Mogadishu i-Today’s meeting between the Federal Government of Somalia and opposition politicians ended without an agreement on the most critical points related to the country’s electoral process.
The meeting, which lasted several hours, took place inside a heavily secured area at Aden Adde International Airport — specifically at a facility belonging to NISA (the National Intelligence and Security Agency).
The government side was represented by the President of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and the Deputy Prime Minister, Salah Ahmed Jama. The opposition was led by the President of Puntland, Said Abdullahi Deni, and former Somali President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed.
According to sources, representatives from the U.S. and British embassies were present at the start of the meeting and played a role in opening the talks, but later withdrew to allow the Somali leaders to continue their discussions directly.
During the meeting, the opposition insisted on a comprehensive discussion of electoral issues — including those related to federal member states — expressing concern about the current process.
President Hassan Sheikh and Deputy Prime Minister Salah Ahmed Jama, for their part, defended the government’s plan for direct elections, which are already taking place in the districts of the Southwest administration. The government leaders stated that this electoral process is a mechanism to expand popular political participation and that technical preparations must be made for its implementation.
President Said Abdullahi Deni and former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed argued that the electoral dispute cannot be resolved without reaching a comprehensive political agreement that includes the federal member states.
The representatives from the U.S. and British embassies returned to the meeting after the discussions became more intense.
Ultimately, the two sides agreed to continue negotiations and to hold another meeting tomorrow, Thursday.
By Said Ahmed
In the early morning hours of May 12, 2026, I encountered news from Hargeisa that was both unexpected and deeply consequential. The Hargeisa Local Council had voted to remove Mayor Abdikarim Ahmed Mooge from office during a council session that rapidly altered the city’s leadership. The decision unfolded quickly and, most notably, without violence or public disorder. Like many Somalilanders in the diaspora, I experienced immediate surprise and disbelief. Initial reports from regional media, including Hiiraan Online, Saxafi Media, and other outlets, confirmed both the outcome and the procedural nature of the transition.
As further details emerged, what stood out was not only the abruptness of the leadership change but also the calm and orderly way in which it was carried out. That moment became the catalyst for this reflection. It prompted a deeper consideration of what this event reveals about governance, institutional resilience, and the evolving trajectory of Somaliland’s political development.
This episode reflects a broader structural tension that I describe as the Local Governance Paradox. At a time when Somaliland is gaining increased international visibility through diplomatic engagement and strategic partnerships, the realities of governance within Hargeisa remain uneven. Nationally, there is a narrative of stability, progress, and a continued pursuit of international recognition. Regionally focused platforms such as Horn Diplomat and other media increasingly portray Somaliland as an emerging political actor in the Horn of Africa. Yet within the capital, persistent challenges in infrastructure, service delivery, and administrative capacity continue to shape everyday life.
This divergence between external projection and internal performance raises important questions about sustainability. It calls into question whether international momentum can be maintained without corresponding improvements in local governance systems. The issue is not simply one of image, but of alignment between aspiration and institutional capability.
The tenure of Mayor Abdikarim Ahmed Mooge represented a significant shift in Hargeisa’s political culture. Elected in 2021 with one of the strongest mandates in Somaliland’s recent history, his leadership emphasized a civic identity that sought to move beyond clan based political organization. His focus on linking municipal taxation to visible public goods such as roads, sanitation, and urban cleanliness resonated strongly with a younger generation seeking tangible change. Commentaries and local analyses, including those on platforms like Gallaydh, highlighted both the symbolic and practical significance of this approach.
At the same time, his administration exposed the structural limits of reform oriented leadership within a constrained municipal environment. Rapid urban expansion, limited fiscal capacity, and entrenched political dynamics restricted the pace and scope of transformation. His leadership demonstrated what was possible, but it also revealed how difficult it is to institutionalize reform within existing systems.
The events of May 12 must therefore be understood within this wider institutional setting. The extension of local council mandates reshaped political timelines and incentives, altering the expected rhythm of municipal accountability. Instead of a transition driven by municipal elections, the change in leadership occurred through internal council mechanisms, as reported by Saxafi Media and others. The presence of senior government figures during the council session underscored the broader political significance of the decision and indicated that the process was embedded within the larger architecture of governance.
While the council acted within its formal authority, the process inevitably raises questions about accountability and representation. When leadership changes occur through internal deliberation rather than direct electoral renewal, the connection between citizens and decision makers becomes less immediate. This creates a potential gap in public trust, particularly for those who view electoral mandate as the primary source of legitimacy.
At the same time, the peaceful execution of the transition remains significant. In a region where political shifts can trigger instability, the ability to manage such a consequential change without conflict reflects a level of institutional discipline and a shared commitment to order. This produces a dual reality in which procedural stability coexists with concerns about democratic depth and inclusive participation.
The implications extend beyond municipal governance. Somaliland’s pursuit of international recognition and its expanding diplomatic engagement contribute to a narrative of forward movement. However, recognition that is not grounded in consistent and effective governance risks remaining symbolic. Analyses of emerging political entities, including coverage on platforms such as AllAfrica, frequently emphasize that institutional performance at the local level is central to long term credibility.
For international partners, the legitimacy of a political system is assessed through the reliability of its institutions, particularly those that directly affect citizens. If municipal governance struggles to deliver services, maintain continuity, or ensure transparent decision making, broader claims about state capacity may face increased scrutiny. Hargeisa, as the political and economic center, plays a decisive role in shaping these perceptions.
The leadership transition therefore serves as a critical test of alignment between national ambition and local reality. It highlights the need to move beyond governance models centered on individual leadership and toward systems that are durable, predictable, and institutionalized. It also underscores the importance of strengthening mechanisms for public accountability and communication during periods when electoral timelines are extended or disrupted.
Without such mechanisms, there is a risk that citizens, including those in the diaspora, will perceive political decisions as distant and elite driven. This perception can gradually erode trust, which is essential for both domestic legitimacy and international confidence. For a polity seeking formal recognition, that erosion would carry significant cost.
From a scholar practitioner perspective, this moment reinforces the importance of grounding state building analysis in local governance practices. The reaction across the Somaliland diaspora reflects both emotional connection and analytical concern. It illustrates how closely the country’s global image is tied to developments within its capital.
The orderly nature of the transition offers cautious optimism, suggesting that institutional norms continue to function and that political actors retain a preference for nonviolent change. However, long term legitimacy depends on more than procedural calm. It requires consistent delivery of equitable, transparent, and effective governance that citizens can see and experience.
Ultimately, the Local Governance Paradox captures a central challenge facing Somaliland today. The events of May 12, 2026, demonstrate that while the state may project confidence and progress internationally, its durability will be determined by the strength of its local institutions. Unless Somaliland brings its municipal governance performance into closer alignment with its diplomatic ambitions, it risks advancing the narrative of recognition faster than it consolidates the institutional foundations necessary to sustain it.
Hargeisa – Mr. Abdulrasaq M. Farah “Wiiwaa” was elected this morning as the new Mayor of the capital, Hargeisa. In the same session, Aden Jama Xaddi (Xil Mideeye) was elected Deputy Mayor.
An extraordinary meeting of the Hargeisa City Council convened early this morning, with the Governor of Maroodi Jeh region, Prof. Ahmed Mohameed Cadaad, present as an observer. The new mayor and his deputy were elected by a majority vote.
Ten of the 18 council members were present during the session. The new Mayor, Eng. Abdirisaq Mohamed Farah Wiiwaa, and his Deputy Mayor, Eng. Adan Jama Xaddi (Mideeye), were elected by a show of hands.
The session, held earlier in the morning under tight security at the local government headquarters, was boycotted by the dismissed Deputy Mayor Khadar Nur, councillor Said Abdisamad Cudhay, and five other members who opposed the convening of the meeting.
Notably, the outgoing Mayor, Abdikarim Ahmed Mooge was present during the session. He stated that he was fulfilling the campaign pledge he made during the election—that he would not extend his five-year term beyond the elected period.
HARGEISA, Somaliland – The Ministry of Local Governments and Urban Development has officially authorized an extraordinary session of the Hargeisa District Council, clearing the way for a formal vote on the removal of the city’s Mayor and Deputy Mayor.
In a directive issued on May 11, 2026, Minister Hassan Ahmed Ducaale (Macalin) approved the session in response to a written request submitted by six council members on May 9, 2026. The letter, bearing reference number WDH&HM/XW/484/09/2026, was addressed to the Governor of Maroodi-Jeeh, the Mayor of Hargeisa (who also chairs the District Council), the Deputy Mayor, and all council members, with copies sent to senior ministry officials.
Legal Framework Cited
The Minister’s decision invokes Article 51, Section (B) of the Regional and District Administration Law No. 23/2019, which grants one-third of a district council’s members the right to petition for an extraordinary session. The approval also references Article 51, Section 4, requiring that the rationale for such a session be explicitly outlined in the meeting agenda
According to the letter, the six council members have proposed a motion of no confidence specifically seeking the removal of both the Mayor and their Deputy — a significant political step under Somaliland’s local governance laws
Session Scheduled for Tuesday
The extraordinary session is set to take place on Tuesday, May 12, 2026, at 7:30 AM local time. The Minister has further instructed the Governor of Maroodi-Jeeh region to ensure the session is duly convened.
The letter concludes with a standard Islamic invocation, “ALLA MAHAD LEH” (Praise be to God), and was issued from the Ministry’s office in the Shacab area, behind the Ministry of Livestock, in Hargeisa.
Political Implications
The approval marks a rare and accelerated procedural move within Hargeisa’s local government. Should the session proceed as scheduled, council members will deliberate and vote on the motion — a process that, if successful, would trigger a leadership vacuum and likely require the election of a new mayor. Observers note that the short timeline between the request (May 9) and the approved session (May 12) underscores the urgency or political weight behind the six members’ initiative.
As of this writing, no public statement has been issued by the Mayor’s office or the council members who submitted the motion
Based on official correspondence from the Ministry of Local Governments and Urban Development of the Republic of Somaliland, dated May 11, 2026.
Hargeisa – The government of the Republic of Somaliland has appointed a diplomatic envoy to represent its interests in Greece.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Somaliland has named a special diplomatic envoy to Greece: Dimitrios Tourikis, a Greek national.
This appointment marks a step forward in Somaliland’s ongoing efforts to strengthen international relations and diplomatic cooperation with European countries.
The appointment of a Special Envoy to Greece carries several important implications for Somaliland, including:
· Deepening diplomatic engagement with Greece, especially following recent reports of active bilateral diplomatic contact.
· The new envoy could also play a key role in attracting investment and fostering cooperation across various sectors.
Sheikh Sharif: “We do not seek war, but the situation in Mogadishu shows that the system is steadily weakening.”
He added that troops have been deployed around his area, and that some members of parliament and other individuals who were on their way to him have been prevented from reaching the house where he resides.
He accused the government of trying to block opposition gatherings, stating that such measures are only increasing political tensions.
Somalia’s former president, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, called on all parties to avoid anything that could lead to bloodshed, stressing that the opposition only wants to hold peaceful protests.
“We want peace; we do not want war. We want the Somali people to have the opportunity to make their voices heard,” he said.
On the evening of 6 May 2026, in the Warlaliska neighbourhood of Deyniile district in Mogadishu, federal government forces opened fire on civilians. The clashes were not triggered by Al-Shabaab. They were triggered by the government’s own land clearance operations, the forced removal of residents from public and private land that the federal administration has been conducting across the capital in recent weeks. A three-year-old child, Musamil Yusuf Osman, was killed. Casualties were reported on multiple sides. Former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, condemning the attack as a criminal act, warned publicly that a dangerous threshold had been crossed and called on Hassan Sheikh Mohamud to stop abusing state power and looting public assets.
This is not an isolated incident. It is a destination. The Deyniile clashes are the foreseeable endpoint of two years of decisions that have systematically dismantled Somalia’s institutional safeguards, concentrated power in a single man’s hands, alienated the international partners keeping the state alive, and created the conditions for exactly this kind of violence. The question Somalia faces on 7 May 2026, eight days before the presidential mandate expires, is no longer whether the crisis is serious. It is whether the country can pull back from the edge before it goes over.
The Policy Behind the Killing
The fighting in Deyniile did not begin with guns. It began with eviction notices.
Across Mogadishu’s districts, the federal government has been conducting forced removals of residents from public land. Opposition figures, civil society organisations, and affected residents have documented the pattern: families are removed from plots, including in some cases privately owned land with legal documentation, and the cleared properties are subsequently transferred to individuals with business connections to the presidency. The proceeds are unaccounted for.
The government calls this a public land clearance programme. The residents of Warlaliska called it what it was. When federal forces arrived to enforce the removals, they fought back. A child died in the crossfire. Sharif Sheikh Ahmed did not equivocate in his response. He described the attack as criminal, demanded accountability, and said directly to the president: a dangerous threshold has been reached. Stop abusing the power of the state. Stop looting the assets of the people.
Those are not the words of a politician positioning himself. They are the words of a man who watched a child die during a government land clearance operation and felt obliged to name what he saw.
This is the government Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has built. Not the government he was elected to build. The government that exists tonight in Mogadishu.
Expelling the Monitors, Keeping the Money
To understand how Somalia arrived at this moment, it is necessary to understand what has been systematically removed over the past two years.
On 10 June 2025, the Federal Government sent a letter through State Minister Ali Omar demanding the dissolution of the C6+. The group comprising the UN, the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, the African Union, IGAD, Ethiopia, and Kenya had served as Somalia’s primary external accountability mechanism for governance and electoral conduct. Ali Omar’s letter called it “outdated and counterproductive.” The dissolution came months before a scheduled election whose framework remained unresolved, at the precise moment when questions about the president’s constitutional conduct were becoming impossible to ignore.
The C6+ had helped end the 2021-2022 electoral crisis. It asked hard questions. When those questions became inconvenient, it was ended. The questions did not go away. They went unanswered.
What makes this decision so damaging is what it was paired with. Somalia’s 2025 federal budget stands at $1.32 billion. Sixty-seven per cent of it — $870 million — comes from external donors. The AU stabilisation mission AUSSOM, which provides the security buffer keeping Al-Shabaab from the capital, runs on a budget of $166.5 million a year. The African Union contributes $20 million of that. Twelve per cent. The rest comes from Western governments. The EU has contributed nearly €2.8 billion to AU peacekeeping in Somalia over two decades. Norway, the third-largest donor to the World Bank’s Somalia trust fund, has contributed NOK 890 million since 2015 and announced NOK 102 million more in April 2026. In December 2023, multilateral creditors cancelled $4.5 billion in Somali debt.
This is the partnership Hassan Sheikh Mohamud dismantled the oversight of. He expelled the watchers and kept the cheques. He called it sovereignty. It was something closer to its opposite: a government that cannot function without external financing, demanding that the people providing that financing ask no questions about how it is used.
The cost of that calculation is visible. US senators introduced the AUSSOM Funding Restriction Act in 2025. The UN Security Council failed to lock in the Resolution 2719 hybrid financing framework by its May 2025 deadline. The mission between Mogadishu and Al-Shabaab is running on contingency pledges. A government that spends two years undermining donor confidence while depending on donors for 67 per cent of its budget is not managing a difficult situation. It is manufacturing a worse one.
The Looting That Has No Paper Trail
The Deyniile evictions are one face of a broader pattern of resource extraction that has operated without accountability throughout this administration.
The 2024 energy agreements with Turkey’s state oil company TPAO grant exploration rights in three offshore blocks. According to multiple credible reports, TPAO can recover up to 90 per cent of operational costs before revenue-sharing begins. Somalia’s royalty is approximately five per cent. The agreements reportedly include no signature, development, or production bonuses and TPAO is said to be exempt from domestic taxation. The Çağrı Bey drillship departed in February 2026 escorted by three Turkish naval frigates, with F-16 fighters already positioned at Mogadishu airport. Not one of these terms was subject to published parliamentary scrutiny. The contract has not been made public.
Somalia’s offshore resources belong to the Somali people. A deal that delivers five per cent in royalties, no bonuses, and probable tax exemption to a foreign state company conducted without parliamentary oversight and without disclosure of its terms is not a development agreement. It is an extraction arrangement negotiated in the dark.
The land evictions and the energy deal share the same logic: state assets are being converted into private value, outside any accountability framework, by a government that has removed the mechanisms that would normally ask where the money went. The energy contract is unpublished. The parliamentary chamber that might ask questions has been converted into a vehicle for ratifying decisions already made.
Threatening the People It Is Supposed to Protect
The Defence Minister told Mogadishu that anyone who attempted to take up arms would regret it. He explicitly invoked the 2021 crackdown in which protesters were killed. That statement was not a security assessment. It was a threat to the civilian population of the capital, delivered through a subordinate, aimed at people whose demand was nothing more than a legitimate election.
In September 2025, opposition leaders including former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed visited Warta Nabadda police station in the Wardhigley district to advocate for a civilian detainee whose violent arrest had caused public outrage. Gunfire erupted. One opposition bodyguard was killed. Civilians were injured. The Prime Minister called it a coup attempt. A former head of state, at a police station, speaking for a detained civilian, was labelled an insurrectionist.
Now, in May 2026, the same pattern has produced a dead child in Deyniile.
The trajectory is not difficult to read. A government that deploys armed force against civilians to clear land, that labels a police station visit by a former president a coup, that issues public threats invoking past crackdowns against protesters who ask for elections, is a government that has normalised the use of state violence against its own population as a political instrument. That normalisation is not stable. It escalates. The events of 6 May 2026 are not an endpoint. They are a warning of what comes next if the direction does not change.
The International Community: Present, Silent, Complicit
What makes Somalia’s current crisis so dangerous is not only what the president has done. It is what the international community has failed to do about it.
Western governments fund 88 per cent of AUSSOM. They have contributed billions to Somalia’s reconstruction over three decades. They cancelled $4.5 billion of Somalia’s debt in 2023. They are the reason the federal government in Mogadishu functions at all. And they have watched, largely in silence, as the government they finance has expelled its accountability mechanisms, conducted forced evictions, signed opaque energy deals, extended a presidential mandate through a parliament of expired mandates, and now killed a child in a land clearance operation.
The argument offered for this silence is pragmatic: Somalia cannot be sanctioned without collapsing; it cannot be abandoned without handing a strategic victory to Al-Shabaab; a compromised government is better than none. That calculation may have been defensible at some point. It is not defensible tonight, with a three-year-old buried in Deyniile and a mandate expiry eight days away and no agreed electoral process in sight.
When international partners fund a government’s security and say nothing about its governance failures, they do not maintain stability. They communicate to every actor in Somali politics that accountability has no price. They tell the president that Western engagement is unconditional. That message is the seed of exactly the anti-Western sentiment that Al-Shabaab needs. The partners planting that seed with their silence are not protecting their investment. They are destroying it slowly.
The African Union Commission, under Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, has been equally absent. The AU spoke correctly and loudly when Israel recognised Somaliland. It has said nothing about the parliamentary term extension, nothing about clan-aligned battalion deployments inside Mogadishu, nothing about unrecorded land revenues, and nothing about the evictions that produced last night’s killing. The AU deployed 84 observers to Uganda’s January 2026 elections. Somalia’s collapsing electoral process has attracted no comparable institutional attention. That silence gives Hassan Sheikh Mohamud continental cover. It tells him that what he is doing carries no African cost either.
Silence from partners is not neutrality. It is permission. And permission granted now, in these eight days, will be paid for at a far higher price later.
What Civil War Looks Like Before It Starts
Somalia has been to this place before. The Somali civil war did not begin suddenly. It began with a government that decided power-sharing was a threat, that concentrated authority in fewer and fewer hands, that used state forces against political opponents and called it governance, that alienated its international partners and called it sovereignty, that looted public resources and called it development. The country did not fall suddenly. It fell after the social contract collapsed under the accumulated weight of those decisions.
The conditions accumulating in Mogadishu in May 2026 are not identical to 1991. The institutions are different. The international presence is different. The political configuration is different. But the logic is recognisable: a government using force to resolve political disputes that require negotiation, creating enemies faster than it can suppress them, degrading the institutions that might otherwise contain the pressure, and moving towards a confrontation it cannot win cleanly but refuses to avoid.
The elite battalions deployed along sub-clan lines within Mogadishu are not a security architecture. They are a civil war waiting for a trigger. The land evictions radicalising civilian populations in Deyniile and beyond are not governance. They are recruitment. The unanswered questions about the energy deal and the land sales are not technical failures. They are grievances being stored for a moment when the political temperature rises high enough to ignite them.
Al-Shabaab advanced to less than 50 kilometres from Mogadishu by July 2025. Foreign embassies withdrew non-essential staff to Nairobi. The security gains of 2022 and 2023 have been reversed. The resources that should have sustained the counter-insurgency were redirected into suppressing domestic political opposition. The greatest external beneficiary of Somalia’s current internal crisis is the organisation the international community has spent three decades and billions of dollars trying to defeat.
The president has eight days left on his constitutional mandate. He has no agreed successor process. He has a capital city where government forces just killed a child in a land clearance operation. He has international partners whose patience with unconditional engagement is visibly exhausting. He has a political opposition that has been threatened, shot at, and labelled insurrectionist for asking for elections. He has a national army fractured along clan lines. And he has an African Union that is watching all of this and saying nothing.
This is what a country looks like on the verge of collapse. Not after the violence starts. Before it.
What Must Happen Now
The president still has the ability to change course. The mandate expires on 15 May. There is still time to convene a genuine, inclusive process, to reach an agreement with the opposition and the federal member states, to produce a credible electoral framework, and to begin a transition that does not require a confrontation nobody can afford.
International partners must stop calculating that silence is safer than engagement. It is not. Public conditionality — clearly stated, consistently enforced, coordinated across bilateral and multilateral channels — is the only tool that has a realistic chance of altering the trajectory before the trajectory becomes irreversible. The EU, the UK, Norway, the United States, and the AU all have leverage. They have chosen not to use it. That choice now has a name: Musamil Yusuf Osman, three years old, killed in Deyniile on 6 May 2026 during a government land clearance operation.
The Somali people did not elect this president to evict them from their homes, sign away their offshore resources in unpublished contracts, extend his own mandate through a parliament of expired terms, and then shoot at the civilians who object. They elected him to build a country.
Eight days remain. The choices made in those eight days will determine whether Somalia steps back from this edge or goes over it. The evidence of the past two years leaves little room for optimism. But the alternative to demanding better is accepting what happened last night in Deyniile as the new normal. That is not a price the Somali people should be asked to pay. It is not a price their partners should be willing to fund.
The geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa continues to highlight the contrast between the Republic of Somaliland and its neighbors, particularly the Federal Government of Somalia. As of early May 2026, public discussion has centered on President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, known as Dr. Irro, and his extended absence from the country, raising questions about what such travel means for state continuity and diplomatic strategy. Somaliland’s constitutional framework and political institutions help explain why an extended presidential absence does not automatically signal instability.
I wrote this blog post in response to concerns raised within the Somaliland diaspora about President Irro’s whereabouts, the length of his absence, and whether the silence surrounding the trip reflects hidden problems. Drawing on constitutional sources, regional reporting, and diplomatic context, this analysis aims to clarify the issue in a balanced way. My purpose is not to sensationalize the matter, but to show how Somaliland’s institutions can sustain governance while high-level diplomacy remains deliberately low profile.
President Irro’s reported travel to the United Arab Emirates in late April 2026 fits a broader pattern of discreet diplomacy in Somaliland’s external relations. Reporting on the trip suggests that the visit was linked to ongoing discussions with the UAE, a state that has long played an important economic role in Somaliland, including through investment connected to Berbera Port and related infrastructure. In a region shaped by Red Sea tensions, such engagements are best understood as part of Somaliland’s effort to advance economic and strategic interests through carefully managed diplomatic channels.
The limited public information surrounding the visit appears consistent with the confidential nature of sensitive diplomatic talks. In practice, governments often avoid disclosing full details of negotiations until outcomes are secure, both to preserve leverage and to reduce unnecessary political distraction. In Somaliland’s case, this discretion may also serve to protect the negotiation process from premature speculation and external interference.
Somaliland’s resilience during presidential travel rests on a constitutional framework that provides clear lines of authority. The Constitution establishes the executive branch as separate and independent, with the President at its head, the Vice-President empowered to act in the President’s absence or illness, and the Council of Ministers charged with assisting in the execution of government policy. Article 85 limits the President’s absence from the country to 45 consecutive days unless the absence is for health reasons, while Article 91 authorizes the Vice-President to act as President in the President’s absence. Article 94 further ensures continuity by assigning the Council of Ministers collective responsibility for state policy and administration.
This framework is important because it shows that continuity in Somaliland does not depend on constant presidential visibility. Instead, it depends on institutions that can absorb temporary absence without creating a constitutional vacuum. The presence of an active Vice-President and a functioning cabinet allows the state to continue operating while the President carries out external engagements.
Somaliland’s broader governance model also helps explain this stability. Alongside elected institutions, the political system incorporates the House of Elders, or Guurti, which has historically played a role in sustaining clan consensus and political balance. That hybrid arrangement has long contributed to conflict management and continuity in a society where formal state institutions and customary authority remain closely connected.
Irro’s victory in the 2024 presidential election, with 63.92 percent of the vote, marked a significant political transition and ended years of delayed electoral cycles. His mandate matters because it provides political space for a more active diplomatic agenda, including high-level engagement with foreign partners. Even so, the strength of that mandate should not be confused with immunity from domestic scrutiny, especially on issues of public services, transparency, and communication.
Somaliland’s foreign policy orientation has increasingly emphasized strategic visibility in the Red Sea and Gulf region. Public reporting and policy commentary indicate that the territory’s diplomatic relevance has grown in discussions involving Israel, the United States, and the UAE, especially as regional actors assess maritime security and Red Sea instability. Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in late 2025 also intensified international attention to Somaliland’s external posture, although the practical consequences of that recognition remain unfolding and should be described carefully rather than overstated.
Domestic criticism has not disappeared, and it should not be ignored. Concerns about public service delivery, governance controversies, and online dissatisfaction among younger citizens remain part of the political landscape. These critiques matter because they remind policymakers that diplomatic success is most durable when paired with visible domestic performance and clear communication to the public.
Somaliland’s position becomes even more striking when viewed beside Somalia’s current political uncertainty. Reports in March and April 2026 described contentious constitutional changes and parliamentary maneuvers in Mogadishu that may affect presidential and parliamentary timelines, while opposition figures challenged the legality and legitimacy of those changes. That contrast does not mean Somaliland is free of political contestation, but it does show that its institutions have so far been more effective at preserving continuity during executive travel and transition.
Over more than three decades, Somaliland has developed state practices that allow it to combine institutional continuity with diplomatic experimentation. President Irro’s UAE mission may eventually produce concrete economic or strategic gains, but its deeper significance lies in what it reveals about Somaliland’s governing style: deliberate, cautious, and institutionally anchored. The challenge ahead is to ensure that this diplomatic confidence is matched by domestic transparency, service delivery, and sustained public trust.
As Somaliland continues to consolidate its democratic gains and seek international recognition, the question of leadership becomes ever more critical. Among the contenders for the nation’s highest office, Hersi Ali H. Hassan, Chairman of the WADDANI Party, has emerged as a uniquely viable future leader. His blend of deep political experience and genuine engagement with diverse segments of society sets him apart in a crowded political landscape.
Political Maturity Forged Through Experience
Hersi Ali H. Hassan is not a novice in the corridors of power or the challenges of statecraft. Having served in senior governmental roles—including as Minister of Livestock and Fisheries, a portfolio vital to Somaliland’s economy—he understands both policy and public administration from within. His tenure in parliament further honed his legislative skills, giving him a comprehensive grasp of Somaliland’s legal and institutional frameworks.
Unlike leaders who rely solely on charisma, Hersi brings a track record of navigating complex political negotiations, managing resources in a resource-constrained environment, and advocating for Somaliland’s interests both locally and internationally. This depth of experience translates into readiness: he would require little on-the-job training to steer the nation through security, economic, and diplomatic challenges.
Engaging the Full Fabric of Society
What truly distinguishes Hersi is his deliberate, consistent outreach beyond traditional power bases. While many politicians focus on their clan or regional strongholds, Hersi has invested in building bridges across Somaliland’s diverse communities.
· Youth and Women: Under his leadership, WADDANI has actively created platforms for young people and women to participate in decision-making. Hersi regularly holds town‑hall style meetings in urban centers and rural areas alike, listening to the aspirations of first‑time voters and marginalized groups.
· Business and Diaspora: Recognizing that economic revival requires private sector dynamism, he has worked closely with business associations and the influential Somaliland diaspora. His proposals on investment incentives and remittance-friendly policies are shaped by direct dialogue with entrepreneurs abroad and at home.
· Religious and Traditional Elders: Hersi respects the role of guurti (traditional elders) in maintaining social harmony. He has consistently consulted them on conflict resolution and resource sharing, ensuring that development plans are culturally grounded.
· Civil Society and Intellectuals: From university lecturers to human rights advocates, Hersi has fostered an inclusive political culture that welcomes constructive critique. His public forums are known for allowing tough questions—a sign of confidence in his vision.
A Unifier in Polarised Times
Somaliland’s multiparty democracy has sometimes led to political gridlock and identity-based tensions. Hersi Ali H. Hassan has positioned himself as a unifier who prioritises national interest over partisan gain. His campaign messaging emphasises economic opportunity, security sector reform, and completing the push for recognition—issues that resonate across clan lines.
By consistently showing respect for opposition voices and engaging with civil society, he has earned a reputation as a statesman who listens before deciding. In a region where strongman politics often prevail, this collaborative style is both rare and refreshing.
Conclusion: The Viable Choice
Viability as a future leader rests on three pillars: competence, inclusivity, and vision. Hersi Ali H. Hassan demonstrates all three. His proven political experience equips him to govern effectively from day one. His active, respectful engagement with every layer of Somaliland society builds the trust necessary for lasting peace. And his focus on economic development and international recognition offers a clear roadmap forward.
As Somalilanders weigh their options, Hersi stands out not as a mere candidate, but as a leader ready to unite the nation and realise its long‑deferred promise. The time for experienced, consensus‑building leadership is now—and Hersi Ali H. Hassan is that leader.
Jama Ayaanle Feyte is .Journalist, Horn of Africa Security Expert and Political Analyst
