The Norway-based seismic data company TGS-NOPEC has entered into an agreement with the Federal Government of Somalia, specifically with the Somali Petroleum Authority (SPA).
This agreement grants TGS the rights to market, license, and put out to tender oil exploration and extraction rights within Somaliland’s land and maritime territories. The areas included are those previously surveyed by TGS, as detailed in the maps and blocks attached to the agreement.
TGS has held the primary exploration data for most of Somaliland’s oil blocks for many years. The initial data acquisition began during the administration of former Somaliland President Dahir Riyale Kahin, and subsequent governments have renewed the company’s agreements.
What are the implications of this deal?
This new agreement, signed on the 22nd of this month, effectively allows Somalia to directly receive all revenues generated from the oil exploration data pertaining to Somaliland. Analysts suggest it fundamentally undermines Somaliland’s claim to sovereignty over the oil and gas resources within its own borders.
Furthermore, by transferring this data to the Somali government, TGS appears to have invalidated its previous agreements with the Somaliland government.
What are Somaliland’s options?
To date, the Somaliland government has not issued an official statement regarding the agreement between Somalia and TGS. Its official response and subsequent actions remain to be seen.
Observers note that Somaliland must respond decisively and quickly to this development. A failure to do so could see this agreement follow the path of the airspace control deal, which was initially contested but has now become a significant political and economic burden.
Will this deter foreign investment in Somaliland?
The new agreement explicitly permits TGS to subcontract or share the oil data with other companies. It is widely anticipated that Turkish companies will be primary beneficiaries, following a separate oil and gas cooperation deal signed between Somalia and Turkey last year.
Any foreign company attempting to operate in Somaliland’s territory based solely on an agreement with Mogadishu would face severe practical and security challenges, especially on land. However, the maritime domain presents a more complex defensive scenario for Somaliland, requiring urgent strategic attention to safeguard its offshore resources.
Somalia’s Provisional Constitution enshrines a federal system that relies on clearly defined powers and respect for state-level autonomy. Articles 48 and 54 leave little room for interpretation any authority not explicitly delegated to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) resides with the Federal Member States (FMS). Identity registration, notably, is not listed among the federal government’s exclusive competencies. Instead, it falls under civil registration, citizenship verification, and local administration—areas traditionally regarded as shared or residual responsibilities.
Against this legal backdrop, the unilateral creation of the National Identity and Registration Authority (NIRA) has sparked a nationwide debate. Legal scholars, policymakers, and FMS authorities contend that the FGS may be exceeding its constitutional mandate, encroaching on the rights and prerogatives of the states. This is not merely an administrative question; it is a test of constitutional discipline, federal balance, and the long-term credibility of Somalia’s state-building process. Indeed, it is precisely this potential overreach that raises concerns about the process by which NIRA was introduced.
Limited Consultation with Federal Member States
If the constitutional ambiguity raised initial alarms, the approach to NIRA’s rollout has only intensified them. Article 50 of the Provisional Constitution emphasizes cooperation and consultation as fundamental pillars of federal governance. Yet, NIRA’s implementation has been widely perceived as a top-down initiative that largely bypassed these requirements. Federal Member States report they were not afforded meaningful input into the design, governance, or operational framework of a national identity system—an instrument that directly affects their security responsibilities, service delivery mechanisms, and civic documentation processes. This lack of consultation has deepened political mistrust and hardened positions. In a country where intergovernmental trust is fragile, sidelining the FMS risks transforming a potentially valuable reform into a source of friction. Without broad consensus, NIRA could evolve into yet another centralized structure in a system explicitly designed to prevent the concentration of power.
Concerns Regarding Legislative and Procedural Legitimacy
Article 50 of the Provisional Constitution is explicit in requiring collaboration, consultation, and power-sharing across levels of government. Federal institutions affecting state-level functions are expected to be designed through inclusive processes that ensure nationwide ownership. However, several Federal Member States contend that they were not adequately consulted during NIRA’s conception, design, or rollout.
This perceived lack of meaningful engagement has contributed to skepticism regarding NIRA’s legitimacy. In addition, questions have been raised about whether the legislative procedures used to establish NIRA complied with the constitutional requirement for bicameral approval—especially the role of the Upper House, which exists specifically to safeguard the interests of Federal Member States. Ambiguities in the legislative process further deepen concerns about the institution’s legal soundness.
The establishment of the National Identification and Registration Authority (NIRA) in Somalia raises substantial legal, constitutional, and administrative concerns, particularly in light of the existence of fully operational identification mechanisms at both the federal and state levels. Somalia presently maintains a valid, internationally recognized biometric passport, which functions as the principal instrument of national identification, incorporating biographic data, biometric identifiers, security elements, and nationality verification, and thus conforms to global standards of personal identification.
The presence of such a passport system calls into question the necessity and legality of instituting an additional federal identification framework, especially given that Articles 48 and 54 of the Provisional Constitution reserve to the Federal Member States powers not expressly conferred upon the Federal Government. Furthermore, each Federal Member State has independently invested in civil registration and identification systems, which citizens utilize for local services, intra-state mobility, security clearance, employment verification, and, in jurisdictions conducting local elections, electoral registration.
These state-level systems constitute the operational and functional backbone of population management and enjoy both accessibility and community trust. The unilateral creation of a federal ID by NIRA risks duplicating these existing systems, undermining the authority of state civil registries, generating administrative redundancies, imposing unnecessary financial burdens, and creating citizen confusion. The introduction of a third, separate federal identification system, alongside the existing passport and state-issued IDs, would produce three layers of identification, leading to
Such fragmentation not only compromises efficiency but also threatens the integrity of civil registration and population management. Identity systems inherently involve sensitive personal and biometric data that determine eligibility for services, humanitarian aid, taxation, security clearance, mobility, and electoral participation.
In Somalia’s fragile political environment, where trust between governmental institutions is limited, centralization of such authority at the federal level engenders concerns regarding data security, neutrality, and potential misuse. Federal Member States and civil society actors have expressed apprehension that, absent robust safeguards, the system could be politicized or wielded in a manner disproportionately affecting certain regions or communities.
NIRA’s current approach, widely perceived as an attempt to supplant rather than integrate state-level civil registration systems, contravenes recognized international federal best practices, which emphasize cooperative, decentralized, or hybrid models that align national identification frameworks with subnational institutions.
To address the concerns surrounding NIRA and to ensure constitutional conformity, Somalia could benefit from a coordinated, constitutionally grounded approach that prioritizes federal–state cooperation, legal compliance, and citizen trust, ensuring that identity management systems are harmonized, secure, and reflective of Somalia’s federal structure while preserving the integrity and authority of existing state-level civil registration mechanisms.
mandates
Integration of existing passports and state IDs into a harmonized system rather than their replacement
Enactment of clear data protection and privacy laws to foster citizen trust
A phased, consultative approach to identity modernization.
Implementation of these measures would ensure that identity management respects the federal structure, safeguards civil registration integrity, mitigates institutional overreach, and enhances national confidence in Somalia’s identification system.
Conclusion
While the objective of establishing a national identity authority is commendable, NIRA’s current framework faces constitutional ambiguity, procedural challenges, and fundamental questions about necessity. Somalia already possesses a valid national passport and functioning state-level identification systems. Introducing an entirely new federal ID system—without harmonization or constitutional clarity—risks duplication, political tension, and inefficiency. A successful identity system for Somalia must be grounded in federal cooperation, legal certainty, and respect for existing institutions. Through consultation and consensus-building, Somalia can modernize identification in a manner that strengthens—rather than disrupts—its evolving federal governance structure.
By Abdifatah Abdinur
State Minister of the Presidency
Puntland State of Somalia
Should Israel recognize the pro-Western state located in the Horn of Africa—an area whose security importance for Israel has become even more pronounced over the past two years?
By Asher Lubotzky
In the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region—areas whose security and strategic importance for Israel have grown significantly over the past two years—lies Somaliland, an independent and pro-Western state that has yet to be recognized by the international community. Its primary objective is to secure recognition and to build alliances with states that can support it vis-à-vis its rival, the Somali government in Mogadishu. In recent years, Somaliland has cultivated close ties with the United Arab Emirates and Taiwan. Its leadership has now placed considerable hope in the Trump administration, and in this context, it has intensified its efforts to achieve recognition, including from Israel. This article examines Israel–Somaliland relations from Israel’s perspective and outlines the considerations for both supporting and delaying Israeli recognition.
Somaliland—More Than Thirty Years of Independence and Stability
Somaliland covers the northwestern part of what the international community still recognizes as Somalia. It was independent for a brief five-day period in 1960 before joining a union with Somalia, and it later reasserted its independence in 1991 as it emerged from the brutal Somali civil war that began in the late 1980s.
Over the past century, Somaliland has developed a distinct identity. It was ruled by the British (unlike Somalia, which was under Italian control); its people have long-standing ties with South Yemen across the Gulf of Aden; and most of its population belongs to the Isaaq clan, in contrast to Somalia’s other major clan families. The Isaaq suffered discrimination, violence, and—according to its members—even genocide at the hands of the clans that ruled Somalia, especially during the 1980s.
Since declaring its de facto independence, Somaliland has contrasted sharply with Somalia in almost every respect: its security environment is calm, its internal politics are stable, and it has no significant jihadist presence. Although there are border disputes in outlying areas where other clans reside, these conflicts remain localized and contained. Since the 2000s, Somaliland has maintained a stable, effectively functioning multi-party democratic system with regular elections. The most recent vote, held in 2024, featured orderly and peaceful transfers of power. All major political forces are pro-Western and wary of Islamist movements, as well as of China and Russia. Although they differ on how to achieve it, they all share the overarching goal of securing international recognition.
Somalia’s instability is largely concentrated in the south, which has helped bolster Somaliland’s stability. It is far from the main conflict zones—whether fighting among rival clans or clashes between the government and the powerful al-Shabaab organization. Somaliland also borders relatively stable and friendly neighbors: Ethiopia, Puntland (a de facto autonomous state within Somalia’s federation), and Djibouti, and it maintains peaceful relations with all three. In 2024, Somaliland signed a strategic memorandum of understanding with Ethiopia that would grant landlocked Ethiopia access to the strategic port of Berbera, along with an implicit promise of future recognition of Somaliland’s independence (the agreement was later effectively frozen, although not formally canceled, due to Turkish–Somali pressure). Relations with Djibouti have also advanced, and in October 2025, Somaliland signed the “Nairobi Agreement” with Puntland to enhance security and commercial cooperation.
In recent years, Somaliland has also expanded its ties with other pro-Western states. Its two most strategic partners are Taiwan and the United Arab Emirates. Taiwan—a global chip-manufacturing powerhouse—has invested in Somaliland’s rare metals and minerals sector, while the UAE has invested heavily in developing the port of Berbera. For the UAE, Somaliland offers a strategic foothold in the Horn of Africa, complementing its other regional strongholds, such as Socotra Island in Yemen, Puntland, and Darfur.
Somaliland also has reasons to be cautiously optimistic about its relationship with the United States. American delegations—including representatives from the Pentagon—have visited the country, which positions itself as a potential strategic base for the United States in the region. President Trump has stated that US recognition of Somaliland is under consideration, and Congress is planning to urge the State Department to re-examine bilateral ties with the goal of enhancing them. As an interim step, lawmakers have proposed that the State Department start distinguishing between Somalia and Somaliland in its travel advisories. Senior Republicans, including Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, have repeatedly voiced support for recognizing Somaliland’s independence. Nevertheless, Washington is still weighing several strong arguments against recognition, and progress has been slowed by delays in key appointments and in formulating a broader US policy toward Africa and the Red Sea.
Against this backdrop, Somaliland is waging a media and lobbying campaign to advance its bid for international recognition. In May 2025, Somaliland’s presidency appealed to UN member states to recognize it as an independent state, and in October 2025, local media reported that more than 20 states, including Israel, were moving toward recognition. Somaliland has also become increasingly willing to adopt additional symbols of sovereignty. In November 2025, it declared full control over its airspace—separating it from Somalia’s nominal sovereignty—and required all aircraft to obtain direct authorization from Somaliland’s authorities to fly through its airspace. It also announced that it would no longer recognize visas issued by the government in Mogadishu.
International recognition has therefore been the paramount goal of Somaliland’s successive governments—a goal that has remained unchanged despite democratic transfers of power. Recognition would formalize Somaliland’s status and, it hopes, protect it from a future scenario in which a strengthened Somalia—alone or with its allies—might seek to re-impose its authority over the territory with international legitimacy. In addition to recognition, Somaliland aims to secure reliable and powerful allies.
For now, the danger posed by the government in Mogadishu remains largely hypothetical. Somaliland faces more immediate security concerns, including the Houthis; the spread of global jihad (currently active in neighboring Puntland); separatist pressures along its periphery; and subversive activity linked to China and Turkey—threats for which there is tangible evidence on the ground.
The Importance of Somaliland for the West and Israel
Somaliland’s significance lies in its geostrategic location and in its willingness—as a stable, moderate, and reliable state in a volatile region—to work closely with Western countries. Its location at the entrance to the Gulf of Aden—opposite southern Yemen—linking the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean gives it a unique geostrategic importance. This strategic value was why the British Empire took control of the territory at the end of the 19th century, and why the United States secured access to a military base there during the Reagan administration in the 1980s, at the height of the Cold War.
Today, Somaliland’s coastline and territory lie roughly 300 to 500 kilometers from Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen, including the port of Hodeidah. Since the Gulf states, the United States, and Israel have all fought the Houthis in recent years without achieving a decisive outcome, Somaliland’s location—and the possibility of operating from its territory—could be a game changer.
Somaliland could serve as a forward base for a range of missions: intelligence collection and monitoring of the Houthis and their military buildup; logistical support for Yemen’s internationally recognized government in its war against the Houthis; and direct operations, from offensive actions to intercepting Houthi attacks at sea or by UAVs. A useful parallel is Israel’s close alliance with Azerbaijan, which has significantly strengthened Israel’s strategic and operational ability to counter the Iranian threat. Similarly, Somaliland could become a key pillar of Israel’s efforts to address the Houthi threat.
Alongside Somaliland’s strategic location, it is equally important that its government seeks wide-ranging cooperation with pro-Western states. This reflects both political willingness and practical capability. Although Eritrea lies even closer than Somaliland to areas from which operations against the Houthis could be launched, its regime is anti-Western and maintains friendly ties with Iran. Djibouti, despite its strategic location, maintains de facto neutrality in regional conflicts, while Ethiopia lacks access to the sea and has ambivalent relations with the United States.
Somaliland, therefore, offers a unique combination of geostrategic location and a clear readiness to pursue extensive cooperation with Western-aligned states. Its growing ties with the United Arab Emirates—driven in part by Abu Dhabi’s interest in the war against the Houthis—underscore this. Somaliland has also signaled that it is prepared to develop broad security relations with the United States, including the possibility of hosting an American base, and it might be open to cooperation with Israel.
In relation to Israel, Somaliland’s government has maintained a positive stance, even during the past two years of the war in Gaza, and it is plausible that unofficial contacts already exist among senior figures in both parties. In recent months, Somaliland has signaled its willingness to cooperate with pro-Israel initiatives, including the expansion of the Abraham Accords. Public discourse in Somaliland tends to be generally pro-Israeli, although critical voices also exist, particularly in light of the war and reports from Gaza, as well as the presence of non-violent Salafi movements in the country.
Considerations for and Against Recognizing Somaliland
For Somaliland, the most coveted prize is US recognition, which it expects would prompt many other US partners to follow suit. It therefore devotes the bulk of its diplomatic efforts to the White House and Congress. Somaliland presents itself as firmly opposed to China and willing to take significant steps to advance American interests in the strategic Red Sea-Indian Ocean region. In its engagement with the United States, Somaliland also highlights its democratic system, political freedoms, and opposition to radical Islamist ideologies. In conversations with US officials and in its public messaging, Somaliland has made clear its eagerness to join the Abraham Accords. Moreover, Somaliland’s desire for US recognition is so strong that its government did not publicly reject reports circulating several months ago that Washington was considering a proposal to resettle Gazans in Somaliland, even though the idea was extremely unpopular among Somaliland’s own population.
Nonetheless, despite Somaliland’s goodwill toward Washington and its strategic location, the United States remains hesitant to grant it formal recognition—for several significant reasons.
First, on principle, US policy on Somalia has been consistent in recent decades in supporting the “One Somalia” policy, the position that Somalia should remain a single, unified state rather than be divided into separate sovereign entities. Washington has sought to strengthen the government in Mogadishu, particularly in light of its two-decade war against al-Shabaab. From the US perspective, Somalia is an ally—albeit a weak and failing one—and the United States periodically provides military assistance, including in strikes against global jihadist operatives.
In contrast, recognizing Somaliland would be viewed in Mogadishu as an American betrayal and could trigger blowback inside fragile Somalia—for example, by encouraging the formal secession of Puntland and Jubaland, both of which are still symbolically committed to Mogadishu’s authority, or by strengthening al-Shabaab. This concern aligns with a broader international reluctance to recognize unilateral border changes or secessionist states, out of fear of opening a Pandora’s box and destabilizing borders elsewhere, especially in the Middle East and Africa.
Although this is a significant consideration for Washington, which is generally inclined to maintain the status quo, it is possible that the Trump administration could break with the long-standing practice of upholding “One Somalia” and resisting recognition of secessionist states. However, another factor likely plays an even more important role for the United States at present: the stance of most Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt, as well as Turkey, all of which support preserving Somalia’s unity. With the exception of the UAE, Arab League states both officially and in practice support Somalia’s territorial integrity and vehemently oppose recognition of Somaliland. For Turkey, Somalia is a central ally in the Red Sea region, approaching the status of a client state. These powerful states—whose views carry weight in Washington—have made clear their strong opposition to recognizing Somaliland.
While their influence in Washington is far more limited, African Union member states also tend to oppose the formal recognition of secessionist entities, fearing a domino effect across the continent.
Compared with the United States, Israel faces additional considerations. While opposition from Qatar and Turkey to recognizing Somaliland is not particularly significant for Israel—and could arguably have the opposite effect—Egypt’s position, and possibly China’s, could prove more consequential. At the same time, Israel’s close relationship with the UAE strengthens the case for supporting Somaliland. However, Israel has traditionally been reluctant to recognize secessionist states, partly out of concern that doing so could set precedents that might backfire in the context of a Palestinian state. This concern is less relevant today, given the de facto and near-universal international recognition extended to the Palestinian “state” in recent years.
A more serious factor for Israel—one that warrants caution and serious reflection before extending formal recognition to Somaliland—is a pragmatic one. Recognizing Somaliland without parallel US recognition could trigger negative repercussions for both Israel and Somaliland. While an Israel–Somaliland agreement might appear to strengthen Israel’s regional standing, it could also provoke a significant backlash in parts of the Muslim world. This could place Somaliland at the center of regional criticism and could push it to scale back or avoid expanding its public cooperation with Israel. Paradoxically, Israeli recognition could even complicate efforts to broaden the Abraham Accords to additional Muslim states.
Below the Threshold of Recognition—At Least for Now
Israel requires allies in the Red Sea region for many strategic reasons, among them the possibility of a future campaign against the Houthis. Somaliland is an ideal candidate for such cooperation, as it could offer Israel potential access to an operational arena close to the conflict zone. Beyond security cooperation, ties with Somaliland also carry economic and reputational value for Israel’s national security, given the minerals located in Somaliland and Israel’s interest in cultivating relationships with Muslim populations in the region. Israel should, therefore, work to expand its cooperation with Somaliland, ideally in coordination with the UAE and the United States.
Nevertheless, Israel has compelling reasons to refrain from becoming the first state to recognize Somaliland. Foremost among these is the concern that early recognition could actually hinder the cultivation of close relations, given the possible regional reactions and dynamics. As long as the United States (or at least the UAE) does not recognize Somaliland as an independent state, Israel should not act alone on this front.
The recommendation, therefore, is to advance relations with Somaliland below the threshold of recognition. While Israel and its partners in Washington can assist Somaliland in efforts to persuade the Trump administration to recognize it, the United States should be the first to make any public move. In parallel, prior to formal recognition, Israel and Somaliland can deepen their security and economic partnerships, establish interest offices (as many other states already do with Somaliland), and even take symbolic steps such as recognizing Somaliland passports.
Such steps would avoid the risks of formal recognition while still enabling both sides to advance their essential interests. An Israeli security and economic presence in Somaliland does not necessarily require formal recognition, and conversely, Somaliland may at present prefer close, quiet ties with Israel over high-profile, precedent-setting declarations. Somaliland stands to gain substantially from such cooperation, particularly given the security challenges it faces in the Red Sea region and the Horn of Africa. For Israel, Somaliland may prove to be a game changer in the struggle against the Houthis.
___________________
** The author wishes to thank the team at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) for their fruitful discussions on the issue, including those held during a guest lecture the author delivered at INSS on September 30, 2025; Dr. Rashid Abdi, Director of Research at Sahan Global in Nairobi, Kenya, for his dialogue and knowledge sharing; and the Israel–Africa Relations Institute for its support and encouragement.
The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’
Hargeisa, Somaliland – The President of the Republic of Somaliland, H.E. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (irro), today held a strategic meeting with the Ambassador of Denmark, H.E. Steen Sonne Andersen, at the Presidential Palace.
The President expressed his gratitude to the Ambassador and the Government of Denmark for their consistent support to Somaliland in the areas of development, economic infrastructure, public institutions, and technical support for the electoral process and democratization.
The President emphasized that the Republic of Somaliland is committed to strengthening and expanding the relations between the two countries, particularly in the fields of security cooperation, economy, social services, and development programs.
For his part, the Danish Ambassador congratulated the President and his Government on the successful peacebuilding and stabilization efforts in the eastern regions of Somaliland, particularly the city of Wrigavo.
The Ambassador underscored that his government will continue its support for Somaliland in the areas of peacebuilding, the development of economic infrastructure, and strengthening institutions crucial for good governance.
Furthermore, Ambassador Andersen highlighted Denmark’s development programs and the major projects it is undertaking in Somaliland. He also discussed with the President the progress of the electoral process and the democratization project in the Republic of Somaliland.
The meeting concluded with a mutual understanding to continue working together on issues of peace, stability, and development in the Horn of Africa region.
Field Office Somaliland recently supported the Somaliland Coast Guard (SLGC) Mobile Training Unit in delivering a specialized training on oil spill prevention and environmental protection.
Fourteen officers from Berbera, Zaylac, Maydh and Hargeisa participated in both theoretical and practical sessions to strengthen their ability to respond to environmental incidents. During the training, they practiced techniques for securing contaminated areas and safely collecting oil spills using professional equipment previously donated by the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB).
This initiative further enhances the SLCG’s capacity to protect Somaliland’s coastline and marine environment.
Galkayo – The First Instance Court of the Mudug Region delivered the verdict against Hodan Mohamud Diiriye on Monday following a hearing that was streamed live for hours, drawing widespread public attention. The court also sentenced Hodan’s 65-year-old husband to one year in prison and a $500 fine for his involvement in the case.
Although Hodan denied killing the girl, she admitted in court to repeatedly torturing her. Prosecutors presented evidence that convinced the court she was directly responsible for Sabiriin’s death.
Both defendants were granted one month to file an appeal. Their defense lawyer stated he disagreed with the judgment and confirmed that an appeal had already been submitted on Hodan’s behalf.
Sabiriin’s body, which had been held pending the court proceedings, is expected to be released to her family for burial.
The killing of the young girl had sparked public outrage and protests in Galkayo. Demonstrations last week resulted in one death and significant property damage.
Somaliland to Host National Road
Safety Conference 2025 Under the
Theme “Building A
Safer Future ”
Hargeisa,Somaliland, November 24
th,2025 – The Ministry of Tran-
sport and Roads Development (
MoTRD) has announced the upc-
oming Somaliland National Road
Safety Conference 2025 , to be held
starting tomorrow November 25th to
26th in Hargeisa, under the theme “
Building A Safer Future. ”
This landmark gathering will bring
together government leaders, tran-
sport authorities,development part-
ners, civil society, academia, emer-
gency responders, and the private sec-
tor to address one of Somaliland’s
most urgent challenges: preventable
road accidents.
Despite national development prog-
ress, road traffic incidents remain a
major cause of avoidable injury and
loss of life across the country. The
conference aims to address this crisis
through adata-driven, policy-focused
and community-centered approach
emphasising awareness, safer driving,
effective enforcement, infrastructure,
and stronger emergency response sys-
tems.
Conference Objectives
● Strengthen collaboration
between government, civil
society, private sector, and
development partners.
● Develop research-based nati-
onal strategies to reduce traffic
accidents.
● Improve emergency response
capacity and victim support
systems.
● Promote responsible driving,
road safety awareness, and
public education.
● Invest in better road design,
safer transport systems, and
data infrastructure.
Participants
Through presentations, panels and
focus group discussion participants
from government ministries, Parli-
ament, police and emergency serv-
ices, schools, universities, youth gro-
ups, the transport and insurance indu-
stries, development partners and the
private sector, the conference will
serve as grounds for the Somaliland
Ministry of Transportation and Road
Development to build a strategy and
an action plan to tackle the issues/
challenges in road safety across the
country.
According to the Ministry of Transport
and Roads Development :
“Every journey should begin and end
safely. This conference marks a
national commitment to saving lives
and building a safer future on
Somaliland ’s roads. ”
About the Conference
The Somaliland National Road
Safety Conference 2025 is a nati-
onal initiative aimed at strengthening
transport safety governance, redu-
cing preventable injuries and fatal-
ities, and promoting a safe, modern,
and efficient transport system that
benefits every citizen.
For Media Inquiries
Ministry of Transport & Roads
Development ( MoTRD)
Hargeisa, Republic of Somaliland
Email: roadsafertymotrd2025@gmail.
com
Phone: +252 63 4403797 or +252 63
484 5258
Manila – A delegation headed by Brigadier General Khadar Mohamed Essa ,the First Commander of the Somaliland Coast Guard (SL-CG), and comprising senior officers from its headquarters, took part in the 3rd IORIS Steering Committee Policy Board and Working Groups Meeting in Manila, Philippines.
The proceedings of the conference featured a recognition of the Somaliland Coast Guard as the foremost and most significant agency utilizing the IORIS system.
Commander Khadar Mohamed Essa contributed to the discussions with a major speech, detailing the essential role the SL-CG plays in safeguarding maritime domains and fostering information exchange.
A major new policy paper from Israel’s influential Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) is urging the government to move quickly toward diplomatic recognition of the Republic of Somaliland, describing the self-declared Horn of Africa state as a potential “strategic breakthrough” for Israeli security in the Red Sea.
The report, titled “Tel Aviv Signals New Direction: Somaliland Recognition on the Table,” argues that escalating Houthi attacks on international shipping since late 2023, combined with Iran’s growing influence in the region, have made Somaliland’s strategic location and relative stability indispensable to Israel’s defense posture.
“Somaliland offers Israel a forward operating environment in one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints,” the INSS assessment states. Its 850-kilometer Gulf of Aden coastline and the UAE-upgraded deep-water port at Berbera are seen as ideal platforms for intelligence collection, naval logistics, and drone operations aimed at countering Iranian arms smuggling to Yemen’s Houthis.
The document highlights Somaliland’s stark contrast with neighboring Somalia: regular democratic elections, a functioning central government, low crime. It notes that Somaliland has cooperated with the UAE and Western partners to dismantle al-Shabaab and ISIS cells, earning praise as a rare stable outlier in the region.
Rather than immediate full recognition, which could provoke sharp backlash from Somalia and the African Union, the INSS recommends a cautious, multi-stage approach modeled on Israel’s successful quiet partnerships with Azerbaijan and the UAE before the Abraham Accords.
The report also stresses the need to coordinate with Ethiopia, which signed a controversial January 2024 memorandum granting it access to Berbera in exchange for a pledge to recognize Somaliland—the first such commitment by an African state.
The paper argues that carefully managed engagement, backed by the United States and Gulf allies, could redefine Israel’s standing in Africa and secure vital trade routes that carry 12 percent of global commerce and roughly 30 percent of Israel’s own imports.
The INSS calls for an inter-ministerial task force to be formed by December 2025 to finalize a concrete roadmap. Sources familiar with the discussions say the paper has already been circulated at senior levels in the Prime Minister’s Office, Foreign Ministry, and IDF Planning Directorate.
While no official government response has been issued, diplomatic observers note that quiet Israeli-Somaliland contacts have intensified since 2022, including reported visits by Israeli technical teams to Berbera airfield and growing coordination on counter-terrorism intelligence.
If implemented, recognition of Somaliland would mark Israel’s most significant diplomatic initiative in sub-Saharan Africa in decades and could accelerate a broader realignment of Red Sea security architecture involving the United States, UAE, Ethiopia, and potentially Kenya and Djibouti.
For now, the ball appears to be in Israel’s court—and the clock is ticking as Houthi drones and missiles continue to menace one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes.
The prolonged and repeated drought sweeping across the countryhas worsened, putting the situation of both human and livestock in peril.
This has once again been asserted at the weekly cabinet meeting. It is worth noting that on Monday the VP H.E. Mohamed Abdi aw Ali made a strong statement to the nation explaining the dire situation while noting that the plight of both human and livestock were perilous.
The adoption of the national youth policy was voted for overwhelmingly at the session.
Impending famine and more issues put on focus at the 42nd session of the council of cabinet ministers meeting included the national economic situation, internal security, priority national policy planning, livestock etc.
Chaired by the President H.E. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi Irro, the general agenda as per the presser by Presidential spokesman Hussein Deyr was follows: –
National Security Briefing
The Minister of Interior and National Security, Hon. Abdalle Mohamed Arab, reported that the overall security situation across the country remains stable and calm, with no threats posing significant risk to the state.
Revenue and Economic Update
The Minister of Finance and Economic Development, Hon. Abdillahi Hassan Adan, informed the cabinet that national revenue collection from January to October is progressing in line with the 2025 budget projections.
He added that the 2026 national budget has been fully prepared and will soon be submitted to the cabinet for debate and approval.
The minister also highlighted productive meetings held in Dubai aimed at strengthening bilateral cooperation in economic infrastructure and improving national revenue systems.
National Drought Situation
The Minister of Religious Affairs and Endowments, Sheikh Abdullahi-Bashe Dahir Jama—also a member of the National Drought Relief Committee—warned that drought conditions are worsening across all regions, calling for an urgent nationwide relief effort to support affected households.
Livestock Export Conditions
The Minister of Livestock and Rural Development, Dr. Omar Shu’ayb Mohamed, emphasized the need to modernize livestock export systems and infrastructure, describing livestock as the backbone of Somaliland’s economy.
He noted that the ongoing drought has negatively affected both the number and quality of livestock, urging the government to adopt a national plan to protect the remaining herds.
Public Health Situation
The Minister of Health Development, Dr. Hussein Bashir Hirsi, reported a slight decline in measles, whooping cough, and malaria cases, attributing the improvement to ongoing preventive campaigns.
He also notified the cabinet that an extremely fatal disease known as the Marburg Virus has been detected in the neighbouring country of Ethiopia, and the ministry has begun preparedness and monitoring efforts—particularly in border areas—to safeguard public health.
Upcoming High-Level Development Forum
The Minister of Planning and National Development, Hon. Kaltun Sheikh Hassan Abdi, announced that her ministry will host a High-Level Development Coordination Forum, where priority national development projects will be presented.
The event will bring together the Somaliland government, local institutions, development partners, donors, and international agencies to discuss investment, cooperation, and acceleration of key economic and social infrastructure projects.
New Procedures for Vehicle Plate Removal and Vehicle Modifications
The Minister of Transport and Road Development, Hon. Osman Ibrahim Nuur (Afgaab), briefed the cabinet on newly introduced regulations governing vehicle plate removal, garages management, and vehicle modifications.
Under the new rules, vehicle alterations will only be approved after a full technical inspection to ensure compliance with safety and traffic standards.
Meeting between the Cabinet and the WADDANI Ruling Party
The Minister of Presidential Affairs, Hon. Khadar Hussein Abdi, reported on a crucial meeting held between the cabinet and the ruling WADDANI party, which focused on strengthening coordination, improving communication with supporters, and advancing the party’s political agenda. He described the meeting as one that was quite productive and unifying.
Approval of the National Youth Policy
The Minister of Youth and Sports, Hon. Ahmed-Yasin Mohamed Farah, together with the Attorney General, Ali Bashe Mohamed, briefed the cabinet on the National Youth Policy previously distributed for review.
Following discussion, President Abdirahman Irro called for a vote. All 37 cabinet members present voted in favor, with no objections or abstentions whatsoever.
