Milxo is a tiny mining settlement in a remote and contested region of north-eastern Somalia that, over the past decade, has become the site of one of Africa’s least-known gold booms. What was little more than a cluster of structures housing a few hundred people in 2016 has expanded into a sprawling settlement of an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 residents, drawing prospectors from across Somalia and from abroad, including Sudan, Yemen, Tanzania and Ethiopia. This rapid growth has brought new livelihoods to a neglected region, but it has unfolded in a legal and political vacuum marked by contested sovereignty, weak governance and insecurity.
Milxo lies in a region claimed at various times by Puntland, Somaliland and the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), and more recently by the SSC-Khatumo administration, which received formal recognition from the FGS in 2023. No authority exercises effective control over the area. Local miners describe Milxo as a ‘free zone’ in which no authority regulates extraction, issues licences or enforces taxation. As a result, gold mining has developed without a codified legal framework, with Puntland lacking a functioning extractives regime and the FGS maintaining that mining activity in Milxo is illegal under federal law.
Within this vacuum, a fragmented and unregulated mining economy has emerged. Field research documented 20 mining sites operated by at least 18 commercial entities, many employing foreign technical workers and using rudimentary and hazardous extraction methods, including widespread mercury use and cyanide leaching plants. Very few of these operators appear to hold licences from Puntland authorities, and Puntland has no binding mining law in force. The only identifiable state revenue from the gold trade is a nominal customs levy collected at Bosaso airport, representing a fraction of potential income and often absent from official accounts.
The absence of regulation has created conditions conducive to elite capture and armed-group exploitation. Evidence collected by the GI-TOC indicates that at least one major operator is linked to Puntland’s president. Al-Shabaab, which maintains a presence in the nearby Golis Mountains, has repeatedly attempted to tax or infiltrate mining operations. While the extent of revenue derived from gold is contested, phone records and eyewitness accounts indicate ongoing extortion activity, often framed as zakat.
Milxo’s gold enters the global supply chain with minimal scrutiny. Almost all exports flow to Dubai, typically carried by couriers on commercial flights. Reported imports of Somali gold into the United Arab Emirates have nearly doubled since 2017, rising from 2.8 tonnes to more than five tonnes in 2023. Despite recent regulatory changes, enforcement appears uneven, and couriers report that documentation on origin or compliance is rarely requested.
This report traces the evolution of the Milxo gold rush, documents mining practices, maps supply chains from mine to market, and examines how unregulated extraction intersects with elite networks, armed groups and Somalia’s incomplete federal system. It provides the first comprehensive assessment of how an ungoverned goldfield in northern Somalia has become embedded in the global gold market.
Berbera – It was a great honor for me to inaugurate the WADDANI Party Headquarters in the Sahil region and the city of Berbera. I extend my deepest gratitude to everyone who contributed their effort and dedication to prepare this headquarters, for which the regional and district leadership are responsible.
This headquarters is part of our ongoing initiative to reorganize and modernize the offices of the ruling WADDANI Party. This transformation will ensure the party stands firmly on its own feet, truly owns and serves the nation and its people, and secures the successes it is known for—just as it historically has by winning the public’s mandate and forming the government.
To the loyal supporters of WADDANI, the people who steadfastly align with the party, contribute daily to its cause, and ultimately bring us victory: I am profoundly grateful. I say to you: thank you very much. We have specially furnished this spacious office, and we particularly entrust its care and activity to the people of Sahil.
This article contends that the emergence of today’s Somaliland National Army — and, by extension, Somaliland’s very survival as a political order — cannot be explained solely by institutional design or peace negotiations. Rather, Somaliland’s transition from armed pluralism to statehood hinged on a single foundational act: the voluntary, first-mover disarmament of the Arab (Arap) clan under Sultan Mohamed Sultan Farah in early 1994. Through a close reading of the disarmament process and eyewitness quotations, this study shows how Sultan Farah’s moral authority transformed fear into trust, enabled the surrender of weapons without coercion, and made possible the consolidation of a national military force. Without this intervention, the logic of mutual fear would likely have persisted indefinitely, precluding the formation of today’s Somaliland National Army and, with it, Somaliland’s survival as a functioning polity.
Introduction
On 2 February 1994, what would become the Somaliland National Army Day unfolded at Hargeisa Stadium not as a mere ceremony but as a defining political act. Militia units from the Somali National Movement (SNM) — including the distinguished Sancaani Brigade — handed over weapons to the nascent government. This moment marked the beginning of the transition from clan-controlled arms to a unified national military. Yet this transfer did not occur through coercion or external guarantees. It occurred because one leader chose to act where others hesitated.
This article argues that without Sultan Mohamed Sultan Farah of the Arab (Arap) clan, Somaliland would not exist today in anything resembling its current form. His decision to initiate disarmament reshaped the political landscape, making possible a national army and the sovereign authority it supports.
Post-Liberation Security Dilemma: Independence without Control
After the fall of the Somali Republic in 1991, Somaliland declared independence and emerged from war with fragile unity but deep insecurity. Weapons remained distributed widely among clan-based militias. Every community recognized that peace required disarmament, but no group was willing to move first. The logic was simple and brutal: disarm first, and risk annihilation.
The newly elected government under President Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal had moral authority but no monopoly on force. There was no army to command, no police to enforce order, and no external peacekeeper to guarantee security. Disarmament was repeatedly acknowledged as necessary, yet not a single clan was willing to take the first step.
In this context, fear ruled. Political speeches, religious appeals, and consensus statements repeatedly concluded with the same outcome: “not yet.”
Sultan Mohamed Sultan Farah and the First-Mover Problem
Sultan Mohamed Sultan Farah’s authority was rooted in lineage, mediation, and longstanding respect across Somaliland. As the overall Sultan of the Arab (Arap) clan and an early supporter of the Somali National Movement, his influence transcended ordinary customary authority. Where political leaders were constrained by institutional weakness, he possessed the moral capital to act first.
At a key Borama meeting in January 1994 — convened to address disarmament — discussions stalled once again. Elders and commanders acknowledged the necessity of disarmament, but each insisted that others should go first.
It was in this atmosphere that Sultan Farah spoke:
“A nation cannot be built on fear. A people cannot be governed by guns. Let us remove the steel from our hands so that trust may return to our hearts.”
This statement did not demand obedience; it invited courage. As recounted by Haji Cabdi Waraabe, Sultan Farah followed it with an unprecedented pledge:
“The Arap clan will disarm first.”
For a brief moment, the room was stunned. No clan had ever declared such a willingness to take the first step. Sultan Farah was not asking for assurances, nor promising guarantees from others. He was offering trust without conditions — a radical inversion of the logic that had paralyzed Somaliland since the war’s end.
Disarmament as a Moral and Political Act
Sultan Farah’s words mattered not simply because they were eloquent, but because they were credible. He did not rush to command; he spoke after years of service, mediation, and demonstrated commitment to collective survival. His moral authority was the resource that allowed him to transform fear into a political possibility.
Returning to Baligubadle, Sultan Farah convened a grand clan assembly — inclusive of elders, former fighters, youth, and religious leaders — to explain the proposal and secure genuine consent. Speaking plainly about the stakes, he addressed the central fear:
“We will disarm not because we are weak, but because we are strong enough to trust ourselves.”
When his people raised practical fears — “Other clans will attack us,” “We will be defenseless,” “This is a trap” — he did not dismiss them. Instead, he offered a moral boundary around violence:
“If anyone attacks you, they must face me first. And if they attack our clan, we will take their weapons as our only response.”
This was neither a threat of revenge nor a promise of dominance. It was an assurance that strength would be used to end violence, not perpetuate it. In that moment, the psychology of fear began to shift. Disarmament became an act of honor rather than vulnerability.
2 February 1994: From Clan Arms to a National Army
On 2 February 1994, the formal disarmament ceremony at Hargeisa Stadium became the birth event of the Somaliland National Army. The Sancaani Brigade — among the SNM’s most experienced units — voluntarily handed over weapons, including rifles and artillery, to the government. This was more than a procedural transfer; it was a public affirmation that the state, not clans, would henceforth hold legitimate force.
At the event, Sultan Farah declared:
“Our clan will be the first to disarm. Whether medals are awarded or certificates are given, we will lead the way.”
The stadium responded with celebration, and President Egal honored Sultan Farah and the Arab (Arap) clan with medals, recognizing the courage and precedent set by their decision.
President Egal later reflected:
“Sultan Mohamed built the nation with one act of courage. He gave Somaliland its future.”
This was not mere rhetoric. It was a recognition that the army was born the day weapons were surrendered without coercion, and that surrender was made possible by Sultan Farah’s moral decision.
From One Act to National Transformation
The Arab (Arap) clan’s disarmament triggered a cascade effect. Other clans followed, not because they were compelled, but because the meaning of honor and legitimacy had shifted. Disarmament became a symbol of moral strength, not weakness. Weapons ceased to be primary sources of security; trust and shared commitment became the currency of peace.
Within months, the majority of SNM fighters had demobilized, heavy weapons were surrendered, illegal checkpoints disappeared, and roads reopened. As armed authority consolidated, conversations shifted from survival to organization: policing, coordination, civilian authority.
The Somaliland National Army did not emerge simply as an institution; it emerged as a social contract grounded in voluntary restraint.
Conclusion
The existence of today’s Somaliland National Army — and the relative peace and stability that characterize Somaliland — rests on a pivotal causal sequence driven by one leader’s decision. Sultan Mohamed Sultan Farah’s willingness to absorb risk and place his own people at the forefront of disarmament transformed a deadlocked society into a state capable of governing itself.
Somaliland was not made solely through declarations or conferences. It was made in 1994, when one leader chose to lower arms first and ask others to follow — invoking trust where there was fear, and imagining a nation where there was fragmentation.
On this 32nd anniversary of Somaliland National Army Day, that foundational act remains the moral and political bedrock of Somaliland’s development and progress.
Without Sultan Mohamed Sultan Farah’s courage, there would be no Somaliland National Army. Without that army, there would be no Somaliland today.
Gulaid Yusuf Idaan
Independent Researcher
Specialist in Conflict Resolution, Disarmament, and Horn of Africa Politics
Hargeisa, Somalia — The Central Bank of Somaliland has successfully concluded a three-day intensive training program in Islamic banking and economics for its management and staff, as part of its broader push to strengthen financial sector capabilities.
Organized in collaboration with the Al-Huda Islamic Banking and Economics Organization, the program was designed to deepen the bank’s expertise in Islamic financial services. It covered nine modules—two delivered remotely—and was led by senior specialists with extensive experience in the field.
Participants examined international best practices in Islamic banking and discussed how to tailor such frameworks to Somaliland’s economic landscape. Senior officials who attended hailed the training as “highly beneficial” and pledged to integrate the new knowledge directly into their day-to-day roles.
“This training is not a one-off event, but part of our continuous effort to build a strong, capable institution,” stated Central Bank Governor Abdinasir Ahmed Hersi during the closing ceremony. He emphasized that developing local expertise is central to advancing Somaliland’s financial markets and service quality.
Deputy Governor Hamse Abdiraman Khayre echoed this commitment, stressing that the lessons learned must translate into practical application across the bank’s operations. “Knowledge should not remain theoretical—it must be implemented to achieve real progress,” he said.
At the end of the training, certificates were awarded to all participants, including managers, directors, and support staff. The initiative reflects the bank’s long-term strategy to strengthen governance, enhance service delivery, and support the development of a robust Islamic finance sector in Somaliland.
Dubai, UAE – His Excellency President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Cirro) of the Republic of Somaliland has commenced a high-level working visit to the United Arab Emirates, leading a ministerial delegation. The visit is anchored by the President’s participation as a distinguished guest at the annual World Governments Summit in Dubai, a premier global forum for shaping future governance.
This strategic diplomatic mission positions Somaliland directly among the world’s nations, offering a platform to share its unique narrative with an audience of over 130 governments, international organizations, and thought leaders. President Abdullahi’s presence at this influential gathering is a significant marker of Somaliland’s evolving international profile.
During a plenary session, President Abdullahi will present Somaliland’s distinctive story—a three-decade journey of grassroots state-building, democratic consolidation, and economic self-reliance. His address, titled “From Post-Conflict to Progressive Governance: The Somaliland Model,” will detail the nation’s homegrown frameworks for maintaining peace, conducting successive democratic elections, and fostering development, positioning it as a critical anchor of stability in the Horn of Africa.
Parallel to the summit agenda, the President and his delegation will engage in a series of targeted bilateral meetings. These discussions aim to translate diplomatic recognition into tangible partnerships, with a focus on:
· Economic & Developmental Cooperation: Attracting investment in key sectors such as infrastructure, renewable energy, and port logistics.
· Trade & Connectivity: Expanding market access and strengthening Somaliland’s role as a regional trade hub.
· Security Collaboration: Deepening dialogue on shared regional security interests and capacity-building.
· Multilateral Engagement: Advancing Somaliland’s interests on the global stage.
Somaliland’s formal participation in the World Governments Summit represents more than diplomatic outreach; it is a powerful affirmation of its institutional maturity and the international community’s growing confidence in its governance. This visit represents a proactive step toward securing the partnerships necessary for the nation’s next chapter of growth and international engagement.
The formalization of mutual recognition between the Republic of Somaliland and the State of Israel on December 26, 2025, constitutes one of the most significant shifts in the diplomatic architecture of the Horn of Africa and the broader Red Sea basin since the end of the colonial era.
This development does not merely represent a bilateral diplomatic success for two traditionally isolated actors but serves as a profound challenge to the established international legal order, which has long prioritized the principle of territorial integrity over the de facto realities of statehood in the Somali peninsula.
The act of recognition, signed in a joint declaration by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, and the Republic of Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, invokes the “spirit of the Abraham Accords” to justify a departure from the “One Somalia” policy that has guided international relations in the region for over three decades.
To fully understand the legal and political ramifications of this watershed event, it is necessary to conduct a rigorous examination of the underlying legal principles, the historical precedents of the Republic of Somaliland’s sovereignty, the strategic imperatives of the Israeli state, and the critical findings of the 2005 African Union Fact-Finding Mission, which remains the most authoritative multilateral assessment of Somaliland’s claim to statehood.
📍Theoretical Foundations of Statehood and Recognition
The legal discourse surrounding the Republic of Somaliland’s status is anchored in several core concepts of international law. The tension between the recognition of the Republic of Somaliland and the sovereignty of the Failed Tribal Federal Republic of Somalia is essentially a conflict between competing interpretations of these foundational terms.
📍The Montevideo Criteria for Statehood
🗂 The primary legal standard for determining statehood in the modern era is the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. Article 1 of this convention outlines four objective criteria that an entity must satisfy to be considered a state: a permanent population, a defined territory, an effective government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.
“In the case of the Republic of Somaliland, its legal proponents argue that the republic has satisfied these criteria more effectively than many recognized UN member states for over thirty years”
The Republic of Somaliland maintains a permanent population of approximately 3.5 to 4.5 million people. Its territory is clearly defined by the borders of the former British Somaliland Protectorate, established by international treaties in the late 19th century, the government in Hargeisa exercises exclusive and effective control over the majority of this territory, maintaining a standing army, a national currency, and a democratic system characterized by the peaceful transfer of power, most recently demonstrated in the November 2024 presidential elections.
✳️ Finally, its capacity to enter into relations has been proven through high-stakes agreements with foreign entities, including the DP World port deal, the 2024 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Ethiopia, and the 2025 mutual recognition with Israel.
📍Declaratory vs. Constitutive Theories of Recognition
The debate over the legal effect of Israel’s recognition hinges on two competing theories, the Declaratory Theory, which is favored by the majority of modern legal scholars and reflected in Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention, posits that statehood is a question of fact. If an entity meets the objective criteria, it is a state under international law, and recognition by other states is merely an acknowledgment of that existing reality. Under this theory, the Republic of Somaliland has been a state since 1991, and Israel’s 2025 act simply formalizes a legal truth that the international community had previously chosen to ignore for political reasons.
🔆 Conversely, the Constitutive Theory suggests that an entity only becomes a state through the act of recognition by other states. Proponents of this view, including the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the African Union (AU), argue that without widespread recognition, the Republic of Somaliland remains a sub-state entity or a secessionist province, regardless of its internal stability or effective governance. The 2025 recognition by Israel is seen by these actors as an illegal attempt to “constitute” a state from territory that is de jure part of Somalia.
Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity
Sovereignty refers to the supreme authority of a state to govern its territory and population without external interference. In the context of this dispute, Somalia asserts its sovereignty over the entire territory of the former Somali Republic, including the Republic of Somaliland, based on the principle of territorial integrity enshrined in Article 2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter. This principle prohibits states from using force or taking actions that undermine the unity and territorial boundaries of a recognized member state.
The Republic of Somaliland, however, argues that its sovereignty was never legally extinguished by the 1960 union and was successfully reclaimed in 1991 following the collapse of the central Somali state and the commission of genocidal acts against northern populations. From Hargeisa’s perspective, territorial integrity cannot be invoked by a “parent state” that has failed to protect its citizens and has lacked effective control over the territory in question for decades.
Uti Possidetis Juris and the African Border Policy
The principle of uti possidetis juris (as you possess under law) mandates that newly independent states should retain the internal administrative borders or colonial boundaries that existed prior to their independence. This doctrine was adopted by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the 1964 Cairo Resolution to prevent a “Pandora’s box” of secessionist movements that could destabilize the continent.
The Failed Tribal Federal Government of Somalia utilizes this principle to argue that the only legitimate borders are those of the 1960 Somali Republic. However, the Republic of Somaliland presents a counter-interpretation:-
🔹️It argues that its claim upholds uti possidetis juris because it seeks recognition within the exact colonial borders of the British Somaliland Protectorate as they existed upon its independence on June 26, 1960. By reverting to its 1960 borders.
🔹️The Republic of Somaliland asserts it is not creating new borders but respecting the original ones, a distinction noted by the AU’s own experts in 2005.
Entity acting as a state without full de jure status.
• The Republic of Somaliland’s Application:-
Fulfilled since 1991 through effective governance.
Israel’s 2025 act is a validation of legal fact.
Reclaimed after the dissolution of a failed union.
Reversion to 26 June 1960 British borders.
Transitional status held from 1991 to 2025.
• Somalia’s Application:-
Unfulfilled; Somaliland is a regional administration.
Israel’s 2025 act is an illegal breach of sovereignty.
Continuous and indivisible since 1960.
Maintenance of 1 July 1960 Republic borders.
An illegal entity occupying Somali territory.
Historical Legal Architecture of the Republic of Somaliland’s Independence
To analyze the 2025 recognition, one must first deconstruct the legal history of the Somali union and its subsequent dissolution, the Republic of Somaliland’s claim is unique because it is rooted in state succession and the restoration of a prior status, rather than a simple act of secession.
The British Protectorate and the State of the Republic of Somaliland (1960)
Unlike the Trust Territory of Somalia (former Italian Somaliland), which was a UN trust territory, the Republic of Somaliland was a British Protectorate. Its legal relationship with the United Kingdom was defined by 83 treaties signed between 1884 and 1894 between the British Crown and the traditional elders of the northern clans. These treaties established Somaliland as a separate international legal entity.
On June 26, 1960, the British Somaliland Protectorate became the “State of Somaliland,” an independent sovereign nation. In its five days of independence, it was recognized by over 30 countries, including the United States, and received formal messages of congratulations from the United Nations.
This brief period of independence is a critical legal anchor; it proves that Somaliland once existed as a recognized state within the international system, separate from the southern territory.
The “Defective” Union of July 1, 1960
The merger of the State of Somaliland and the Trust Territory of Somalia on July 1, 1960, was intended to form the Somali Republic. However, legal analysis of the “Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law” reveals a critical procedural failure. The act of union was never formally ratified as a bilateral treaty. The northern legislature passed its version of the law, but the southern legislature failed to pass an identical instrument. Consequently, a unified legal document signed by both parties never existed.
⚖️ This legal “defect” was compounded in 1961 when a constitutional referendum was held. While the constitution passed in the south, it was rejected by a majority of voters in the north, who felt marginalized by the new central government in Mogadishu. A 1961 court case in Hargeisa further solidified this legal ambiguity. When a group of British-trained northern military officers launched a coup to restore the Republic of Somaliland’s independence, a British judge acquitted them, ruling that in the absence of a ratified act of union, the officers could not be guilty of treason against a state (the Somali Republic) that had no valid legal authority over their territory.
🔹️The 1991 Restoration of Sovereignty
The collapse of the Somali Republic in 1991 followed a decade of civil war and a systematic campaign of state-sponsored violence against the Isaaq clan in the north. This campaign, which included the aerial bombardment of Hargeisa and the mass execution of civilians, created what legal scholars term a “remedial right to self-determination”.
At the Burao Conference in May 1991, the Republic of Somaliland’s traditional leaders and the Somali National Movement (SNM) did not declare a new independence but rather “withdrew” from the failed union of 1960. Legally, they asserted the right of state succession: the union was a voluntary association that had been breached and dissolved, allowing the Republic of Somaliland to resume its prior sovereign status.
Under the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, a state emerging from a dissolved union has the right to resume its original sovereignty.
The 2005 African Union Fact-Finding Mission: An Exhaustive Analysis
The mutual recognition by Israel in 2025 brings renewed attention to the findings of the African Union Fact-Finding Mission, which visited the Republic of Somaliland from April 30 to May 4, 2005. Led by Patrick Mazimhaka, the Deputy Chairperson of the AU Commission, the mission’s report remains the most significant challenge to the AU’s own policy of non-recognition.
Mandate and Methodology of the Mission
The mission was dispatched by AU Commission Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konare following successive visits by the Republic of Somaliland leadership to Addis Ababa in 2003 and 2004.
Its objective was to assess the political, security, socio-economic, and humanitarian situation on the ground and to hear the Republic of Somaliland’s case for statehood.
The mission conducted wide-ranging consultations in Hargeisa, Berbera, Sheikh, Burao, and Borama, meeting with government officials, opposition leaders, civil society, and traditional elders.
Detailed Findings on Governance and Stability
The mission’s report was startlingly positive, concluding that the Republic of Somaliland had successfully laid the foundations of a “modern state”. It highlighted several key factors:-
1️⃣. Democratic Consolidation: The AU noted the functional co-habitation of traditional governance (the House of Elders or Guurti “Golaha Guurtidda JSL”) and modern elected representatives. It praised the 2003 referendum and the subsequent democratic processes as “internally driven” and “home-grown”.
2️⃣. Security and Disarmament: Unlike southern Somalia, which was mired in warlordism, the Republic of Somaliland had successfully executed a total disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) process without external military intervention.
3️⃣. Territorial Control: The mission witnessed an effective government with a clear mandate to defend its “territorial integrity” based on the 1960 colonial borders.
Clarification on the Legal Argument of “Reclaimed Independence”
One of the most critical aspects of the AU report is its support for the distinction between secession and the dissolution of a union. The report explicitly states that the union between the Republic of Somaliland and Somalia “was never ratified” and “malfunctioned” during its thirty-year existence. By acknowledging the 1960 independence of the Republic of Somaliland as a historical and legal fact, the AU mission provided a roadmap for recognition that sidesteps the “Pandora’s box” of illegal secession.
The report argues that the Republic of Somaliland’s case is “historically unique” because it involves a former independent state reclaiming its status after the failure of a voluntary merger.
The “Pariah Status” and Humanitarian Concerns
The mission observed that the lack of international recognition has made the Republic of Somaliland a “pariah region” by default. This status “ties the hands” of local authorities, preventing them from accessing international financial institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), which are essential for reconstruction and the mitigation of the humanitarian legacy of the civil war (including landmines and mass graves). The mission recommended that the AU find a “special method” of dealing with this case, judging it from an “objective historical viewpoint and a moral angle”.
• AU Mission Category:-
State Building.
Borders.
Union Status.
Stability.
Recommendation.
• Key Findings in 2005 Report:-
Foundations of a “modern state” established through home-grown processes.
Respect for 1960 colonial borders inherited from Britain.
The 1960 union was never formally ratified and failed in practice.
Internally driven peace, security, and democratic transitions.
Use a “special method” to recognize Somaliland’s “unique” case.
• Legal and Political Implications:-
Validates “effective government” criterion of Montevideo.
Aligns with uti possidetis juris; avoids secessionist precedent.
Supports the “dissolution of union” vs. “secession” argument.
Demonstrates Somaliland’s capacity as a reliable international partner.
Suggests AU policy should evolve beyond rigid territorial integrity.
Israel’s Recognition: A New Strategic and Legal Paradigm (December 2025)
The December 26, 2025, announcement that Israel would become the first UN member state to formally recognize the Republic of Somaliland marked the end of Hargeisa’s three-decade diplomatic isolation. This move was not merely a symbolic gesture but a calculated strategic act with immediate legal consequences.
The Joint Declaration and Bilateral Framework
The recognition was formalized through a “Joint Declaration of Mutual Recognition” signed during a videoconference between The Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu – בנימין נתניהו and President Cabdiraxmaan Cirro. This document established full diplomatic relations, including the exchange of ambassadors and the opening of embassies. Netanyahu framed the decision as being in the “spirit of the Abraham Accords,” signaling a desire to incorporate the Republic of Somaliland into a regional network of normalization and security cooperation.
Strategic Imperatives: The Red Sea and Bab al-Mandeb
Israel’s primary motivation for recognition is its strategic depth in the Red Sea. The Republic of Somaliland’s location along the Gulf of Aden provides a critical vantage point for monitoring Houthi activity in Yemen and Iranian proxy networks:-
Military and Intelligence Cooperation: Reports indicate that the recognition is a precursor to a formal security pact. Discussions include the establishment of Israeli intelligence facilities and potential access to the Berbera International Airport for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) The proximity of Berbera to Sana’a (approximately 550 km) provides a 70% reduction in response time for Israeli airstrikes against Houthi targets compared to current basing.
Maritime Security: As a “state-level partner” in the Horn of Africa, the Republic of Somaliland can participate in formal agreements regarding navigation rights and maritime security in the strategic Bab al-Mandeb strait.
The Role of Intelligence and Diplomacy
The recognition process involved high-level clandestine engagement facilitated by the Mossad and its director, David Barnea. This underscores the security-first nature of the relationship. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gideon Sa’ar – ENG visit to Hargeisa on January 6, 2026, further institutionalized these ties, with the two sides pledging “no limits” to their cooperation in defense, agriculture, technology, and health.
Legal Refutation of Palestinian Relocation Allegations
Following the recognition, Somalia and several Arab nations alleged that the Republic of Somaliland had agreed to accept the forced relocation of Palestinians from Gaza in exchange for Israeli recognition. Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Somaliland, issued an emphatic denial.
On January 1, 2026, stating that its engagement with Israel is “purely diplomatic” and conducted with “full respect for international law”. The ministry characterized these claims as “baseless allegations” intended to undermine its diplomatic progress and mislead the international community.
The Global Legal Clash: Perspectives from Somalia and the International Community
The State of Israeli recognition of the Republic of Somaliland has triggered a massive legal and political pushback from Mogadishu and its regional allies, highlighting the deep divide in the interpretation of international law.
Somalia’s Legal Argument: “Null and Void”
The Failed Tribal Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has reacted with what it terms “all necessary diplomatic, political, and legal measures” to defend its sovereignty. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the Somali Parliament declared the Israeli recognition “null and void” and a “flagrant assault” on the country’s unity:-
• Breach of UN Charter: Somalia argues that the recognition violates Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, framing it as an act of aggression and a “naked invasion” of its territorial integrity. Mogadishu asserts that the Republic of Somaliland is legally “incapable” of entering into any international agreement.
• Retaliation Against Partners: In January 2026, Somalia terminated all security and defense agreements with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a key regional ally of Israel that has long invested in the Republic of Somaliland’s Berbera port. This move illustrates Somalia’s willingness to use diplomatic ” scorched earth” tactics to punish those who engage with Hargeisa on a sovereign level.
Regional and Multilateral Condemnation
The response from international bodies has been overwhelmingly supportive of Somalia’s position, prioritizing the stability of existing borders over the de facto reality of Somaliland’s governance:-
1️⃣. African Union (AU) “African Union”: The AU Commission Chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, unequivocally rejected the recognition, stating it undermined the principles of the AU Constitutive Act and risked setting a “dangerous precedent”.
2️⃣. Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC): The OIC’s 22nd Extraordinary Session on January 10, 2026, condemned the recognition as an “illegal measure with no legal effect” and a violation of public international law. The (OIC) resolution categorically rejected any foreign military presence on Somali territory, specifically targeting potential Israeli bases in Somaliland.
3️⃣. Cross-Regional Group of 22 Countries: A group of nations including Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Nigeria issued a joint statement condemning the move. They warned that recognizing “parts of states” threatens international peace and security and constitutes a “full and blatant disregard for international law”.
The Role of Major Powers and the “Domino Effect”
While the United States and the European Union “European Commission” have reiterated their support for Somalia’s territorial integrity, the Israeli move has introduced significant internal friction. In the U.S., there is growing bipartisan pressure—notably from Republican Senator Ted Cruz—to consider recognizing the Republic of Somaliland as a reliable security partner in the Red Sea. The Donald J. Trump administration in early 2026 signaled it was “looking into” the issue, though it remained cautious about following Jerusalem’s lead immediately.
The Republic of Somaliland’s leadership remains hopeful that the Israeli act will act as a “cracked dam,” eventually leading to a cascade of de jure recognitions from other states that value effective governance and strategic alignment.
Comparative Analysis and Future Legal Trajectory
The recognition of the Republic of Somaliland by Israel provides a fascinating case study in the selective application of international legal principles.
The Republic of Somaliland 🆚️ Palestine: A Study in Legal Disparity
A recurring theme in the scholarly analysis of the 2025 events is the comparison between the Republic of Somaliland and Palestine. Legal experts note that while 157 nations have endorsed Palestinian statehood despite its lack of a unified government and contested territory, the Republic of Somaliland satisfies all Montevideo criteria yet has been ignored for 34 years. Proponents of the Republic of Somaliland argue that the world has “weaponized statehood” as a political tool, elevating dysfunctional entities for geopolitical reasons while punishing the Republic of Somaliland’s successful democratic project. Israel’s recognition of the Republic of Somaliland is framed by some as a defense of the “rule of law” and the declaratory theory of statehood.
📍Impact on Regional Stability and Security
The long-term legal and political consequences of this recognition will depend on the evolution of the security situation in the Horn of Africa:-
1️⃣. Militarization of the Horn: The potential for an Israeli military presence has already led to a counter-alliance between Egypt, Turkey, and Somalia. This “strategic encirclement” of Ethiopia and the Republic of Somaliland could lead to increased regional tensions and the militarization of the Gulf of Aden.
2️⃣. Counter-Terrorism Efforts: Somalia and various international observers warn that the fragmentation of Somalia could create “vulnerable environments” exploitable by Al-Shabab and other extremist groups. Conversely, the Republic of Somaliland argues that its recognition would provide it with the legal standing and resources to better combat regional terrorism.
The Future of the “One Somalia” Doctrine
The mutual recognition between the Republic of Somaliland and the State of Israel has effectively ended the era of “near-universal diplomatic quarantine” for Hargeisa. Whether this leads to a permanent alteration of the regional order depends on the resilience of the (FGS) and the AU’s adherence to the principle of territorial integrity.
If the Republic of Somaliland continues to operate as a stable, democratic state with a major power partner, the legal fiction of its inclusion in Somalia will become increasingly untenable for the international community to sustain.
Conclusion
The mutual recognition between the Republic of Somaliland and the State of Israel in December 2025 is a definitive challenge to the post-colonial legal framework of Africa:-
🅰️ For the Republic of Somaliland, it represents the legal validation of its claim that it is a state by virtue of its historical independence, the flawed nature of the 1960 union, and its successful three-decade democratic project.
🅱️ For Israel, it is a lawful exercise of sovereign discretion that secures vital strategic interests in the Red Sea basin.
However, this act directly confronts the “One Somalia” policy and the AU’s rigid interpretation of uti possidetis juris, which prioritizes the preservation of existing borders over de facto governance.
The findings of the 2005 AU Fact-Finding Mission provide a potential legal path forward, emphasizing that the Republic of Somaliland’s case is “unique and self-justified” and does not constitute an illegal secession.
Ultimately, the 2025 recognition shifts the debate from whether the Republic of Somaliland should be a state to how the international legal system will adapt to the fact that it is a state:-
The future will be defined by the tension between the declaratory reality of Hargeisa’s sovereignty and the constitutive resistance of the international organizations committed to Mogadishu’s territorial integrity.
In this new geopolitical landscape, the Horn of Africa has become the primary theater where the future of international recognition and the sanctity of post-colonial borders will be decided.
Works cited
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Hargeisa, 01/02/2025– The Daami Youth Development Organization (DYDO) has distributed sustainable Solar Livelihood Pods to 120 households in the Iidaan Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Camp. This initiative is a key component of the Youth Climate Innovation & Renewable Energy Acceleration Program.
Speaking at the handover ceremony, Mr. Mahmoud Abdi of DYDO emphasized the program’s goals: “Today, we officially entrust these solar lamps to the Iidaan Camp Committee for distribution. This ‘Solar Livelihood Pods’ solution is designed to promote green jobs, renewable energy, and youth entrepreneurship, specifically for displaced and marginalized communities in Hargeisa.”
The project, implemented in partnership with the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family (MoLSAF), Save the Children, and DANIDA Somaliland, addresses urgent energy and safety challenges in displacement settings.
“Providing safe, clean energy is fundamental to improving the security and well-being of vulnerable families,” Mr. Mahmoud added. “These lanterns offer a foundation for displaced communities to pursue better living standards and opportunities, despite ongoing hardships.”
The clean, reliable solar lighting directly enhances household and community safety—particularly for women and children—while extending hours for education and income-generating activities. By replacing hazardous and polluting light sources, the solution also contributes to environmental protection and climate resilience.
The handover to the camp committee reinforces community ownership and sustainable management, ensuring the project remains responsive to residents’ needs.
Through this project, DYDO showcases how youth-led innovation and renewable energy can deliver practical, scalable, and climate-smart solutions for Somaliland’s most vulnerable populations.
Project Summary:
· Project: Solar Livelihood Pods
· Program: Youth Climate Innovation & Renewable Energy Acceleration Program
· Lead Implementer: Daami Youth Development Organization (DYDO)
· Key Partners: Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Family (MoLSAF), Save the Children, DANIDA Somaliland
· Location: Iidaan IDP Camp, Hargeisa
· Primary Focus: Fostering green jobs, renewable energy adoption, and entrepreneurship among IDP and minority youth.
Hargeisa — Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (lrro) convened a meeting with the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and leaders of the three national political parties—WADDANI, KAAH, and KULMIYE—to review the timeline for parliamentary and local council elections, currently scheduled for 31 May 2026.
A statement from the Presidency reported that the NEC informed the assembly that holding the elections as planned is not feasible. The Commission cited technical, security, and humanitarian challenges, including a widespread drought, localized security issues, and delays stemming from disagreements over voter registration procedures.
To address these obstacles, the NEC has stated it requires an extension of ten months beyond the original date of 31 May 2026. This period would be used to complete voter registration, update electoral equipment, and finalize all logistical arrangements for the polls.
The political parties expressed divergent views on the proposed delay. While KAAH opposed postponing the elections, both WADDANI and KULMIYE voiced support for the NEC’s technical assessment.
In response, President Cirro underscored the critical importance of national unity and constructive dialogue. He reaffirmed the government’s commitment to fully finance the electoral process, with the ultimate goal of ensuring that the elections are inclusive, transparent, and conducted peacefully.
Hargeisa — The National Electoral Commission (NEC) of Somaliland has postponed the Parliamentary and Local Council elections, which were originally scheduled for 31 May 2026.
In a statement released on 31 January 2026, the Commission explained that the decision follows a thorough legal, technical, and security review conducted in accordance with the General Election and Voter Registration Law (Law No. 91/2023).
Key factors cited for the delay include widespread drought, security concerns in several regions, and protracted political disagreements regarding the voter registration framework.
The NEC indicated that the additional ten months—beginning 31 May 2026—will be used to finalize technical preparations for voter registration, enhance the accuracy of voter data, modernize registration equipment, and complete all arrangements necessary to ensure the elections comply with constitutional, legal, and international standards.
The Commission emphasized that the postponement aims to uphold the credibility, transparency, and integrity of Somaliland’s electoral process and to preserve public trust in the nation’s democratic institutions.
The assessment, commissioned by British International Investment (BII) and conducted by Itad and Steward Redqueen, examines the impact of a multi-year modernisation of Berbera Port led by DP World in partnership with the Government of Somaliland.
British International Investment joined the project as a minority investor in early 2022 through its Africa Gateway partnership with DP World.
Located on the Gulf of Aden, Berbera occupies a strategic position along one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes and has long been viewed as a potential alternative trade corridor for landlocked Ethiopia. The evaluation finds that targeted investment in port infrastructure has significantly upgraded Berbera’s capacity and performance, enabling it to compete more effectively with established regional ports.
Berbera expansion overview
Source: Itad and Steward Redqueen study
Container handling capacity at Berbera has more than tripled, increasing from 150,000 to 500,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). This expansion has been supported by new quay infrastructure, deeper draught and modern cargo-handling equipment, allowing the port to accommodate larger vessels and higher volumes of traffic.
Operational efficiency has also improved sharply. Average vessel turnaround times fell from 64 hours in 2018 to around 25 hours in 2024, a reduction that has helped lower costs for shipping lines and cargo owners. According to the report, these improvements have repositioned Berbera as a credible regional competitor and contributed to rising container traffic through the port.
As a result, Berbera’s share of regional container trade has increased steadily, reaching 14% in 2024, up from 9% in 2017. Modelling cited in the evaluation suggests the port now offers cost-competitive access to parts of eastern Ethiopia and Somaliland that were previously underserved, particularly areas beyond the Addis Ababa–Djibouti transport corridor.
Increase in port efficiency as measured by operational KPIs
Source: Itad and Steward Redqueen study
Business and societal impact
The efficiency gains are translating into meaningful savings for businesses. Transport cost reductions for importers and exporters using Berbera were estimated at $8.4 million in 2024, or $6.9 million after adjusting for new users attracted by the expanded port. Environmental benefits have also emerged, with improved logistics and shorter vessel waiting times cutting carbon emissions by an estimated 7,651 tonnes a year.
Beyond trade flows, the evaluation highlights a material contribution to Somaliland’s economy. In 2024, the upgraded port and the adjacent Berbera Economic Zone supported around 2,490 jobs and added $45.1 million in value to the economy. Of this, 921 jobs and $16.7 million in economic output were directly attributable to the port expansion, equivalent to roughly 0.4% of Somaliland’s gross domestic product.
Container throughput (TEU) at Berbera Port and share of ports in the region
Source: Itad, National statistics for respective countries, Rebel analysis
More to come
The study notes that the full impact of the investment has yet to be realised, with current trade volumes not yet requiring the port’s full capacity. External factors, including disruptions linked to the Red Sea crisis, have also affected shipping patterns.
In addition, some benefits – such as the impact of cheaper imports on living standards and wider spillovers into neighbouring Ethiopia – are not fully captured in the analysis.
Nonetheless, the evaluation concludes that well-structured infrastructure investment in underserved frontier markets, when combined with experienced global operators and complementary logistics ecosystems, can unlock substantial trade, economic and environmental gains.
