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PUNSAA Sounds Alarm on Somalia’s Constitutional Amendment Process

By
Goth Mohamed
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The Puntland Non-State Actors Association (PUNSAA) has issued a sharp critique of the process behind the recent parliamentary approval of amendments to Somalia’s constitution, calling it opaque, exclusionary, and a potential threat to national unity.

In an open letter addressed to the highest levels of Somali government and the international community, the prominent civil society network—which coordinates over 120 organizations—stated it was completely sidelined during the critical deliberations.

Key Criticisms Outlined

The statement centers on amendments to the 4th Chapter of Somalia’s Provisional Constitution, passed by the Federal Parliament today. PUNSAA asserts the process “lacked proper procedure and transparency” and was finalized “without the consultation and unanimous consent of all Federal Member States.”

Furthermore, the association challenges the claim by the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission (ICRIC) of having consulted civil society. “PUNSAA…was not once invited or shared any document throughout the debates,” the letter states, adding that any organizations that did participate do not represent the broader Somali civil society.

A Warning of National Risk

The association framed its concerns within Somalia’s fragile political context, warning that the move “could endanger the unity and cohesion of the Somali community and the long-standing efforts of Somali state-building.”

It emphasized that the amendments come at a sensitive time when the nation is grappling with political disputes that affect statehood, territorial integrity, and internal security—a likely reference to tensions between Mogadishu and Federal Member States like Puntland.

A Call for Consensus

Concluding its statement, PUNSAA made an urgent appeal to Somalia’s federal and state-level leadership to return to a collaborative path. It called for work towards “a consensual constitution that has been carefully considered from all perspectives,” arguing this is essential to complete the state-building process and achieve national reconciliation.

Background
PUNSAA is one of Somalia’s largest civil society umbrella bodies, with deep roots in the Puntland region. Its public condemnation adds a significant civil society voice to the growing political debate surrounding constitutional reforms, a process central to defining Somalia’s future federal structure and political system.

Extended reach: diplomatic recognition paves the way for IDF basing in Somaliland

By
Goth Mohamed
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0

This blog post was first published on Military Balance+ on 26 January 2025
On 26 December 2025, Israel became the first country to formally recognise the Republic of Somaliland. Several indicators suggest that the development of diplomatic and other relations between the two may lead to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) gaining access to facilities in East Africa.
Israel’s declaration came two weeks before a visit to Somaliland by Israel’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gideon Sa’ar. At a 6 January meeting with the president of Somaliland and Somaliland’s military chief of staff, Sa’ar said that ‘we will also cooperate on defence and develop a strategic partnership’.
Meanwhile, Israeli media cited the director of the political department of Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation as saying that a military base ‘is on the table and being discussed’. The chairman of the governing Waddani party, Hersi Ali Haji Hassan, did not deny the prospect, saying that it is a question to be asked ‘when the time comes’.

Should these discussions lead to access or basing arrangements, they could widen Israel’s military options in the region, but they could also risk additional vulnerabilities, as well as diplomatic friction with other regional states.
The ability to operate from Berbera International Airport on the Gulf of Aden could be beneficial to Israel by enabling the Israeli Air Force (IAF) to expand the range of missions that it conducts in the region and the assets it employs. Berbera is just 550 kilometres from Sanaa, whereas current basing in Israel is at least 1,800 km away – a 70% reduction in distance. IAF aircraft operating from Berbera airport would have significantly reduced response times for strikes against Ansarullah (Houthi) targets, and could also provide enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance coverage in the region.
The present status of Berbera airport is unclear, however, despite recent activity that has upgraded the facilities.
Berbera airport was constructed by the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s and served as an emergency landing location for NASA’s Space Shuttle from 1980–91. More recently, the site was upgraded following an agreement between Somaliland and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that granted the latter access to naval and air facilities in Berbera to support its operations in Yemen. The improvements included paving the 4,000-metre-long runway in 2018 and, between 2018 and early 2019, the construction of an apron. However, in September 2019, shortly after the UAE announced a partial withdrawal from Yemen, then Somaliland president Muse Bihi Abdi announced that Berbera airport, ‘which was being built by the UAE and designed to be a military base will become a public airport for civilians’.
The airport is listed as a public/military site, but despite the presidency of Somaliland announcing in March 2025 that it was open to global trade, there has been little sign of commercial activity. This may be because Somaliland’s Hargeisa International Airport has the capacity for current traffic demands, but it has also been suggested that Somaliland has delayed civilian use while it considers offering access to the United States.
This draws attention not only to recent US military visits to Berbera – the commander of US Africa Command visited the airport in 2022 and again in June 2025 – but also to how these discussions can reflect tensions between Somaliland and Somalia. March 2025 saw Somalia’s president send a letter to US President Donald Trump offering access, and four months later, the president of Somaliland suggested there are ongoing discussions over access.

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There are indications that the UAE has used the airport for military and logistics purposes already, including a 22 September 2025 cargo flight that followed the Bosaso–Berbera–Abu Dhabi route, and on 7 January 2026 for the evacuation of Aidarous al-Zubaidi, the then-leader of the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen.

Recent work at Berbera airport points to its military utility. In late 2023, as Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping intensified, construction started on the first of three storage facilities, all of which feature semi-buried structures and berms consistent with the storage of fuel and ammunition. An initial seven buried structures were built next to the apron, and new groundworks identified in this area in January 2026 indicate possible expansion. A second storage area to the north was also built in late 2023, comprised of 20 bermed bays housing containers and three larger structures. This area is now undergoing extensive expansion, with indications that the number of bays will at least quadruple. Construction of the third facility to the south with 14 buried structures began in late 2025 and is still ongoing.

By early 2024, additional aircraft shelters had been erected on the apron, the designs of which are commonly associated with supporting combat aircraft. At the end of 2025, the apron was also expanded to the northeast. As of January 2026, the construction of three new structures is visible on the apron, including what are likely to be two aircraft shelters or hangars.
The construction of a number of raised earth platforms in October 2025 likely indicates plans to install air-defence systems at the airport. The distinctive raised positions could help to provide greater coverage, particularly against lower-flying targets, while the through-access ramps that are present at three platforms suggests a realistic possibility that they are intended for mobile air-defence systems.
It remains unclear who is behind the expansion, but interviews and analyst reports have indicated that the UAE was involved in previous developments at Berbera.

Options for Israel and risks for Somliland

Basing access in Somaliland would give the IDF facilities much closer to the Houthis, potentially enabling them to monitor the Gulf of Aden and southern Red Sea, providing valuable information about the Houthis and patterns of life near Yemen’s shores.

Striking Yemen from Israel is a long-range mission, requiring at least two air-to-air refuelling serials for most IAF combat aircraft. With a facility in Berbera, IAF aircraft could land post-strike, refuel, and return to Israel using external fuel tanks. A deployment to Berbera airport would increase Israel’s ability to launch strikes at much shorter notice in Yemen and the Gulf of Aden. It would also enable the use of shorter-range uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs), increasing ISR and strike options for Israel to further degrade the Houthis and disrupt maritime smuggling routes supplying the group.

For Israel, operating from Berbera would risk adding considerable friction to its relationships with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkiye, which all suspect that Israel is encouraging local separatism across the region. In addition, geographical proximity and the airport’s fixed location would heighten the risk of Houthi strikes on Israeli assets at the site.

Israel’s use of Berbera airport would also come with risks for Somaliland, and could exacerbate its international isolation by antagonising the African Union, China, Somalia, and other countries. An Israeli military presence could also provoke UAV and missile attacks from the Houthis, who have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to strike at long distances and have threatened to target any Israeli presence in Somaliland. Meanwhile, a spokesperson for Somalia-based Al-Shabaab also said the group will fight against Israel’s attempt to use what they perceive as their land. If so, Houthi attacks may not be limited to Berbera airport, and they could also choose to target the port of Berbera, Somaliland’s economic lifeline.

Author

  • Albert Vidal Ribe

    Research Associate for Middle East Defence Industry and Procurement

    https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2026/01/extended-reach-diplomatic-recognition-paves-the-way-for-idf-basing-in-somaliland/?fbclid=IwdGRjcAPmoL1jbGNrA-afgGV4dG4DYWVtAjExAHNydGMGYXBwX2lkDDM1MDY4NTUzMTcyOAABHmBp-0TVfJEuSxDYSW7b1y6Qr47pz_4-3DNfcA5Wg0mGn7QD4M5reN-umO84_aem_AnnEIflh_2uLZ0JzlUZ3xg

Is the UK playing a double game in Sudan and Somalia?

By
Goth Mohamed
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0

In December, as it often has during the ongoing war between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the British government urged accountability, expressing concerns about the mass-scale death and devastation that civilians have suffered.

But reporting has shown that, behind the scenes, the United Kingdom rejected more ambitious plans to prevent atrocities as violence escalated‎ in the diplomatic framing of the war”.
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‎Asked about its approach to Sudan, the UK Foreign Office told Al Jazeera: “The crisis in Sudan is the worst we have seen in decades – the UK government is working with allies and partners to end the violence and prevent further atrocities from occurring.
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‎“We need both the parties to support a ceasefire; this means unrestricted humanitarian access and a peace process with transition to a civilian government.”
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‎Recognise Somalia, do business with Somaliland
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‎The Foreign Office did not respond to questions about the UK’s role in Somalia or its commercial engagement in Somaliland, where scrutiny has increasingly centred on the port of Berbera.
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‎The British government co-owns the port through its development finance arm, British International Investment (BII). The port is jointly owned by the UAE-based logistics firm DP World and the government of Somaliland – even though the UK does not officially recognise that government. The UAE, too, formally does not recognise Somaliland.
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‎Berbera sits near one of the world’s most important maritime corridors linking the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. An impact assessment commissioned by the UK Foreign Office described it as “a strategic gateway” to Somaliland and a potential alternative trade corridor for Ethiopia, language that places it firmly within the region’s geopolitical architecture.
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‎The port’s strategic value is not new. Matthew Sterling Benson, a social and economic historian of Africa at the London School of Economics (LSE), noted that Berbera has repeatedly been treated by external powers as strategic infrastructure first, and a political community second. It has served at different points as a British coaling station, a Soviet naval base during the Cold War, and now a commercial logistics hub shaped by Gulf and Western interests.
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‎The Sudan-Somaliland link
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‎That wider architecture has become more politically charged as Sudan’s war has spilled across borders.
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‎Observers have suggested that Berbera is part of a broader Emirati logistics network that United Nations experts and international media have linked to alleged supply routes used to arm the RSF. The UAE has consistently denied these allegations.
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‎For critics, the UK’s commercial entanglement with that alleged network raises uncomfortable questions. While London publicly calls for accountability in Sudan, it remains financially tied, via the BII, to a port operated by the UAE, a close regional partner accused of backing one side in the war next door.
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‎Abdalftah Hamed Ali, an independent Horn of Africa analyst, said this highlights what many critics see as “a gap between principle and practice”.
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‎“Even if London disputes those linkages,” he said, “the perception problem remains.”
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‎The sensitivity has deepened as Somaliland’s political status has returned to the diplomatic spotlight. Last month, Israel became the only country to formally recognise Somaliland’s independence, a move condemned by Mogadishu and rejected by the wider international community.
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‎For analysts, these developments underscore why claims that economic engagement can be kept separate from politics are increasingly difficult to sustain.
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‎Ali said Berbera cannot be treated as a neutral commercial asset.
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‎“Ports in the region are not just economic assets; they are nodes in a security and influence ecosystem,” he said. “When investment touches ports, free zones, and long-term trade access, it becomes politically legible. People interpret it as strengthening one authority’s bargaining position, whether that is the intention or not.”
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‎In Somaliland’s case, that political legibility cuts several ways: Reinforcing its de facto autonomy, reshaping regional alliances, and entangling external actors, the UK included, in a dispute London – officially – says should be resolved through dialogue rather than external alignment.
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‎Ali described the UK’s approach as a “dual-track” policy.
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‎“Britain maintains its formal diplomatic line with the recognised Somali state, but it also works with Somaliland as a de facto authority because it is stable and functions and controls territory,” he said.
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‎LSE’s Benson explained that after declaring independence in 1991, Somaliland was excluded from international recognition and large-scale foreign aid. Early governments were forced to rely on locally raised revenue, particularly taxation linked to Berbera port, a dependence that gave domestic actors leverage to demand representation and accountability.
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‎In 1992, when a transitional government attempted to seize control of Berbera by force, local clan authorities resisted. The standoff ended in compromise, helping to entrench Somaliland’s power-sharing system.
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‎Benson, who also serves as Sudan’s Research Director at LSE, described this dynamic as a “revenue complex”, in which fiscal control and political legitimacy are tightly intertwined.
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‎Large external infrastructure investments, he warned, risk undermining that bargain.
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‎“When states can finance themselves through deals with external investors rather than negotiations with local constituencies, the fiscal contract changes,” Benson said.
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‎Such projects, he added, reconfigure who controls revenue flows, who benefits from the port economy, and who gains political leverage. In territories with unresolved political status, infrastructure investment can enable what he described as “governance through commercial presence” – allowing external actors to extract strategic value while avoiding explicit political responsibility.
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‎Ambiguity by choice
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‎The UK’s position, Benson argued, exemplifies this ambiguity.
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‎British formal support for Somalia’s territorial integrity, paired with deepening commercial and security engagement with Somaliland, he said, gives it port access, counterterrorism cooperation and commercial returns, while avoiding the political costs of a clear position.
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‎Over time, this can undermine institutional consolidation on both sides: Allowing Mogadishu to avoid meaningful negotiations over Somaliland’s status, while weakening Somaliland’s domestic accountability mechanisms by bypassing local political bargaining.
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‎The UK’s posture in Somaliland has drawn scrutiny before. In 2023, Declassified UK reported that the British government suppressed the release of a report into the killing of civilians during clashes in Somaliland, a decision critics then said prioritised political relationships over transparency and accountability. British officials said at the time that decisions around the report were taken in line with diplomatic and security considerations.
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‎Read together, analysts say the UK’s decisions in Sudan and Somalia reflect a single approach applied in different contexts: Preserving access and partnerships while avoiding moves – diplomatic pressure, public confrontation or policy shifts – that would narrow its room for manoeuvre.
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‎Ali argued that while this approach may secure short-term influence, it carries longer-term costs, particularly in a region as politically entangled as the Horn of Africa.
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‎“In the Horn, where alliances overlap with regional rivalries and the conflict economy, mixed signals can quickly become a liability,” he said. “You lose the moral authority to press for political compromise if local actors think your incentives lie elsewhere.”

Somaliland President Briefs Cabinet on Landmark Participation in World Economic Forum, Davos

By
Goth Mohamed
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0

Hargeisa, Somaliland – The President of the Republic of Somaliland, H.E. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi (Cirro), accompanied by the Vice President, H.E. Mohamed Ali Aw Cabdi, today convened an extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers. The purpose was for the President to deliver a comprehensive briefing on his historic participation in the Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland.

President Cirro informed the Cabinet that this marked Somaliland’s inaugural participation in a forum of this global stature, placing the nation alongside heads of state, world leaders, and international investors. This engagement, he stated, projected Somaliland’s image and elevated its international standing to an unprecedented level in over three decades.

The President characterized the Davos Forum as a decisive platform where Somaliland successfully asserted itself within global political and investment spheres. He detailed how he utilized this opportunity to convey clear, resonant messages about the Republic of Somaliland, emphasizing three core pillars:

  1. Readiness for Recognition: Somaliland is a nation prepared for and deserving of formal recognition by the international community.
  2. Open for Investment: Somaliland is an open, stable, and welcoming destination for international investment and economic partnership.
  3. A Democratic and Stable State: Somaliland is a peaceful, democratic, and functioning state whose sovereignty merits full acknowledgment.

Highlighting the tangible outcomes, President Cirro reported that the delegation secured significant high-level international connections through direct engagements with global politicians, influential investors, and major media outlets.

He further stated that his presence in Davos served to clearly demonstrate to the world that Somaliland is a mature nation with a strategic vision and credible diplomacy—a reliable partner whose stability is crucial for the security and prosperity of the Horn of Africa and the vital Red Sea and Gulf of Aden waterways.

In his concluding remarks, the President stressed that the diplomatic successes achieved in Davos must now be translated into concrete action. He charged the Cabinet with developing and implementing steps to bolster national security and defense, reinforce social cohesion, and decisively advance Somaliland’s journey toward universal recognition. He also directed the government to proactively inform the public of this new diplomatic chapter and its historic significance.

The Council of Ministers unanimously commended the President on the historic national achievement, affirming that the gains from Davos substantially enhance Somaliland’s global reputation, political capital, and economic prospects.

Dr. Bayle: Eric Trump Expressed Significant Interest in Somaliland’s Livestock and Agriculture Sectors

By
Goth Mohamed
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0

Dr. Abdirahman Ducaale Bayle, Senior Economic Advisor to Somaliland President Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi Irro, has strongly echoed the administration’s proactive economic outreach following the President’s high-profile engagements at the World Economic Forum in Davos.

In an exclusive interview with the BBC, Dr. Bayle emphasized that Somaliland is shifting from aid dependency to active participation in the global marketplace. He highlighted President Irro’s strategic meetings—including discussions with Israeli President Isaac Herzog and Eric Trump, Executive Vice President of the Trump Organization—as key platforms to present Somaliland’s vast investment potential.

Dr. Bayle confirmed that Eric Trump expressed significant interest in Somaliland, particularly in the livestock and agriculture sectors. “We explained Somaliland and its resources to him, and he showed great interest in the opportunities,” Dr. Bayle stated. The conversations focused on attracting international investors to process and export livestock and agricultural products to global markets, as well as sharing details of the country’s natural resources such as natural gas and minerals with other world leaders.

He reiterated the strategic importance of the Port of Berbera, describing it as a future regional hub for logistics, trade, and energy infrastructure that continues to draw growing attention from international investors.

Dr. Bayle’s comments underscore Somaliland’s rising profile, political stability, and readiness for sustainable partnerships, reinforcing the message that the current government is firmly focused on economic cooperation, job creation, and long-term development through global investment rather than reliance on external aid.

 

DYDO Concludes Two-Day Digital Resilience Training for Rights Defenders

By
Goth Mohamed
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0

By Goth Mohamed Goth
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‎Hargeisa, January 22, 2026 – The Daami Youth Development Organization (DYDO) has successfully concluded an intensive two-day training program on Digital Security and Resilience. The event, held with support from the Hivos Project, aimed to enhance the safety, operational capacity, and long-term resilience of civil society networks across Somaliland.
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‎The training brought together over 58 participants, including human rights defenders, journalists, community-based organizers, and representatives from vulnerable minority groups.
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‎Facilitated by Digital Security Specialist Mr. Ahmed Abdi, the program provided practical, context-aware strategies to counter escalating digital threats. As civil society increasingly depends on digital platforms for advocacy and outreach, the curriculum focused on mitigating risks such as surveillance, phishing attempts, data breaches, online harassment, and doxxing—threats that pose particular danger to marginalized communities.
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‎Strengthening Digital Foundations for Civil Society and Youth Rights Defenders with support from HIVOS/ Digital Defenders Partnership (DDP) and Hivos.

During the official opening, DYDO Director Mr. Mahmoud Abdi emphasized the critical importance of digital preparedness. “Digital security is no longer optional; it is essential for protecting our organizational integrity, safeguarding sensitive data, and maintaining the trust of the communities we serve,” he said.

 

He further highlighted the broader national significance of such initiatives: “In today’s digital age, cybersecurity is a strategic imperative. It requires dedicated practices, robust tools, secure infrastructure, and—most importantly—skilled human resources. Every sector must contribute to protecting our national data and the digital identity of every citizen.”
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‎This training represents a key step forward in fortifying the digital defenses of Somaliland’s civil society, youth rights derenders , while ensuring that activists and organizations can continue their vital work in a more secure and sustainable manner

DYDO distributed the “Digital Security Toolkit for Human Rights Defenders” to all participants at the conclusion of the training. This handbook was developed as part of the project “Enhancing Digital Security and Resilience for Minority and Youth Rights Defenders in Somaliland,” with support from Digital Defenders Partnership (DDP) and Hivos.

 

Turkey’s Outrage Over Somaliland: When Propaganda Meets Its Own Mirror

By
Goth Mohamed
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0
The classic Somali proverb rings truer than ever in this moment: Someone rushes in shouting, “He insulted you!” only for the reply to come coolly, “We were already enemies anyway, bro!”
That’s precisely the vibe surrounding the latest TRT Afrika video—a slick, dramatic piece recycling old conspiracies about covert Israeli military bases, cyber operations, resource plunder in the Red Sea, and even dredging up a long-forgotten 1940s proposal for Jewish resettlement in British Somaliland and Ethiopia’s Harar region. It’s presented as explosive proof of some shadowy colonial revival in 2026. But for Somalilanders, this isn’t breaking news; it’s the same tired Mogadishu lobby script, amplified by Turkish state media, that’s been looping for two decades.
Israel’s formal recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign state on December 26, 2025—announced by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and formalized in a joint declaration—marked a genuine diplomatic earthquake. As the first UN member state to do so, Israel acknowledged Somaliland’s de facto independence since 1991: a stable, democratic republic with regular elections, functioning institutions, and a track record of peace in a turbulent region. Somaliland’s leaders hailed it as historic validation, with celebrations in Hargeisa and even the Israeli flag projected in public spaces. The move aligns with potential Abraham Accords expansion, strategic Red Sea access via ports like Berbera, and mutual security interests amid piracy, terrorism, and shipping threats.
Somaliland’s Foreign Ministry swiftly shut down the wilder claims in the TRT piece. No Palestinian resettlement schemes from Gaza. The engagement is straightforward: sovereign-to-sovereign cooperation respecting international law. Facts over fantasy.
This fury reveals more about Turkey’s own deep footprint in Somalia than anything else. Over the past decade, Ankara has turned Somalia into a key Turkish outpost hub: operating the largest overseas Turkish military base (Camp TURKSOM) in Mogadishu, training thousands of Somali soldiers, managing the Port of Mogadishu and Aden Adde Airport, securing massive infrastructure contracts, and signing defense pacts that grant naval access and joint operations. Most strikingly, a December 2025 fisheries agreement handed sweeping control of Somalia’s rich exclusive economic zone—among the world’s most abundant fishing grounds—to a company tied to Turkey’s military pension fund (OYAK), centralizing licensing, monitoring, and regulation while promising Turkish fleets prime access. Add hydrocarbon exploration deals and port leases, and the pattern is clear: billions invested, but often with limited trickle-down stability for ordinary Somalis.
When Israel’s recognition cracked the door open for Somaliland’s legitimacy, it directly challenged this arrangement. Turkey’s loud protests—from Erdoğan down to Foreign Ministry spokespeople—suddenly look less like principled defense of Somali unity and more like alarm over a rival power eroding Ankara’s influence in a strategically vital zone. The same state media ecosystem (TRT included) that amplifies anti-Somaliland narratives stays notably quieter about its own extensive resource and security entanglements.
The real irony? Turkey maintains robust trade and diplomatic ties with Israel itself, even amid public rhetoric. Lecturing Somaliland on sovereignty while embedding so deeply in Mogadishu’s affairs highlights a glaring double standard.
For Somaliland, none of this is new. Decades of smears, AU threats, Arab League pressure, and paid disinformation campaigns have failed to erase the reality: a self-governing democracy that has built peace from scratch, held off extremism, and earned recognition through facts on the ground. Israel’s step shatters the illusion that Somaliland can be perpetually sidelined.
The panic from detractors? Let them run with it. Somaliland isn’t pleading for approval—we’re defending our hard-won peace, institutions, and right to self-determination. This recognition is the first real breach in the wall of denial. More will follow because sustainable progress and democratic reality always outlast propaganda.
Long live the Republic of Somaliland! No myths, no resettlement schemes—just unstoppable forward momentum.

French Senator Olivier Cadic Calls for Recognition of Somaliland’s Stability and Democracy

By
Goth Mohamed
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0

Senator Olivier Cadic, Vice-President of the French Senate’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Armed Forces and President of the France-Gulf Countries Interparliamentary Group, urged France and Europe to actively support Somaliland during a recent Senate debate under Article 50-1 of the Constitution on France’s role in preventing and resolving international political crises.

In his intervention on behalf of the Union Centriste group, Senator Cadic spotlighted Somaliland’s achievements since restoring its independence from Somalia in 1991. He described the nation in the Horn of Africa as a model of stability, the rule of law, and consistent democratic elections.

Cadic highlighted the inconsistency in international responses to raising nations, pointing out that the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993 was quickly recognized by European nations. He questioned why Somaliland, despite its peaceful, democratic record and effective governance, continues to be largely overlooked.

“France cannot remain a mere spectator,” Cadic declared, stressing that diplomacy is as vital to international security as justice is to domestic order. He called on France and Europe to defend democracies globally, assist peoples escaping unworthy regimes, uphold right over might, and protect sovereignty from coercion rather than settling for mere condemnation.

The senator connected Somaliland’s case to parallel challenges in Taiwan and other nations at risk, framing them as part of a fundamental 21st-century question: whether borders and sovereignties will be shaped by force or by law.

Cadic has long advocated for Somaliland, including during a 2023 visit where he met local officials and emphasized its functioning institutions, free elections, and state-like attributes as grounds for international recognition.

The speech by Senator Cadic in parliament aligns with the efforts of Somaliland’s ambassador to France, Abdirahman Yassin Mohamed, aimed at strengthening cooperation between Somaliland and France, as well as collaboration among key French political stakeholders, of which Senator Cadic is a part.

His remarks reflect growing parliamentary interest in France toward deeper engagement with Somaliland amid evolving dynamics in the Horn of Africa.

Somaliland and Israel Forge New Strategic Partnership in Historic Davos Meeting

By
Goth Mohamed
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0

Davos – Last night in Davos, Switzerland, a significant diplomatic event unfolded as the President of the Republic of Somaliland, H.E. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Irro), held an historic and honorary dinner meeting with the President of the State of Israel, H.E. Isaac Herzog. The gathering was also attended by Mr. Eric Trump, son of the current President of the United States.

This meeting inaugurated a new chapter in bilateral relations, establishing a framework for future diplomatic and strategic cooperation between Somaliland and Israel. Conducted in an atmosphere of mutual respect and shared vision, the discussions focused on aligning common interests and deepening ties across multiple sectors.you

The two leaders engaged in substantive dialogue on strengthening state-to-state relations, with particular emphasis on enhancing collaboration in Security, Defense, Technology, Agriculture, Water Resource Management, Public Health, Energy, and Mineral Development. They also explored avenues for social cooperation and discussed the potential for joint contributions to peace and stability in the Horn of Africa region.

President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi expressed Somaliland’s profound appreciation to the President, Government, and People of Israel for the historic decision to extend official recognition to the Republic of Somaliland on December 26, 2025. He characterized this move as a courageous and necessary affirmation of Somaliland’s sovereignty and its rightful place within the international community after 34 years of steadfast self-governance.

The President assured President Herzog that Somaliland is a trustworthy and committed partner, emphasizing that its people hold in high esteem those who stand with them. He further highlighted Somaliland’s identity as a stable, peace-loving, and democratic nation dedicated to the principles of good governance and the rule of law.

The presence of Eric Trump at this diplomatic occasion added a notable dimension, underscoring the growing international engagement with Somaliland.

This landmark meeting between the leaders of Israel and Somaliland signifies a pivotal step in Somaliland’s journey toward broader international recognition and partnership. It reinforces Somaliland’s emerging role as a responsible actor capable of contributing meaningfully to regional security and global diplomatic efforts.

‎Recognizing Somaliland: Israel’s Return to the Red Sea

By
Goth Mohamed
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0

By Ehud Yaari

‎Israel’s agreement with Somaliland will boost its security in the Red Sea Basin and may encourage the United States and other countries to follow suit, though political obstacles and complications abound.

‎The surprise announcement on December 26 that Israel will be the first country to grant Somaliland full recognition has ignited new dynamics in the Red Sea Basin. As part of the agreement, Israel will establish a diplomatic presence and possible security presence in the area for the first time since relations with Eritrea broke down in 2020. Israeli relations had been further degraded by the suspension of normalization with Sudan since civil war broke out there in April 2023. The Somaliland breakthrough gives Jerusalem an opportunity to move past those setbacks and could spur other governments to recognize the republic as well.

‎Why Normalize with Somaliland?

‎Aformer British colony, Somaliland gained independence in June 1960 and five days later united with Somalia, which had been an Italian colony. In 1991, however—following the brutal dictatorship of Gen. Muhammad Siad Barre, the collapse of the Somali state, and the country’s defeat in the Ogaden War with Ethiopia—Somaliland’s clans “restored sovereignty” and declared full independence with Hargeisa as their capital. In the thirty-five years since then, the Republic of Somaliland has maintained a democratic system with free elections and avoided the terrorist threats prevalent in Somalia.

‎Normalization of relations with Israel may open opportunities for bilateral cooperation in many spheres, including intelligence sharing and access to naval and air bases. (Notably, Somaliland has allocated only a minimal budget to its small military throughout its existence.) An ambitious program for Israeli civilian aid in water management, agricultural modernization, and information technologies is also being planned, and a large delegation from Hargeisa is expected in Israel soon.

‎Jerusalem was forced to seek allies with access to the Gulf of Aden, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and the Red Sea after the Yemeni Houthis began a concerted attack campaign on October 19, 2023, targeting ships bound for Israel and launching missile and drone strikes on Israeli soil. Theoretically, Somaliland’s 850 kilometers of coastline across from Yemen could offer certain advantages to the Israel Defense Forces, who have mounted a series of massive airstrikes and occasional naval strikes against the Houthis. Although the IDF does not want a base in Somaliland, it does seek access rights when needed, as well as intelligence facilities to monitor the Houthis. (Relatedly, Arab states claimed for years that Israel had established an intelligence-gathering facility on top of a mountain range in Eritrea and a naval base in the Dahlak Islands. Yet according to various sources consulted by the author, there were no permanent IDF bases, just occasional Israeli use of Eritrean facilities.) Israeli planners assume that confrontations with the Houthis will resume if fighting erupts with Iran or Hamas. Importantly, the port of Eilat—Israel’s only outlet to the Red Sea—has all but ceased operations, and Jerusalem will not tolerate this state of affairs indefinitely.

‎Initial discussions about establishing relations between Israel and Somaliland began four years ago—well before the Houthi crisis—and intensified after former president Muse Bihi Abdi visited Washington in March 2022. The objective at that time was to exchange trade offices and/or diplomatic missions, not full recognition. Eager to reach an agreement, authorities in Somaliland quietly sent high-level envoys to Jerusalem (hosted by the author). Successive Israeli governments were reluctant to strike a deal, but by April 2025, the pace of negotiations with Somaliland’s new democratically elected president, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdilahi (aka Irro), was accelerating, eventually leading to the current breakthrough.

‎Other Potential Partners (and Complications)

‎Ethiopia—Somaliland’s closest neighbor, which governed the area during different periods in the more distant past—has long been weighing recognition but continues to postpone a decision. In January 2025, the two governments signed a memorandum of understanding that would give Addis Ababa access to the port of Berbera in return for recognition of Somaliland, thereby replacing the port of Djibouti as Ethiopia’s main trading route while meeting Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s top strategic goal of securing maritime access for his landlocked country. This idea was hotly debated because it would mean Ethiopia backing down from the “One Somalia” policy and flouting Mogadishu’s argument that Berbera is still part of its territory. In any case, implementation has stalled, and the prospects for reviving the deal are not clear.

‎Similarly, Taiwan has cultivated very close economic cooperation with Somaliland and helped develop the republic’s coast guard, but it, too, is hesitant to go further. Although it has exchanged trade and diplomatic representatives with Hargeisa, it has not granted formal recognition, mainly because China has been pressuring Somaliland not to recognize Taiwan.

‎The United Arab Emirates maintains close relations with Somaliland as well, running the republic’s ports and serving as its main export destination. Moreover, the UAE was one of the few Arab League members that did not join the chorus denouncing Israel’s recognition. Nevertheless, Abu Dhabi has avoided granting recognition—though this did not stop Somalia’s government from retaliating against the UAE after Israel’s recognition, announcing that it would terminate all Emirati port security deals and annul all defense agreements. Notably, however, two of the three ports covered by these canceled deals—Berbera and Bosaso—are not actually under Mogadishu’s control. Somaliland controls Berbera, while Bosaso lies in Somalia’s semiautonomous Puntland region, which cooperates closely with the UAE under President Said Abdullahi Deni and may eventually decide to secede from Somalia if the circumstances are favorable. (Both ports are also significant to U.S. military operations, as discussed in the next section.)

‎Most Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, seem to view Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as part of its wider cooperation with the UAE. Riyadh publicly denounced the move, describing it as an attempt to establish “parallel entities” in Somalia, though it ignored Mogadishu’s request to bomb Somaliland. Meanwhile, many Arab media outlets argue that Israel’s recognition announcement is connected to the recent UAE-sponsored offensive in eastern Yemen, in which the Southern Transitional Council captured large swaths of territory only to be turned back by a Saudi-led counteroffensive. They point out that STC leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi—who seeks the secession of “South Yemen” and peace with Israel—fled to the UAE through Somaliland after his offensive was defeated.

‎In Jerusalem, some officials felt that revealing Israel’s secret contacts with Somalia would be more beneficial than recognizing Somaliland. Yet the decision to favor Hargeisa instead was greatly influenced by Mogadishu’s lack of progress toward joining the Abraham Accords. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud met with Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu in Nairobi in 2016, and six years later, his spokesmen made public statements about the government’s desire for normalization with Israel. Yet Somalia’s deteriorating security situation—largely a product of intensifying offensives by the terrorist group al-Shabab—led Mohamud to rely on Turkish and Qatari military support, and the dialogue with Israel was suspended.

‎Next Steps and U.S. Interests

‎President Irro is hoping that the breakthrough with Israel will spur other countries—mainly the United States but also the United Kingdom and India—to review their stand on recognition, publicly declaring that “many” governments will follow Israel’s lead. For his part, Netanyahu would no doubt like the United States to recognize Somaliland, though it is unknown if he has spoken with Washington about this. He has urged India to recognize the republic, and Foreign Minister Gideon Saar has been consulting with Ethiopia and Kenya on this issue as well.

‎As for the future scope of cooperation with Israel, Hargeisa has consistently denied that it will provide Jerusalem with military bases. In a series of X/Twitter posts on January 1, Somaliland’s Foreign Ministry issued a strong statement on the matter: “The Government of the Republic of Somaliland firmly rejects false claims made by the President of Somalia alleging the resettlement of Palestinians or the establishment of military bases in Somaliland. Somaliland’s engagement with the State of Israel is purely diplomatic, conducted in full respect of international law and the mutual sovereign interests of both countries.” This statement may not reflect the longer-term intentions of both parties, however, and predicting how the emerging alliance will advance is premature at the moment.

‎Ultimately, much will depend on how the U.S. position evolves, and whether Washington wishes to build on its military operations from facilities in the strategically located port of Berbera. Notably, the Puntland-controlled port of Bosaso offers similar advantages on the Gulf of Aden and has repeatedly hosted U.S. operations against local al-Shabab mountain hideouts.

‎If the Trump administration decides to accept the fait accompli of Somaliland’s independence and recognize the republic, this may encourage more countries to adopt a different approach to the chronic crisis in the Horn of Africa. To be sure, this decision would carry the risk (or, in some eyes, the benefit) of fracturing Washington’s troubled relations with Somalia. Yet when it comes to staving off al-Shabab and other security threats, Mogadishu has no alternative to the counterterrorism assistance provided by U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), so it may not be willing to sever this relationship regardless of what happens with Somaliland.

‎Ehud Yaari is The Washington Institute’s Lafer International Fellow and a Middle East commentator for Israel’s Channel 12 television.

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