The Women’s Human Rights, Education & Environment Association (WHEEA) has published an article titled about “The Cost of Backlash; How Roll Backs on Women Rights Deepen Sexual Violence in Somaliland”, a series of consultations with internally displaced women (IDPs), educated girls, and women activists.
During these discussions, participants shared their personal experiences and highlighted key concerns, including violence against women, the lack of sustainable livelihoods, environmental challenges, limited access to education and adult literacy programs, weak economic opportunities, and the underrepresentation of women in decision-making roles.
WHEEA released this statement to raise public awareness of these pressing issues and to amplify the voices of women and girls—particularly those from displaced communities. The association calls on government institutions, community leaders, and partner organizations to take concrete, actionable steps toward protecting women’s rights, promoting women’s empowerment, and strengthening women’s participation across social, economic, and political spheres in Somaliland.
The statement issued by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission regarding Somaliland reflects a political position, not an objective or evidence-based assessment grounded in African realities, international law, or the African Union’s own historical findings.
First, it is important to state clearly that Somaliland’s quest for recognition is not an attempt to undermine Somalia’s unity, but a legitimate exercise of self-determination based on historical, legal, and political facts.
Somaliland was a sovereign and independent state in 1960, recognized by over 35 countries, before it voluntarily entered into a failed and unratified union with Somalia.
That union collapsed in 1991, restoring Somaliland’s previously recognized sovereignty.
Second, the African Union cannot selectively invoke the 1964 OAU borders principle while ignoring the fact that Somaliland’s borders are colonial borders inherited at independence, identical to those of the former British Somaliland Protectorate.
Recognition of Somaliland would therefore not redraw borders, but rather restore a pre-existing internationally recognized boundary, fully consistent with AU principles.
Third, it is deeply concerning that the Chairperson’s statement ignores the African Union’s own Fact-Finding Mission to Somaliland (2005). That mission concluded unequivocally that:
Somaliland’s case is unique and self-justified;
Somaliland has demonstrated peace, stability, democratic governance, and effective state institutions for more than three decades;
The Somaliland issue should not be compared to other separatist movements in Africa;
The AU should find a special, tailored approach to Somaliland’s recognition.
Disregarding this official AU report undermines the credibility of the Commission and raises serious questions about institutional consistency and integrity.
Fourth, the reality on the ground is that Somaliland has already begun to receive international recognition, including from states acting in accordance with their sovereign foreign policies.
This trend reflects geopolitical realities, regional security considerations, and Somaliland’s strategic importance in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa.
Recognition is not a theoretical debate anymore—it is a developing diplomatic reality, and more countries are expected to follow.
Finally, it must be stated respectfully but clearly that the Chairperson of the Commission, as a former Foreign Minister of Djibouti, appears to be articulating a position closely aligned with Djibouti’s national policy, rather than speaking as a neutral custodian of African continental interests.
The role of the AU Commission requires impartiality, balance, and adherence to facts, not the projection of individual state agendas onto the entire continent.
Africa cannot continue to penalize success, stability, and democratic governance.
Somaliland has built peace where chaos once prevailed, institutions where collapse existed, and democracy where authoritarianism dominates the region.
Denying recognition in the face of these realities weakens, rather than strengthens, Africa’s credibility.
The African Union must choose between political convenience and historical truth.
Somaliland’s case deserves fairness, honesty, and the implementation of the AU’s own findings—not perpetual delay.
Mohamed Ali
Chairman of Somaliland Intellectual Organization
#Somaliland #Israel #Somalilandrecognition #AfricanUnion
On Tuesday, December 26, Dr. Badr Abdel-Aty, Egypt’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Emigration, and Expatriate Affairs, received a series of telephone calls from His Excellency Abshir Omar Jama, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Somalia; His Excellency Hakan Fidan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye; and His Excellency Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Djibouti.
The calls focused on the dangerous escalation of tensions recently witnessed in the Horn of Africa region.
The discussions specifically addressed the matter of Israel’s recognition of the Somaliland region. The ministers expressed their unequivocal and firm rejection and condemnation of this recognition. They reaffirmed their full support for the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Somalia, and categorically opposed any unilateral measures that could infringe upon Somalia’s sovereignty or undermine the foundations of the country’s stability. Furthermore, they declared their full backing for the legitimate institutions of the Somali government and rejected any attempt to establish parallel entities or administrations that challenge the unity of the Somali state.
During the calls, it was also stressed that recognizing the independence of parts of a sovereign state’s territory sets a dangerous precedent that threatens international peace and security, and contravenes the established principles of international law and the United Nations Charter. It was affirmed that respect for the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of nations is a cornerstone of the international order, which must not be violated under any circumstances.
The ministers also clearly denounced all attempts to create faits accomplis or establish parallel structures that bypass international legitimacy and jeopardize prospects for peace, stability, and development.
Finally, they firmly rejected any and all plans to displace or resettle the Palestinian people outside of their homeland—a position shared and fully supported by the vast majority of the international community, in any form or guise.
Somaliland’s 30-year quest for recognition exposes the limits of Africa’s rigid colonial-border doctrine and challenges the African Union to confront a political and legal reality it can no longer ignore.
For over three decades, a quiet, stable democracy has flourished on the Horn of Africa, a beacon of peace in a region synonymous with chaos. This nation, Somaliland, has its own currency, its own army, its own elected government, and its own passport. Yet, in the eyes of the world, and crucially, in the eyes of the African Union (AU), it does not exist.
Somaliland’s story is not one of a typical secessionist movement. It is a profound legal and political anomaly, a direct challenge to the African continent’s most sacred, yet most problematic, doctrine: the principle of uti possidetis juris—the iron law that perpetuates colonialism on African borders.
The dilemma is stark. On one side stands the AU, fearing that recognizing Somaliland will open a “Pandora’s Box, unleashing a wave of border revisionism and fragmentation across the continent. On the other side is a fully functioning, self-governing state that claims it is not breaking a border but merely restoring one—the distinct boundary of the former British Somaliland Protectorate, which existed before a disastrous, flawed union with the former Italian Trust Territory of Somalia in 1960.
The continued non-recognition of Somaliland is more than a diplomatic slight; it is a policy failure that ignores a stable, democratic reality in favour of a rigid, theoretical principle. The question for the AU is no longer if Somaliland is a state, but whether its unique circumstances justify an exceptional, pragmatic solution that could redefine the future of African sovereignty.
The Flawed Marriage of 1960
Somaliland’s claim to independence is rooted in the argument that its union with Somalia in 1960 was legally flawed from its inception and failed catastrophically in the decades that followed.
On June 26, 1960, British Somaliland gained its independence. Five days later, on July 1, it voluntarily united with the newly independent Italian Trust Territory of Somalia to form the Somali Republic. This “come-we-stay” union, as legal scholars like Judge Eugene Cotran described it, was rushed, romantic, and ultimately, legally unsound.
The legislative instruments intended to formalize the union were never properly enacted. The Provisional President’s decree unifying the two territories was never converted into law as required by the Constitution. As Judge Cotran noted, the key legal documents—the Union of Somaliland and Somalia Law and the Somalia Act of the Union—were never formally signed by representatives of both territories.
A retroactive “Act of Union” was passed in January 1961, but this action arguably breached the very constitution it sought to uphold. The failure to properly formalize the union was a symptom of a deeper incompatibility. The two territories had inherited vastly different legal, judicial, and administrative systems from their respective colonial masters, Britain and Italy. The attempt to merge these disparate systems, along with the imposition of a highly centralized, unitary political system, disregarded the decentralized governance models, such as the traditional xeer system, prevalent in the north.
This political mismatch quickly devolved into marginalization and, eventually, brutal military suppression. The military dictatorship that seized power in 1969 focused its wrath on the northern regions (Somaliland), leading to a devastating civil war in the 1980s. The systematic bombing of cities like Hargeisa by the central government remains a scar on the national memory. Following the collapse of the central government in 1991, Somaliland declared the restoration of its independence on May 18, 1991. Since then, Mogadishu has not exercised any administrative control over the territory.
The Case for Statehood: A De Facto Reality
Somaliland’s argument for recognition rests on two pillars: its compliance with the international legal criteria for statehood and its unique historical claim.
The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933), which sets the standard for statehood, requires four qualifications: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Somaliland meets these criteria in practice, if not in name.
Criterion
Somaliland’s Evidence
Status
Permanent Population
Estimated population of 5.7 million people.
Meets Criterion
Defined Territory
The internationally recognized borders of the former British Somaliland Protectorate.
Meets Criterion
Government
A stable, functioning, and democratically elected government with effective administrative control over its territory since 1991.
Meets Criterion
Capacity to Enter into Relations
Maintains numerous “government-to-government dealings” with states (e.g., Ethiopia, Taiwan, UK, UAE) and international organizations (e.g., EU), including hosting consulates and liaison offices in Hargeisa.
Meets Criterion (De Facto)
Under the declaratory theory of statehood, meeting these factual and objective criteria should be sufficient, regardless of formal recognition by other states. The 1991 British commercial court ruling in Republic of Somalia v Woodhouse Drake & Carey (Suisse) SA further supports this pragmatic view, as the court considered the degree, nature, and stability of administrative control as a key factor in determining the existence of a government.
However, Somaliland’s most powerful argument is its historical one. Its independence is not an act of secession that seeks to create a new border, but an act of re-establishing the original colonial boundary that existed prior to the failed 1960 union. This directly invokes the spirit of the AU’s own border principle. The AU’s commitment to uti possidetis (Latin meaning “as you possess”) is to respect the “borders existing on achievement of independence.” Somaliland achieved independence within its colonial borders on June 26, 1960. Its separation from Somalia is therefore a restoration of a recognized colonial boundary, not a revisionist claim. This makes Somaliland a unique case, distinct from irredentist or sub-state secessionist movements that seek to redraw existing lines.
The Cairo Resolution and the precedent problem
The AU’s reluctance to recognize Somaliland is rooted in its interpretation of the 1964 Cairo Resolution, which is the legal foundation for the inviolability of colonial borders. The resolution states that all member states “pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence.”
The original intent of the resolution was pragmatic: to prevent interstate conflicts arising from irredentist claims, such as Somalia’s own historical claims on the territories of its neighbours. It was not explicitly designed to preclude internal boundary adjustments or the dissolution of a failed union, especially one where the internal border was itself a former international colonial boundary.
Yet, the AU has adopted a maximalist interpretation, treating the resolution as a blanket prohibition on all border changes—often incorrectly termed the “intangibility principle.” This interpretation is codified in Article 4(b) of the AU Constitutive Act.
Defenders of this rigid stance argue that recognizing Somaliland would set a dangerous precedent, potentially destabilizing countries with their own internal separatist movements. However, Somaliland counters this “Pandora’s Box” argument by pointing to two key precedents already set by the AU: Eritrea and South Sudan.
Case
Parent State
AU/OAU Stance
Key Distinction
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Recognized
Independence was based on the restoration of a distinct Italian colonial boundary and followed a prolonged war and a referendum.
South Sudan
Sudan
Recognized
Independence was achieved through a negotiated process and a referendum, following a comprehensive peace agreement. Sudan and South Sudan are separated by the 1 January 1956 British colonial boundary.
Somaliland
Somalia
Unrecognized
Independence is based on the restoration of a distinct British colonial boundary and the failure of the parent state. The lack of a negotiated settlement with Somalia is the primary obstacle.
While both Eritrea and South Sudan were ultimately recognized, the key difference for Somaliland is the lack of a negotiated settlement with Somalia. The international community tends to favour the position of the parent state, making Somalia’s assent—or at least a negotiated agreement—a likely prerequisite for full UN and AU membership. This is the political hurdle that Somaliland must clear, even with its strong legal and historical case.
A path forward: criteria for exceptionalism
The continued denial of recognition is not a defence of the uti possidetis principle, but a perpetuation of instability and an obstacle to regional integration. The AU must develop a policy framework that addresses cases of state failure and the restoration of colonial boundaries without undermining the core principle.
A criteria-based approach for exceptional cases of state dissolution and re-establishment of colonial borders is the most pragmatic path forward. This approach would allow the AU to acknowledge the reality of Somaliland’s de facto statehood while simultaneously safeguarding the continent against widespread fragmentation.
The criteria for such exceptional recognition could include the following. First, an obligation to restore a boundary existing at independence if the claim is based on the re-establishment of a distinct, internationally recognized colonial boundary that existed before the formation of the failed union. This is the unique legal hook that separates Somaliland from other secessionist movements.
Second, if there is a protracted state failure where the parent state (Somalia) has demonstrated a prolonged and irreversible failure to exercise effective sovereignty and administrative control over the territory for a significant period (e.g., three decades).
Third, if the aspiring state demonstrates a sustained record of peace, stability, democratic governance, and respect for human rights. Somaliland has held multiple successful presidential and parliamentary elections, a stark contrast to the instability in Mogadishu.
Fourth,if the aspiring state formally renounces any irredentist claims on the territory of its neighbours, thereby affirming its commitment to the existing colonial borders it seeks to restore.
The Geopolitical Chessboard
The debate over Somaliland is no longer confined to the halls of the AU. The geopolitical landscape is shifting, and major global powers are increasingly engaging with Hargeisa, driven by strategic interests.
Somaliland’s location on the Gulf of Aden, near the Bab el-Mandeb strait—a critical chokepoint for global shipping—makes it strategically vital. Concerns over counter-terrorism, maritime security, and the competition for influence in the Horn of Africa have led to increased engagement from countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates.
The US government, for instance, has shown a growing willingness to bypass Mogadishu and engage directly with Hargeisa on security and development matters. Congressional actions and the establishment of a US presence in the capital suggest that external actors are losing patience with the AU’s rigid stance. This external engagement, while beneficial to Somaliland, puts pressure on the AU to either adapt its policy or risk having its norms circumvented by international actors who prioritize stability and strategic access over adherence to a decades-old, arguably flawed, legal doctrine.
A chance to strengthen the AU
The case of Somaliland is a litmus test for the AU’s ability to evolve and adapt its foundational principles to modern realities. It is not a typical secessionist movement; it is the consequence of a failed political union and the restoration of a distinct colonial boundary.
The AU’s rigid adherence to a maximalist interpretation of the Cairo Resolution, while understandable in its goal of preventing fragmentation, ignores the unique legal and historical facts of the Somaliland case. By adopting a nuanced, criteria-based approach, the AU can acknowledge the reality of Somaliland’s de facto statehood without opening the feared “Pandora’s Box.”
Recognizing Somaliland as an exceptional case—one that affirms the original colonial boundaries rather than violates them—would strengthen the AU’s credibility, reward stability and democracy, and provide a constructive solution to a long-standing political and legal anomaly on the continent. The continued denial of recognition is not a defence of the uti possidetis principle, but a perpetuation of instability and an obstacle to regional integration. It is time for the AU to choose pragmatism over dogma and acknowledge the state that has already built itself.
Dr Wafula Okumu is theExecutive Director of The Borders Institute (TBI), Nairobi. Kenya. The views expressed in this Op-Ed article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent The Horn Tribune’s editorial policy.
In a significant diplomatic development, Israel and the Republic of Somaliland have signed a mutual recognition agreement and established full diplomatic relations, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar announced today.
In a statement, Sa’ar said he had spoken with Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (also known as Irro) on what he described as “this important day for both countries.” The agreement follows a year of comprehensive dialogue between the two sides.
“Following the decision of Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, we signed today a mutual recognition and the establishment of full diplomatic relations,” Sa’ar stated. This will include the appointment of ambassadors and the opening of embassies in each other’s capitals.
The agreement is expected to enhance cooperation in areas such as security, economic development, and regional stability, particularly in the strategic Horn of Africa and Red Sea region. Sa’ar emphasized that both nations will work together to advance relations between their peoples and promote economic prosperity.
“I have instructed my offices to act immediately to formalize ties between the countries across a variety of fields,” he added.
The agreement may pave the way for further international engagement with Somaliland, including potential involvement in broader frameworks like the Abraham Accords.
Israel becomes the first country to recognize the Republic of Somaliland as an independent state, more than three decades after it broke away from Somalia.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar sign the declaration for Israel, while Somaliland’s President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi signs for his country.
Somaliland, a Sunni Muslim country, enjoyed five days of independence in 1960, during which time it was recognized by Israel and 34 other countries before uniting with Somalia. Somaliland formally broke away in 1991, and while no other countries recognized it, several powerful countries — the UK, Ethiopia, Turkey, UAE, Denmark, Kenya and Taiwan — maintained liaison offices.
Speaking to Abdullahi by phone, Netanyahu says the friendship between the countries is “seminal and historic.”
“We intend to work together with you on economic fields, on agriculture, in the fields of social development,” Netanyahu says.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu statement
I announced today the official recognition of the Republic of Somaliland as an independent and sovereign state.
Together with Foreign Minister Sa’ar and the President of the Republic of Somaliland, we signed a joint and mutual declaration.
This declaration is in the spirit of the Abraham Accords, signed at the initiative of President Trump.
I congratulated the President of Somaliland, Dr. Abdirahman Mohamed Abdallah, and praised his leadership and commitment to promoting stability and peace. I invited the President to pay an official visit to Israel.
The President thanked me for this historic declaration and expressed appreciation for my achievements in fighting terrorism and advancing regional peace.
I thank Foreign Minister Sa’ar, the Head of Mossad David Barnea and the Mossad, for their contribution to today’s development, and I wish the people of Somaliland success, prosperity, and freedom.
The State of Israel plans to immediately expand its relations with the Republic of Somaliland through extensive cooperation in the fields of agriculture, health, technology, and economy.
The African Union’s swift condemnation of Israel’s recognition of the Republic of Somaliland, as articulated by Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, represents a knee-jerk defense of colonial-era borders at the expense of self-determination, effective governance, and regional stability. This rigid adherence to the 1964 OAU resolution on the intangibility of borders is not principled but selective and counterproductive, perpetuating instability in the Horn of Africa rather than resolving it.
Republic of Somaliland is not merely a “breakaway” region, as the AU often portrays it. It was a distinct British Somaliland Protectorate that achieved independence on June 26, 1960, and was recognized by over 30 countries—including Israel—before voluntarily uniting with Italian Somaliland to form Somalia. That union dissolved violently in 1991 amid civil war, genocide, and total state collapse. Since then, Somaliland has governed itself peacefully for over 34 years: conducting multiple free and fair elections, maintaining security, and establishing functional institutions. In stark contrast, Somalia’s federal government in Mogadishu controls limited territory, battles Al-Shabaab insurgency, relies on clan militias and foreign troops (including the AU-led AUSSOM mission), and depends heavily on international aid.
The AU’s selective application of its border principles is glaringly hypocritical. The organization has endorsed secessions when politically expedient—Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia in 1993 (via referendum) and South Sudan’s from Sudan in 2011 (following a peace deal and referendum)—despite those cases lacking Somaliland’s historical claim to pre-union independence or its proven record of stability and democracy. The AU’s 2005 fact-finding mission to Somaliland itself described the situation as “unique and self-justified in African political history” and recommended finding a special approach. Yet, no action followed, likely due to geopolitical pressures from powerful patrons rather than any genuine commitment to unity.
Chairperson Youssouf’s warning of “dangerous precedents” rings hollow. The real precedent is the AU’s ongoing refusal to engage with Somaliland’s reality, which sustains a failed state in Mogadishu, fuels perpetual conflict, and hinders economic progress. Somaliland’s Berbera port, bolstered by investments from the UAE and Ethiopia, offers a gateway for regional trade and development—yet the AU clings to a fiction that isolates this success story.
The AU claims to uphold Somalia’s “unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.” But what sovereignty exists when Mogadishu governs little beyond its capital and relies on external forces for survival? Somaliland neither needs nor desires such imposed “unity”—it has forged a more stable, democratic, and prosperous future independently.
Israel’s recognition rewards a functioning democracy that poses no threat to regional peace, unlike the ongoing chaos in southern Somalia. Far from undermining stability, it acknowledges a reality that the AU ignores: Republic of Somaliland exists and thrives despite decades of diplomatic isolation. True leadership would involve learning from Somaliland’s model of self-governance rather than condemning it.
The Republic of Somaliland is a de jure state with a track record of peace and progress. Recognition of this fact—not blind loyalty to outdated colonial maps—would better advance peace, prosperity, and self-determination across Africa. The AU should reconsider its stance: Republic of Somaliland is here to stay, whether the organization accepts it or not.
PRESS RELEASE: WADDANI Party Endorses National Electoral Commission Decision
Hargeisa, December 24, 2025 – The WADDANI opposition party has formally accepted and endorsed the National Electoral Commission’s (NEC) procedural decision concerning voter registration for the upcoming elections in the Republic of Somaliland.
Issued earlier today, the NEC’s decision details the voter registration process to be implemented nationwide and mandates the correction of inaccuracies within the existing voter registry. The WADDANI party regards the decision as fully consistent with the legal framework, which authorizes the NEC to establish such procedures.
In a statement reaffirming its respect for the Commission’s independence, WADDANI announced its support for the voter registration plan and welcomed all lawful decisions by the NEC that facilitate the timely holding of parliamentary and local council elections as scheduled on May 31, 2026.
· END –
Hirsi Ali H. Hassan
Chairman, WADDANI Party
Hargeisa, Somaliland
Hargeisa – The KAAH party has strongly criticized the decision issued today by the National Electoral Commission (NEC) regarding voter registration and electoral procedures, calling it biased.
In a statement published on its official Facebook page, the party declared:
“The KAAH party views the decision announced today by the NEC as one-sided, demonstrating irresponsibility, acting against the national interest, and failing to reflect the true reality and internal circumstances within the NEC offices.
Consequently, we will issue a response in the near future—a response grounded in accountability, transparency, responsibility, integrity, patriotism, and the public interest—and will announce the KAAH party’s official stance on this decision.
There will be no retreat.”
— Mr. Abdulkarim Mohamed Haji Ali
Deputy Chairman for Regions and Districts, KAAH Party
Hargeisa, December 2025 – His Excellency President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi (Cirro) chaired the 47th session of the Council of Ministers today at the Presidential Palace, with Vice President Mohamed Ali Aw Cabdi in attendance.
The session featured comprehensive briefings from key ministries, covering security, economic performance, public health, livestock development, youth engagement, and governance. Below are the key outcomes:
Security Situation Rated Stable
Minister of Interior and National Security Abdalle Mohamed Carab reported nationwide stability, with no significant security disturbances recorded across Somaliland’s regions. The main challenges remain petty crime and road accidents, which continue to be the leading cause of fatalities.
Economic Growth and Revenue on Track
Minister of Finance and Economic Development Abdullahi Hassan Aadan confirmed that revenue collection is meeting 2025 budget targets, keeping the government on course to achieve its annual fiscal objectives. He also thanked all branches of government for their collaboration in the timely preparation and approval of the 2026 National Budget—the first to be completed within the standard budgetary timeline.
In a related development, the Minister noted ongoing efforts to enhance operations at Berbera Port, following a recent working visit by a high-level Ethiopian trade delegation. The delegation, led by the Secretary-General of the Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce, toured the port, the National Strategic Fuel Reserve, and the Berbera Free Zone.
Public Health Priorities and Drought Advisory
Minister of Health Development Dr. Hussein Bashir Hirsi provided an update on national health services, emphasizing epidemic prevention, healthcare accessibility, and quality improvement. Given current drought conditions, the Minister issued a public advisory urging citizens to exercise caution regarding drinking water quality.
Livestock Sector Identified as Economic Backbone
Minister of Livestock and Rural Development Dr. Omar Shucayb Mohamed reported on the outcomes of the recent National Livestock Trade Conference, describing the sector as the core of Somaliland’s economy. The conference highlighted the need for a national strategy, increased investment, and public-private collaboration to address value-chain challenges and expand into international markets.
Key opportunities identified included modernizing hide production, developing meat and dairy processing, and meeting export certification standards.
Youth and Sports Development Advancing
Minister of Youth and Sports Ahmed-Yassin Mohamed Farah announced that regional youth forums have been successfully concluded and that the National Youth Forum will be held in Berbera on January 1, 2026. Preparations are also underway for a national inter-regional sports tournament designed to promote talent, transparency, and social cohesion.
Government Performance Reporting Framework Introduced
Minister of the Presidency Khadar Hussein Abdi outlined a new framework for assessing government performance in 2025 using Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). The system is intended to enhance accountability and track progress against electoral commitments and national priorities. He also emphasized the need to finalize and implement a unified Government Communication Strategy.
National Land Management Policy Deliberations Begin
Government Spokesperson Ali Bashe Mohamed and Minister of Public Works, Land, and Housing Hussein Ahmed Caydiid presented the draft National Land Management Policy, which seeks to provide a clear, equitable, and legally sound framework for land administration and conflict prevention. Discussion on the policy will continue in the next session.
The Council of Ministers is scheduled to reconvene to further review pending policy matters and continue deliberations on the national agenda.
