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The Legality of Recognizing Somaliland

By
Goth Mohamed
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0

By  Eran Sthoeger

On 26 December 2025, Israel became the first state to formally recognize Somaliland as a state. The reactions of the international community have ranged between negative, cautious, neutral and silence. While Somaliland has welcomed Israel’s recognition, others have argued that its recognition is unwise, dangerous and illegal.

This contribution will explore the legal contours of state recognition and whether the recognition of Somaliland is a breach of international law. At the outset it should be said that I have advised the government of Somaliland on matters of recognition in the past, though this contribution is in my personal capacity.

Somaliland and Israeli recognition

The British protectorate of Somaliland became independent on 26 June 1960. On 1 July 1960, it unified with Italian Somaliland to form the Republic of Somalia. Somalilanders were marginalized and discriminated against during unification and the two entities – comprised of distinct clans – never fully integrated. During the civil war that broke out in 1988, the forces of Somali President Siad Barre committed widespread atrocities against the Isaaq clan, the dominant clan in Somaliland. Thousands of civilians were killed (estimated at 50,000—60,000) and roughly a million people fled Somaliland. As calamity overtook Somalia, in contrast, by January 1991, the Somali National Movement (the SNM, which despite its name was an Isaaq-led organization based in Somaliland) consolidated its position in Somaliland, effectively controlling the territory (see Amnesty International, Mburu and Bradbury, pp. 32-49). On 18 May 1991, a national congress was convened in Somaliland, whereas Somaliland decided to resume its independence. Later on, the Constitution of the Republic of Somaliland was adopted by the parliament on 30 April 2000 and approved by a referendum held on 31 May 2001, when 97% of the voters voted in its favor (the referendum was viewed by outside observers to be “conducted openly, fairly, honestly, and largely in accordance with internationally recognized election procedures”). The governments of Somaliland and Somalia have held talks in 2013 and in 2023, in an attempt to reconcile their differences, to no avail.

Since then, the Republic of Somaliland has existed de facto as an independent state, free of Somali or other foreign presence. It has a permanent population of roughly 6 million people and its permanent boundaries are that of the former British protectorate of Somaliland (notwithstanding a disputed boundary with Puntland in Somalia in the east). As opposed to Somalia, Somaliland is relatively stable and safe, has held several democratic elections with peaceful transitions of power, with a government that maintains public order, services and infrastructure (see Crawford, pp. 412-415; Lewis, pp. 30-72; Prunier; Bradbury, pp. 4-5, 184-219). While states have refrained from recognizing Somaliland until now, Somaliland nevertheless exercises foreign relations with a range of states and international organizations. Prominent examples are agreements with Ethiopia establishing a consulate in Hargeisa (which Somaliland claims has been upgraded to an embassy), the building of a Somaliland embassy in Addis Ababa, and the agreement with United Arab Emirates (UAE) state-owned port operator, DP World, to develop and manage the port in Berbera. In addition, the UAE and the European Union (EU) have provided training and support to Somaliland’s security forces. At the same time, the lack of recognition has barred assistance from organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, signed a declaration recognizing Somaliland and “its right of self-determination” on 26 December 2025, “in the spirit of the Abraham Accords, signed at the initiative of President Trump”. He noted the close informal relations between the two parties and that Israel intends to cooperate with and assist Somaliland in the fields of agriculture, health, technology and economic and social development (see also here). Israel’s Foreign Minister, Gideon Sa’ar, paid an official visit to Somaliland in early January 2026. He stated that Israel “will determine for itself who it recognizes”.

Commentators note the strategic location of Somaliland along the Gulf of Aden near the entrance to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. It can offer Israel access to the region, in particular as a potential base for operations against the Houthis across the Gulf in Yemen. The Houthis, for their part, have stated that any Israeli presence would be considered a target by them. Others suggest that Israel’s decision is part of a broader move related to regional competition, in collaboration with the UAE, another state with close ties to Somaliland, intended to counter increased Iranian and Turkish influence in the region, (see here, here, and here).

Reactions to Israel’s recognition of Somaliland

The President of Somaliland, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi, welcomed Israel’s “historic and principled” decision as a “milestone in Somaliland’s longstanding pursuit of international legitimacy, reaffirming its historical, legal, and moral entitlements to statehood”. He further conveyed Somaliland’s intention to join the Abraham Accords and “deepen cooperation across a broad range of sectors”. Mass celebrations have been reported in Somaliland following the recognition.

A 28 December 2025 statement by the foreign ministers of 22 Muslim, Arab and African states, organizations and entities rejected Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as “a grave violation of the principles of international law and the United Nations Charter, which explicitly stipulates the imperative of protecting the sovereignty of states and their territorial integrity”. They also warned that recognition threatens international peace and security. The statement further rejected “any potential link between such measure and any attempts to forcibly expel the Palestinian people out of their land” (see also here and here), referring to reports in the media of discussions between Israel, Somalia, Somaliland and the US on the transfer of Palestinians from Gaza—reports that Somalia and Somaliland have denied. Among states that did not join this statement are the UAE, Bahrain and Morrocco, all parties to the Abraham Accords.

Somaliland’s recognition follows a recent wave of recognitions of Palestine, including by several western states, a matter that was raised in a meeting of the Security Council on 29 December 2025. During the meeting, the US stated that Israel has the same right to conduct itself as other States that have recently decided to unilaterally recognize “a nonexistent Palestinian state”. It added that its own position on the statehood of Somaliland had not changed. Slovenia rejected this comparison, stating that it has recognized Palestine “in response” to the “undeniable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination” and that “Palestine is not part of any state – it is illegally occupied territory as declared by the International Court of Justice”. Slovenia then asserted that recognizing Somaliland “goes against…Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter”. As will be explained below, the recognition of Somaliland is much more comparable to that of Kosovo, not Palestine.

Speaking in the Security Council, Somalia – also on behalf of Algeria, Guyana and Sierra Leone – described the recognition as “an act of aggression”. Somalia also asserted that the recognition was a violation of the United Nations Charter and “a breach of a cornerstone of international law: respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other States”. On 12 January 2025, Somalia announced that it was terminating agreements with the UAE in light of what it perceives as the latter’s involvement in facilitating Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. Türkiye has called the recognition “a clear violation of international law” and an “interference in Somalia’s internal affairs”.

Several states and organizations expressed their support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the need for dialogue between Somalia and Somaliland and the potential destabilizing effect of the recognition (China, Denmark, France, Slovenia, Somalia, Russia, UK, EU). Some states have taken the view that the recognition is a potential threat to regional peace and security that reinforces Al-Shabaab’s insurgency in the region (Somalia, Russia, UK). For the African Union (see also here) in particular, recognition of Somaliland raises the fear of encouraging secessionist movements across the continent and their subsequent recognition, counter to the principle agreed by its member states in the 1964 Cairo Declaration, to “respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence”, reflective of the wider principle of territorial integrity, discussed below. Israel was further condemned by the Organisation of Islamic Collaboration, and the Arab League.

Noticeable silence on the recent development has come from two powerful regional powers, Kenya and Ethiopia. The latter had agreed in a memorandum of understanding in July 2024 to recognize Somaliland in exchange for Somaliland’s agreement to establish an Ethiopian naval base in its territory.

The (non)legal dimensions of recognition

The recognition of Somaliland undoubtedly raises wide-ranging and significant issues, as well as concerns for both the well-being of the affected people and for the security and stability of the region. The legal arguments concerning the act of recognition, however, are much narrower. When a state is created on part of the territory of an existing state which continues to exist, it can be generally referred to as ‘secession’. As reflected above, the main legal arguments raised are that recognition of a secessionist entity as a state constitutes a use of force under Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter (or aggression) against its parent state, breaches the obligation of non-intervention, or is a breach of its territorial integrity.

At the outset, a declaration of recognition does not involve use of force and therefore cannot be said to be in breach of Article 2(4) or an act of aggression. Territorial integrity is only mentioned in the Charter in the context of the use of force, and non-intervention under Article 2(7) only applies to the United Nations, not member states.

But a more difficult question is whether recognition can breach the wider principle of territorial integrity or the principle of non-intervention under customary international law, reflected in the Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970. As Pellet notes (p. 274), it is unquestionable that secession undermines the territorial integrity of the parent state, but that effect in itself does not dictate that secession by a non-state actor is illegal, and that recognizing a seceding entity is illegal, absent an international rule to that effect (ibid).

Under the constitutive theory of state recognition, an entity becomes a state by the act of recognition itself. Recognition then is purely a matter of states’ discretion (Talmon, p. 102; Crawford, pp. 4-5). The dominant theory of state recognition in the literature, however, is the declaratory theory, under which a state’s existence “is a question of fact” (Badinter Commission), independent of recognition. In the words of Crawford (p. 93), “an entity is not a state because it is recognized; it is recognized because it is a state”. As such, Somalia is correct to assert that the recognition of Somaliland does not alter the latter’s status, but that does not mean that its recognition is a breach of international law.

Rather, as stated by the Supreme Court of Canada, though “there is no right, under the Constitution or at international law, to unilateral secession…this does not rule out the possibility of an unconstitutional declaration of secession leading to a de facto secession” (Reference re Secession of Quebec, para. 155). International law is neutral when it comes to secession. It is neither legal nor illegal, but a legally neutral act that produces consequences for the international community (Crawford, p. 390). There is no principle of international law that forbids an entity to secede. While assisting a non-state actor in attempting to secede could arguably be a breach of the principle of non-intervention, when a seceding entity is able to meet the requirements of statehood on its own, and particularly demonstrate the requisite level of effectiveness and independence, it is thus established in fact. While examples in the United Nations era are rare, international law does not prohibit states from recognizing the seceding entity’s existence as a state (Crawford, pp. 390-391, 415-418 (also here, p. 282); Milanović, pp. 33-34; Pellet, pp. 274-276; Weller, p. 136; see also here, para. 401).

Finally, it should be mentioned that there is also a process-oriented approach to secession, according to which, as Milano explains, international law does not prohibit secession, but it “regulates the processes by which secession is produced” (pp. 195, 214). It does so, in practice, by assessing factors such as whether a secessionist ‘state’ is a result of an external military intervention, if it clearly manifests the will of its local population in favor of secession, whether it made reasonable efforts to reach a compromise solution with the existing state, and whether its establishment respects the principle of  uti possidetis (pp. 195-201). Even under this ‘processual’ approach, it should be noted, an “irreversible status quo” of an entity demonstrating the required effectiveness of a state may ultimately be recognized by other states, as “territorial integrity and inviolability of international borders, even when framed in terms of uti possidetis, are not norms of a peremptory character and no secondary rule of general international law imposes on third states a duty not to recognise the new situation as lawful under international law” (pp. 209-210; see also International Law Commission (ILC), Draft articles on State Responsibility, Art. 41 with commentaries).

When may recognition be considered illegal?

While the decision to recognize thus operates in the political rather than the legal sphere, there are nevertheless three well-established scenarios in which recognition of a secessionist entity will be considered a breach of international law. The first is ‘premature recognition’. This occurs under the declaratory theory when a state recognizes an entity before it meets the requirements of statehood (see Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, §202, para. f; Thürer and Burri, para. 40). (Under the constitutive theory recognition cannot be premature, as recognition itself brings the state into being). This argument has been mentioned, for example, with respect to some of the early recognitions of Kosovo, as well as Croatia and Slovenia (Tomuschat; Oeter). In any event, in the case of recognizing Somaliland, which has functioned as a de facto state independent of Somalia for decades, premature recognition is unlikely to be at issue.

In addition, according to Crawford (p. 387), a right of self-determination may “legitimize recognition that would otherwise be premature”. If the doctrine of remedial secession – allowing the exercise of external self-determination – is part of customary international law, which is controversial (Kosovo Advisory Opinion, paras. 82-83; Milanović, p. 34), it can reasonably be said to apply to Somaliland, as the mass crimes committed by Somalia against Somaliland during the civil war – amounting to war crimes, crimes against humanity and likely exhibit the facts and special intent present in acts of genocide against the Isaaq clan – were gross violations of the fundamental human rights of Somalilanders and are a solid basis for the rise of a right to remedial secession (Poore; Carroll and Rajagopal, pp. 666-674; Mburu, pp. 36-42; Klich, p. 116; Keinard and Einashe; International Crisis Group, pp. 5-6).

Second, recognition may be illegal if an entity is constituted by “the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens)” (Kosovo Advisory Opinion, para. 81; ILC, Art. 41; Crawford, p. 160; Milano, pp. 195-197). An often quoted example is the obligation not to recognize the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, established following Türkiye’s illegal use of force against Cyprus (Milano, p. 195; Vidmar, p. 382, fn. 147; Milanović, p. 33). This scenario is not applicable to Somaliland, which established and sustains its independence from Somalia without any foreign military intervention.

Third, and not unrelated to the previous scenarios, recognition is illegal where the Security Council has adopted a resolution obligating states not to recognize an entity as a state or part of another state. For example, in resolution 662 (1990), the Security Council decided that “that annexation of Kuwait by Iraq under any form and whatever pretext has no legal validity, and is considered null and void”. No such decision has been taken in the case of Somaliland.

But, as explained above, international law does not prohibit recognition of a seceding entity that meets the criteria for statehood in the absence of these three scenarios. Alternatively, Somaliland may be recognized under the ‘processual approach’, if one were to apply it: Somaliland was established within its administrative boundaries and those of the former British protectorate, thus conforming to the uti possidetis principle; its statehood reflects the overwhelming wishes of the local population as reflected in a free and fair referendum; it has attempted dialogue with Somalia; and it is an effective entity established without foreign military intervention. Thus, the recognition of Somaliland by any state is unlikely to be a breach of international law.

The example of Kosovo

Slovenia is correct to assert that the statehood of Palestine is in the context of a foreign occupation and therefore its recognition is inherently dissimilar to that of a secessionist entity such as Somaliland. While each case may be said to be different, the recognition of Somaliland is more comparable to that of Kosovo, and its declared independence from Serbia. But as a matter of law, as with Kosovo (and with Palestine, where differences of views exist as to whether it meets the criteria for statehood, compare Milanović  with Verdirame), it is most likely that the US is correct that the recognition of Somaliland is within the political prerogative of a state.

In the Kosovo advisory proceedings, a small minority of States argued that the principle of territorial integrity applies to internal actors and, therefore, this principle and that of non-intervention bar other states from recognizing a seceding state (e.g., Cyprus, paras. 82-89; Serbia, paras. 423-424; Spain, paras. 2-5; see also Milanović, p. 43; Crawford, pp. 282-283). The Court, however, referring to the Friendly Relations Declaration, concluded that “the scope of the principle of territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of relations between States”, and does not apply to non-state actors (Kosovo Advisory Opinion, para. 80; for the opposite view see the dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma, paras. 19-26). Though the direct issue of recognition by states was not addressed by the Court, according to Crawford (p. 283), the Court effectively endorsed the view that states are within their right to recognize Kosovo or not (see also Pellet, p. 276; Weller, p. 135).

To date, 121 states have recognized Kosovo, including Israel, as well as states that have argued that recognizing Somaliland is illegal, such as Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia, and Türkiye. It is worth mentioning that in the case of Somaliland there is no question of a link between a likely illegal foreign military intervention (the NATO military intervention of 1999) and independence, as opposed to Kosovo. In addition, at no point has Somaliland been in danger of collapsing, under threat of being consumed by its ‘parent’ state, or reliant on international actors to sustain its independence, as can be argued with respect to Kosovo (see Tomuschat, pp. 38-39; Tancredi, pp. 105-106). At no point has Somaliland been dependent on outside actors for its existence.

There does not seem to be any principled difference between the recognition of Kosovo’s secession from Serbia to that of Somaliland from Somalia.

Final thoughts

This recent development brings with it both opportunities and risks. For the people of Somaliland, this has been seen as a momentous occasion—the first of potential future recognitions, as it attempts to join the community of nations. For Somalia, the region, and more broadly, it presents an increased risk of further destabilization in an already volatile region. From a legal perspective, it further demonstrates the astuteness of Crawford’s observation that secession is a legally neutral act and its recognition is not governed by law, but “the consequences of which are regulated internationally”, and produce “important legal and political effects” (Crawford, pp. 27, 390).

Somaliland Recognition Isn’t the Problem. Somalia’s State Failure Is

By
Goth Mohamed
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0

Mogadishu’s Attempt to Portray Somaliland as a Separatist Project Ignores Operational Realities and Misrepresents the Historical Record

January 29, 2026
Siyad Madey

Israel’s December 26, 2025, recognition of Somaliland triggered sharp condemnation from Mogadishu. Somali officials framed the decision as a violation of sovereignty and a threat to regional stability. Yet this reaction obscures a deeper reality: The controversy is less about borders and diplomatic protocol and more about Somalia’s unresolved state failure and the strategic recalibration unfolding along the Red Sea corridor. Recognition did not create Somalia’s crisis; it exposed it.
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‎For more than three decades, Somaliland has operated as a functioning entity. It controls territory, conducts elections, maintains internal order, and administers civilian institutions with a level of continuity absent across much of southern Somalia. Mogadishu’s attempt to portray Somaliland as merely another separatist project ignores these operational realities and misrepresents the historical record.
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1961
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‎Somaliland entered a rushed union with Italian Somaliland five days after independence, but the legal foundation of the union was flawed from the outset. Somaliland passed its Union Act on June 27, 1960, while no corresponding ratification occurred in the South, leaving no jointly ratified Act of Union in force on July 1, 1960. The retroactive union law adopted in 1961 was an attempt to repair this defect. In legal terms, the union was politically proclaimed but never constituted at inception, rendering it—by juristic standards—defective ab initio.
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‎The political trajectory that followed deepened this structural weakness. The 1969 coup dismantled constitutional governance in Mogadishu and entrenched centralized rule that eroded the original political bargain. When the Somali state collapsed in 1991, the union lost its institutional foundation entirely. Somaliland’s withdrawal was therefore not ideological fragmentation, but institutional self-preservation following systemic collapse.
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‎From Israel’s perspective, the recognition was strategic rather than symbolic. The Horn of Africa has become an extension of Middle Eastern security competition. Red Sea chokepoints and commercial shipping routes now sit at the center of regional power calculations. Somaliland’s proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait places it along one of the world’s most consequential trade arteries. Facilities such as Berbera provide logistical depth and leverage that carry strategic value beyond domestic Somali politics. In this environment, states do not select partners based on constitutional theory but, rather, upon on territorial control, reliability, and institutional continuity. Somaliland offers predictability in a region defined by fragmented authority and political volatility.
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‎By contrast, Somalia’s federal government continues to struggle with structural incoherence. National authority remains divided across parallel political and security frameworks. Electoral processes are routinely delayed or contested. Constitutional harmonization remains incomplete. Economic governance varies sharply across regions.
‎This governance deficit weakens Mogadishu’s ability to project itself as the uncontested center of authority. International actors increasingly distinguish between formal sovereignty and functional capacity. Investment flows, security cooperation, and diplomatic engagement reflect this distinction.
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‎No other Somali region possesses Somaliland’s historical independence status or international legal continuity from decolonization.
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‎Somalia’s warning that Somaliland’s recognition will trigger regional fragmentation is overstated. No other Somali region possesses Somaliland’s historical independence status or international legal continuity from decolonization. Federal member states formed after 1991 through negotiated political settlements. They do not carry comparable sovereign lineage. The feared cascade effect does not exist.
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‎What does exist is a gap between political claims and operational realities. For Israel and other security-focused actors, engagement will prioritize maritime stability, regional access, and dependable partners. That calculus is unlikely to change in response to diplomatic protests.
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<span;>‎If Somalia seeks to alter this trajectory, the solution is not external pressure campaigns but internal reconstruction: consolidating national authority, restoring institutional coherence, and rebuilding political legitimacy. The hard truth is Somaliland recognition will reoccur wherever functionality outperforms fiction. States that govern territory effectively become partners. States that rely on symbolic sovereignty without institutional capacity will lose diplomatic ground. Recognition is not the destabilizing force. State failure is.

Somaliland – Israel sets a moral example via recognition

By
Goth Mohamed
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0

By Alana Schetzer

Why did Israel officially recognise Somaliland, the Muslim-majority breakaway African state that had, until Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s unexpected announcement on December 26, spent 34 years being internationally ignored?

During a phone call with Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu said the two countries shared a “seminal and historic” friendship and would work together across economic, agriculture, and social development fields.

For Somaliland – a territory on the very tip of the Horn of Africa that broke away from Somalia in 1991 and has fought for international recognition ever since – the news was met with literal cheers on the streets and fireworks.

Other than the usual assortment of benefits, such as full diplomatic relations, and the fact that it will “institutionalise ties between the two countries across a wide range of fields,” the deal appears to be focused on two key pillars – defence and economics.

While the two countries may appear on the surface to be odd bedfellows, they have more than one might expect in common, especially when it comes to their respective high-tech industries and ongoing problems with terrorists on their respective doorsteps.

 

All about Somaliland

Somaliland split from Somalia in 1991 after the latter’s government collapsed – although there had been an independence movement underway since the early 1960s – and has remained an unofficial but functional country ever since.

But Somaliland has a longer history than that. It was a separate British protectorate between 1884 and 1960, gaining independence on June 26, 1960 – after which it was recognised by 35 countries, including Israel, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, and France. It voluntarily united with Somalia shortly afterwards, although problems arose almost immediately.

Somaliland’s break with Somalia came in the wake of a state-sponsored genocide of civilians from the Isaaq tribe between 1987 and 1989 by the Somali Democratic Republic, under the dictatorship of Siad Barre. The number of civilian deaths in this massacre is estimated to be between 50,000 and 200,000, according to various sources. The majority of Somalilanders are Isaaqs.

Despite these origins, Somaliland has been the sort of success story to which many African countries aspire. It has achieved genuine internal peace, political stability, and democratic elections, and has a promising free market-based economy.

Somaliland isn’t even the only breakaway state from Somalia; Puntland declared itself an autonomous state in August 1998. And although not as successful as Somaliland – armed conflict and piracy remain – Puntland is an important destination for Somalis to escape from the endemic violence that has been a result of Somali state collapse since 1991.

Countries such as the United Kingdom, Denmark, Taiwan, Ethiopia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and Kenya have liaison offices in Somaliland, and it has trade with Oman, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti and Ethiopia, plus an inventory of foreign investors. This is despite not having access to many global institutions, such as the international financial system, due to its unofficial status.

While the territory still grapples with many issues, including high unemployment and relatively low GDP, its peace and stability are a genuine success story achieved almost entirely indigenously by Somalilanders, with very little outside assistance.

 

Somaliland meets the criteria to become a country

Under the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, there are four basic tenets that a territory must meet for nationhood: a government, defined territory, permanent population and “the capacity to enter into relations with other states.” Somaliland meets all those criteria, while the ‘State of Palestine’ – which has now been recognised by 157 of the 195 member states of the United Nations – clearly does not.

US-based analyst Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute, who has long advocated for international recognition of Somaliland, told AIJAC the fact that Somaliland had been denied recognition for so long was “hypocrisy plain and simple.”

While Israel’s decision was unexpected by most, it was several years in the making, and experts had pegged it as an option four years ago. While it doubtless did little to improve Israel’s international reputation in the short run, it was arguably an astute political manoeuvre for several reasons:

  • It meets international legal obligations to recognise a state that meets all the criteria for statehood;
  • It gives Somaliland an overdue and deserved reward for what it has achieved, despite extraordinary obstacles;
  • It will play well in many parts of Africa, where Israel is trying to build relationships, by helping display the benefits of relations with Israel; and
  • It provides a clear contrast with the legally unjustifiable recognition of “Palestine”, which does not meet the criteria for recognition, drawing attention to the completely political nature of the decision to do so by so many states.

It’s also, symbolically, a recognition from one indigenous people that established self-determination in the wake of a genocide to another that is doing the same.

 

A tense region

Israeli strategic analysts say Somaliland offers an essential and much-needed ally in the strategic Horn of Africa. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar made his first official visit to Somaliland in early January, meeting with President Abdillahi – who said the mutual recognition agreement was about “serving the mutual interests of both nations and contributing positively to peace and stability in the Horn of Africa.”

Israel now has a partner with direct access to the Red Sea for the first time since Sudan signed the Abraham Accords in 2020 (a partnership that has effectively been paused due to Sudan’s civil war). Israel previously also had a relationship with Eritrea to allow some access, but this effectively ended a few years ago. Such access is vital for Israel as its only access to the Indian Ocean, its own Eilat Port, has been all but closed for almost two years due to Houthi attacks.

Tensions have been rising across the Horn of Africa for years. Ethiopia and Eritrea have been teetering on the brink of war over conflict in the Tigray region; Ethiopia incurred the wrath of Egypt over its Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project, which Egyptian officials claim could be an ‘existential threat’ to their country during drought; Turkey’s long-term – and growing – economic, political and military presence in Somalia continues to rattle neighbours; and Egypt has been growing its already large military force in Somalia since August 2024 amid rising tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia.

And Russia, in December, finally achieved its long-term objective of successfully negotiating a naval base at the Port of Sudan. This will make future US military operations across the Red Sea-Suez-Eastern Mediterranean corridor trickier, and give Russia a base for intelligence-gathering and an extraordinary degree of leverage over the vital Red Sea trade routes.

The Israel-Somaliland relationship could very well redraw the power balance in the region.

 

Fighting terrorism

Somaliland is surrounded by quasi-failed states, including Somalia and Ethiopia, which grapple with political corruption, terrorism, drought and extreme hunger. One of its biggest threats is the Al-Qaeda branch in Somalia, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, widely known as al-Shabaab, which has been fighting the Somali government for years and controls large swaths of that country.

As part of the deal, Israel will presumably be able to monitor the Yemen-based, Iran-backed terrorist group the Houthis – which fired thousands of ballistic, crude, and modified scud missiles, plus drones at Israel between October 2023 and October 2025 – from Somaliland. This will also benefit Somaliland,  as the Houthis have been working with al-Shabaab since 2024, a partnership that has allowed them to increase their capabilities. In October, there was serious concern that Mogadishu’s fall to the terrorist group was just a “matter of time”.

Al-Shabaab eyes Somaliland to extend its power base, and it is part of its overall goal to establish a ‘Greater Somalia’ under strict Islamic rule. Somaliland’s government spends approximately one-third of its annual budget on security and defence and has so far successfully secured its borders from weapons smuggling via Yemen and piracy. It’s in Israel’s interest to ensure those borders remain solid.

After significantly subduing threats from Hezbollah and Hamas – also backed by Iran – the Houthis have become one of Israel’s biggest threats.

Some have mentioned the potential for Israel to establish a military base along the Red Sea in Somaliland, but Somaliland officials have denied this. More likely, at least in the short-term, will be the IDF exercise access rights for short-term operations.

Michael Rubin argued as long ago as 2019 that Somaliland shares the same security goals as the United States, and that working with Somaliland was a key way for Washington to help defeat al-Shabaab and other Somalia-based terrorist groups, such as ISIS-Somalia, Al-Itihad al-Islami, Hizbul Islam and Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a.

Last June, a US congressman introduced a bill into the House of Representatives to recognise Somaliland as an independent sovereign nation. This push could well be renewed in the wake of Israel’s move.

Rubin told AIJAC that he believes Israel’s decision could also pave the way for other countries to follow, including the UAE, Ethiopia and Paraguay. Noted Israeli journalist and analyst Ehud Yaari has reported that Sa’ar has spoken to his Ethiopian and Kenyan peers about the prospect of recognition.

 

Economic ties

Economically, there are clear mutual benefits to Israel-Somaliland ties. While Israel is a technology powerhouse, Somaliland – despite its struggling economy – is starting to make its own strides in hi-tech. Rubin told AIJAC that “Somaliland is not far behind Rwanda as the Silicon Valley of Africa.”

“I’ve walked from a dusty, unpaved road in [Somaliland capital] Hargeisa into the control room of the multibillion-dollar communications conglomerate Telesom and it was like entering a NASA facility.”

Telesom established Somaliland’s first 5G network when it switched on the connection in January 2024. Two Israeli companies, VisiRight and Amore Capital, have already announced plans to set up in Somaliland to support Israeli businesses wanting to enter the market there, most likely in the fields of agricultural innovation, water management, and technology.

 

Somali Opposition Condemns Constitutional Maneuvers as Destructive and Irresponsible

By
Goth Mohamed
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0

Mogadishu – The Somali Future Council strongly condemns the disorder that erupted today in the Federal Parliament of Somalia. This disruption stems from an attempt by the Speaker of the House of the People, Mr. Aadan Maxamad Nuur, to unilaterally advance amendments to Articles 5 through 9 of the constitution—actions taken without the broad consensus that previously accompanied revisions to Articles 1 through 4.

The Council has monitored closely how President Hassan Sheikh exerted pressure on the Speaker to pursue these constitutional changes. In response, the Speaker has engaged in the reckless dissemination of misinformation to the Somali public, falsely claiming that the proposed amendments were formally distributed to parliamentarians today.

These developments demonstrate profound political irresponsibility and a dangerous abuse of authority.

Moreover, the Council emphasises that such maneuvers are clearly designed to undermine the forthcoming national dialogue between the Federal Government and the Somali Future Council, scheduled to commence on 1 February. These talks are critical to achieving a consensual, lawful, and peaceful electoral process.

The Somali Future Council and Opposition parties holds President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud fully accountable, both politically and legally, for orchestrating this destabilising event.

The Council reiterates its firm opposition to any unconstitutional amendments and calls for the immediate cessation of all illegal efforts to alter the foundational charter, which was originally established through national consensus.

Solar Lights Illuminate Safety and Hope at Iidaan IDP Camp in Somaliland

By
Goth Mohamed
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0

DYDO handed over the solar lamps to the Iidaan IDP Camp committee for camp-wide distribution, and clearly framed as a solution:
‎
‎Initiative: Youth Climate Innovation & Renewable Energy Acceleration Program
‎Focus: Green Jobs, Renewable Energy And Entrepreneurship for IDP and minority youth

Iidaan IDP Camp, Somaliland — In a significant step toward enhancing safety and sustainability for displaced communities, hundreds of solar light lamps have been distributed to families at the Iidaan Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Camp. The initiative, led by the Daami Youth Development Organization in partnership with the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, and Family (MoLSAF) and Save the Children Somaliland, aims to address critical energy poverty and reduce nighttime risks.

The handover, conducted directly with the camp’s community committee, is part of the broader Youth Climate Innovation & Renewable Energy Acceleration Program, which promotes renewable energy solutions to meet humanitarian and environmental needs.

For residents of Iidaan Camp, where darkness once heightened dangers and limited daily activities, the solar lamps represent a transformative intervention. Many families previously relied on kerosene lamps or candles, which posed health hazards from indoor air pollution, contributed to carbon emissions, and increased fire risks.

“This is more than just light—it is security, opportunity, and a step toward a healthier environment,” said a representative from Daami Youth Dev Org. “By using solar energy, we are tackling several challenges at once: protecting vulnerable families, especially women and children, after sunset; extending time for children to study and adults to work; and reducing harmful emissions.”

Key impacts expected from the solar lamp distribution include:

· Enhanced Safety: Improved lighting in households and communal areas to prevent accidents and promote safer movement at night.
· Livelihood and Educational Support: Extended hours for studying, small-scale income activities, and household tasks after dark.
· Environmental Benefits: A shift away from polluting fuel-based lighting, supporting climate resilience and cleaner air indoors.
· Community Ownership: Management of the lamps by the camp committee ensures the initiative is locally sustained and responsive to residents’ needs.

The collaboration underscores how youth-led innovation, supported by government and humanitarian partners, can deliver tangible solutions in displacement settings. “Addressing energy access is crucial in IDP camps,” noted a Save the Children Somaliland representative. “Sustainable light improves well-being, dignity, and the capacity of families to rebuild their lives.”

MoLSAF officials highlighted the initiative’s alignment with national efforts to improve living conditions for displaced populations while embracing green energy. “This partnership shows our shared commitment to practical, sustainable support for vulnerable communities,” a ministry representative said.

As solar lights begin to glow each evening in Iidaan, they symbolize a brighter, safer, and more sustainable path forward—one powered by community collaboration and renewable energy.

Through this solution, DYDO continues to demonstrate how youth-led innovation and renewable energy can deliver practical, scalable, and climate-smart outcomes for displaced and marginalized communities in Somaliland.

‎Project: Solar Livelihood Pods

‎Program: Youth Climate Innovation & Renewable Energy Acceleration Program

‎Implementer: Daami Youth Development Organization (DYDO)

‎Partners: MoLSAF, Save the Children & DANIDA Somaliland

‎Location: Iidaan IDP Camp, Hargeisa

‎Focus: Green jobs, renewable energy, and entrepreneurship for IDP and minority youth.

 

The Push to Amend the Somali Constitution: A Perilous Political Gamble

By
Goth Mohamed
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0

By Jama A Feyte

As the terms of the President and Parliament near their end and national elections approach, any rash attempt to amend the Constitution is an irresponsible act that betrays the national interest. This move exposes an agenda driven by personal ambition and partisan gain, eroding the legitimacy of state institutions and undermining public trust.

Somalia stands at a critical juncture, grappling with assaults on its unity, severe security threats, crippling drought, and economic distress. This moment demands national cohesion and leadership characterized by responsibility and accountability. Rushed constitutional amendments, pursued without due consideration, will only deepen existing societal fractures and fuel instability, sabotaging hard-won progress in state-building and national reconciliation.

Ultimately, the Constitution serves as the foundational social contract for the nation’s unity and future. To alter it through illegitimate means risks triggering severe repercussions and entrenched division. Any constitutional change must emerge from a legitimate, inclusive, and transparent process—guided by a shared national vision, not narrow self-interest.

Mr. Jama Ayaanle Feyte, Somaliland-born politician, Journalist, and Horn of Africa political analyst

Somaliland Finance Delegation Attends Key SERP Project Restructuring Talks in Nairobi

By
Goth Mohamed
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0

Nairobi, 28 January 2026 – A high-level delegation from the Republic of Somaliland, led by the Director General of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Mr. Maxamed Xasan Saleebaan, participated in a critical meeting in Nairobi today concerning the restructuring of the World Bank-funded Strengthening Economic Resilience Program (SERP).

The SERP Project is central to Somaliland’s efforts to enhance public financial management, focusing on accountability, transparency, and the empowerment of state institutions tasked with managing public resources. It plays a pivotal role in advancing domestic revenue mobilization, fiscal management, and the overall improvement of public administration.

Scheduled to run for three days, the meeting will conduct a comprehensive review of the SERP Project’s restructuring process. Key discussion points include potential adjustments to the project’s scope, its various components, and its outcome indicators. The objective is to ensure the project is implemented effectively, completed on schedule, and aligned with the core developmental priorities of Somaliland.

Accompanying the Director General at the meeting are:

· Chairman of the Civil Service Commission
· Chairman of the Good Governance Commission
· Director General of the National Tender Board
· Director General of the Civil Service Reform and Employee Rights Agency
· SERP Project Coordinator
· Senior officials from the Office of the Auditor General and the Office of the Accountant General
· Deputy Directors from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
· Members of the SERP Project implementation team

The World Bank delegation is led by May, supported by Kandi and Vikram.

On the sidelines of the main meeting, Director General Mr. Saleebaan is also scheduled to hold separate talks with Hideki Matsunaga and other current and future World Bank project leaders for Somaliland. These discussions aim to strengthen partnership and expedite the implementation of priority development projects

Somaliland Coast Guard Chief Conducts Strategic Site Inspection with EUCAP Delegation

By
Goth Mohamed
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0

Berbera, Somaliland – The Commander of the Somaliland Coast Guard, Admiral Ahmed Hure Haariye, led a strategic site visit to key facilities at the Coast Guard’s 1st Base in Berbera. The inspection was conducted alongside a high-level delegation from the European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP), headed by Mr. Pateth from the Netherlands.

The delegation toured several critical infrastructure sites, including:

· The Headquarters of the 1st Coast Guard Base.
· The modern communications building of the Coast Guard (CIX).
· The naval vessel dry dock facility.
· The boat mooring jetty.
· The base’s vehicle maintenance depot.

The assessment noted substantial progress on several ongoing projects, with plans to expand and upgrade additional facilities in the coming months.

The primary objective of the visit was to evaluate the operational developments and infrastructure advancements achieved by the Somaliland Coast Guard, with a specific focus on enhancing the capabilities and readiness of its premier base in Berbera.

Somali Parliamentary Session Derailed by Opposition Protest Over Constitution

By
Goth Mohamed
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0

Mogadishu –  A special session of Somalia’s parliament, convened to introduce significant constitutional amendments, collapsed in disorder and was forced to adjourn after opposition lawmakers staged a vociferous protest.

Opposition members, who have long argued that the amendment process is being rushed without adequate consultation or legal foundation, escalated their dissent into direct action. Their protest erupted into a raucous demonstration inside the chamber, with lawmakers marching through the aisles and publicly shredding the session’s agenda.

The political theater reached a symbolic climax when the opposition bloc united to sing the Somali national anthem, a gesture that silenced the chamber and served as a potent rebuke of the government’s agenda, framing their stance as one of patriotic defense.

The contentious amendments, championed by President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud’s administration, include a proposed 40-day extension of the current parliamentary term and revisions to key constitutional articles concerning governance. This push persists despite a formal appeal from the Somali National Consultative Council—comprising federal member states like Puntland and Jubaland—which recently called for an immediate halt to the process, citing national instability.

With tensions at a peak, all eyes now turn to a crucial summit scheduled for next week in Mogadishu between the Federal Government and the Council. The constitutional crisis is poised to be the central, and most divisive, item on the agenda.

The Quiet Case for Somaliland’s Sovereignty

By
Goth Mohamed
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0

Somaliland has built a stable, democratic, and self-governing state through locally grounded institutions and disciplined patience—long before the world was willing to recognize it.

By Mohamed Nouh Rakaab

Since reasserting its sovereignty in 1991, Somaliland has pursued a deliberate and internally driven project of state-building that sets it apart from much of the Horn of Africa. While the region has often been defined by institutional fragmentation and recurring conflict, Somaliland has moved—patiently and largely out of international view—toward democratic consolidation, internal security, and social cohesion.

The break with the former Somali Republic followed a brutal civil war and the near-total collapse of central authority. At that historical juncture, Somaliland faced choices that would prove decisive. Rather than reverting to centralized autocracy or adopting a fragile, clan-based federalism, it pursued a path anchored in self-determination and negotiated consensus. This was not simply a matter of survival. It was an exercise in political construction, premised on the belief that legitimacy, security, and social trust had to precede external validation. Over time, that choice produced a functioning polity capable of governing territory, mediating conflict, and sustaining public order.

What distinguishes Somaliland’s formation is its rejection of externally imposed governance models in favor of a bottom-up approach rooted in local practice. In the years immediately following the 1991 declaration of independence—while international attention remained fixed on Mogadishu—Somaliland’s leaders turned inward. A series of national conferences between 1991 and 1997, most notably the 1993 Borama Conference, became the forum through which peace was negotiated and authority reconstituted. These were not symbolic gatherings. They were prolonged, often arduous deliberations involving clan elders, religious figures, and civic leaders, drawing on customary law to resolve grievances, demobilize militias, and articulate a shared political framework.

The result was a social contract that enjoyed broad legitimacy precisely because it emerged from within society rather than being imposed from above. This process endowed Somaliland’s early institutions with a durability uncommon in post-conflict settings. Peace was not enforced by foreign troops or underwritten by external guarantors; it was bargained, internalized, and defended by local actors with a stake in its survival.

Women in the Somaliland, wearing the colors of the Somaliland flag, participating in a parade for UCID party prior to parliamentary elections in 2005
Women in the Somaliland, wearing the colors of the Somaliland flag, participating in a parade for UCID party prior to parliamentary elections in 2005. (Wikimedia)

From this foundation emerged a hybrid political system that fused traditional authority with modern state institutions. Central to this arrangement was the formal incorporation of elders into national governance through the Guurti, or House of Elders, which functions as the upper chamber of parliament. The Guurti has served as a stabilizing mechanism, mediating political disputes and ensuring that modernization did not rupture social continuity. Its role in conflict resolution and security oversight helped prevent political competition from sliding into violence and contributed to the consolidation of a national monopoly on force.

As a result, Somaliland developed unified national security institutions rather than the fragmented militia structures common elsewhere in the region. A centralized army and police force now maintain internal order, enabling the state to secure its borders and contribute meaningfully to regional security efforts, including counter-piracy and counter-extremism initiatives along the Gulf of Aden.

Over time, this system evolved. What began as a consensus-driven, clan-mediated order gradually transitioned into a competitive, multi-party democracy grounded in universal suffrage. Over the past three decades, Somaliland has conducted repeated municipal, parliamentary, and presidential elections. International observers have generally described these contests as credible and peaceful. More telling than procedural benchmarks, however, has been Somaliland’s record of orderly transfers of power. Presidents have conceded defeat. Opposition parties have assumed office. Constitutional authority has prevailed over personal rule.

In a region where incumbency often hardens into permanence, this pattern marks a genuine political maturation. Somaliland’s use of biometric voter registration—implemented earlier than in many more affluent states—reflects both institutional ambition and a sustained commitment to electoral integrity. These practices reinforce the reality that Somaliland functions not as a provisional authority but as a self-governing democratic state.

Political stability, in turn, has enabled a measure of economic resilience. Lacking formal recognition, Somaliland has been excluded from international financial institutions and most bilateral aid frameworks. Yet this isolation has fostered fiscal restraint and a reliance on domestic revenue and private enterprise. The economy remains anchored in livestock exports, supported by an unusually advanced telecommunications sector that has expanded access and lowered costs nationwide.

Geography has further shaped Somaliland’s economic strategy. Its long coastline along the Gulf of Aden, and particularly the port city of Berbera, has become central to its regional ambitions. Investments in port modernization and logistics infrastructure aim to position Somaliland as a critical trade corridor for the Horn of Africa, especially for landlocked Ethiopia. These projects are not merely commercial. They assert Somaliland’s relevance to global supply chains and maritime security amid renewed international attention to the Red Sea.

Despite these achievements, Somaliland has operated for more than three decades in a diplomatic vacuum. The absence of de jure recognition has constrained access to credit, limited foreign direct investment, and excluded Somaliland from formal participation in international institutions. In response, Somaliland has pursued what might be described as a diplomacy of pragmatism—engaging states and organizations on the basis of functional cooperation rather than formal status.

Through security partnerships, trade agreements, and development cooperation, Somaliland has secured growing de facto acknowledgment of its sovereignty. It operates its own currency, passport, flag, and national institutions. It does not function as a subordinate federal unit awaiting direction from Mogadishu, but as a parallel and autonomous political entity.

That long campaign of patience and self-reliance reached a turning point in late 2025. On December 26, Israel became the first United Nations member state to formally recognize Somaliland as a sovereign and independent nation. The joint declaration, signed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, marked a diplomatic breakthrough with far-reaching implications.

Recognition transformed Somaliland’s international standing almost overnight. What had long been described as a “silent success” was suddenly a visible strategic partner. The agreement opened new channels for diplomatic engagement and accelerated reassessments in capitals that had previously maintained only informal ties with Hargeisa. Countries including the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, and Ethiopia began reviewing their positions, drawn by Somaliland’s strategic location near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and its demonstrated capacity for governance and security.

The implications extend beyond bilateral relations. As global attention returns to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, Somaliland’s control over key maritime corridors positions it as a central actor in regional stability. Its trajectory since 1991 challenges prevailing assumptions about post-conflict reconstruction, suggesting that durable peace is more likely to emerge from locally grounded institutions than from externally engineered solutions.

Somaliland’s experience does not offer a universal blueprint. But it does present a compelling case: that democratic legitimacy, patiently constructed and culturally rooted, can endure even in the absence of international recognition. In an era of renewed geopolitical competition, Somaliland stands as a reminder that sovereignty is not conferred solely by diplomacy—it is built, sustained, and defended over time.

 

Mohamed Nouh Rakaab is a Somalia-based social researcher and political analyst specializing in governance, state-building, and political stability in fragile and post-conflict contexts, with a focus on Somaliland and the wider Horn of Africa. His work combines field-based research and political analysis to inform international debates on sovereignty, legitimacy, and sustainable governance.

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