Home Blog Page 26

The Houthi Threat to Israel and Somaliland—Characteristics and Policy Recommendations

0

INSS Insight No. 2134, April 29, 2026

Danny Citrinowicz
‎Hasaan Abdi
‎The Houthi threat has evolved into a multidimensional challenge with direct implications for Israel and growing relevance for Somaliland. While the Houthis lack the capacity to defeat Israel militarily, they have demonstrated an ability to expand the geographic scope of confrontation, disrupt critical maritime routes in the Red Sea, and serve as a key instrument of Iran’s regional strategy. At the same time, emerging dynamics suggest increasing strain on Iran’s proxy network, potentially rendering actors such as the Houthis more central, yet also more unpredictable. Against this backdrop, the emerging relationship between Israel and Somaliland reflects broader geopolitical shifts linking the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. While this convergence offers strategic opportunities, particularly in maritime security and regional positioning, it also carries significant risks, including escalation, retaliation, and diplomatic backlash.

‎Addressing these challenges requires a calibrated, multi-domain strategy that integrates military, economic, and diplomatic tools while avoiding destabilizing overreach. To address this shared challenge, INSS and the ISIR research institute in Somaliland have partnered to produce a joint analysis of the Houthi threat to both Israel and Somaliland, including policy recommendations on how the two sides should respond to this common threat.

‎Somaliland’s mutual recognition has arrived at a time when regional geopolitics in both the Horn of Africa and the Middle East are reshaping. While Somaliland and Israel have different contexts and power relations, the two have found exchangeable interests—Somaliland has been struggling to secure international recognition for its statehood for the past three decades. For this reason, it is leveraging its geographic location. Israel, on its side, is struggling for its national security interests in the Middle East and has leveraged its “recognition vote.” Jointly concerned by the Houthi disruptions in the Red Sea since 2023, Somaliland has been receiving international attention, as it is regarded as a potential partner in any attempt to improve Red Sea security.

‎The Houthis currently pose a multifaceted challenge, incorporating military, economic, and geopolitical elements. For Israel, their importance lies not in their ability to defeat Israel militarily, but in their capacity to expand the geographic scope of confrontation, disrupt maritime trade, and serve as a key lever in Iran’s regional strategy. At the same time, evolving regional dynamics suggest that Iran’s reliance on proxy warfare is under increasing strain, potentially making actors such as the Houthis more central—but also more unpredictable. For Somaliland, the Houthi movement represents multifaceted risk, involving direct physical attacks in the form of retaliation, complicating trade navigation, potentially affecting the cost of living, strategic entanglements in regional conflicts, and complex geopolitical rivalries.

‎The Missile, UAV, and Maritime Threat
‎The Houthis’ military capabilities have improved significantly due to sustained Iranian and Hezbollah support, including technology transfers, training, and weapons supply. Their arsenal includes long-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, advanced UAVs, and maritime strike capabilities. These capabilities have effectively erased the strategic distance between Yemen and Israel. While Israel’s missile defense systems intercept many threats, they cannot provide full protection. Even limited successful strikes or the constant need for defensive readiness impose psychological, operational, and economic costs.

‎Beyond direct attacks, the Houthis have demonstrated their ability to weaponize maritime disruption. Their attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait impose indirect but substantial costs on Israel and the global economy, transforming the challenge into a broader strategic issue involving freedom of navigation and regional stability.

‎Expanding Threat Vectors: Land and Networked Actors
‎Beyond missile and maritime threats, the Houthis are signaling ambitions to expand their operational reach. Their ties with Shiite militias in Iraq raise the possibility of multi-front coordination, including potential land-based threats via Syria or Jordan.

‎At the same time, reports of interaction with non-state actors such as Al-Shabaab and ISIS affiliates point to the emergence of cross-regional destabilization networks. While operational coordination remains limited, shared interests in weakening state structures and disrupting maritime control increase long-term strategic risk.

‎The African Dimension: Somaliland Between Opportunity and Risk
‎The Houthi threat is no longer confined to the Middle East; it increasingly intersects with the Horn of Africa, particularly Somaliland, which has gained attention as a potential partner in securing Red Sea maritime routes. For Israel, Somaliland represents a potential strategic foothold near critical shipping lanes and in proximity to Yemen. For Somaliland, engagement with Israel offers opportunities in technology, agriculture, and diplomatic advancement, especially in its pursuit of international recognition. However, this convergence introduces significant risks. Alignment with Israel against the Houthis could expose Somaliland to direct retaliation, trigger regional backlash, and undermine its recognition strategy. Somaliland’s limited defense capabilities further heighten these risks.

‎Strategic Considerations in Israel–Somaliland Relations
‎The emerging relationship between Israel and Somaliland reflects broader geopolitical shifts across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Somaliland’s geographic position, particularly around the Berbera port, makes it strategically attractive. However, framing the relationship primarily in military terms risks destabilization. For Somaliland, careful calibration is essential: maximizing economic and technological benefits while minimizing exposure to geopolitical risks and regional backlash.

‎Integrated Policy Approach
‎Given the multi-dimensional nature of the Houthi threat, responses must move beyond narrow military solutions and adopt a broader strategic framework:

‎Strengthening Maritime Security—Israel and Somaliland should deepen cooperation with international and regional partners to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. A sustained naval presence and coordinated maritime defense architecture are essential to counter Houthi disruption.
‎Expanding Intelligence and Disruption Efforts—Enhanced intelligence-sharing, particularly targeting supply lines and smuggling networks, can slow the Houthis’ military buildup and limit their operational reach.
‎Adopting a Multi-Theater Perspective—The Houthi challenge should be integrated into a broader strategic framework spanning the Middle East and Africa. This includes monitoring potential expansion into Iraq, Syria, and North Africa, as well as their growing influence along maritime corridors.
‎Building Regional Coalitions—Israel should prioritize flexible coalition-building with both Middle Eastern and African partners. Such cooperation can mitigate operational burdens and improve regional resilience against non-state actors.
‎Calibrating Engagement with Somaliland—For both Israel and Somaliland, cooperation should focus on low-risk, high-benefit domains such as trade, agriculture, and technology. However, avoiding the establishment of an Israeli military base in Somaliland is critical, as it would likely provoke escalation and regional backlash. Instead, gradual trust-building and economic engagement can provide strategic value without triggering destabilizing responses.
‎Preventing Regional Polarization—Somaliland should avoid exclusive alignments that could lead to diplomatic isolation. Maintaining balanced relations with Gulf states, Turkey, and other regional actors is essential to preserving its strategic flexibility.
‎Conclusion
‎The Houthis represent a new type of threat: a geographically distant actor capable of exerting significant strategic pressure through military capabilities, maritime disruption, and networked alliances. As proxy-based deterrence erodes, actors like the Houthis are likely to play a more central and less predictable role. For Israel, the challenge is managing an expanding multi-theater confrontation. For Somaliland, it is balancing opportunity with risk. In both cases, success will depend on careful calibration of alliances, multi-domain coordination, and long-term strategic restraint.

The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’ alone.

A New Era of Cooperation: WADDANI Party and Somaliland Workers’ Unions Become Allies

0

By Jama Ayaanle Feyte

“We are new to this, but the world has seen that workers’ unions and political parties can cooperate and become allies.”

The Chairman of the Somaliland ruling party, Hon. Hersi Haji Ali Hassan, speaking to the Somaliland Workers’ Unions, said:
“We are very pleased with the preliminary Memorandum of Understanding between the WADDANI Party and the Somaliland Workers’ Unions. This agreement is the result of the great efforts and extensive scrutiny that the workers’ unions have put into affirming their existence, securing their rights, and advancing their interests.

To all the workers of Somaliland, we extend a platform on which we will become allies—a party that supports, champions, and sympathizes with the workers, shares their needs, and addresses their concerns.”

He added: “As a party, it was an ambition we aspired to—to develop the workers’ unions—as we articulated in our political program upon which we entered the election. We stand for creating new ideas and visions through which the country can progress and take steps forward.”

The Chairman concluded:
“If in the past the workers’ unions were oppressed, today we have become allies through cooperation between us!”

Cruz Calls for US to Join Israel, Taiwan in Recognizing Somaliland

0
By David Michael Swindle

US Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) has renewed his calls for the Trump administration to recognize Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state, arguing the self-declared African republic would be a significant strategic partner if Washington were to formalize relations.

“Somaliland is a geo-strategic US maritime security partner in Africa,” Cruz said last week during a hearing on US counterterrorism approaches in Africa. “It sits along the Gulf of Aden near one of the world’s busiest shipping corridors and its forces actively contribute to counterterrorism and anti-piracy missions.”

Somaliland, which has claimed independence for decades in East Africa but remains largely unrecognized, is situated on the southern coast of the Gulf of Aden and bordered by Djibouti to the northwest, Ethiopia to the south and west, and Somalia to the south and east. It has sought to break off from Somalia since 1991 and utilized its own passports, currency, military, and law enforcement.

Unlike most states in its region, Somaliland has relative security, regular elections, and a degree of political stability.

“Somaliland stands with our allies, including Taiwan and Israel, and aligns with US interests in a region where China is aggressively expanding,” Cruz said. “Most recently, Israel’s decision to formally recognize Somaliland in December 2025 underscores its growing strategic relevance.”

In December, Israel recognized Somaliland’s independence, becoming the first UN-recognized country in the world to do so — Taiwan did in 2020 — while igniting a diplomatic firestorm in Somalia and dozens of Muslim nations which condemned the decision.

Israel announced the appointment of its first ambassador to Somaliland earlier this month. Less than two months earlier, the first official delegation from the self-declared African republic — 25 water sector workers — arrived in Israel for help on tackling their water crisis at home.

As for the US, Cruz noted that Gen. Dagvin Anderson, the Commander of US Africa Command, had met with partners in Somaliland last year “to assess the security environment and to review Berbera’s operational capacity.”

“This is the kind of partner we should be encouraging and one that will shape how we confront CT challenges in the Horn of Africa,” he added.

Anderson visited Somaliland’s capital Hargeisa and Berbera, the site of a rapidly developing trading port operated by Dubai’s DP World, one of the world’s top shipping and logistics companies which manages 10 percent of global container trade.

On Thursday, Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi visited the United Arab Emirates (UAE), responding to an official state invitation. The UAE has nurtured a longstanding relationship with Somaliland, previously supporting training for the country’s military in 2018. The deal for constructing the Berbera port will allow the UAE to maintain a presence for 30 years.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has “solidified a ‘Berbera Axis’ (Israel-UAE-Ethiopia) centered on port access and maritime monitoring,” according to an analysis by Marie de Vries, a researcher at the French think tank La Fondation Méditerranéenne D’études Stratégiques (Mediterranean Foundation for Strategic Studies), or FMES. In contrast, she added, a “Mogadishu Axis” has emerged due to a partnership of Somalia with Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia

Cruz’s comments came after US Rep. John Rose (R-TN) told The Algemeiner that he supported the US recognizing Somaliland.

“I think it’s also an important element that this is a relatively well-functioning democracy, and we think the United States should encourage that,” said Rose, who also touted the strategic benefits for the US. He introduced legislation to push the US government to study boosting economic ties with Somaliland.

Cruz addressed the arguments of those who oppose recognition of Somaliland in last week’s hearing.

“Critics argue that recognizing Somaliland could introduce new CT [counterterrorism] risks or undermine our posture in Mogadishu. I would argue the opposite,” Cruz said. “Working with a capable, willing partner like Somaliland strengthens our posture, particularly when Somalia itself continues to struggle with instability and persistent terrorist threats.”

Nick Checker, senior official in the US State Department’s Bureau of Africa Affairs who testified at the hearing, said that while Somaliland has been a “very good partner” on counterterrorism, US President Donald Trump’s current position is not to support formal recognition.

“I certainly agree with you that Somaliland has been a very good partner CT and otherwise with the United States. We’ve had a positive relationship with both them and other member states,” Checker said. “But you know the policy of the administration for now is that we do continue to recognize, as you know, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the federal government of Somalia. But within that framework, we still do obviously look for opportunities to deepen our cooperation with Somaliland.”

Cruz expressed optimism that Trump would change his position.

“Well, I think the implications would be strengthening an ally, and I think clarity is powerfully effective in foreign policy and national security,” Cruz responded. “And I think that is an approach that President Trump has embodied. So, I have a high level of optimism that by the end of this term, President Trump will recognize Somaliland.”

Cruz previously called on Trump to recognize Somaliland in an August 2025 letter.

Somaliland “has proposed hosting a US military presence near the Red Sea along the Gulf of Aden and is open to critical minerals agreements that would support our supply chain resilience,” Cruz wrote in his letter. “The US-Somaliland partnership is robust, and it is deepening.”

Somaliland says it has significant mineral resources, and officials have expressed a willingness to offer the US a strategic military base at the entrance to the Red Sea and critical minerals as part of a deal that would include formal recognition.

However, China has strongly opposed any such moves.

“The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is using economic and diplomatic coercion to punish Somaliland for its support for Taiwan, as well as to undermine that support,” Cruz wrote in last year’s letter. “The government of Somalia has played an unfortunate role in these efforts: In April 2025, the CCP arranged for Somalia to bar Taiwanese passport holders from transiting into Somaliland, and Chinese support to Somalia is benefiting anti-Somaliland groups working to erode its sovereignty.”

China’s embassy in Somalia released a statement in response to Cruz’s letter declaring that Beijing “firmly opposes this misconduct. Senator Cruz’s remarks constitute serious interference in the internal affairs of Somalia and reflect the hegemonic and bullying attitude of certain US politicians towards the Somali people.”

Cruz referenced China’s response during last week’s hearing.

“Unsurprisingly, the Chinese Communist Party immediately condemned my letter, which only shows how important Somaliland is to US national security,” he said.

De Vries described in her FMES report that “recognition of Somaliland risks normalizing Taiwan’s presence in a region where China has heavily invested in ports, telecommunications, and security partnerships. China’s reaction is driven less by the legal status of Somaliland than by a broader strategic calculus focused on preventing Taiwanese visibility and safeguarding Djibouti’s role as a primary regional hub.”

China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017

Why Africa Still Ignores Somaliland but Engages Coup Leaders

0

By Femi Aderibigbe

Africa says it rewards democracy, but in practice it is still more comfortable shaking hands with coup leaders than recognising a place that has quietly held credible elections for decades.

‎Development Diaries reports that in January 2026, voters in Somaliland went to the polls in a presidential election that was monitored by international observers, contested by opposition parties, and concluded with results the losing candidates accepted.

‎That marked yet another peaceful transfer of power in a territory that has governed itself since breaking away from Somalia in 1991 but remains unrecognised by the African Union, African governments, and the United Nations.

‎At the same time, leaders who took power through coups in countries like Gabon and Guinea have continued to receive diplomatic engagement, attend continental meetings, and remain part of regional processes.

‎What Somaliland has built over the past three decades is not theoretical. It has a functioning government, an elected presidency. This bicameral legislature blends modern politics with traditional leadership, a judiciary, its own currency, and security institutions that have maintained relative stability in a region where fragility has been the norm.

‎It has organised multiple elections and managed transitions of power that many recognised states still struggle to achieve consistently, yet it continues to operate in a diplomatic limbo where it behaves like a state but is treated like an exception.

‎To be clear, Somaliland is not perfect, and no serious observer claims it is, as there are concerns about press freedom, opposition space, and uneven political inclusion in some regions.

‎But these are not unique shortcomings when placed alongside the records of fully recognised states across the continent. If anything, Somaliland’s imperfections look familiar, not exceptional, which makes its continued exclusion even harder to justify.

‎Despite the lack of formal recognition, Somaliland has built practical relationships with partners such as the United Arab Emirates, Taiwan, and Ethiopia, relationships that stop short of official recognition but quietly acknowledge what is already obvious on the ground, which is that Somaliland functions as a state, whether or not the paperwork agrees.

‎The problem sits squarely within the rules Africa set for itself. The Organisation of African Unity’s 1964 Cairo Declaration, now carried forward by the African Union, prioritised preserving colonial borders to prevent endless fragmentation.

‎That is a decision that made sense in the fragile years after independence but has since created a system that struggles to respond to cases like Somaliland, where the issue is not violent secession but sustained self-governance over decades.

‎What this framework has produced is an uncomfortable imbalance, where military takeovers trigger temporary suspensions but still allow pathways back into continental engagement within months, while a territory that has spent over 30 years building democratic institutions remains stuck in a waiting room with no clear criteria for entry.

‎The failure here is not just political but structural, as the African Union has developed mechanisms to respond to unconstitutional changes of government but has no equivalent system to recognise or even evaluate democratic governance outside existing borders.

‎Institutions like the Pan-African Parliament and the AU Commission on International Law have the mandate to interrogate this gap, yet the issue has largely been avoided, perhaps because addressing it would force a difficult conversation about whether Africa’s governance principles are being applied consistently.

‎For ordinary Somalilanders, travelling internationally often means relying on documents that are either issued by a government they do not recognise or are not fully accepted abroad, while access to banking, trade finance, and development funding remains limited because the global system is built around recognised states.

‎The impact is even sharper for women and vulnerable groups, as women seeking specialised medical care abroad face documentation barriers that others do not, entrepreneurs encounter obstacles in securing international contracts, and students struggle with qualification recognition, while rural communities and persons with disabilities bear the brunt of limited access to services that depend on global partnerships.

‎What makes this situation difficult to ignore is that Somaliland’s case does not threaten the continent with chaos but instead challenges it with consistency, asking whether democratic governance is genuinely the standard or simply one of many considerations that can be overlooked when it becomes inconvenient.

‎Until African institutions decide to confront that question directly, the message being sent is clear, even if it is never officially stated, that building democratic systems over time does not guarantee recognition, while seizing power by force does not permanently exclude you from engagement.

‎And in a continent that continues to preach democracy as its guiding principle, that is a credibility problem.

The Risks of Delaying Somaliland’s Parliamentary and Local Elections

0

Somaliland’s April 28, 2026 decision to extend the mandates of the House of Representatives and local councils by 27 months is not a minor administrative adjustment. It is a dangerous political signal. What was presented as a pragmatic response to instability is, in practice, a serious blow to democratic credibility.

Somaliland has spent years building its reputation on one powerful claim: that it does politics differently. It has marketed itself as more orderly, more accountable, and more democratic than the chaos that has too often defined the region. That argument now takes a hard hit. When elections are delayed this long, the language of necessity begins to sound uncomfortably like the logic of power preservation.

This is how democratic erosion works. It rarely arrives all at once. It comes through exceptions, extensions, and “temporary” delays that slowly become normal. Each postponement is defended as unavoidable, but together they create a pattern that weakens constitutional discipline and teaches leaders that deadlines are flexible when politically convenient.

The real damage is not only domestic. Somaliland’s international standing depends heavily on the image of a stable, rule-bound, and politically mature entity. A 27-month extension undermines that image. Donors, diplomats, and observers do not judge legitimacy by speeches alone; they judge it by whether leaders honor electoral commitments. Once that trust is shaken, it is difficult to restore.

If Somaliland wants to preserve its democratic claim, it must treat this extension as an emergency exception, not a governing habit. That means clear milestones, public accountability, and an unmistakable commitment to returning power to voters on a credible timetable. Otherwise, this decision will be remembered not as a necessary pause, but as the moment Somaliland began surrendering the very democratic distinction that made it stand out.

Said Mohamud Ahmed
Doctoral Candidate in Educational Leadership | Social justice and Community Organizer | Researcher.

Somaliland Guurti Approves 27-Month Term Extension for Parliament and District Councils

0

By Goth Mohamed Goth

HARGEISA – The Somaliland House of Elders (Guurti) has approved a 27-month term extension for the House of Representatives and District Councils, pushing their mandate from July 7, 2026, to October 7, 2028.

The decision, announced in a press statement on Saturday, cites ongoing regional conflicts in Sool, Sanaag, Awdal, and SSC, drought conditions, and economic fallout from instability in the Middle East as the primary reasons for the delay in holding elections.

According to the Guurti’s statement, the extension process began with a formal request from the President, conveyed via letter reference JSL/XM/GG/081/2-257/042026, dated April 18, 2026. The letter included a proposal from the National Electoral Commission and called on the upper house to address the electoral delay.

To examine the matter, the Guurti leadership appointed a 25-member committee composed of 21 parliamentarians, the House leadership, and the Secretary General. The committee met separately with the National Electoral Commission and representatives from Somaliland’s three national political parties: Kaah, Kulmiye, and Wadani.

In its ruling, the Guurti cited several legal provisions, including Articles 42 (paragraphs 1 and 3) and Article 83 of the Somaliland Constitution, as well as Article 6 (paragraph 4) of the amended General Elections Law and Voter Registration Law (Law No. 91/2023), which empower the House of Elders to evaluate and decide on term extensions.

The House determined that “circumstances causing the election delay include conflicts present in some regions of the country such as Sool, Sanaag, Awdal and SSC, and drought – as spring rains did not reach the whole country, with some areas still facing water shortages – in addition to economic difficulties caused by instability in the Middle East.”

The Guurti also noted the need to secure peace in the eastern regions and prepare them for future elections to ensure free and fair voting nationwide.

Key provisions of the term extension decision:

1. The term of the House of Representatives and District Councils, originally expiring on July 7, 2026, is extended by 27 months, ending on October 7, 2028.

2. In line with Article 19 of the constitution, the term of the House of Elders shall end one year after that of the lower house – setting the Guurti’s new term expiry on October 7, 2029.

The decision was passed by a show of hands, with 72 members voting in favor, no opposing votes, and no abstentions. The Chairman did not vote, following custom. The quorum was recorded as 73 members.

The statement was signed by:

· Sulaiman Mahmoud Aden – Chairman of the House of Elders

· Abdinasir Aden Beegsi – Secretary of the House of Elders

Inside Somaliland’s 27-Month Election Delay: Leaks, Contradictions, and a Decision That’s Raising Red Flags

0

‎Hargeisa, 28 April, 2026 — Somaliland’s House of Elders (Guurti) has today approved a 27-month extension to the country’s upcoming local council and parliamentary elections, a decision that has sparked political debate and public concern.

‎The decision to extend key elections by 27 months is now facing intense scrutiny, as emerging details and insider accounts suggest the move may have been driven by political calculations rather than purely technical necessity.

‎Officially, the delay follows a recommendation from the National Electoral Commission, which advised a 10-month postponement due to logistical and operational constraints. That recommendation was formally transmitted by the President to the Guurti, the upper house constitutionally mandated to approve such extensions.

‎But multiple sources familiar with internal discussions, speaking on condition of anonymity, describe a process that diverged sharply from the official narrative.

‎According to these accounts, early deliberations within political circles centered around a shorter delay broadly aligned with the Electoral Commission’s recommendation. However, the final 27-month extension reportedly emerged after closed-door consultations that have yet to be publicly explained.

‎“The shift was sudden and not rooted in the technical brief,” said one source with knowledge of the discussions. “What was presented as a logistical issue became something else entirely.”

‎No official minutes or detailed justification have been released to clarify how or why the extension expanded from 10 months to more than two years.

‎The timing has only deepened suspicion.

‎The President, who is constitutionally required to transmit but not dictate the Guurti’s decision, departed the country on an official trip just days before the extension was finalized. While there is no direct evidence linking his absence to the outcome, several observers question whether the political environment during that period allowed for a decision that might have faced greater resistance otherwise.

‎Compounding the controversy are the President’s own past statements. While in opposition, he had repeatedly pledged that no election under his leadership would be delayed. That position now stands in stark contrast to the current outcome, prompting accusations of political inconsistency—or worse.

‎For many analysts, the key issue is not merely the delay itself, but the lack of transparency surrounding it.

‎“If this were purely technical, the numbers would align,” said one governance expert. “A 10-month problem does not produce a 27-month solution without political input.”

‎Somaliland is no stranger to election delays. But this instance is unfolding under unprecedented international attention. Following Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as an independent state on December 25, 2025, the country has found itself under a sharper global spotlight.

‎That recognition has elevated expectations around governance, accountability, and democratic practice. Decisions that might once have been absorbed into domestic political rhythms are now being examined as indicators of institutional credibility.

‎Diplomatic observers warn that prolonged, unexplained extensions could complicate Somaliland’s efforts to build broader international support.

‎“Recognition brings scrutiny,” said one regional analyst. “The question is no longer just whether Somaliland is stable, but whether it is predictably democratic.”

‎The Decision Of The Guurti
‎The Decision Of The Guurti Somalilands Upper House Of The Parliament

‎Meanwhile, opposition figures and civil society organizations are demanding answers: Why was the Electoral Commission’s technical advice overridden? What criteria justified a 27-month delay? And who ultimately shaped the outcome?

‎So far, those questions remain largely unanswered.

‎Supporters of the extension argue that a longer timeline ensures better preparation and avoids rushed elections that could undermine legitimacy. But critics counter that without transparency, such arguments risk sounding like justification after the fact.

‎As pressure mounts, the 27-month extension is becoming more than a scheduling decision—it is a test case for Somaliland’s political system.

‎At its core lies a fundamental question: was this a necessary adjustment to electoral realities, or a carefully engineered extension of political time?

‎Until clearer answers emerge, the gap between those two possibilities continues to fuel doubt, speculation, and a growing demand for accountability.

‎Source: Somalilandpost

‎https://somalilandpost.news/inside-somalilands-27-month-election-delay-leaks-contradictions-and-a-decision-thats-raising-red-flags/

The Gathering Storm: How Al-Shabaab’s Infiltration of Sanaag Threatens to Unravel Somaliland’s Hard-Won Peace ‎

By Jama Ayaanle Feyte

‎For over three decades, while much of Somalia grappled with insurgency and state collapse, the Republic of Somaliland forged a different path—one defined by peace, co-existence, and homegrown infrastructure development. But today, forces actively working against that government are attempting to dismantle this legacy from within. Quietly and methodically, extremist elements have been infiltrating the population, laying the groundwork for a rebellion that threatens to drag the Sanaag region into chaos.

‎This covert infiltration is no longer a matter of speculation. In a recently circulated propaganda video, the notorious Al-Shabaab Jihadist commander Abdi Madoobe was shown presiding over the graduation of several hundred militiamen under his command. His proclamation was unequivocal: an attack on Erigavo, the regional capital of Sanaag, is imminent. The imagery of a Jihadist group leader openly drilling forces within striking distance of a major city represents a direct and unprecedented erosion of Somaliland’s long-standing security shield.

‎Imminent Threat to National Celebrations

‎The danger has now been sharpened by a chillingly specific threat. Intelligence reports indicate that the Abdi Madoobe group is actively planning to launch terrorist attacks in Somaliland during the 18 May celebrations. This date marks the most sacred moment on the national calendar—the anniversary of Somaliland’s reclaiming of its sovereignty. Targeting these celebrations is a calculated psychological warfare tactic designed to achieve maximum symbolic damage. The 18 May events draw large gatherings of civilians, government officials, and security personnel, presenting a high-value target for militants seeking mass casualties.

‎An attack on this date would be more than bloodshed; it would be a deliberate assault on Somaliland’s national identity. The militants seek to prove that the state cannot protect its citizens on its most cherished day, thereby shattering public confidence, humiliating the government, and projecting an image of jihadist reach far beyond the Sanaag region. If successful, such an attack would break Somaliland’s unblemished record of preventing major terrorist operations on its soil since the 2008 Hargeisa bombing, signalling to the world that the security paradigm has fundamentally shifted in the jihadists’ favour.

‎The Danger of a Permanent Foothold

‎The risks of allowing these sleeper cells to cement a foothold in the otherwise peaceful Sanaag region are manifold and catastrophic. The chief beneficiaries of any prolonged conflict will undoubtedly be Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS). These groups specialize in thriving within power vacuums. Should the current provocations spiral into sustained fighting, it will compromise not only Somaliland’s hard-earned stability but will also send destructive shockwaves across the broader region.

‎The first and most immediate danger is the systematic subversion of Somaliland’s greatest asset: its customary dispute resolution mechanisms. Historically, the region has succeeded in abating conflict through traditional dialogue where military force has failed. However, this social fabric is fragile. There is a critical, closing window for all parties to step back from the brink. If they fail to do so, groups like Al-Shabaab will fully subvert these de-confliction efforts, replacing dialogue with the permanent violence of the gun.

‎The Amniyat Playbook: Exploiting Clan Rivalries

‎We do not need to guess what Al-Shabaab’s strategy in Sanaag will look like; they have perfected it elsewhere. Al-Shabaab’s intelligence wing, the Amniyat, has for years expertly assessed and exploited clan rivalries for its benefit. Puntland has already seen how the group can weaponize local grievances. By embedding themselves as political and economic tools within clan dynamics, jihadist operatives corrode trust from the inside. To Al-Shabaab, conflict is not just ideology; it is a business model. The organization operates like a deeply corrupt corporation, enmeshed in political and economic ecosystems to fund itself and enrich its elite. In Somalia, businessmen and political elites have often knowingly—or unknowingly—utilized these fighters to pursue narrow agendas. If this predatory model takes root in Sanaag, Al-Shabaab will become inextricably linked to local trade and governance, making it almost impossible to surgically remove without destroying the regional economy.

‎A Security Apparatus at a Disadvantage

‎This infiltration occurs against the backdrop of a stark financial disparity. Somaliland’s security and intelligence services, which have historically been community-centric and remarkably effective, are operating on a budget that is a mere rounding error compared to the resources flowing into the broader Somalia. Since the last major suicide bombing in Hargeisa in 2008, Somaliland’s forces have kept the terror group at bay largely through a community-centric approach born out of both proven strategy and sheer necessity. These intelligence gatherers rely on the goodwill of a peaceful population.

‎But this model can only function when public trust is intact. As sleeper cells and extremist ideologues poison community relations, the eyes and ears of the security services go blind. When Al-Shabaab marches openly and threatens towns like Erigavo, it signals a shift from covert intelligence gathering to overt military ambition. If left unchecked, Commander Abdi Madoobe’s mobilization will transform the calm of Sanaag into a decentralized battlefield where both Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State in Somalia compete for dominance.

‎The time to act is before the customary mechanisms break down entirely. Once the shooting starts between rival groups manipulated by Amniyat operatives, the only victors will be the jihadists waiting in the shadows, ready to harvest the chaos. For Somaliland, the battle for Erigavo is more than a territorial skirmish; it is a fight to preserve the very philosophy of peace that has defined the region against an enemy that sees stability as a threat to be destroyed.

‎Jama Ayaanle Feyte is a Somaliland Born Journalist , and Horn of Africa political and Security Analyst

Source: Pan African Viisions

 

 

 

FORMAL STATEMENT: THE OBLIGATION OF MAINTAINING DEMOCRACY IN SOMALILAND”-SAG Group

0

Somaliland Strategic Advisory Group

FORMAL STATEMENT: THE OBLIGATION OF MAINTAINING DEMOCRACY IN SOMALILAND”

TO: The Guurti House of the Republic of Somaliland
FROM: Somaliland Strategic Advisory Group (SL-SAG)
SUBJECT: Urgent Recommendation: Adhering to the Election Timeline Set by the NEC

INTRODUCTION

The Somaliland Strategic Advisory Group (SL-SAG) submits this recommendation to the Guurti House, considering their constitutional role in maintaining the nation’s peace and stability. Today, we stand at a historic moment that will determine the democratic destiny of Somaliland.

The National Electoral Commission (NEC) has clearly confirmed that elections can be held within just 10 months. Therefore, SL-SAG calls upon the Guurti House to avoid any extension beyond that technical period. A two-year extension without technical justification endangers the very existence and reputation of our statehood.

  1. The Freedom House Rating: Protecting the Greatest Asset of Statehood

Our democratic reputation is the most precious asset we present to the world. The international organization Freedom House consistently ranks Somaliland 3rd in East Africa in terms of freedom and democracy.

This high rank did not come easily; it was achieved through “much sacrifice” over 33 years. If an unnecessary extension is made, we risk losing that international status, appearing like countries where leaders cling to power. This would genuinely damage the reputation we have long built and undermine our case for international recognition.

  1. The World’s Eyes Are Upon Us

We must realize that international eyes are fixed on us today. Global partners and investors are closely monitoring how we manage our democracy.

· Unjustified Extension: When the NEC states that elections can be held in 10 months, any extension beyond that will be seen merely as political maneuvering and manipulation.
· Reputational Damage: Extending or overlapping the democratic process while the world watches will truly harm the reputation we have built over a long period.

  1. Conclusion and Recommendation

SL-SAG views the current situation as both a challenge and an opportunity. Despite existing obstacles, the transparency, legality, and strategic importance of Somaliland stand out strongly on international platforms.

We strongly recommend that the Guurti House align its decision with the NEC’s technical schedule, limiting any extension to the 10 months required for voting preparations. Let us uphold the law and give the people the opportunity to cast their votes at the appropriate time.

And with God’s guidance lies success.

Media Contact:
Somaliland Strategic Advisory Group (SL-SAG)
Washington, D.C

Click the link Below to Read the Somali Version

Somaliland Strategic Advisory Group

 

Several Arrested in Badhan as Family of U.S. Airstrike Victim Protests Puntland Presidential Visit

0

By Jama Ayaanle Feyte

Badhan, Puntland – Security forces in Puntland arrested several civilians on Saturday during a protest against a planned visit by regional President Said Abdullahi Deni, authorities confirmed. The demonstration occurred ahead of the president’s expected arrival in the area in the coming days, triggering the amassing of Puntland troops in the area amid a heightened security response.

Eyewitnesses told local media the protest was organized by residents and the family of Caqil Omar Abdulahi, a traditional elder killed in a U.S. airstrike in the El Buh region. The United States has officially claimed responsibility for the strike, describing it as part of ongoing counter-terrorism operations.

However, relatives of the deceased firmly reject that narrative. They describe the late Caqil Abdulahi as a respected clan leader and traditional elder, and are demanding answers, justice, and possible compensation for what they call the unlawful killing of a civilian.

Presidential Visit Turns Tense

The protest coincided with President Deni’s presence in the broader region. Although his exact location was not disclosed for security reasons, sources close to the regional government confirmed the president is on an official tour.

Security forces moved quickly to disperse the gathering. Several family members and supporters were taken into custody to prevent any disruption or potential escalation. It remains unclear whether those arrested have been formally charged or released.

Background on the El Buh Airstrike

El Buh is a rural area in the Bari region of northeastern Somalia. The United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) has conducted multiple airstrikes in Somalia, often targeting Al-Shabaab or ISIS-Somalia affiliates. Following such strikes, AFRICOM typically states that it conducts “precision strikes” and takes all feasible precautions to avoid civilian casualties.

Nevertheless, this is not the first time local families have accused the U.S. military of killing non-combatants. The case of Caqil Omar Abdulahi has now become the latest flashpoint in the ongoing debate over foreign military intervention in the Horn of Africa.

Reactions and Next Steps

Puntland authorities have not yet issued an official statement regarding the arrests. Security analysts suggest the government faces a difficult balancing act: maintaining a close security partnership with the United States while addressing legitimate grievances from local clans.

Family members of the arrested protesters have called for their immediate release, insisting that peaceful protest is a fundamental right. Meanwhile, the family of Caqil Omar Abdulahi continues to demand an independent investigation into the airstrike that killed their elder.

This is a developing story. More details are expected as local journalists gain access to the arrested individuals and as Puntland officials respond to growing public pressure.