Eritrean-born scholar Dr. Habtom Ghebrezghiabher tells Politurco that Israel’s partnership with Somaliland could reshape the Horn of Africa—but warns that a security-only relationship would be a “big loss” for both sides.
POLITURCO INTERVIEW
Israel’s recognition of Somaliland has turned Hargeisa’s decades-long search for legitimacy into a major geopolitical development. The move intersects with Houthi attacks, Red Sea security, Ethiopia’s search for maritime access and intensifying regional competition.
Israel formally recognized Somaliland as an independent state on December 26, 2025. In May 2026, Israel received Somaliland’s first ambassador; a month later, Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdillahi made a historic state visit to Israel and opened an embassy in Jerusalem.
Politurco spoke with Dr. Habtom Mehari Ghebrezghiabher, an Eritrean-born sociologist specializing in authoritarianism, migration and Red Sea geopolitics. After fleeing Eritrea and enduring imprisonment and deportation in Kenya and Ethiopia, he crossed the desert from Sudan to Israel on foot in 2007. He recently received his doctorate from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
“The Houthis created an opportunity”
Politurco: What are Israel’s principal strategic objectives in developing relations with Somaliland?
Dr. Habtom Ghebrezghiabher: The Houthi threat forced Israel to look more seriously at the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Somaliland had sought Israeli recognition for decades, but it never happened. The Houthis created an opportunity for Somaliland—and Somaliland now gives Israel an opportunity to establish a presence in a region that has become vital to its security.
Somaliland has preserved its autonomy and democratic system for more than three decades. Israel may help it secure deeper engagement from Ethiopia, the UAE and perhaps the United States. But recognition is only one part of the issue. Israel must also share technology and connect Somaliland with international capital and markets. That requires a genuine long-term strategy rather than rhetoric.
Could Israel become Somaliland’s bridge to Washington?
Politurco: Could Israel help Somaliland obtain recognition from the United States?
Ghebrezghiabher: Israel has strong influence and advocacy networks in Washington, and Somaliland may benefit from the relationship between President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu. I cannot say recognition will come immediately, but it is possible. Trump has shown that he is willing to make unexpected diplomatic decisions. He could surprise us again.
Ethiopia, Eritrea and the struggle for the Red Sea
Politurco: Could Ethiopia also recognize Somaliland despite pressure from Turkey and Egypt?
Ghebrezghiabher: Ethiopia’s access to the Red Sea may be more important to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed than pressure arising from relations with Turkey or other states. Somaliland is willing to offer Ethiopia a coastal lease, giving Addis Ababa diversified maritime access and a greater role in Red Sea and Gulf of Aden security.
Recognition would carry political risks because of Ethiopia’s own federal system, but its strategic interests in Somaliland are enormous.
Politurco: Where does Eritrea stand?
Ghebrezghiabher: President Isaias Afwerki opposes Somaliland’s independence because he believes Somalia must remain unified. He also opposes a stronger American or Israeli presence in the Red Sea and sees Somaliland as a possible pathway for Israeli influence. That is why Eritrea has moved closer to Egypt and Somalia on this issue.
“The Red Sea is no longer Israel’s periphery”
Politurco: Is Israel seeking a long-term security presence near Bab el-Mandeb?
Ghebrezghiabher: After October 7, Israel initially viewed the Houthi campaign mainly as an effort to obstruct Red Sea shipping. The Houthis then demonstrated that missiles and drones launched from Yemen could directly threaten Israeli cities and even Ben Gurion Airport.
I find it difficult to imagine Somaliland granting Israel a conventional military base, but security and intelligence facilities are more plausible. Cooperation could include surveillance, intelligence collection and possibly access to Somaliland’s airspace in operations involving the Houthis.
Red Sea disruption has also affected Eilat and forced ships to take the longer route around southern Africa. The Red Sea is no longer Israel’s periphery; it is part of its immediate security environment.
More than an intelligence partnership
Politurco: Would the relationship survive if the Houthi threat declined?
Ghebrezghiabher: That depends on Israel’s commitment. Will it invest in Somaliland and build a durable partnership, or simply call Somaliland a friend and use it for monitoring? If the relationship is reduced to intelligence and surveillance, it will be a major missed opportunity.
Security cooperation must be accompanied by private investment, people-to-people ties and visible improvements in Somalilanders’ living standards. The strongest model would combine Gulf capital, Israeli technology and American diplomatic backing.
Africa’s growing importance
Politurco: What does Israel ultimately want from Africa?
Ghebrezghiabher: Israel needs Africa for three reasons: diplomacy, economics and security. Africa represents 54 votes at the United Nations. Its share of the global workforce and consumer population will continue to grow, while Israeli technology can contribute in agriculture, water and health.
Finally, the Horn of Africa and the countries bordering the Red Sea are now inseparable from Israel’s security. Somaliland may become the first major test of whether Israel can turn a moment of shared strategic interest into a lasting diplomatic, economic and human partnership.
Source:POLITURCO.COM
