Exclusive Investigation Reveals Funding Disparity, Clan Favouritism, and Opaque Procurement in Strategic Infrastructure Initiative
By Rahma Ibrahim Nur
HARGEISA – A World Bank-funded road project intended to boost regional trade through Somaliland’s strategic Berbera corridor is facing mounting criticism over severe funding disparities, lack of transparency, and allegations that the initiative has been captured by clan-based political networks serving narrow elite interests rather than public good.
The $56 million Horn of Africa Infrastructure Integration Programme (SHIIP), launched in April 2021, promised to transform the region’s connectivity by financing a 25.7 km section of the Haleya–Ina Guha road – a vital secondary corridor linking the port of Berbera to the Ethiopian border. However, an investigation reveals that Somaliland – which hosts the critical infrastructure and was the primary reason for the project’s conception – has received a paltry $2.6 million for initial feasibility studies, representing less than five percent of total funds.
The remaining 80 percent of the financing, sources confirm, has been directed to Mogadishu for projects including drainage master plans, trunk line infrastructure, and airport development – a pattern of centralised resource capture that has persisted since 1960 and was precisely the reason Somaliland chose to secede from Somalia in 1991.
Funding Disparity Raises Questions About World Bank Priorities
The project’s Sub-Component 1.C allocated $50.7 million for economic corridors, with the Haleya–Ina Guha section described in project documents as critical for connecting the Berbera Corridor to destinations in eastern Ethiopia and eventually southern Somalia. The road already carries an average of 416 heavy trucks daily, with traffic projected to grow at 4.3 percent annually.
Yet despite the corridor’s strategic importance, the World Bank has only committed to financing the first 25.7 km lot of a planned 90 km road. The second lot, stretching to the Ethiopian border, is to be financed by a “future phase” – a piecemeal approach that critics say creates uncertainty and risks turning the partial investment into a stranded asset.
“The World Bank is treating Somaliland’s most critical infrastructure as an afterthought,” said a Hargeisa-based economic analyst who requested anonymity. “They have allocated crumbs for feasibility studies while Mogadishu receives millions for drainage systems. This is not development – it is institutionalised inequity.”
Political Appointments Reveal Clan Capture of Project
Concerns over the project’s governance have been heightened by the composition of President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdilahi Irro’s administration. Key ministerial roles overseeing the infrastructure portfolio – including the Minister of Transport and Road Development, the Minister of the Presidency, and the Minister of Environment and Climate Change – are all Garhajis clan appointees.
This concentration is not coincidental, analysts say, but reflects a calculated distribution of patronage. The Garhajis community originally funded the Ina-Guuxa road project themselves, hoping it would become a bustling dry-port. The World Bank’s decision to allocate a mere $2.6 million for feasibility studies on a road the community had already invested in represents an insult to ordinary citizens while allowing political elites to claim credit for “development.”
“The project serves the interests of a narrow political elite rather than the broader population,” said a former government official familiar with the procurement process. “We are seeing the same pattern that has plagued World Bank projects across Somalia – presidents installing clansmen at the helm of projects to direct contracts to favoured entities.”
The World Bank’s own documents acknowledge these risks, noting that “any perception of clan favoritism would tarnish the project’s image” . Yet investigators say the Bank has proceeded with a project structure that virtually guarantees such perceptions – and likely the reality – of favouritism.
Ogaden Alliance and Transborder Interests
The Garhajis-Ogaden axis that has formed around the Ina Guuxa project represents a troubling dimension of elite capture. The Ogaden clan, which inhabits the Somali region of Ethiopia, has historical ties to the Garhajis, creating a transborder kinship network with shared interests: the Ogaden seek improved access to Berbera port for their trade, while the Garhajis seek to control the infrastructure enabling that access.
This alliance has significant strategic implications. By positioning themselves to benefit from the corridor, Garhajis politicians and their Ogaden allies gain influence over trade flows between Ethiopia and Somaliland – a position that could translate into political leverage and economic rents.
Impact on Berbera Corridor and Regional Trade
The Berbera Corridor is the economic lifeblood of Somaliland and a critical alternative trade route for landlocked Ethiopia, which currently routes approximately 95 percent of its trade through Djibouti. Berbera’s share of regional container trade has increased from 9 percent to 14 percent by 2024, with DP World pledging up to $1 billion over the next decade to develop logistics infrastructure supporting the route.
A 2024 study estimated that transport cost reductions linked to Berbera’s expansion reached $8.4 million in a single year. Ethiopia’s Growth and Transformation Plan set a target to diversify 30 percent of trade from Djibouti to Berbera by 2025 – a target that is now in jeopardy.
“The World Bank’s inadequate investment in the secondary corridor threatens to undermine Berbera’s competitiveness,” warned a regional trade expert. “Each truck that does not travel down the Berbera Corridor is a truck that keeps Djibouti’s monopoly intact. The World Bank claims to support regional integration, but its actions suggest otherwise.”
The secondary corridor – Berbera-Hargeisa-Haleya-Ina Guuxa-Ethiopia – was intended to provide redundancy in case of disruptions to the main Berbera-Hargeisa-Wajaale route. Given that Ethiopia’s economic growth is reduced by 20-30 percent annually compared to coastal states due to high transit costs, redundancy is not a luxury but a necessity. Djibouti’s recent ban on Ethiopian multimodal operators has exposed what experts call a “profound and dangerous structural weakness” in Ethiopia’s trade architecture.
A properly funded secondary corridor would accelerate the shift of trade away from Djibouti; the World Bank’s approach delays it.
Transparency Deficit and Hidden Procurement
Perhaps most concerning is the complete lack of transparency regarding consultants and firms engaged for the project. The identity of consultants remains unknown, directly contravening Somaliland’s 35-year regulatory framework requiring competitive bidding for such projects.
Serious allegations have emerged regarding the selection process for World Bank-funded project coordinators, with complaints that selection criteria were “tailored to favor a pre-selected candidate” with “direct links to the Presidency.” Sources familiar with the process allege that the real aim is to “install a compliant Project Coordinator who will have significant influence over the allocation of multimillion-dollar procurement contracts” – allowing the appointee to direct contracts to entities favoured by their sponsors.
This opacity is not merely a procedural violation – it is a red flag for potential corruption. Data shows that only 29 percent of allocated funds for World Bank projects in Somaliland were actually spent in Q1 2025, with procurement delays and implementation bottlenecks undermining impact. Key projects like RAJO-KAAB registered zero execution.
Erosion of Somaliland’s Democratic Credentials
The Ina Guuxa controversy comes at a sensitive time for Somaliland’s democratic aspirations. President Irro’s promise of timely elections has been broken, with delays now underway. The “G+1” scandal – where every government official builds at least one new house financed through looted public funds – has become shorthand for systemic corruption.
Without legal recognition, Somaliland is excluded from major global financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF, forcing it to rely on Mogadishu-channeled funds – a relationship that reinforces the very dependency Somaliland seceded to escape. The World Bank’s decision to route funds through the Federal Government of Somalia rather than directly to Somaliland institutions legitimizes Mogadishu’s claim over the region, undermining Somaliland’s case for international recognition.
For Isaaq communities straddling the Somaliland-Ethiopia border, cross-border trade is not abstract – it is survival. The secondary corridor was meant to serve these communities. Instead, they receive a feasibility study for a road they already helped fund, while political elites position themselves to capture whatever contracts eventually materialize.
The Verdict: Development or Patronage?
The Haleya–Ina Guha road project, as currently structured, represents the worst of both worlds: it fails to deliver meaningful infrastructure while entrenching the very patronage politics that undermine Somaliland’s stability and economic potential.
A $153.8 million in unverified social payments flagged by Somalia’s auditor under World Bank-funded programs suggests a pattern of systemic waste and mismanagement. The Ina Guuxa project, critics say, is following the same trajectory.
For the World Bank, the choice is clear: insist on genuine transparency, competitive bidding, equitable funding distribution, and full commitment to the entire 90 km corridor – or continue funding a project that serves clan elites while leaving the people of Somaliland with yet another broken promise.
“The Horn of Africa does not need another development project that enriches consultants and politicians while communities wait,” said the Hargeisa-based analyst. “It needs genuine partnership, accountability, and investment that recognises the region’s strategic importance. The World Bank has an opportunity to correct course – but time, and trust, are running out.”
Key Facts at a Glance:
· Total Project Financing: $56 million (SHIIP Programme)
· Somaliland Allocation: $2.6 million (4.6%) for feasibility studies
· Mogadishu Allocation: ~$45 million (80%) for urban infrastructure
· Road Length: 90 km planned, only 25.7 km funded
· Traffic Volume: 416 heavy trucks daily, 4.3% annual growth
· DP World Commitment: $1 billion for Berbera logistics
· Funds Spent in Somaliland (Q1 2025): 29% of allocated budget
· Election Delays: Irro administration has postponed promised elections
