Key Takeaways:
- The author reads the Ethiopia–Somaliland memorandum as a territorial bargain, not a normal trade deal: Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland would come only after a specified land handover, with Mogadishu excluded.
- The core clause is described as a 50-year lease near Lughaya—a coastal strip plus an inland corridor with road and rail—giving Ethiopia “full control and jurisdiction,” in exchange for unsellable Ethiopian Airlines shares.
- The piece argues this violates Somalia’s internationally recognized borders and AU norms, clashes with Ethiopia’s later Ankara Declaration with Somalia, and could set a dangerous precedent if outside powers deal with breakaway authorities instead of Mogadishu.
Read on its own terms, the memorandum is not a trade agreement dressed up in diplomatic language. It is a template for dismembering a UN member state. And it was written by two parties that have no standing, individually or together, to do that.
Recognition As Leverage, Not Principle
Article II is the clearest tell. Ethiopia does not commit to recognizing Somaliland as a matter of law or historical justice. It commits to recognizing Somaliland “immediately after” a specified territorial handover. The two sides also agree to coordinate their “political efforts and outreach to stakeholders” toward that end. Recognition, in other words, is the payment, not the principle. That is not how states normally address secession claims. It is how states normally address property transfers. The mechanism turns one region’s disputed constitutional status into a bargaining chip for a third country’s port access. Mogadishu is never at the table.
Article X Does The Real Work
Strip away the framing about “partnership and cooperation” in health, agriculture and culture. Article X is the substance of the document. It provides for a 50-year lease of a coastal strip near eastern Lughaya: 20 kilometers wide along the coast and 20 kilometers inland. It also includes a land corridor from the Ethiopian border to the coastline, complete with its own highway and railway. Ethiopia is to receive “full control and jurisdiction” over that territory. It may not sublease or transfer it. And it is to take possession within 30 days of signing.
That is not a commercial port-use agreement. It is a description of a foreign military and administrative enclave, carved out of territory that remains Somali sovereign soil under the Somali constitution and the overwhelming weight of international recognition. The compensation on offer underlines the imbalance: shares in Ethiopian Airlines that cannot be sold or transferred. Somaliland is being offered paper equity in a foreign national carrier in exchange for permanent foreign jurisdiction over its coastline.
Why This Is Somalia’s Grievance, Not Only Hargeisa’s
Somaliland is free to argue its case for independence in whatever forum will hear it. What it cannot do is unilaterally grant a third country a 50-year lease, full jurisdiction and a dedicated transport corridor over territory that is still, in the eyes of the African Union and the United Nations, part of Somalia. Every government that has ever opened an embassy in Mogadishu rather than Hargeisa recognizes that too. The African Union’s founding commitment to the inviolability of colonial-era borders exists precisely to prevent this kind of arrangement, where a breakaway administration and an outside power settle between themselves questions that belong to the sovereign state and the wider international system.
Ethiopia’s position compounds the problem. This is a government that has struggled to hold its own federal system together, and that fought a civil war in Tigray over questions of territorial control. Now it is proposing to solve its own maritime access problem by treating a Somali region’s contested status as negotiable, with whichever local authority is willing to sign. That is not regional cooperation. It is a landlocked state exporting the costs of its own geography onto a weaker neighbor’s internal fault lines.
The Precedent Problem
This memorandum matters well beyond Berbera and Lughaya. Somalia’s federal member states, and the unresolved administrative disputes across Sool, Sanaag and Cayn, all sit in its shadow. If Addis Ababa can trade recognition for territory with a breakaway administration, that model is available to any outside power patient enough to find a Somali faction willing to sign. That is the real reason Mogadishu’s objections were not parochial in 2024, and remain live today. A precedent, once normalized, does not need the original deal to survive in order to keep doing damage.
What Should Follow
Ethiopia signed the Ankara Declaration with Somalia in December 2024, committing both sides to respect each other’s unity and territorial integrity. Addis Ababa cannot credibly hold that commitment in one hand while keeping the Somaliland memorandum active in the other. It owes Somalia, and the region, a clear statement of which document actually governs its position. Somalia, for its part, has signaled openness to a maritime arrangement negotiated on its own terms. That offer, not a side deal with a breakaway administration, is the version of “sea access” that regional stability can survive.
Appendix: Text of the Memorandum
Memorandum of Understanding for Partnership and Co-operation between the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and Somaliland
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and Somaliland:
Reaffirming their longstanding solidarity, fraternity and friendship,
Committed to foster a close partnership that would contribute to peace and security in the Horn of Africa and the broader region,
Desiring to encourage closer economic cooperation and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being,
Considering their common concern in the maintenance of peace and security in the Horn of Africa,
Having resolved to conclude this Memorandum of Partnership and Cooperation,
Agree as follows:
ARTICLE I
The relationship between the parties shall be based on the principles of good faith cooperation and partnership for the advancement of mutual interests.
The purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding is to identify the major fields of cooperation and provide a framework to govern their overall engagement and partnership.
ARTICLE II
The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia shall extend recognition to Somaliland immediately after the designated area stipulated under Article X of this agreement. The parties shall coordinate their political efforts and outreach to stakeholders in the lead up to this determination.
The contracting parties shall hold regular consultations through the Joint Ministerial Platform established pursuant to this Memorandum of Understanding, and through other modalities as necessary, to harmonize and coordinate their views in international forums to advance common objectives and positions. They shall also cooperate in the areas of foreign service and diplomacy.
ARTICLE III
The contracting parties shall cooperate in trade and investment by developing physical infrastructure linkages to increase the flow of trade and investment.
The parties shall jointly invest in and develop the facilities and infrastructure necessary for the utilization of the Berbera Port, including a railway and a highway. The modalities and detailed arrangements for such joint investment shall be provided in subsequent agreements to be concluded by the parties.
The Berbera railway, as necessary to be linked with other railway networks in the area, shall be prioritized by the parties in their joint infrastructure development efforts.
The parties shall enter into a bilateral trade and investment agreement to foster greater economic integration.
ARTICLE IV
The Contracting Parties shall cooperate in infrastructure, water and energy sectors.
The FDRE undertakes to use the Berbera port facilities, on competitive market terms that cannot be greater than the prevailing market rate, for not less than 10% of its annual import and export.
The FDRE shall supply electricity to Somaliland on competitive market terms that cannot be greater than the prevailing market rate.
The detailed terms and conditions for the undertakings indicated in Article IV (2) and (3) shall be negotiated and agreed upon by the parties.
ARTICLE V
The Contracting Parties shall cooperate in the agricultural sector through training and capacity building in small scale irrigation, watershed development, food security and disaster management, control of trans-boundary animal and plant diseases, surveillance and control of livestock, fish and crop diseases and pests, exchange of experience in agricultural extension and rural development, environmental management and afforestation programs, and any other fields that may be mutually agreed upon.
ARTICLE VI
The contracting parties shall cooperate in the health sector and work in collaboration in building the capacity of health professionals and medical practitioners, malaria control, epidemiological surveillance, research, exchange of health professionals for the purpose of sharing new techniques and technologies, experience sharing in the provision of primary health care, nutrition and immunization, and any other fields that may be mutually agreed upon.
ARTICLE VII
The Contracting Parties shall cooperate in the education sector through capacity building and experience sharing at all levels of education and training, including technical and vocational education; the promotion of higher education; and promotion of alternative basic education, as well as any other fields that may be mutually agreed upon.
ARTICLE VIII
The Contracting Parties shall cooperate in the cultural sector through the exchange of cultural troupes, artifacts, experts and information sharing, as well as exchange of experiences on indigenous knowledge preservation and utilization; promotion of cooperation between national museums, libraries and archives, as well as exchange of delegations, publications and expert visits; preservation and restoration of cultural heritage, and any other fields that may be mutually agreed upon.
ARTICLE IX
The Contracting Parties shall cooperate in the defense and security sectors. This cooperation shall include but is not limited to: military training, education and technical assistance; exchange of information on defense, security and intelligence matters; countering terrorism and combating organized and transnational crimes; and any other fields and technical arrangements that may be mutually agreed upon.
ARTICLE X
Somaliland shall provide a 50-year lease of a coastal area with a 20 km width along the coast and a 20 km length inland (hereinafter referred to as the “leasehold area”) near eastern Lughaya to the FDRE for the establishment of a naval base and the development of commercial maritime facilities.
The leasehold area shall include the maritime zones adjacent to the coastline on which a coastal state might exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, as well as a land corridor from the Ethiopian border to the coastline.
The land corridor shall include a highway and a railway going from the border to the naval base and maritime facilities. A map and GPS coordinates of the leasehold area shall be annexed to this Memorandum of Understanding.
The FDRE shall exercise full control and jurisdiction over the leasehold area. The FDRE shall not sublease, transfer control, assign territory or pledge to a third party.
The leasehold area shall be transferred over to Ethiopia within 30 days from the signing of this Memorandum of Understanding.
In lieu of rent for the lease indicated under sub-article 1 of this Article, the FDRE shall grant Somaliland shares in Ethiopian Airlines. The number of shares to be granted shall be agreed upon between the parties. These shares may not be sold, transferred, assigned, pledged, or encumbered to a third party.
Upon expiry of the period stipulated under sub-article 1 of this Article, the parties shall negotiate in good faith the terms for the extension of the leasehold, taking into account the investment of the FDRE in the leasehold area.
ARTICLE XI
The contracting parties hereby establish a Joint Ministerial Platform to oversee implementation of this agreement.
The Joint Ministerial Platform shall meet at least twice a year; it may hold extraordinary meetings as it may deem necessary.
About Ismail H. Warsame
Ismail H. Warsame is a Somali policy analyst, author, and one of the founding figures of Puntland State, a Federal Member State of Somalia. He served as the state’s first Chief of Staff (Chief of Cabinet) to the Presidency during Puntland’s formative years (1998–2004), helping build its administrative institutions during the early period of decentralized constitutional governance in Somalia. He later worked with the joint UN–World Bank Reconstruction and Development Programme as Zonal Technical Coordinator for Puntland, and subsequently as National Aid Technical Coordinator with Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government in cooperation with the European Union. Warsame is the founder of Warsame Policy & Media Network (WAPMEN) and Warsame Digital Media (WDM), through which he has published editorials, policy papers, and historical essays on Somali federalism, constitutional governance, security, and state-building. He is the author of several books on Somali political development, including Talking Truth to Power in an Undemocratic and Tribal Context, which examines the tension between clan loyalty and constitutional government. Professionally trained in Thermal Power Engineering, Warsame combines technical background with decades of institutional and analytical experience. He is based in Toronto, Canada, and travels frequently to the Horn of Africa — including Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia — to maintain firsthand engagement with the region he writes about. He writes for policymakers, scholars, and the Somali diaspora on federalism, security, and the rule of law.
