of Africa also reveals that ethnically homogeneous societies are no less prone to violent conflict than their more heterogeneous peers. This shows that national cohesion is not just a product of demographic uniformity, but the result of state-building strategies, effective diversity management and political legitimacy.
The AU Peace and Security Council’s communiqué has frozen the discussion about Somaliland’s quest for independence. Longstanding AU efforts to stabilise Somalia must include a political dimension related to dialogue with Somaliland. This will increase the AU’s legitimacy on the matter and prevent additional external actors from following Israel’s precedent.
Mahemud E. Tekuya, a former lecturer of Law at Dire Dawa University, Ethiopia, holds a JSD/Ph.D. from McGeorge School of Law, where he received the 2022 Award of Excellence for JSD Achievement (highest GPA and scholarship achievement). He is the author of The Nile in Legal and Political Perspective: Between Change and Continuity. 1st ed. Boston: BRILL, 2023]
On December 26, 2025, Israel officially recognized Somaliland as a sovereign and independent state, contending that Somaliland satisfies “the objective criteria for statehood under customary international law, as reflected in the Montevideo Convention.” Somalia, together with regional institutions and twenty-one Arab, Islamic, and African states, rejected the recognition as a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (see here, here, here, here, and here). More specifically, the African Union (AU) stated that “recognizing Somaliland as an independent entity…runs counter to the fundamental principles of the African Union.”
This development raises a critical question about the interplay between general international law on state recognition and the legal obligations of African states under the AU Constitutive Act. Situating the recent Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and the AU’s response at the intersection of two normative regimes governing state recognition, this piece argues that while the general international law allows Israel, as a non-AU member, to recognize Somaliland, African states are bound by the doctrine of non-recognition, a distinct regional legal doctrine established to ensure regional stability.
Despite fulfilling the requirements for Statehood, no United Nations member state other than Israel has recognized Somaliland. This limited recognition is largely attributed to geopolitical factors, including the desire to discourage “other secessionist movements in East Africa” and the doctrine of non-recognition, which binds African states under the AU Constitutive Act.
The next section briefly reviews recognition of a state under international law, highlighting the theories and requirements of state recognition and the doctrine of non-recognition. Then, the piece scrutinizes the legality of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in light of these principles. The final section analyzes the African regional approach to state recognition.
Recognition of States Under General International Law
Recognition of states is one of the most consequential issues under international law. However, it is also one of the most controversial areas of discipline (see here, here, & here). Scholars have long debated the very nature of the subject, including when a given entity can be accepted as a state and what legal effects recognition entails. Despite this controversy, certain general propositions tend to be accepted. First, while the traditional view considers recognition as a “constitutive” of a given entity’s statehood, conferring it international legal personality, the contemporary and most widely held view is that recognition is a mere “declaration” of an already existing state, established after the fulfillment of certain objective conditions (see here, here, & here).
Second, in order to avoid premature or precipitate recognition and to respect the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of another state, a state contemplating recognition must carefully evaluate the extent to which the entity in question fulfills the objective requirements of statehood (see here and here). The 1933 Montevideo Convention sets forth the most widely accepted criteria. In the relevant part, it provides that “[t]he state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with…other states.”
Third, while recognition of a state remains generally permitted, the doctrine of non-recognition prohibits recognition in certain exceptional circumstances. Derived from the legal maxim ex injuria jus non oritur, the doctrine bars states from recognizing territorial acquisitions arising from unlawful acts, including, inter alia, the threat or use of force and occupation. In this regard, following Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence in November 1965, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution calling upon “all States not to recognize this illegal authority and not to entertain any diplomatic or other relations with it.” Similarly, in relation to apartheid South Africa, the Security Council called upon “all Governments to deny any form of recognition to the so-called ‘independent’ Bantustans.” The Security Council also determined that Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait was “null and void” and called upon “all States, international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize that annexation.” More recently, the International Court of Justice, in its advisory opinion on the legal consequences arising from the policies and practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, stated that “all States are under an obligation not to recognize as legal the situation arising from the unlawful presence of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.”
The legality of Israel’s Recognition of Somaliland
For Israel’s recognition of Somaliland to be valid under international law, it must neither constitute (1) premature or precipitate recognition nor (2) a recognition of a situation resulting from an unlawful act. On its face, the recognition appears to be neither.
(1) With respect to the question of premature or precipitate recognition,Israel asserts that Somaliland satisfies “the objective criteria for statehood under customary international law, as reflected in the Montevideo Convention.” Measured against the four Montevideo Convention requirements mentioned above, Somaliland presents a coherent claim to statehood.
The first requirement—a permanent population—comprises two elements: “permanent” and “population.” While permanence does not preclude migration, it requires “some degree of stability of population.” Somaliland has a stable population residing within a defined territory. Although the population has a quantitative aspect, international law does not prescribe a minimum population (see here, here, and here). Vatican City, which is considered a state under international law, has a population of approximately 503 (see here and here). Somaliland, by contrast, has a population of more than 6.2 million. Therefore, Somaliland fulfils the requirement of a permanent population.
Second, regarding the defined territory, Somaliland, located on the southern coast of the Gulf of Aden, borders “Ethiopia to the south and west and Djibouti to the northwest.” Its territory covers approximately 176,120 square kilometers and includes a coastline of about 850 kilometers on the Red Sea. Some commentators further note that “the British protectorate established clearly defined borders for Somaliland by treaties in the 19th century… [which] were confirmed upon Somaliland’s declaration of independence in 1960.”
Somaliland indeed faces a territorial dispute with Puntland, a self-declared autonomous region in northeastern Somalia, in the Sanaag and Sool regions (see here and here). Nevertheless, Somaliland satisfies the requirement of a defined territory. Under international law, this requirement does not demand fully settled or undisputed boundaries. A state may be recognized as a legal person even where boundary disputes exist, as long as its government exercises effective control over a consistent area of territory. In this regard, the Somaliland government clearly exercises authority over a substantial and identifiable territory.
As to the third requirement, the Somaliland government has effective control over both the population and the territory. After the Somali National Movement (SNM), a Somaliland-based movement that ousted the military junta of President Siad Barre, declared Somaliland’s independence in May 1991, the people of Somaliland adopted a constitution through a referendum and established a multiparty presidential system. The government has subsequently established “its own currency, flag, military and police force.” It also ensures peace and security, making the territory “an ‘oasis’ for stability in a turbulent region.” Somaliland has held free and fair elections and has become “one of the most stable democracies in the region.”
Fourth, although Israel is the first country to recognize Somaliland (the second, if Taiwan is counted), Somaliland has long engaged in diplomatic relations with several countries, including by opening representative or diplomatic missions in Addis Ababa, Djibouti, London, Sanaa, Nairobi, Washington, D.C., Brussels, South Africa, Sweden, and Oslo (see here and here). While Ethiopia, Kenya, Turkey, Taiwan, and Denmark maintain diplomatic or representative missions in Somaliland, Ethiopia, South Africa, Kenya, and Djibouti recognize Somaliland-issued passports (see here and here). Moreover, Somaliland has concluded a number of agreements with Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (see here, here, and here). Accordingly, Somaliland not only possesses the capacity to engage in international relations with other states but is already actively doing so.
(2) With respect to the doctrine of non-recognition situation arising from unlawful acts, Somalia’s independence is not related to the threat or use of force, coercion, occupation, or any other unlawful conduct. Somalia and the Palestinian Authority have alleged that “Israel’s recognition of Somaliland could be linked to a plan to displace Palestinians.” Somaliland, for its part, has stated that “any move by Israel to recognize its independence would not have anything to do with the Palestinian issue.” Other analyses have linked Israel’s engagement with Somaliland to its geostrategic location and potential security cooperation, including “countering threats from Yemen, particularly from Iran-backed Houthi rebels who have repeatedly targeted international shipping.” Therefore, in the absence of conclusive evidence establishing a causal link between Israel’s recognition of Somaliland and an independently unlawful act, these allegations alone do not render the recognition unlawful under international law.
Even assuming, arguendo, that Israel’s recognition was motivated by Israel’s intent to ethnically cleanse Palestinians and to resettle them in Somaliland, the relevant legal question remains whether Israel is recognizing an entity created through the threat or use of force, coercion, occupation, or other unlawful conduct. Somaliland does not fall within that category. As noted above, following the ouster of the military junta of President Siad Barre in 1991, Somaliland unilaterally declared independence and has maintained its de facto existence since then. In its advisory opinion on Kosovo, the International Court of Justice remarked that “general international law contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of independence” and concluded that “the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law.” Therefore, Israel is not recognizing a situation arising out of an unlawful act.
It should be noted, however, that if the allegations advanced by Somalia and the Palestinian Authority were to materialize, such conduct would constitute a clear violation of international law, including the prohibition of the deportation or transfer of civilians under customary international humanitarian law. Since Somaliland’s independence was not the result of any such violation, this would not affect the legality of Israel’s recognition. In that event, the doctrine of non-recognition would impose a duty on all states to refrain from recognizing any unlawful demographic outcome in Gaza or treating the settlement in Somaliland as a lawful result.
Accordingly, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is consistent with international law. It is based on internationally recognized objective criteria, is not premature, and does not violate the doctrine of non-recognition.
An African Approach to the Law of State Recognition
In an apparent response to Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as an independent state, on December 16, 2025, the Chairperson of the African Union issued a press release stating, inter alia, that “any initiative or action aimed at recognizing Somaliland as an independent entity” must be rejected, recalling that “Somaliland remains an integral part of the Federal Republic of Somalia.” The statement further emphasized that “[a]ny attempt to undermine the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Somalia runs counter to the fundamental principles of the African Union.”
These principles, although not binding on non-member states, are enshrined in three principal regional instruments: the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU); OAU Resolution AHG/Res. 16 (I), adopted in 1964 at the first session of the Conference of African Heads of State and Government held in Cairo, Egypt (the “Cairo Declaration”); and the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The OAU Charter, under Article III, requires member states, inter alia, to adhere to the principles of “non-interference in the internal affairs of States” and “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence.” The Cairo Declaration, noting that “border problems constitute a grave and permanent factor of dissension” and recognizing that “the borders of African States, on the day of their independence, constitute a tangible reality,” solemnly reaffirms strict respect for the principles set out in Article III of the OAU Charter and declares that all member states “pledge themselves to respect the borders existing at the time of their achievement of national independence.” More recently, the Constitutive Act of the African Union reiterates this commitment, providing in Article 4(b) that member states shall respect “borders existing on achievement of independence.”
The underlying purpose of these principles has been further clarified in judicial commentary. In his separate opinion in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case concerning the Frontier Dispute between Burkina Faso and Niger, Judge Yusuf noted that the main objective of these principles, particularly the obligation articulated under the Cairo Declaration, was “to discourage territorial annexation by force as well as irredentist, pan-nationalist and secessionist claims” (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the explicit obligation of states not to interfere in the domestic affairs of other states under the OAU Charter, together with the obligation to respect borders existing at the time of independence as articulated in the Cairo Declaration and codified in the AU Constitutive Act, gives rise to a corollary duty of non-recognition with respect to secessionist breakaway regions.
African institutional practice also supports this conclusion. When Biafra attempted to secede from Nigeria and unilaterally declared its independence on 30 May 1967, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted Resolution AHG/Res. 51 (IV), treating the situation in Nigeria as an internal affair and condemning Biafra’s attempt to secede. One year later, the OAU adopted Resolution AHG/Res. 61 (IV), requesting “the secessionist leaders to co-operate with the Federal authorities in order to restore peace and unity to Nigeria.”
Similarly, the OAU condemned the island of Anjouan’s attempt to secede from the Union of the Comoros, imposed sanctions on separatist leaders on the island, and expressed its determination to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a united Comoros. Likewise, the AU declared the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad’s (MNLA) proclamation of independence from Mali “null and of no value.” In doing so, the AU underscored the “fundamental principle of the intangibility of borders inherited by the African countries at their accession to independence,” reiterating its “unwavering commitment to the national unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of Mali.”
Despite this consistent rejection of unilateral secession, Africa has welcomed two new States following the end of the Cold War: Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia in 1993 and South Sudan’s independence from Sudan in 2011. However, in both cases, independence was not the result of a unilateral declaration but of negotiated political processes in which the mother states, both Ethiopia and Sudan, consented to the creation of the new States.
Therefore, under the AU system, non-recognition of secessionist or breakaway regions is the norm. At the same time, recognition of a seceding entity is an exception, permitted only with the consent of the parent state.
Conclusion
This piece demonstrates the coexistence of two divergent approaches within the general international law and the legal framework established under the African Union. It shows that international law generally permits state recognition, except when it is premature or the result of an unlawful act. In the AU system, however, non-recognition is the norm, with recognition of a seceding entity exceptionally allowed only with the consent of the parent state. Therefore, although general international law allows non-AU members, such as Israel, to recognize Somaliland, African states are bound by the doctrine of non-recognition, a regional treaty-based obligation derived from the AU Constitutive Act and related instruments. They should exercise particular caution in matters of recognition to avoid breaching their obligations under these instruments.
Ultimately, it is a longstanding principle of international law that “everything which is not prohibited is permitted.” Against this background, and in order to reconcile the obligations of African states under the African Union framework with the permissive rules of general international law, the doctrine of non-recognition should be understood as a special, treaty-based regional rule applicable to all African States. As Judge Yusuf observed, it is “specific to the African continent, where it is considered part of the public law of Africa applicable to all African States, but has no claim to being a general principle or a customary rule of international law.” Understood in this way, African states are bound by the prohibition arising from the treaty, without affecting the legal position of non-member states.
Somaliland (SL) Politicians have been chasing international recognition since May 1991. The harvest of 35 years is Taiwan and Israel. How do we assess this achievement?
By Dr Abdillahi Sheikh Mohamed Walaaleye-
Taiwan is a rump state of Big China without UN recognition or by any significant country worldwide. Nobody dares to recognize it even the US or Europe to avoid China’s ire. Since the current US Administration may not much mind angering China, if we played our cards right, we could have gained some worthwhile concessions before we made the jump. Now all we get is a meagre development assistance and the enmity of a Super Power with a Security Council veto..
Secondly, we received just over a month ago a recognition from Israel a UN Member with strong alliance with the West especially with the USA. For a small Muslim Country even with a strong geopolitical position to recognize Israel stirs the wrath of both the Arab and Muslim World even from those who had such relations for decades: Turkey and Egypt. Again, the loss was greater than the gain because there was no political deal for the West to recognize us for accepting the Abraham Accords. Compare Morocco who obtained US recognition of its ownership of the Western Sahara
It is high time our Politicians understand that the recognition path passes only through Mogadishu. The World has never accepted the split of one State into two, especially in Africa, unless both sides are agreed on it e.g. Senegal/Gambia etc. We should start building better relations with the important elements in Mogadishu Society: Merchants, Elders. Politicians and Ulema. We should have started in 1991 but both sides were too weak to take any decisive action at that time. Also, many of our experienced Personnel in the ways and means of Mogadishu have departed the scene. After concentrated effort we should be able to bring to the Mogadishu Presidency a figure who genuinely believed that it’s in the best interest of both sides to separate legally and amicably
Meanwhile, we should refrain from any action affecting sovereignty including selling pieces of our land in pursuit of recognition.
Another opportunity squandered was the 2005 African Union’s (AU) high-powered, fact-finding mission led by the deputy Chairperson of the AU H. E. Patrick Mazimhaka. It came to a very favorable conclusion to Somaliland. However, the contemporary SL President sent a ‘letter’ requesting implementation of the Mission’s recommendations instead of dispatching a team of most experienced SL Diplomats to pursue the implementation of this favorable decision within the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa.
If Mogadishu could not be moved after a reasonable period of years, our next move should be a diplomatic blitzkrieg of the African Union (AU) in Addis Ababa grabbing the narrative: Somaliland is one of the Eighteen (18) African Countries who wrested their Independence in 1960, The Year of Africa; we are bang in the forefront No.4 with (Somalia,1 July) two countries behind (Madagascar 26 June, D R Congo 30 June). The AU could run a plebiscite of the Somaliland population, if necessary.
After all is done, one should remember that a Country can prosper and be respected without World recognition. Taiwan is a shining example. With a Ten Million population, it has a higher GDP than the next 14 African Countries after the Big Four (Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa and Ethiopia).
Mogadishu is preparing to host Puntland President Said Abdullahi Deni today, with his arrival expected later this afternoon. He will participate in a meeting between the Federal Government leadership and the National Advisory Council.
An advance team for President Deni’s visit, which includes presidential security personnel, landed at Mogadishu’s Aden Adde Airport this morning.
Similarly, Jubaland President Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Madobe) is also scheduled to arrive in the capital later today. His arrival will be preceded by a security detail and an advance delegation.
Today, Tuesday, February 10th, is the confirmed date for the long-anticipated meeting in Mogadishu, with all participants expected to be in attendance.
This follows a recent statement from the Federal Government of Somalia confirming the resumption of flights for the delegations and security teams of the Puntland and Jubaland presidents. The move came after successful mediation between the parties by the international community.
Somaliland’s president said the territory will capitalise on Israel’s recent diplomatic recognition to pursue acceptance from Washington and other major powers, presenting the Horn of Africa state as a mineral-rich ally to US President Donald Trump, Semafor reported on February 8.
The push to develop the pseudo-state into an actual country comes amid international outrage from Somalia, which does not recognise the breakaway republic.
By aligning itself with Israel, Berbera inherits both opportunity and exposure. While recognition opens diplomatic and strategic doors that have long remained closed, it also places Somaliland firmly within a web of regional rivalries and potential security risks.
President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdilahi, speaking in Dubai, described Israel’s December decision to become the first country to formally recognise Somaliland as a transformative development for the territory, which has operated as a self-governing entity since its 1991 break from Somalia.
“More people will pay attention,” Abdilahi said, noting the global discussion now surrounding Somaliland’s status.
Israel’s announcement drew sharp criticism from the African Union, European Union and several governments, including China, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Tensions over Somaliland’s growing relationship with the United Arab Emirates have complicated relations between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh.
The president dismissed the negative responses as primarily driven by political interests or insufficient understanding of Somaliland’s history. He noted the territory predates modern Somalia and initially joined the union voluntarily to unite Somali-speaking regions.
Abdilahi said Somaliland’s campaign for international recognition will proceed carefully, given increased opposition. “We have more enemies than before, so everything has to be done discreetly,” he said.
Plans to strengthen Israeli ties include establishing embassies and commercial exchanges. The president cited Israel’s technological expertise in education, agriculture, science and water management as areas for cooperation.
In courting US support, Abdilahi pointed to Somaliland’s Red Sea and Horn of Africa coastline alongside its natural resource deposits including oil, gas and minerals. “We have the best beaches in the world,” he added.
Washington observers view Somaliland as a potential security partner for monitoring weapons trafficking, Yemen’s Houthi movement and China’s expanding presence, including Beijing’s military installation in nearby Djibouti.
The UAE remains Somaliland’s largest investor. Port operator DP World has committed over $400mn to expand Berbera’s port infrastructure for major cargo vessels and to develop an adjacent manufacturing and trade zone.
Following the UAE’s investment, Somalia scrapped all cooperation agreements with the Emirates, including port concessions and defence arrangements, accusing Abu Dhabi of actions that threaten its sovereignty.
Officials in Somaliland said their agreements, including those linked to Berbera port, remain valid, while Puntland and Jubbaland reaffirmed security and development partnerships with Abu Dhabi.
Somaliland plans to use the momentum from Israel’s recognition of the breakaway state to press its case to Washington and other major capitals, pitching the territory as a strategic, resource-rich partner to US President Donald Trump, its leader said in an interview.
“The recognition of Somaliland was a historic moment for myself and for my people,” President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdilahi told Semafor in Dubai. “More people will pay attention. Somaliland is now used in every language in the world, and so that’s a major impact.”
In December, Israel became the first country to formally recognize Somaliland — which has been operating as a de facto independent state since 1991 — triggering condemnation from the African Union, the European Union, and countries including China, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Somaliland’s close ties to the UAE have also become a sticking point in the rift between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh.
Abdilahi said the backlash over Israel’s announcement was expected. “Negative reactions were mostly based on interests, or some didn’t know the history of Somaliland,” he said. “We are older than Somalia, and we voluntarily merged with Somalia because we wanted to unite all Somali-speaking territories at that time.”
He said Somaliland has long pursued recognition quietly, and will continue to do so. “We are working hard to get more friends and countries,” Abdilahi said. “We have more enemies than before, so everything has to be done discreetly.”
Abdilahi also plans to deepen ties with Israel, including opening embassies and exchanging commercial attachés. “Israel is a highly technologically advanced country. So we want to benefit from their technology in all aspects — in education, in agriculture, in science, in water,” he said.
The president also reiterated previous overtures to Washington, highlighting Somaliland’s coastline on the Red Sea and in the Horn of Africa, as well as its mineral resources, which he explicitly offered to Trump. “We have an abundance of natural resources, including minerals. We have oil and gas. We have very large arable land for agriculture,” he said. “We have the best beaches in the world.”
Somaliland supporters in Washington view the territory as a potential security ally in the Horn of Africa. Recognition could allow US intelligence to establish a base to monitor weapons flows, Houthi activity in Yemen, and China’s growing footprint, including Beijing’s military base in neighboring Djibouti.
The UAE is the territory’s biggest investor, through port operator DP World, which has invested more than $400 million to expand a facility to handle the largest cargo vessels and is building a manufacturing and trade zone nearby in Berbera.
Somali Defence Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi (left) signed a memorandum of understanding for military cooperation with his Saudi counterpart, Khalid bin Salman bin Abdulaziz, in Riyadh [X/@MoDSomaliya]
Somalia has signed a “military cooperation” agreement with Saudi Arabia, weeks after inking a similar deal with Qatar, as Mogadishu seeks regional support against Israel’s recognition of the breakaway region of Somaliland.
The memorandum of understanding was signed on Monday between Somali Minister of Defence Ahmed Moallim Fiqi and his Saudi counterpart, Prince Khalid bin Salman bin Abdulaziz, in Riyadh.
The agreement “aims to strengthen the frameworks of defense and military cooperation between the two countries, and includes multiple areas of common interest, serving the strategic interests of both parties”, Somalia’s Ministry of Defence said.
Prince Khalid confirmed the agreement in a post on X.
But neither country provided further details.
Last month, Somalia signed a defence pact with Qatar, aimed at “strengthening military ties and security collaboration”, according to the Somali state news agency.
The pact with Qatar “focuses on military training, the exchange of expertise, the development of defence capabilities, and enhanced security cooperation, in support of efforts to promote regional security and stability”, it said.
Doha said the agreement was “aimed at strengthening areas of joint cooperation in a way that serves mutual interests and enhances defense partnerships”.
The diplomatic offensive by Somalia comes amid growing tensions in the Horn of Africa region following Israel’s world-first recognition of Somaliland in December. Mogadishu has warned that Israel plans to set up a military base in the breakaway region, which could be used to launch attacks on neighbouring countries.
Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud told Al Jazeera last week that Mogadishu “will never allow” the establishment of an Israeli base in Somaliland and will “confront” any such move.
“We will fight in our capacity. Of course, we will defend ourselves,” he said. “And that means that we will confront any Israeli forces coming in, because we are against that and we will never allow that.”
A Somaliland official told Israel’s Channel 12 in January that an Israeli military base is “on the table”, though terms were still being negotiated.
Separately, Somalia also cancelled all agreements with the United Arab Emirates last month – including port operations, security and defence deals – citing “harmful actions” that undermine its “national unity and political independence”.
The move came amid reports that the UAE had facilitated Israel’s recognition of Somaliland’s independence.
The Gulf state, which normalised ties with Israel in 2020 under the Abraham Accords, has cultivated deep economic and security ties with Somaliland. These include a 30-year concession at the strategic Berbera port held by the UAE company DP World.
The UAE declined to sign a joint Arab-Islamic statement condemning Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, but it released a joint statement with the African Union in January pledging “support for Somalia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, security and stability”.
Somalia’s break with the UAE coincided with a deterioration in Saudi Arabian-Emirati relations.
Tensions erupted in December when Saudi forces bombed what Riyadh described as a UAE weapons shipment to the separatist Southern Transitional Council in Yemen. Saudi Arabia also backed a call by Yemen’s internationally recognised government for Emirati forces in the country to withdraw.
The UAE denied the allegations.
Separately, Abu Dhabi has also been accused of supporting the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan, which has been battling the Sudanese Armed Forces for nearly three years.
Saudi Arabia, an ally of Khartoum, condemned the RSF on Saturday over attacks in Sudan’s Kordofan region, which have killed dozens of people, including women and children.
Riyadh also denounced “foreign interference” by unspecified parties in Sudan, saying the “continued influx of illegal weapons, mercenaries and foreign fighters” was prolonging the continuation of the nearly three-year-old war.
It did not name the parties.
Sudan, meanwhile, filed a case against the UAE at the International Court of Justice last year, accusing it of “complicity in genocide” allegedly committed by the RSF against the Masalit community in West Darfur state.
The UAE slammed the move as “nothing more than a cynical publicity stunt” and said it would seek the “immediate dismissal” of the case.
