Fifteen years after Erdoğan’s historic visit, Ankara’s expanding role in Somali resources sparks sovereignty concerns
By Jama Ayaanle Feyte
MOGADISHU — It has been exactly 15 years since Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan first set foot in Mogadishu on August 19, 2011. At the time, he was Turkey’s prime minister, and his visit marked a historic turning point—the first by a non-African leader in nearly two decades.
The mission was humanitarian. Somalia was in the grips of its worst drought in 60 years, and Erdoğan came to spotlight the urgent need for famine relief. Just days earlier, an Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) meeting in Istanbul had raised over $105 million for the crisis.
But much has changed since that landmark visit. Today, Turkey’s role in Somalia has evolved far beyond humanitarian aid—and the transformation is fueling intense political debate.
A Political Balancing Act
Somalia’s fragile political landscape is once again bristling with tensions over foreign influence, with Turkey’s role in internal affairs drawing particular scrutiny. Opposition politicians and analysts charge that Ankara plays a visible role in propping up President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration. Government supporters, however, frame the relationship as a strategic partnership between two sovereign nations.
Beyond the political maneuvering, deeper concerns are emerging among Somali lawmakers, civil society groups, and international observers that Turkey’s expanding presence in Somalia’s extractive industries may represent a new form of economic exploitation rather than genuine partnership.
Oil and Gas: A Deal Heavily Favouring Ankara
In March 2024, Somalia and Turkey signed a hydrocarbon exploration and production agreement granting Turkey’s state-owned energy company, TPAO, exclusive rights to explore three offshore blocks—each covering approximately 5,000 square kilometres.
Turkish seismic surveys have reportedly identified up to 20 billion barrels of commercially viable oil. Drilling operations began in April 2026 with the arrival of the Turkish drillship Çağrı Bey.
But the agreement’s terms have ignited fierce criticism. A leaked copy reveals that Turkey is entitled to recoup all exploration and operational costs through a “cost petroleum” model, after which it may claim up to 90 percent of extracted oil and gas revenue. Somalia, by contrast, is guaranteed just 5 percent of revenue during initial phases.
Somali MP Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame described the deal as “deeply imbalanced,” warning that it allocates over 90 percent of benefits to one side, leaving Somalia with little meaningful revenue from its own resources.
Analysts have further noted the agreement exempts the Turkish contractor from signature, development, or production bonuses, as well as surface fees and administrative charges—standard revenue streams in similar deals elsewhere.
Fisheries: Centralised Control Through SOMTURK
In December 2025, Somalia and Turkey signed a fisheries and “blue economy” agreement establishing a joint company called SOMTURK to manage all licensing and fishing activities within Somalia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The company is managed by a Turkish military-linked entity.
While Somali officials have hailed the deal as a “win-win partnership,” critics argue it effectively outsources control of Somalia’s rich marine resources—among the world’s most abundant—to Turkish interests.
Mining: Uranium and Critical Minerals in Ankara’s Sights
Somalia is estimated to hold over 10,200 tons of uranium reserves, with around 7,600 tons considered commercially recoverable, according to International Atomic Energy Agency data. Surveys have also identified deposits of lithium, copper, titanium, gold, and rare earth elements.
In May 2026, Somali officials confirmed they are seeking to deepen cooperation with Turkey in the mining sector, building on a 2016 memorandum of understanding. While the government presents this as an opportunity to develop long-dormant mineral reserves, there is little public information on proposed revenue-sharing terms or environmental and social safeguards.
Infrastructure and Strategic Assets
Turkey has also taken a leading role in managing Somalia’s key infrastructure. Turkish conglomerate Albayrak operates the Port of Mogadishu, with the government claiming revenues increased tenfold under Turkish management. Turkey has additionally deployed F-16 fighter jets and tanks, and is reportedly constructing an aerospace base northeast of Mogadishu.
While framed as security cooperation, these moves raise questions about long-term strategic implications for Somali sovereignty.
A Pattern of Unequal Exchange?
The cumulative effect of these agreements—offering Turkey exclusive access to oil, gas, fisheries, minerals, and strategic infrastructure—has led to accusations that Somalia is effectively surrendering control of its natural wealth without receiving commensurate benefits.
Critics point to the lack of parliamentary oversight, limited transparency, and the absence of clear provisions for local job creation, technology transfer, or community development.
As one analyst put it, Turkey “has effectively outsourced Somalia’s economic sovereignty to Ankara.”
The Somali government has dismissed such criticism as “disinformation campaigns,” but questions raised by lawmakers, civil society, and international observers remain unanswered.
Fifteen years after Erdoğan’s humanitarian visit, Somalia finds itself at a crossroads—weighing the benefits of Turkish investment against the cost to its sovereignty and economic independence.
About the Author: Jama Ayaanle Feyte is a journalist, Horn of Africa security specialist, and political analyst focused on governance, conflict resolution, and regional integration.
